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The purpose of this treatise, Massachusetts Bar 
Discipline: History, Practice, and Procedure, is to 
make the law and procedure related to bar 
discipline more accessible and understandable 
to the bench, the bar, and the public. While 
there have been several publications describing 
the Massachusetts bar discipline process, no work 
has described it in great detail while also analyz-
ing the sanctions it imposes, and more generally, 
the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct. 
Here, important cases are reviewed, rules are 
explained, and practical pointers abound. In this 
way, this treatise seeks to fill a perceived gap in 
access to important information—both the sub-
stantive and procedural law of bar discipline 
and the realities of practice before the Board of 
Bar Overseers—and to make that practice more 
transparent to participants and observers. 
The Board of Bar Overseers was established by 
the Supreme Judicial Court in 1974 as the regula-
tory and disciplinary authority for Massachusetts 
lawyers. The board consists of twelve volunteer 
members—eight attorneys and four public 
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solely from attorneys’ annual registration fees; 
no public funds support it.
Law
9 780692 162644
57500>
ISBN 978-0-692-16264-4
$75.00
MASSACHUSETTS BAR DISCIPLINE:
HISTORY, PRACTICE, AND PROCEDURE
BOARD OF BAR OVERSEERS
The purpose of this treatise, Massachusetts Bar Discipline: History, Practice, and 
Procedure, is to make the law and procedure related to bar discipline more 
accessible and understandable to the bench, the bar, and the public. We encour-
age all interested persons to use it. This book, however, is not a codiﬁcation of 
the law, nor is it a predictive guide to the development of the common law of 
bar discipline.
Vincent J. Pisegna, Chair
John J. Morrissey, Vice Chair
April C. English
Erin K. Higgins
Francis P. Keough
David B. Krieger, M.D.
Jeﬀrey R. Martin
David A. Rountree
Kevin P. Scanlon
Michael G. Tracy
July 2018
Massachusetts Bar Discipline:
History, Practice, and Procedure
The Board of Bar Overseers
of the Supreme Judicial Court
The Board of Bar Overseers of the Supreme Judicial Court
2018
The Board of Bar Overseers of the Supreme Judicial Court
99 High Street, Second Floor
Boston, MA 02110
Copyright © 2018 by The Board of Bar Overseers of the Supreme Judicial Court
Printed in the United States of America
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized 
in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter 
invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or 
retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.
The web addresses referenced in this book were live and correct at the time of the 
book’s publication but may be subject to change.
ISBN: 978-0-692-16264-4
eISBN: 978-0-692-16265-1
The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National 
Standard for Permanence of Paper for Publications and Documents in Libraries and 
Archives Z39.48-1992.
vDedication
This treatise is dedicated to Michael Fredrickson, who served as General Counsel to 
the Board of Bar Overseers from 1989 until his retirement in 2017. His institutional 
knowledge became a mainstay for board members who, as volunteers, often sought 
his guidance. Mike led the Office of General Counsel with intelligence, wit, and 
humility. This treatise represents an effort to continue and honor his legacy.

vii
Preface xiii
Acknowledgments xv
PART I INTRODUCTION 1
Chapter 1 A Brief History of Bar Discipline in Massachusetts 1
Chapter 2 The Actors in and the Structure of the Massachusetts
Disciplinary System 9
I. Introduction 9
II. The Participants in the Disciplinary Process 10
III. Participants Ancillary to the Disciplinary Process 15
Chapter 3 The Structure of the Disciplinary Process 18
Chapter 4 Discipline: Grounds and Types 35
I. Grounds for Discipline 35
II. Types of Dispositions, Including Formal Sanctions 35
III. Mitigating and Aggravating Factors 62
IV. Disability Inactive Status 62
PART II THE DISCIPLINARY PROCESS 63
Chapter 5 Complaints, Attorney and Consumer Assistance Program,
Investigation, and Stipulations 63
I. The Complaint 63
II. The Attorney and Consumer Assistance Program 66
III. The Oﬃce of Bar Counsel Investigation 68
IV. Resolution by Agreement After Investigation Complete 72
V. Complainant’s Right to Review 75
Chapter 6 Proceedings Before the Board of Bar Overseers 77
I. Introduction 77
II. The Petition for Discipline 77
III. Answer of the Respondent; Filing and Service 79
IV. Motions Before Filing an Answer 82
V. Selection of the Hearing Committee or the Special Hearing Oﬃcer 83
VI. Discovery 84
Contents
viii
Contents
VII. Motions After the Filing of an Answer 90
VIII. Mandatory Prehearing Conference 91
IX. The Hearing 93
X. Transcript of the Proceeding 103
XI. Posthearing Briefs 104
XII. The Committee Report 105
XIII. Special Hearing Procedures 106
PART III MISCONDUCT AND TYPICAL SANCTIONS 109
Chapter 7 Problems of Competence: Poor Work, Neglect, and Failure
to Communicate with a Client (Rules 1.1, 1.2(a) and (c), 1.3, and 1.4) 109
I. Introduction 109
II. The Nature of the Lawyer’s Responsibilities Regarding Competence 110
III. The Nature of the Lawyer’s Responsibilities Regarding Diligence 117
IV.  The Nature of the Lawyer’s Responsibilities Regarding Communication
  and Keeping a Client Informed 126
V. Additional Considerations for Matters Involving Allegations of Lack
  of Competence, Neglect of Client Matters, and Failure to Communicate 131
Chapter 8 Confidentiality (Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c)) 133
I. Introduction 133
II. The Nature of the Conﬁdentiality Duty and Sanctions for Violating
  the Duty 133
III. The Nature of the Conﬁdentiality Duty to Former Clients and Sanctions
  for Violating the Duty 145
IV. Exceptions to the Duty of Conﬁdentiality 147
Chapter 9 Allocation of Roles and Authority in the Attorney-Client
Relationship (Rules 1.2, 1.4, 1.13, and 1.14) 152
I. Introduction 152
II. The Rules Governing a Lawyer’s Responsibilities in Decision-Making
  for a Client and Sanctions for Related Misconduct 152
III. Allocation of Decision-Making Authority with Organizational Clients 167
IV. Allocation of Decision-Making Authority for Clients with Diminished
  Capacity 173
Chapter 10 Problems of Conflicts of Interest: Concurrent Conflicts,
Successive Conflicts, and Business Transactions (Rules 1.7, 1.8,
1.9(a) and (b), and 1.10) 179
I. Introduction 179
II. The Rules Governing Concurrent Conﬂicts of Interest 180
ix
Contents
III. The Rules Governing Successive Conﬂicts of Interest 202
Chapter 11 Other People’s Money (Rules 1.5 and 1.15) 212
I. Introduction 212
II. The Rules Governing Lawyer’s Fees 212
III. The Rules Governing Holding and Safekeeping Property 230
Chapter 12 Candor to the Court and Third Parties (Rules 3.3,
4.1(a), and 8.4(c)) 256
I. Introduction 256
II. The Nature of the Lawyer’s Responsibilities Regarding Candor
  Before a Tribunal 256
III. The Nature of the Lawyer’s Responsibilities Regarding Candor Outside
  of the Tribunal Setting 270
IV. The Nature of the Lawyer’s Responsibilities Regarding Deception
  Generally 276
Chapter 13 Other Limits on Zealous Advocacy (Rules 1.2(d), 3.1, 3.2, 3.4,
3.5, 4.2, and 4.3) 287
I. Introduction 287
II. Rules Governing the Scope of Representation and Permissible Claims 288
III. Rules Governing Limits on Litigation Tactics 295
IV. Rules Governing Limitations on Contact with Others 310
Chapter 14 Law Practice Management (Rule 1.17 and Rules 5.1 Through 5.7) 320
I. Introduction 320
II. The Nature of the Lawyer’s Responsibilities Regarding the Sale
  of a Law Practice 320
III. The Nature of the Lawyer’s Responsibilities Regarding Supervision
  Within a Law Practice 323
IV. The Nature of the Lawyer’s Responsibilities Regarding Unauthorized
  Practice of Law Within a Law Practice 331
V. Regulating the Lawyer-Nonlawyer Relationship When Delivering
  Legal Services 344
VI. The Nature of the Lawyer’s Responsibilities Regarding Restrictions
  on the Right to Practice 348
Chapter 15 Advertising and Solicitation (Rules 7.1 Through 7.5) 350
I. Introduction 350
II. The Nature of the Lawyer’s Responsibilities Regarding Advertising
  and Solicitation 350
III. Discipline for Violating Rules 7.1 Through 7.5 360
IV. Special Considerations for Using Social Media 365
xContents
Chapter 16 Prosecutor Duties (Rules 3.8, 4.2, and 8.4(c)) 367
I. Introduction 367
II. The Nature of the Prosecutor’s Special Responsibilities 367
III. The Limits on the Prosecutor’s Contact with Represented Persons 373
IV. Limits on the Prosecutor’s Use of Deception in Undercover Investigations 376
Chapter 17 Special Advocacy Duties (Rules 3.6, 3.7, and 3.9) 379
I. Introduction 379
II. The Nature of the Lawyer’s Special Advocacy Duties 379
PART IV MITIGATING AND AGGRAVATING FACTORS 387
Chapter 18 Mitigating and Aggravating Factors 387
I. Introduction 387
II. Mitigating Factors 388
III. Aggravating Factors 401
IV. Procedural Requirements for Mitigating and Aggravating Claims 407
PART V THE POSTHEARING PROCESSES 411
Chapter 19 Posthearing Review 411
I. Introduction 411
II. The Scope of Review 411
III. The Review Process When Neither Party Appeals 413
IV. The Review Process When a Party Appeals 414
V. Appeal from the Board Decision 417
VI. The Information and the Proceeding Following Its Filing 418
VII. Review of an Admonition Through an Expedited Hearing 422
PART VI DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES NOT REQUIRING AN EVIDENTIARY 
HEARING 425
Chapter 20 Reciprocal Discipline 425
I. Introduction 425
II. Reporting Sanctions to the Board of Bar Overseers 425
III. Out-of-State Discipline: Procedures and Standards 427
IV. Reciprocal Eﬀect of Discipline from a Tribunal 436
V. Reinstatement After Reciprocal Discipline 438
Chapter 21 Resignation and Disability Inactive Status 439
I. Introduction 439
II. Resigning While Under Disciplinary Investigation 439
III. Disability Inactive Status 445
xi
Contents
PART VII AFTER SUSPENSION OR DISBARMENT 452
Chapter 22 Duties and Restrictions After Suspension or Disbarment 452
I. Introduction 452
II. Required Steps After an Order to Cease Practice 452
III. Activities Not Permitted During the Suspension 462
IV. Conclusion 468
Chapter 23 Reinstatement: Standards and Procedures 469
I. Introduction 469
II. Reinstatement Procedures and Protocols 470
III. Requirements for Reinstatement 479
IV. Reinstatement After Administrative Suspension 491
PART VIII SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS AS A LICENSED PROFESSIONAL 494
Chapter 24 Attorney Registration, Trust Accounts, and the Clients’
Security Board 494
I. Introduction 494
II. Becoming and Remaining a Member of the Massachusetts Bar 494
III. IOLTA and Other Trust Account Obligations and Compliance 510
IV. The Clients’ Security Board and Fund 513
APPENDICES 517
Appendix A Sample Petition for Discipline 519
Appendix B  Sample Notice to Respondent Accompanying Petition
for Discipline 529
Appendix C Sample Answer to Petition for Discipline 531
Appendix D Form Stipulation for Discipline 543
Appendix E Form Affidavit of Resignation 547
Appendix F Sample Prehearing Conference Order 551
Appendix G Sample Information 557
Appendix H Sample Clerk’s Cover Sheet 559
Appendix I  Sample Affidavit of Compliance with Order of Suspension
or Disbarment with Attached Form Notices 561
Appendix J SJC Standing Order on Nondisciplinary Voluntary Resignation 578
Table of Cases 579
Table of Statutes, Rules, and Orders 598
Table of Secondary Sources 605
Subject Index 612

xiii
While there have been several publications describing the bar discipline 
process for violations of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct, no work 
has described that process in great detail while also analyzing the related sanc-
tions. The Oﬃce of General Counsel compiled, and the Supreme Judicial 
Court published, the case law of bar discipline in the Massachusetts Attorney 
Disciplinary Reports which, for a long time were only available in print. Indi-
vidual cases are available online; still, even if one had access to all the reports, 
it would be time-consuming and diﬃcult to research issues or legal principles, 
to say nothing about the procedural nuances of practice before the Board of 
Bar Overseers.
The treatise seeks to ﬁll this gap and make the practice more accessible to 
participants and observers by referencing, in a single volume, materials that had 
not previously been collected and analyzed. We begin with an overview of the 
history of bar discipline in the Commonwealth, followed by a discussion of the 
participants in, and structure of, the disciplinary process. Part II takes the reader 
through the steps of a typical bar discipline case from the initial complaint through 
the hearing. Part III discusses in detail some typical misconduct, including that 
related to competence, conﬁdentiality, safekeeping of trust property, and adver-
tising—and the sanctions typically imposed for it. This is followed by a discus-
sion in Part IV of conduct that may aggravate or mitigate the presumptive 
sanction. Lastly, Part V discusses the post-hearing process as well as reciprocal 
discipline, resignations, duties after suspension or disbarment, reinstatement, 
and registration. While this volume is not a dissertation on legal ethics per se, 
it addresses the Rules of Professional Conduct as they arise in bar discipline.
In addition, the treatise provides practice tips and other guidance to the 
parties and their counsel. This book is intended to be a history, a scholarly trea-
tise, and a practice guide. We hope that we have succeeded in this endeavor.
The Board of Bar Overseers
Preface
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1PART I
Introduction
chapter one
A Brief History of Bar Discipline in Massachusetts
1 In one case, involving allegations of jury tampering, the petition was brought “on behalf of a 
committee of citizens of the commonwealth,” who obtained the appointment of two “special com-
missioners” whose subsequent report led to a trial before a single justice. See Matter of Keenan, 
287 Mass. 577, 192 N.E. 65 (1934).
2 See, e.g., Matter of Cohen, 261 Mass. 484 (1928).
3 See, e.g., Matter of Carver, 224 Mass. 169, 170, 112 N.E. 877 (1916).
4 Matter of Greenhood, 168 Mass. 169, 46 N.E. 568, 575 (1897).
Before 1972, bar discipline in Massachusetts was administered, as it was 
throughout most of the country, on a county-by-county basis. A petition to re-
move a lawyer from the oﬃce of attorney at law was usually brought by a county 
bar association acting in a voluntary capacity1 in the Superior Court under Mass. 
Gen. Laws ch. 159 § 39. By statute, the attorney’s appeal from any adverse judg-
ment lies with the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC). 
By at least the beginning of the twentieth century, the SJC had made clear 
that bar discipline was a matter wholly committed to its “inherent jurisdiction”2
and that any permissible statutory incursions by the legislature were viewed as 
measures in aid of the Court’s exercise of that jurisdiction and did not limit the 
Court’s judicial power.3 The speciﬁc history and the details of those proceedings 
have less relevance to this book than the essential principles of bar discipline laid 
down in the Court’s early jurisprudence. 
The Court decided early on that removing an attorney from the bar was not 
a punishment but an action taken to preserve “the purity of the courts.”4 Re-
moval acknowledges that a “due regard to the dignity and decency of the court 
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does not permit such fellowship” with the ousted attorney.5 As a consequence, 
a disciplinary proceeding is neither civil nor criminal in nature,6 and the attor-
ney is not entitled to criminal or other special process, but only, as the Court 
later put it, to reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard.7
Subsequent decisions put further ﬂesh on the skeletal notion of the kind of 
notice, opportunity, and procedural safeguards a respondent attorney facing dis-
cipline was entitled to receive. While acknowledging that ethical codes adopted 
by bar associations “have no statutory force,” the Court nonetheless found that 
they were “commonly recognized by bench and bar alike as establishing whole-
some standards of professional action,” and their breach would warrant disci-
pline.8 In Matter of Mayberry,9 the Court determined that a preponderance of 
the evidence, not clear and convincing evidence, should be the standard of proof 
in disciplinary proceedings.10 In Matter of Santasuosso,11 the Court permitted the 
introduction in a bar discipline proceeding of evidence taken, but not the ﬁnd-
ings made, in a prior court proceeding.12 In Matter of Centracchio,13 the Court sug-
gested much of what became the current standard for assessing petitions for bar 
reinstatement. In all important respects, bar discipline was conducted in such a 
framework until the mid-1970s.
In 1970, the American Bar Association (ABA) published the report of its Spe-
cial Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, known as the Clark 
5 Id.
6 Matter of Randall, 93 Mass. (11 Allen) 473, 476 (1865).
7 See, e.g., Matter of Greenhood, 168 Mass. at 168, 46 N.E. at 575 (1897). See also Bar Ass’n of 
City of Boston v. Scoty, 209 Mass. 200, 203, 95 N.E. 402, 403 (1911) (“mere forms not aﬀecting 
[the] merits should not stand in the way of protecting the court and the public by appropriate 
action after a full hearing”).
8 Matter of Cohen, 261 Mass. at 487 (two-month suspension for engaging in lawyer advertising).
9 295 Mass. 155, 3 N.E.2d 248 (1936).
10 In this regard, Massachusetts is in the distinct minority: most states require, as the American 
Bar Association (ABA) recommends, that charges against a lawyer be established by clear and con-
vincing evidence. In 2005, the Massachusetts Bar Association (MBA) recommended to the SJC 
that the Court raise the standard of proof. See Massachusetts Bar Association, Report of 
the MBA Task Force on Lawyer Discipline—Protecting the Public: Reforming the 
Disciplinary Process (2005). The SJC did not make the suggested change. In 2008, the First 
Circuit held that the preponderance of the evidence standard does not oﬀend due process. Mat-
ter of Barach, 540 F.3d 82, 86–87 (1st Cir. 2008).
11 318 Mass. 489, 62 N.E.2d 105 (1945).
12 Bar Counsel v. Board of Bar Overseers, 420 Mass. 6, 11 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 291 (1995), the 
Court determined that the usual rules of issue preclusion applied to bar discipline proceedings, 
but see SJC Rule 4:01 § 1. Given that the standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence, 
issue preclusion based on prior civil adjudications is more prevalent in Massachusetts than in states 
that require clear and convincing evidence to prove misconduct.
13 345 Mass. 342 (1963).
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Committee after its head, former United States Supreme Court Justice Tom Clark.14
After undertaking the ﬁrst nationwide examination of lawyer disciplinary proce-
dures in the United States, the Clark Committee warned of a “scandalous sit-
uation” in professional discipline that required “the immediate attention of the 
profession.”15 The Clark Committee deplored a nationwide situation in which 
“most states conducted lawyer discipline at the local level with no professional 
staﬀ,” in a “secretive procedural labyrinth of multiple hearings and reviews,” and 
before local hearing oﬃcers with too little rotation and no assurance of objectiv-
ity.16 As a consequence, discipline was parochial, subject to cumbersome proce-
dures, and woefully underﬁnanced. Disciplinary staﬀ was usually unpaid and, in 
any event, given little access to training opportunities. While the ABA had adopted 
its Model Code of Professional Responsibility in 1969, there was little coordination, 
guidance, or research on the subject.
In the aftermath of the Clark Committee’s report, the ABA adopted its Model 
Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement. Model Rule 8, intended to address the 
problem of ﬁnancing bar discipline activities, provided as follows:
Requirement: Every lawyer admitted to practice before this court shall 
pay to the clerk of this court [state bar] an annual fee for each ﬁscal
year . . . to be set by the court [state bar] from time to time. The fee shall 
be used to defray the costs of disciplinary administration and enforce-
ment under these rules, and for those other purposes the board shall 
from time to time designate with the approval of this court.
The phrase “state bar” appeared in brackets because the drafters proposed 
the state bar as an alternative recipient of annual fees for those states in which the 
state supreme court delegated the disciplinary function to a mandatory state 
bar association. In fact, a majority of the supreme courts delegate this function.
On May 15, 1970, the Massachusetts Bar Association (MBA) petitioned the 
SJC to adopt such a rule. The MBA asked the Court to establish the MBA as a 
“uniﬁed self-governing entity to which every Massachusetts lawyer must belong 
and pay dues.”17 The MBA also sought to establish the Clients’ Security Board 
(CSB), which would be supported by the same funding.
14 Lawyer Regulation for a New Century: Report of the Commission on Evaluation 
of Disciplinary Enforcement (ABA, 1992).
15 Id. at xiv.
16 Id.
17 Herbert Wilkins, A Justice’s Perspective of the First Twenty Years of the Board of Bar Overseers,
79 Mass. L. Rev. 134, 134 (1994). Justice (later Chief Justice) Wilkins’s article oﬀers a fascinat-
ing glimpse into the Court’s deliberations on the matter.
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Most county bar associations supported the petition, but the Boston Bar 
Association (BBA) and the Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts (CLUM) stren-
uously opposed it. While the petition was still pending, the justices adopted the 
ABA’s Model Code of Professional Responsibility and Canons of Judicial Ethics, with 
some modiﬁcations to reﬂect local practice.18
The full Court heard oral argument on the uniﬁcation petition on Novem-
ber 4, 1972. The BBA argued against concentrating so much authority in the 
hands of a single bar association, while CLUM feared that individual lawyers 
might be obliged to provide funding to a bar association whose political stances 
they did not support. The concerns CLUM expressed proved prescient in view 
of the success of later constitutional challenges to the funding of the political 
activities of uniﬁed bars in other states.19
After argument, the Court appointed retired Justice R. Ammi Cutter to serve 
as special master and commissioner to hear additional arguments and to draft 
rules to achieve the objectives of the petition and, as a separate matter, to pres-
ent draft rules “which this court should consider if it were to order the uniﬁca-
tion of the bar.”20
On September 12, 1973, Cutter ﬁled his comprehensive report. He took 
no position on the uniﬁcation proposal, which remained squarely before the 
Court. Although, as Chief Justice Herbert Wilkins relates, the Court was ini-
tially inclined, by a vote of four to three, to adopt the uniﬁcation proposal, the 
Court later determined not to do so.21 It is Justice Wilkins’s recollection that 
the justices felt that uniﬁcation was too controversial a change to visit on the 
bar by so divided a vote. Hence, on June 3, 1974, the Court entered an order that 
promulgated rules, eﬀective on September 1, 1974, concerning bar discipline and 
clients’ security protection.22 Uniﬁcation was rejected. A nine-member Board of 
Bar Overseers (BBO) and a seven-member CSB would be created, and their 
members would be appointed not by the MBA but by the Court after receiving 
nominations from the various bar associations. The justices indicated that the 
question of uniﬁcation would remain on the Court’s docket for two years, but 
18 See Massachusetts Rules and Orders of the Supreme Judicial Court Rule 3:22 [here-
inafter SJC Rule], 359 Mass. 796 (1971).
19 See, e.g., Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1 (1990); Matter of the State Bar of Wis-
consin, 169 Wis. 2d 21 (1992).
20 Wilkins, supra note 17, at 135.
21 Id.
22 See Matter of McInerney, 389 Mass. 528, 530 n.5, 451 N.E.2d 401, 403 n.5 (1993) (describing 
the 1974 action).
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by then the BBO was fully operational, and no one suggested revisiting the uni-
ﬁcation issue.23
The procedural rules Justice Cutter originally recommended and that the 
Court adopted constituted a rule-bound set of procedures that departed from 
the loose notions of procedural due process that the Court had previously in-
voked. Those rules also diﬀer strikingly from those that apply today in two impor-
tant respects. First, decisions on whether to institute formal charges against a 
lawyer were delegated to hearing committees sitting in the county where the 
lawyer lived or practiced. Second, the rules could be read to grant accused law-
yers a trial de novo before the SJC on the charges against them.
In 1978, Justice Wilkins, sitting as a single justice, noted the apparent con-
fusion as to the nature and scope of the BBO’s and the Court’s review of hear-
ing committee ﬁndings.24 The BBO responded by proposing, and the Court 
adopted, an amendment that squarely provided that the Court would uphold 
the subsidiary facts the BBO found “if supported by substantial evidence.”25 In 
addition, the 1978 amendment empowered the BBO to adopt the hearing com-
mittee’s ﬁndings of fact or to “revise such ﬁndings which it determines to be erro-
neous, paying due respect to the role of the hearing committee as the sole judge 
of the credibility of the testimony presented at the hearing”26 (emphasis added).
Research has been unable to locate any documents or obtain any oral his-
tory that explains the reasons for granting such unusual authority to the hearing 
oﬃcers. The available record contains no clue whatsoever why the Court and the 
BBO departed from the Administrative Procedure Act in rejecting the “substan-
tial deference” standard administrative agencies used in reviewing the credibility 
determinations of hearing oﬃcers. Instead, the rule grants almost total deference 
to a hearing committee’s credibility determinations—deference the Court has 
since likened to that owed a jury’s ﬁndings on credibility.27 In any event, it is 
now clear beyond cavil that a hearing committee’s credibility determinations are 
sacrosanct and cannot be set aside unless wildly wrong or self-contradictory.28
23 Wilkins, supra note 17, at 136. As it happened, the MBA’s petition for uniﬁcation of the bar 
was the high-water mark of the drive for uniﬁed bars: it appears that no other supreme court has 
adopted a uniﬁed bar proposal since Massachusetts rejected the MBA’s petition in 1974.)
24 See Matter of Blais, 1 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 30, 34–35 (1978).
25 SJC Rule 4:01 § 8(6).
26 Id., now at SJC Rule 4:01 § 8(5).
27 See, e.g., Matter of Barrett, 447 Mass. 453, 463–465, 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 58, 70–72 (2006).
28 See, e.g., Matter of Wise, 433 Mass. 80, 16 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 416 (2000) (overruling a BBO 
ﬁnding that conﬂicted with a hearing committee’s credibility determination); Matter of Hachey, 
11 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 102, 103 (1995) (same). See also Matter of Barrett, 447 Mass. 453, 460, 
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Since 1978, three major sets of amendments have been made to SJC Rule 
4:01 and the BBO’s own administrative rules. The ﬁrst group of changes came 
hard on the heels of a 1992 federal district court decision striking down a Flor-
ida rule that prohibited complainants from making public the allegations or even 
the existence of grievances ﬁled against lawyers.29 Justice Wilkins, then chair of 
the Court’s rules committee, asked the BBO to make recommendations on what 
to do about the Court’s almost identical rule. In addition, he asked whether it 
was not time for Massachusetts, which generally conducted disciplinary pro-
ceedings in secret until after hearing and review by the full BBO, to join the 
thirty-two other states that opened the process to the public upon the ﬁling of 
formal charges. The BBO responded by recommending, and the Court subse-
quently adopted, fairly sweeping changes to the procedural rules, the more impor-
tant of which included: 
• Proceedings became public upon the ﬁling of formal charges. 
• The BBO was permitted to recruit and deploy laypersons to serve on 
hearing committees.30
• Two available private sanctions—the informal admonition and private 
reprimand—were merged into a single form of private discipline 
called admonition.
• The former public censure, which only the Court could impose, was 
replaced by the public reprimand, which the BBO imposes.
• Complainants and witnesses were granted absolute immunity for 
giving testimony and communicating with the BBO and bar counsel.
• The BBO and bar counsel were given discretion to make public dis-
closures regarding the pendency, subject matter, and status of an 
investigation in certain circumstances.
22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 58, 67 (2006) (hearing oﬃcers act like a jury on issues of credibility, 
which may not be set aside “unless the ﬁnding was wholly inconsistent with another implicit 
ﬁnding”) (quoting Matter of Hachey, supra). Cf. Matter of Strauss, 479 Mass. 294, 298–99, 33 
Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2018) (reiterating the “irreconcilable inconsistency” standard of 
review). In Matter of Hession, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 338 (2013), the single justice stated that 
the hearing committee’s “decision to credit the respondent’s testimony that what he said was true 
does not deserve deference as a credibility determination,” 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. at 350 n.8. That 
determination seemingly rested on the single justice’s determination that the issue in question 
was not one of credibility but of suﬃciency of evidence.
29 Doe v. Supreme Court of Florida, 734 F. Supp. 981 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
30 The BBO itself has had laypersons among its twelve members since 1978, and it typically has 
four lay members.)
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• Respondents who fail to cooperate with bar counsel’s investigation 
would be administratively suspended until they did.
• Bar counsel was granted authority to close meritless grievances unilat-
erally so long as complainants could review the closing upon appeal to 
a single BBO member.
The second group of changes to Rule 4:01 was eﬀective July 1, 1997, and 
included the following major amendments:
• Imposing administrative suspension for failure to respond to a sub-
poena and other defaults.
• Adding a special hearing oﬃcer as a sole adjudicator at the discretion 
of the BBO chair.
• Creating the disability inactive status and new proceedings to deter-
mine incapacity.
• Implementing major changes to the procedure to follow after disbar-
ment, suspension, resignation, or transfer to disability inactive status.
• Reinstating lawyers suspended from practice for a year or less without 
the need for a hearing.
• Allowing lawyers suspended for more than a year to ﬁle a petition for 
reinstatement three months before the reinstatement eligibility date.
The third group of major rules changes occurred eﬀective September 1, 
2009, following recommendations by a task force of the MBA31 as well as an 
evaluation by ABA representatives.32 The principal changes included: 
• Replacing the presumption that disciplinary hearings would be held 
in disciplinary districts based on the lawyer’s home county. Instead, 
the venue would be the oﬃces of the BBO unless the BBO chair 
found another venue convenient for the parties and witnesses. 
• Permitting the use of probation or diversion in place of traditional 
discipline where appropriate.
• Giving the bar counsel further authority not to entertain frivolous 
complaints.
31 Report of the MBA Task Force on Lawyer Discipline, supra note 10.
32 American Bar Association, Report on the Lawyer Regulation System of Massachusetts (2005).
8Introduction
• Allowing lawyers to contest an admonition at a private, expedited 
hearing before a single BBO member, with any appeals limited to 
BBO review, not the Court.
• Amending the BBO’s rules to allow respondents additional discovery 
in formal proceedings.
In 1992, the BBO encouraged its general counsel to ﬁnd pro bono counsel to 
represent indigent respondents, an undertaking now codiﬁed in the BBO’s rules 
in section 3.4(d).33  The same year, the BBO voted unanimously to recommend 
that the Court fund the operations of Lawyers Concerned for Lawyers (LCL) 
out of the registration fees lawyers paid. The Court accepted the recommenda-
tion, and the LCL later expanded its mission beyond providing mental health 
services to lawyers to include law oﬃce management services.
33 Rules of the Board of Bar Overseers § 3.4(d) (2011).
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The Actors in and the Structure of the Massachusetts 
Disciplinary System
I. INTRODUCTION
The Massachusetts disciplinary processes include several diﬀerent partici-
pants and entities, each of which has a deﬁned role in regulating Massachusetts 
attorneys and protecting consumers of legal services. This chapter introduces the 
following participants and describes their respective roles and responsibilities:
Board of Bar Overseers (BBO): has primary responsibility for administer-
ing the system of lawyer discipline in Massachusetts. It appoints 
hearing committees or hearing oﬃcers consisting of volunteers (law-
yers and laypersons) to hear and make recommendations to the 
board in contested disputes about lawyer discipline. The BBO also 
hears appeals and recommends (and sometimes imposes) discipline.
BBO Hearing Officers: hear and make recommendations to the board in 
contested discipline cases, usually in committees of three. Sometimes 
a single “special hearing oﬃcer” is assigned to a case. For simplicity, 
this chapter will refer to “hearing committees,” which includes spe-
cial hearing oﬃcers. 
Office of the General Counsel of the BBO (OGC or, specifically, the General 
Counsel): provides legal advice and guidance to the BBO and hear-
ing oﬃcers. 
Office of the Bar Counsel (OBC or, specifically, the bar counsel): investigates 
and prosecutes lawyers accused of misconduct.
The Attorney and Consumer Assistance Program (ACAP): a division of the 
OBC that in some matters handles initial case intake, as well as 
referral of more serious matters for investigation and possible 
prosecution.
Supreme Judicial Court (SJC): is responsible for approving recommenda-
tions for suspension or disbarment and deciding appeals involving 
lesser sanctions, usually through single justices but sometimes as a 
full court.
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1 The SJC Rules do not ﬁx the size of the board: “The Board shall consist of such number of mem-
bers as the court shall determine from time to time.” Massachusetts Rules and Orders of 
the Supreme Judicial Court, Rule 4:01 § 5(1) [hereinafter SJC Rule].
This chapter also describes the following important ancillary organizations:
Clients’ Security Board (CSB): manages and distributes monies in the 
Clients’ Security Fund to victims who lost money because of the dis-
honest conduct of a bar member acting as an attorney or ﬁduciary.
Board of Bar Examiners (BBE): oversees applicant admission to the Mas-
sachusetts bar, including deciding questions of moral ﬁtness.
Lawyers Concerned for Lawyers (LCL): assists attorneys and others in the 
profession who are impaired in their ability to function as a result of 
personal, mental health, addiction, or medical problems.
Law Office Management Assistance Project (LOMAP): assists Massachusetts 
attorneys in establishing responsible and eﬀective oﬃce practices.
Massachusetts IOLTA Committee: advises attorneys with respect to the 
receipt, safeguarding, accounting, and distribution of client funds.
This chapter also oﬀers a schematic of how the Massachusetts disciplinary 
processes are structured and how the actors’ work ﬁts together.
II. THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE DISCIPLINARY PROCESS
A. Board of Bar Overseers
The BBO is a volunteer body appointed by the SJC under authority estab-
lished by SJC Rule 4:01. Traditionally, the BBO has twelve members: four lay-
persons (including, usually, a doctor) and eight attorneys.1 The BBO includes a 
chair and a vice-chair, who have special responsibilities, described in the follow-
ing paragraphs. The BBO administers and oversees the entire disciplinary pro-
cess, but it is separate from (if often confused with) the OBC. In essence, the OBC 
prosecutes lawyers, while the BBO serves as the tribunal that decides disputed 
matters surrounding discipline. While the BBO does appoint the bar counsel
with the approval of the SJC and approves the hiring of the OBC lawyers, the 
bar counsel serves at the pleasure of the SJC.
The BBO serves several discrete functions. It assembles a group of volun-
teer lawyers and laypersons to serve as hearing oﬃcers and assigns them to sit 
as hearing committees or individual hearing oﬃcers to preside over the hear-
ings that arise in disputed matters. The BBO then serves as the reviewing body 
11
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(either as a full board or in panels of three members each) to hear and decide 
objections to reports from hearing committees and to review hearing reports 
where there has been no objection to determine whether the board will adopt 
the committee’s ﬁndings, conclusions, and recommendation for discipline. Some 
BBO decisions are binding and ﬁnal (for example, public reprimands, if no fur-
ther appeal occurs). BBO decisions that are not ﬁnal must be reviewed by a sin-
gle SJC justice. The distinction is that the BBO may issue public reprimands on 
its own and approve or reject proposed admonitions, but the SJC must enter 
more serious discipline, such as suspension and disbarment orders. The BBO 
members also, again in panels of three, hold evidentiary hearings in selected 
matters, including petitions for reinstatement and hearings arising from a law-
yer’s conviction of a crime. On occasion, a BBO member will sit as part of a hear-
ing committee.
BBO members have the authority to issue hearing subpoenas at the request 
of the OBC or a respondent.2 The chair of the BBO (or the vice-chair in the 
chair’s absence) has special duties beyond that of other members. For instance, 
the chair hears certain motions during hearing proceedings. If a party ﬁles a 
prehearing motion for a protective order, for issue preclusion, or to stay or defer 
prosecution, or if a respondent ﬁles a motion to dismiss, the BBO chair or a des-
ignee must rule on those matters.3 In addition, BBO members periodically are 
assigned “duty review” for a given week. Duty review involves, among other tasks, 
issuing subpoenas when a party requests, approving a charging memorandum if 
the OBC decides to proceed with discipline, approving admonitions, and review-
ing complainant objections after the OBC has decided to close a grievance with-
out disciplinary proceedings.
The SJC appoints BBO members, who serve staggered terms of four years 
each. BBO members may be reappointed for one more four-year term;4 that 
term limit does not bar reappointment after the member has been oﬀ the BBO 
for at least one year. The Court’s consistent practice since at least the 1990s, how-
ever, has been to decline requests for appointment to a second four-year term 
except for lay members of the BBO.
Finally, the BBO has established standing committees through which to 
conduct its work: the Rules Committee, the Budget and Finance Committee, 
and the Personnel Committee have responsibilities apparent from their titles. 
2 SJC Rule 4:01 § 22(1). The chair of a hearing panel or a special hearing oﬃcer may also issue 
subpoenas.
3 See Rules of the Board of Bar Overseers §§ 3.18(a)(2), 3.18(b) [hereinafter BBO Rules].
4 SJC Rule 4:01 § 5(2).
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(The Rules Committee traditionally includes at least one nonvoting representa-
tive of the OBC.) The Hearing Oﬃcer Committee is responsible for recruiting, 
selecting, and training hearing oﬃcers. The Technology Committee supervises 
the board’s eﬀorts to modernize and maintain its technology systems.
B. BBO Hearing Officers
The BBO itself does not typically conduct evidentiary hearings in discipli-
nary disputes.5 Those hearings are conducted by volunteer hearing oﬃcers, either 
in committees of three (usually two lawyers and a layperson) or as a special hearing 
oﬃcer (always a lawyer). The BBO appoints such individuals to serve as hearing 
oﬃcers for three-year terms, renewable once. Later chapters describe the hear-
ing process and the powers and responsibilities of hearing oﬃcers. In 2017, the 
BBO had a roster of 141 hearing oﬃcers, of whom 40 were not attorneys.
C. Office of the General Counsel of the BBO
The OGC serves as the in-house counsel to the BBO and advises and assists 
the volunteer hearing oﬃcers on behalf of the board. In ﬁscal 2018, the OGC 
consisted of four attorneys—a general counsel and three assistant general coun-
sels, along with two administrative staﬀ members. The OGC is responsible for 
advising the BBO, which is its client, and, on the board’s behalf, the hearing oﬃ-
cers. OGC lawyers attend hearings and BBO meetings, assist in drafting hear-
ing decisions and memoranda, research legal matters to assist the BBO and the 
hearing oﬃcers to decide disputes, and otherwise ensure that the processes oper-
ate according to the SJC’s and the BBO’s rules. The OGC also serves the BBO’s 
administrative needs by scheduling matters, distributing notices, and maintain-
ing case records.
The OGC is entirely different and separate from the OBC and does not offer legal 
advice to respondent lawyers. The General Counsel does, however, endeavor to ﬁnd 
counsel to represent respondents who cannot aﬀord to hire a lawyer and who do 
not have a professional liability insurance policy that covers the defense of dis-
ciplinary grievances. Depending on the circumstances, the attorneys the Gen-
eral Counsel locates may oﬀer legal services to the respondent at a reduced fee 
or on a pro bono basis.
5 Disciplinary proceedings may be heard by a panel of BBO members, see SJC Rule 4:01 § 5(3)(e); 
BBO Rules § 3.19(a), but the BBO’s practice since 2008 has been to assign hearing committees or 
a special hearing oﬃcer.
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D. Office of Bar Counsel: The Bar Counsel
The OBC, established by SJC Rule 4:01 § 7, functions independently of 
the BBO, despite much popular misconception. Its responsibility is “to inves-
tigate all matters involving alleged misconduct by a lawyer coming to [the Bar 
Counsel’s] attention from any source.”6 Besides investigating such allegations, 
the OBC disposes of complaints that do not warrant disciplinary proceedings, 
proposes and obtains BBO approval for (private) admonitions and diversions, ﬁles 
petitions for (public) discipline, and then prosecutes the matters that proceed 
toward possible discipline. The OBC consists of the bar counsel and a staﬀ of 
assistants who are the lawyers who carry out the responsibilities of the oﬃce. 
In 2017, the oﬃce included the bar counsel, twenty-one assistant bar counsels, 
and several investigators.
The chief bar counsel, known as “the bar counsel,” is appointed by the BBO, 
with the approval of the SJC.7 The bar counsel hires the assistant bar counsel 
with “the concurrence” of the BBO.8
In addition to its duties as investigator and prosecutor of discipline com-
plaints, the OBC serves an educational role as well. It regularly issues, and posts 
on the BBO website, articles and columns advising lawyers about ethical issues 
that might cause trouble for the unwary.9 Through its telephone “helpline,” the 
oﬃce also oﬀers informal, nonbinding advice to attorneys on ethical problems 
and provides continuing legal education training for attorneys. 
E. Attorney and Consumer Assistance Program
The OBC receives and investigates complaints about lawyers, some of which 
are relatively minor or do not involve professional misconduct. To resolve such 
complaints, streamline the OBC’s work, and oﬀer prompt assistance to com-
plainants, the OBC created ACAP in 1999. ACAP, an oﬃce within the OBC, 
initially addresses the overwhelming majority of complaints about a lawyer. 
ACAP staﬀ may contact both the complainant and the lawyer to determine 
whether the complaint can be resolved through some informal action. If so, no 
6 SJC Rule 4:01 § 7(1). The only exceptions to that authority are allegations of misconduct 
against bar counsel or one of her assistants or against a member of the board or its staﬀ, which 
the board investigates itself. See BBO Rules § 5.6(c)(2).
7 SJC Rule 4:01 § 5(3)(b).
8 Id.
9 Articles, Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers, https://www.massbbo.org/Ethics (last 
visited May 1, 2018).
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formal complaint ﬁle is opened, and presumably the complainant receives 
some measure of satisfaction. If the complaint alleges more serious, credible 
allegations of misconduct, the complainant may ﬁle a formal complaint with 
the OBC, or the OBC will initiate the disciplinary process itself. Chapter 5 
discusses the ACAP process in more detail.
F. Supreme Judicial Court: Single Justices
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has ultimate authority over law-
yer discipline in the Commonwealth and has well-deﬁned duties in matters 
involving individual lawyers and their discipline. The SJC has administrative over-
sight of the BBO, appoints BBO members, and approves the appointment of the 
bar counsel, who serves at the pleasure of the SJC. But more directly relevant, the 
SJC plays a central role in disciplining lawyers in the Commonwealth. It does so 
in two ways (or perhaps three, depending on how one looks at the arrangements).
First, the SJC must approve all sanctions beyond a public reprimand, even 
if the respondent lawyer and the OBC agree with the sanction the BBO pro-
poses.10 Typically, that approval process goes through a single justice assigned 
to hear the matter. The single justice may or may not accept the disposition the 
parties agreed upon. Second, in all cases where the parties do not agree with 
the BBO’s proposed sanction, the SJC hears the case, initially by a single jus-
tice.11 The single justice has the discretion to refer the matter to a full panel of 
the SJC in lieu of deciding the matter.12 Any party aggrieved by the single 
justice’s decision may appeal that ruling to the full Court. A pilot program 
instituted in 2009, and accepted as a permanent procedure in 2015, spells out 
procedures for such appeals to the full Court.13 Chapter 9 discusses the specif-
ics of these review procedures.
10 SJC Rule 4:01 § 8(6).
11 Id. The rule does not state that a single justice will review the matters, but such is the Court’s 
practice.
12 The referral to the full Court by a single justice is seen in a limited number of cases. See, e.g.,
Matter of Balliro, 453 Mass. 75, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 30 (2009) (“The present bar discipline 
matter is before us on reservation and report, without decision, from a single justice of this 
court”); Matter of Finneran, 455 Mass. 722, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 177 (2010) (“This bar dis-
cipline matter comes before the court on a reservation and report by a single justice, without 
decision”); Matter of Wainwright, 448 Mass. 378, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 749 (2007) (“A single 
justice reserved and reported the cases to the full court”).
13 See Order Establishing a Modiﬁed Procedure for Appeals in Bar Discipline Cases (April 1, 
2009); SJC Rule 2:23, 471 Mass. 1303 (March 9, 2015, eﬀ. April 1, 2015).
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III. PARTICIPANTS ANCILLARY TO THE DISCIPLINARY PROCESS
A. Clients’ Security Board
The CSB is a separate administrative agency that has indirect relevance to 
the Massachusetts disciplinary process and hence to this book’s subject matter. 
It uses funding from the registration fees lawyers admitted in the state pay to 
reimburse clients and other victims who have lost money as the result of defal-
cations by members of the bar acting as lawyers or ﬁduciaries, including misap-
propriation, embezzlement, or conversion of money or property, but not for 
damages caused by legal malpractice.14 The CSB’s website oﬀers the best 
description of what it is and what it does:
The Clients’ Security Board consists of seven members of the bar of the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts who are appointed by the Supreme 
Judicial Court to serve as public trustees of the Clients’ Security Fund. 
A portion of the annual fees paid by each member of the bar is allo-
cated to the Fund. Board members manage and distribute the monies 
in the Fund to members of the public who have sustained a ﬁnancial 
loss caused by the dishonest conduct of a member of the bar acting as 
an attorney or a ﬁduciary. Board members receive no ﬁnancial com-
pensation for their time and eﬀorts in performing their duties as Board 
members.15
The CSB works in the same oﬃces as the BBO but is not part of the BBO. 
It is an independent entity overseeing the Clients’ Security Fund. Chapter 14 
discusses the work of the CSB in more detail.
B. Board of Bar Examiners
The BBE is diﬀerent and separate from its similarly sounding agency, the 
BBO. The BBE consists of ﬁve members appointed by the SJC to examine the 
character and ﬁtness of all applicants to the bar of the Commonwealth. The BBE 
both oversees the administration of the bar examination and ensures that persons 
who apply to become lawyers in this state meet all of the qualiﬁcations necessary 
for that privilege, including investigating the moral character of all applicants. 
14 SJC Rule 4:04 § 1.
15 Clients’ Security Board, Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers, https://www.massbbo
.org/ClientsSecurityBoard (last visited May 1, 2018).
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The BBE recommends applicants to the SJC for admission to the bar and may 
recommend that an applicant be denied admission to the bar. The BBE’s role inter-
sects with the disciplinary process in two ways. First, some respondents end up 
before the BBO because they submitted false or improper materials to the BBE 
in their application to the Massachusetts bar.16 Second, other respondents receive 
BBO sanctions that include submitting to a BBE review of their character and 
rehabilitation before they can resume practicing law in the state.17 While the SJC 
appoints the BBE members and approves its rules, the BBE itself was created 
by the legislature, not the SJC.18
C. Lawyers Concerned for Lawyers
The LCL is a private, nonproﬁt Massachusetts corporation and a recognized 
federal Section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organization. Its operations are governed 
by SJC Rule 4:07. The LCL assists lawyers, judges, law students, and their fam-
ilies who are experiencing any level of impairment in their ability to function 
as a result of personal, mental health, addiction, or medical problems. The LCL 
provides assistance with problems such as career and family diﬃculties, depres-
sion, and stress as well as alcoholism, substance abuse, gambling, and all other 
forms of addiction.19 The organization’s funding comes primarily from a por-
tion of the registration fees the BBO collects each year from Massachusetts 
lawyers.20 The LCL oﬀers all of its services conﬁdentially and free of charge.21
The LCL plays a critical role in the disciplinary process. When the BBO 
or the SJC determines that a lawyer’s misconduct is the result of an impair-
ment or similar diﬃculty that the LCL might help address, the resulting sanc-
tion order may include a requirement that the respondent seek assistance from 
the LCL. At least forty disciplinary reports between 1999 and 2017, inclusive, 
included some reference to the LCL.
16 See, e.g., Matter of Betts, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 44 (2010) (suspension for failure to disclose misde-
meanor charges on petition for admission); Matter of Voykhansky, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 719 
(2008) (suspension after false claim of having obtained an undergraduate degree before law school).
17 See, e.g., Matter of Resnick, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 544 (2010).
18 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 221 § 35.
19 About Us, Lawyers Concerned for Lawyers, http://www.lclma.org/about/who-we-are/
#sthash.JD8TNe7L.dpuf (last visited May 1, 2018).
20 In 2015, the LCL received 7.5% of the annual registration fees the BBO collected. In FY 2013, 
its operating revenue was approximately $1.25 million.
21 The LCL assures users of strict conﬁdentiality. Confidentiality, Lawyers Concerned for 
Lawyers, http://www.lclma.org/about/conﬁdentiality/ (last visited May 1, 2018). In addition, 
Rule 1.6(d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct deems any participant in the LCL (or any similar 
organization) to be a client for purposes of conﬁdentiality protection.
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D. Law Office Management Assistance Program
LOMAP is a program within the LCL. LOMAP’s mission is to educate law-
yers about law oﬃce management and to assist individual lawyers establish eﬀec-
tive oﬃce practices. It provides training classes, individual consultations, and many 
resources on its website.22 All of its services are free of charge.
As with the LCL generally, LOMAP plays an important role in the disci-
plinary system. Many instances of misconduct, and especially those involving 
client neglect or mismanagement of client funds and trust accounts, can be attrib-
uted to a lawyer’s failure to establish eﬀective oﬃce management systems. Dis-
cipline reports often include a requirement that a lawyer work with LOMAP 
as a condition of reinstatement or maintaining the right to practice. From 2006 
through 2017, at least forty-seven disciplinary reports have referenced LOMAP.
E. Massachusetts IOLTA Committee
The Supreme Judicial Court created the Interest on Lawyers Trust 
Account (IOLTA) program in 1985. The committee consists of nine members 
of the bar who are appointed by the SJC. The funds deposited in a pooled 
IOLTA account pay the interest to the committee and funds legal services to 
the disadvantaged and projects that improve the administration of justice. The 
committee conducts training programs for attorneys and banks, publishes edu-
cational materials on the safekeeping property rules, works with the BBO staﬀ 
to ensure that attorneys have adequate procedures for the handling of client 
funds, and ensures that attorneys ﬁll out the required information under the 
IOLTA section of the registration materials.
22 About, Massachusetts Law Office Management Assistance Program, http://
masslomap.org/about/ (last visited March 6, 2018).
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The Structure of the Disciplinary Process
In simpliﬁed terms, the following is how the disciplinary process develops 
from initial intake to ﬁnal disposition. Each of the steps discussed below is 
treated more fully in later chapters.
1. The Office of the Bar Counsel (OBC) begins investigation. Under 
the provisions of Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) Rule 4:01 § 7, the 
OBC is responsible for investigating complaints of attorney miscon-
duct, as well as questions of misconduct that come to the OBC’s 
attention in the absence of a complaint, such as through news media 
or court decisions.
2. The Attorney and Consumer Assistance Program (ACAP) reviews 
and investigates. ACAP is the intake division of the OBC. It attempts 
to identify and resolve minor complaints against attorneys without 
docketing them as formal OBC complaints. Traditionally, ACAP 
can resolve about 85% of the matters it receives without opening 
formal complaints. In those instances, the matters are simply closed. 
When a complaint involves allegations of serious misconduct, such 
as the mishandling of client funds, ACAP urges the complainant to 
ﬁle a formal written complaint (called a “request for investigation”) 
with the OBC to trigger an investigation for possible prosecution.
3. Formal investigation initiated. If ACAP does not resolve the matter, 
or if it involves allegations of serious misconduct but the complainant 
takes no further action, ACAP may refer the matter to the OBC for 
investigation. Upon determining that a matter should be investigated, 
the OBC notiﬁes the attorney in writing of the complaint.
4. Respondent replies, and the OBC investigates further. The attor-
ney is required to respond to the OBC’s letter stating that an investi-
gation has commenced and asking the attorney to cooperate in the 
OBC’s investigation. Failure to do so may constitute a separate act of 
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1 Massachusetts Rules and Orders of the Supreme Judicial Court r. 4:01 § 3 [herein-
after SJC Rule].
2 SJC Rule 4:01 § 22.
3 A complainant may request that the BBO review an OBC decision not to prosecute a matter. 
The BBO’s decision, however, is ﬁnal, with no right on the part of the complainant to seek court 
review of the decision. Chapter 4, Section II(B) discusses the rights of the complainant in more 
detail.
4 SJC Rule 4:01 § 10.
5 SJC Rule 4:01 § 8(1)(a).
misconduct and can result in immediate administrative suspension.1
Upon receiving the respondent’s answer, the OBC determines 
whether further investigation is required and, if so, what is involved. 
That can include, but is not limited to, the following: asking the 
respondent for additional documents, including pleadings, bank 
records, etc.; issuing subpoenas to third parties, such as banks and 
insurance companies; and having the respondent appear at the OBC’s 
oﬃce and give a recorded statement under oath.2
5. The OBC recommends a disposition. What happens next depends 
on the outcome of the OBC’s investigation. Note that, generally, the 
complainant has no role or voice in this process.3 Moreover, the OBC 
is not required to terminate an investigation because a complainant 
wishes to withdraw the complaint or because the parties have settled 
the underlying matter.4
   After the OBC investigates the matter, it recommends a dispo-
sition, which, in most instances, requires a Board of Bar Overseers 
(BBO) member’s review and approval or modiﬁcation. The OBC’s 
recommendation may include the following actions:
• Closing: The complaint may be closed for the following 
reasons: The rules of professional conduct were not violated, 
the violation did not warrant discipline, it occurred more than 
six years earlier, or no violation could be proven. Sometimes a 
ﬁle is closed with a warning to the respondent to employ 
better practices, such as better communications with clients.5
• Deferment: The OBC can, with the approval of the BBO or 
the SJC, defer a matter where the material allegations are 
substantially similar to those in a pending civil, criminal, or 
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administrative proceeding, or to a bar disciplinary proceeding 
pending in another jurisdiction.6 Alternatively, a ﬁle may be 
closed temporarily, subject to the outcome of pending litigation 
in which similar issues are being decided.
• Diversion: The OBC can recommend diversion to an alterna-
tive educational, remedial, or rehabilitative program as an option 
for resolving a complaint. This requires an agreement between 
the OBC and the respondent and is memorialized in a formal 
diversion agreement, which the BBO approves or modiﬁes.7
• Admonition: Upon approval by a BBO member, the OBC may 
impose an admonition, or warning, for relatively minor 
disciplinary violations.8 If so, the identity of the attorney 
receiving the admonition is not made public. Except when an 
admonition is imposed by agreement, the administration of an 
admonition is a unilateral act by the OBC after BBO review 
and approval.9 If an attorney seeks to contest the admonition, 
the attorney must ﬁle timely objections with the BBO and 
request a hearing. The matter is then assigned to a special 
hearing oﬃcer (SHO) and proceeds under a separate rule for 
expedited hearings.10 The proceedings are conﬁdential.11
• The BBO accepts stipulations for public discipline: If the attorney 
and the OBC agree that a violation warranting public disci-
pline has occurred and they also agree on a sanction, they can 
submit a stipulation, or condition, to the BBO for approval 
before or after ﬁling formal disciplinary charges. The submis-
sion includes a petition for discipline (either one drafted for 
submission along with the stipulation because the stipulation 
was reached before formal proceedings began, or the petition 
on ﬁle, or as amended if the stipulation is reached after formal 
6 Rules of the Board of Bar Overseers § 2.13 [hereinafter BBO Rules]; SJC Rule 4:01 § 11.
7 SJC Rule 4:01 § 8(1).
8 BBO Rules § 2.11; SJC Rule 4:01 §§ 8(1)(c)(i), 8(2).
9 SJC Rule 4:01 §§ 8(1)(c)(i), 8(2)(c).
10 BBO Rules §§ 2.11, 2.12; SJC Rule 4:01 §§ 8(2)(c), 8(4).
11 BBO Rules § 2.12(2); SJC Rule 4:01 § 8(4).
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charges have been ﬁled) and an answer and stipulation of the 
parties.12 If the stipulation is approved, no hearing is required. 
If the agreement is for a public reprimand, the BBO issues the 
public reprimand.13 Since only the Court can suspend or dis-
bar a lawyer, if the agreement is for suspension or disbarment, 
then an Information consisting of the administrative record is 
ﬁled in the Supreme Judicial Court for Suﬀolk County, which 
is also referred to as the “single justice session.”14
• Rejected stipulations: If the BBO votes to reject a stipulation, 
this vote is a preliminary determination, and the BBO states 
its reasons for its initial rejection.15 The parties are then given 
an opportunity to brief the issues, and thereafter the BBO 
issues a ﬁnal vote in which, if rejecting the stipulation, it states 
the reasons for its rejection and determines the appropriate 
recommended disposition. Stipulations are either binding on 
the parties or “collapsible,” meaning not binding.16 If a bind-
ing stipulation is rejected, the matter is decided by the single 
justice, with the BBO advocating its recommended disposi-
tion and the parties their stipulated disposition.17 If the BBO 
rejects a collapsible stipulation, the parties can amend their 
pleadings and the matter is then scheduled for a disciplinary 
hearing before a BBO hearing committee.18
• Commencement of formal proceedings: If the matter is not other-
wise disposed of and, in the OBC’s judgment, warrants public 
discipline, the OBC requests approval from a BBO member 
to submit a proposed draft petition for discipline to commence 
formal disciplinary proceedings.19 The BBO does not need to 
approve a petition arising from a conviction in which the Court 
remanded the matter to the BBO under SJC Rule 4:01 § 12(4).
12 BBO Rules § 3.19(d); SJC Rule 4:01 §§ 8(1)(c)(iii), 8(3)(c).
13 SJC Rule 4:01 § 8(1)(c).
14 Id.
15 BBO Rules § 3.19(e); SJC Rule 4:01 § 8(3).
16 BBO Rules § 3.19(e).
17 Id.
18 BBO Rules §§ 3.19(d), (e); SJC Rule 4:01 § 8(3)(c).
19 SJC Rule 4:01 §§ 8(1)(c)(iii), 8(3)(a).
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6. Respondent served with petition for discipline. A petition for 
discipline arises in one of three contexts: 
• After the OBC’s investigation, under BBO Rules § 3.13(a)(2), 
including reciprocal discipline in another jurisdiction under SJC 
Rule 4:01 § 8(16). 
• Following the respondent’s conviction of a serious crime, under 
BBO Rules § 3.13(a)(1).
• When the parties stipulate to a disposition and accompany their 
stipulation with a petition for discipline. 
     Formal disciplinary proceedings commence with the OBC ﬁling 
an approved petition for discipline with the BBO.20 The petition must 
be suﬃciently clear and speciﬁc to inform the respondent attorney of 
the charges of alleged misconduct and must enumerate the speciﬁc 
rules of professional conduct the respondent is alleged to have 
violated.21 The matter is later tried before a hearing committee, 
hearing panel, or SHO appointed for that purpose.22 They and the 
BBO cannot recommend or impose discipline for violating a rule 
that was not charged in the petition for discipline.23 If several 
separate charges of unethical conduct are pending against an attor-
ney, those matters may be brought in a single proceeding. In such a 
case, a recommendation for discipline based upon all of the charges 
is appropriate.24 Related charges against more than one attorney may 
also be consolidated into a single proceeding.25
     The petition for discipline is served upon the respondent with an 
accompanying cover letter informing the respondent that an answer 
must be ﬁled with the BBO, with a copy served upon the OBC, 
within twenty days.26 The respondent is also informed that the 
allegations in the petition will be deemed admitted if no answer is 
ﬁled, that failure to ﬁle an answer can result in an administrative 
20 BBO Rules § 3.13(a); SJC Rule 4:01 § 8(3)(a).
21 BBO Rules § 3.14; SJC Rule 4:01 § 8(3)(a).
22 SJC Rule 4:01 § 8(3)(b).
23 See Matter of Orfanello, 411 Mass. 511, 556, 7 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 220, 226 (1992); Matter of 
Brower, 1 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 45, 47 (1979).
24 See Matter of Saab, 406 Mass. 315, 326–27, 6 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 278, 289–90 (1989).
25 See Matter of Pike, 408 Mass. 740, 6 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 256 (1990).
26 BBO Rules § 3.15 provides that failure to ﬁle an answer constitutes a default and the matter 
is then referred to the BBO to determine the sanction.)
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suspension,27 and that the BBO’s general counsel will assist the 
respondent in obtaining counsel, on a pro bono basis, if necessary.
7. Respondent answers. The respondent has twenty days to ﬁle an 
answer to the petition for discipline.28 The answer must be in writing 
and must state fully and completely the nature of the defense. The 
answer must also speciﬁcally admit or deny, in detail, each material 
allegation of the petition and state clearly and concisely the facts and 
matters of law relied upon. General denials are not permitted. Facts 
alleged in the petition are deemed admitted when not denied in the 
answer in accordance with this section.29
   In addition to responding speciﬁcally to the allegations in the 
petition for discipline, the respondent’s answer must include any facts 
in mitigation and may request that a hearing be held on the issue of 
mitigation. The failure to include facts in mitigation constitutes a 
waiver of the right to present evidence of those claims.30
   If the respondent ﬁles no answer within the time limit established 
by the SJC Rules, the BBO promptly issues a notice of default, notifying 
the respondent that the allegations of the petition have been deemed 
admitted and that the opportunity to present evidence in mitigation has 
been waived.31 Unless the OBC requests a hearing on matters in aggra-
vation, the BBO will then consider the matter of disposition on the basis 
of the admitted charges. The BBO may order the respondent and the 
OBC to submit briefs on disposition.32 A respondent may, within twenty 
days after the notice of default, ﬁle a motion for relief from default. For 
good cause shown, the BBO chair may order the default removed and 
permit the respondent to ﬁle an answer to the petition for discipline.33
8. Respondent may submit a motion to dismiss. A respondent may 
ﬁle a motion to dismiss under BBO Rules § 3.18(b), but unlike such 
motions in civil litigation, it does not delay, or stay, the proceedings. 
Given that a BBO member reviews each petition for discipline before 
27 SJC Rule 4:01 § 8(3)(a).
28 BBO Rules § 3.15(a)(1); SJC Rule 4:01 § 8(3)(a).
29 BBO Rules § 3.15(d).
30 BBO Rules § 3.15(f ).
31 SJC Rule 4:01 § 8(3)(a).
32 BBO Rules § 3.15(a).
33 BBO Rules § 3.15(h).
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it can be docketed and served on a respondent, motions to dismiss 
are rarely, if ever, granted. The BBO chair, or a BBO member that 
the chair designates, decides the respondent’s motion to dismiss.34
9. The OBC and respondent exchange discovery. Within twenty days 
following the ﬁling of an answer, the OBC and the respondent must 
exchange the names and addresses of all persons having knowledge 
of facts relevant to the proceedings. In addition, within thirty days of 
ﬁling of an answer, the OBC and the respondent may make reason-
able requests for nonprivileged information and evidence relevant to 
the charges or the respondent, and the OBC and the respondent 
shall, within ten days, comply with these requests.35 There are no 
express provisions for interrogatories, requests for production, or 
requests for admissions. Discovery of work product is not permitted.
10. Depositions approved. Discovery depositions are allowed only upon 
satisfaction of a high standard of substantial need and require advance 
BBO approval.36 However, testimonial depositions of witnesses who 
are unavailable to attend a hearing may be taken under less stringent 
standards.37
11. Case assigned to a hearing committee. After a petition and answer 
have been ﬁled with the BBO, the BBO assigns the case to a hearing 
committee or an SHO. A hearing committee usually consists of two 
lawyers and one public member, with a lawyer designated as the 
chair. An SHO is always a lawyer and sits alone. Most hearings are 
held in Boston; however, if the respondent’s oﬃce is located near 
Springﬁeld, Worcester, or southeastern Massachusetts, the case is 
usually assigned to a hearing committee from that area and held in 
that area.38 If a case arises from a conviction, it is assigned to a 
hearing panel consisting of three members of the BBO. 
12. Prehearing conference scheduled. In discipline cases, a prehearing 
conference is scheduled to expedite the orderly presentation of the 
34 BBO Rules § 3.18(b)(1).
35 BBO Rules § 3.17(a).
36 BBO Rules § 4.9.
37 BBO Rules §§ 4.10, 4.15.
38 BBO Rules § 3.20.
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evidence and testimony at the hearing and may address such issues as 
discovery, the exchange of exhibits, limits on the number of witnesses, 
scheduling of motions (including motions for protective orders, motions 
to preclude issues, and motions in limine), and potential evidentiary 
issues, such as witnesses testifying remotely by video conferencing. A 
prehearing conference is held in a conviction case only if a party requests 
such a conference within thirty days after the answer is ﬁled. Except 
for good cause shown, a prehearing conference is not held prior to 
an expedited disciplinary hearing on appeal from an admonition.39
   The prehearing conference is usually conducted by the hearing 
committee chair; other committee members may attend—this is 
optional but welcome—and telephone participation is acceptable.
  The OBC, the respondent, and the respondent’s counsel, if any, must 
attend the prehearing conference. The prehearing conference sets the 
schedule for all prehearing events, such as motions, and ﬁnalizes the 
hearing dates. Dates are set for the parties to exchange their proposed 
list of witnesses (including expert witnesses and expert witness dis-
closures) and their proposed hearing exhibits. If a respondent intends 
to introduce medical or psychological evidence in mitigation, a sched-
ule for the nature and timing of such disclosure and related matters 
is established. The parties are given a deadline by which to agree 
upon the admissibility of exhibits and to submit the agreed exhibits, 
along with any fact stipulations, to the committee. The hearing dates 
and various deadlines are then memorialized in a Prehearing Con-
ference Order, the template for which is provided to the parties 
before the prehearing conference.
13. Pro se respondents. Where a respondent appears pro se before the 
hearing committee, the committee encourages the respondent to 
obtain counsel. If the respondent cannot aﬀord counsel, the respon-
dent is referred to the BBO’s general counsel, who will, if requested, 
try to ﬁnd counsel willing to undertake the representation on a pro 
bono or reduced-fee basis.
14. Prehearing motions are heard. Once a case has been assigned to a 
hearing committee, SHO, or hearing panel, all motions are decided 
by the hearing committee chair, except for motions for protective 
39 BBO Rules § 3.23(a).
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orders, motions by a respondent to dismiss some or all of the charges, 
motions for issue preclusion, motions for discovery depositions, and 
motions to stay or defer, which are referred directly to the BBO.40
15. The OBC and respondent agree to stipulations. Before the hearing, 
the OBC and the respondent may agree to certain facts that may 
aﬀect the need for a full evidentiary hearing. Under BBO Rules § 3.38, 
the parties are bound by their stipulations, but the stipulations are 
not binding upon the hearing committee, the BBO, or the SJC. The 
hearing committee has the authority to conduct a hearing or an 
inquiry to satisfy itself as to the accuracy of the factual stipulation.
16. Exhibits agreed upon. As part of the prehearing order, the parties are 
required to exchange, and to attempt to agree upon, proposed exhib-
its. They are required to submit a uniﬁed set of agreed exhibits and 
lists of contested exhibits; a party objecting to an exhibit is required 
to state the reasons why. Exhibits oﬀered for limited purposes must 
be so designated. The originals of the agreed exhibits are ﬁled with 
the BBO; copies of the agreed exhibits are provided to the hearing 
committee members several days before the ﬁrst hearing date.41
17. Hearing subpoenas requested. Unlike in superior court or federal 
district court, the parties cannot issue their own subpoenas. The par-
ties must request hearing subpoenas in advance, including subpoenas
duces tecum; the BBO prepares and issues the subpoenas.42
18. Disciplinary hearing conduct. As noted in Step 11, “Case Assigned 
to a Hearing Committee,” a disciplinary hearing usually takes place 
before a three-person hearing committee or, in some circumstances, 
before an SHO sitting alone. If the case arises from a criminal 
conviction, a three-person hearing panel composed of BBO mem-
bers hears it. Regardless, an assistant general counsel is present at the 
hearing to provide legal advice on behalf of the BBO to the commit-
tee, panel, or SHO and to handle the exhibits, of which the BBO 
takes custody.
40 BBO Rules §§ 3.19(a)(1), 3.18(b), 3.18(c), 3.22, 5.12.
41 BBO Rules §§ 3.25, 3.40.
42 BBO Rules §§ 4.5(a)–(c); SJC Rule 4:01 § 22.
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   A hearing may proceed in the absence of one committee or panel 
member. The absent member may participate fully in all committee 
deliberations so long as the hearing transcript is available to the absent 
member.43 Hearings are generally conducted in accordance with the 
provisions of Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 30A pertaining 
to adjudicatory hearings (the Massachusetts Administrative Proce-
dure Act), except where otherwise inconsistent with the BBO Rules.44
   The respondent must attend the disciplinary hearing. A respon-
dent who fails to appear may be administratively suspended from the 
practice of law.45
   The hearing committee, panel, or SHO can participate actively 
in the conduct of the hearing and usually does. The committee, panel 
members, or SHO can limit the number of witnesses to avoid unduly 
repetitious testimony but can also subpoena witnesses and documents 
on their own.46 They usually ask questions of the witnesses who testify.
19. Burden of proof and presentation of the evidence. The OBC bears 
the burden of proof, except on aﬃrmative defenses and matters in mit-
igation, where the respondent bears the burden of proof. The standard 
of proof is the preponderance of the evidence. The OBC must “initi-
ate the presentation of evidence”; the OBC opens ﬁrst and closes last.47
Both parties have the right to present evidence, cross-examine, object, 
argue, and make appropriate motions.48 Except as otherwise provided 
by the BBO Rules, admissibility is generally governed by the Massa-
chusetts Administrative Procedure Act (Chapter 30A).49 The hearing 
committee, panel, or SHO rules on the admissibility of evidence.50
20. Witnesses and transcripts. All witnesses are sworn and give testi-
mony under oath, which is transcribed by a court reporter. For hearings 
conducted at the BBO’s hearing room, it is possible for a witness to tes-
tify by video conferencing or similar technology, but the notary pub-
lic who swears in the witness must be with the witness to verify his 
43 BBO Rules § 3.7(c).
44 BBO Rules § 3.2.
45 SJC Rule 4:01 § 3(2).
46 BBO Rules §§ 3.30, 4.5(d).
47 BBO Rules § 3.28.
48 BBO Rules § 3.29.
49 Id.
50 BBO Rules § 3.40.
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or her identity. The transcripts are part of the record.51 A respondent 
may obtain a copy of the transcript from the court reporter for a fee.52
21. Evidence submitted after the hearing ends. Before the close of a 
hearing, the hearing committee, panel, or SHO can, in its discretion, 
agree to accept additional evidence at a later date, but no later than 
than ten days before the ﬁling and service of the posthearing briefs.53
After the close of the formal hearing, the record may be reopened at 
the request of one of the parties pursuant to written petition, or sua 
sponte by the committee, panel, SHO, or BBO, at its discretion.54
22. Posthearing submissions. Within thirty days after receiving the last 
hearing transcript, the parties must ﬁle their briefs and proposed 
ﬁndings of facts and requests for conclusions of law (together 
referred to as the PFCs).55 The preferred PFC format is similar to 
the statement of facts in support of a motion for summary judgment: 
a series of numbered paragraphs, with every proposed ﬁnding 
supported by a reference to a speciﬁc citation to evidence in the 
record. PFCs, factors in aggravation and mitigation, and sanctions 
should cite supporting case law. BBO Rules § 3.44 sets forth the 
speciﬁc requirements for the content and format of the PFCs.
23. Hearing report filed. After the PFCs are ﬁled, the hearing commit-
tee, panel, or SHO meets, typically with the assigned assistant gen-
eral counsel, to discuss its ﬁndings, conclusions, and, if appropriate, a 
recommended sanction. The committee, the panel, or the SHO exer-
cise authority as an independent fact-ﬁnder; the assigned assistant 
general counsel supports them in that role, but is not a “fourth mem-
ber” of the committee or panel. These deliberations are privileged 
and are not subject to discovery. However, after the hearing commit-
tee, panel, or SHO reaches its decisions, the assistant general counsel 
prepares a draft report for consideration. Once the report is ﬁnal-
ized, it is ﬁled with the BBO, served on the parties, and becomes 
51 BBO Rules §§ 3.33, 3.36.
52 BBO Rules § 3.35.
53 BBO Rules § 3.31.
54 BBO Rules §§ 3.31, 3.59, 3.60, 3.61.
55 BBO Rules § 3.43.
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part of the record.56 The contents of the report are speciﬁed by BBO 
Rules § 3.47.
24. BBO reviews the hearing report (with no appeal). While either 
party may appeal the ﬁndings, conclusions, or sanction recommen-
dation, the BBO automatically reviews the hearing report even with-
out an appeal. If the BBO makes a preliminary determination not to 
aﬃrm some or all of the hearing committee, hearing panel, or SHO 
decisions, it gives the parties appropriate notice and an opportunity 
to ﬁle briefs. The BBO may then proceed to take such action as it 
could have taken had an appeal been ﬁled.57
25. BBO reviews the hearing report (after an appeal). If a party objects 
to any part of the hearing report (ﬁndings of fact, conclusions of law, 
and/or sanction recommendation), it must ﬁle its brief within twenty 
days of service of the report. Note that the brief must be ﬁled within 
twenty days, not simply a “notice of appeal” as occurs in superior 
court. The opposing party must ﬁle its brief within twenty days after 
the service of the appellant’s brief. The appellee may ﬁle a cross-
appeal in its brief; if it does so, the original appellant has twenty days 
to ﬁle a brief in opposition to the cross-appeal. No further brieﬁng is 
allowed without BBO permission. A party who does not ﬁle a brief 
on appeal is deemed to have waived all objections. The BBO may 
extend these deadlines.58 Section 3.51 of the BBO Rules speciﬁes 
the contents and form of the brief. Oral argument is granted only if 
requested, and a party who does not ﬁle a brief waives its right to 
request oral argument.59
   On appeal, the BBO reviews and may adopt the ﬁndings of fact 
made by the hearing committee, hearing panel, or SHO or revise any 
ﬁndings that it determines to be erroneous. However, the BBO must 
pay due respect to the role of the hearing committee, hearing panel, 
or SHO as the sole judge of the credibility of the testimony presented 
at the hearing. The BBO may adopt or modify the recommendation 
of the hearing committee, hearing panel, or SHO. Whenever the 
56 BBO Rules §§ 3.46, 3.48, 3.49.
57 BBO Rules § 3.52.
58 BBO Rules § 3.50(a).
59 BBO Rules §§ 3.50(a)–(b).
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BBO modiﬁes the ﬁndings or recommendations, it must state its 
reasons in its vote or in a separate memorandum.60
   The BBO may decide to conclude the proceedings with an admo-
nition (which is private) or with a public reprimand of the respondent. 
If so, the BBO serves a copy of the vote and memorandum (if any) on 
the parties. The vote and memorandum constitute the admonition or 
public reprimand.61 If an admonition is imposed, the BBO and the 
OBC must keep the fact of the receipt of an admonition conﬁdential; 
however, in response to speciﬁc inquiry as to the outcome of a public 
hearing that has been concluded by admonition, the BBO or the OBC 
may disclose that an admonition was imposed.62 The admonition is also 
subject to limited disclosure under SJC 4:01 § 20(2).
26. Further proceedings: appealing a dismissal, admonition, or public 
reprimand. If either the respondent or the OBC does not accept the 
BBO’s determination to conclude a matter by dismissal, admonition, 
or public reprimand, the aggrieved party can demand that the BBO 
ﬁle an Information with the Court. The demand must be in writing 
and ﬁled with the BBO within twenty days after the date of service of 
the BBO’s vote and memorandum. This time limit cannot be extended.63
27. Further proceedings: the BBO recommends suspension or disbar-
ment. Only the Court can suspend or disbar a lawyer. Therefore, if 
the BBO decides to conclude the matter with suspension or disbar-
ment (or if the respondent or the OBC ﬁles a written demand for 
the ﬁling of an Information; see the preceding paragraph), the BBO 
ﬁles an Information in the single justice session of the Court (called 
the Supreme Judicial Court for Suﬀolk County), together with the 
entire record of its proceedings.64
28. Proceedings before the single justice. Once the Information is ﬁled 
with the Court, it is assigned to a single justice to impose, modify, or 
reject the proposed discipline. Generally, before rendering a decision, 
60 BBO Rules § 3.53; SJC Rule 4:01 § 8(5).
61 BBO Rules § 3.56(a).
62 BBO Rules § 3.56(c); SJC Rule 4:01 § 8(5).
63 BBO Rules § 3.57(a).
64 BBO Rules § 3.58; SJC Rule 4:01 § 8(6).
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the single justice schedules a hearing where the OBC and the respon-
dent appear and argue. Alternatively, the single justice may remand 
the matter to the BBO or report it to the full bench. The subsidiary 
facts the BBO found, and contained in its report ﬁled with the 
Information, must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.65
29. Appealing the single justice decision. Appealing the decision of a 
single justice in a bar discipline case proceeds under SJC Rule 2:23. 
The aggrieved party may appeal to the full Court for review of the 
order or judgment. A notice of appeal must be ﬁled with the clerk of 
the Supreme Judicial Court for Suﬀolk County within ten days of 
entry of the ﬁnal order. An appeal does not stay any order or judg-
ment of suspension or disbarment unless the single justice or the full 
bench so orders.66
   The matter goes to the full bench for consideration based on the 
record that was before the single justice, which includes the Informa-
tion, the hearing report, the BBO memorandum, and the single 
justice’s decision or memorandum. The appellant can ﬁle a prelimi-
nary memorandum, not to exceed twenty pages, demonstrating why 
there has been an error of law or abuse of discretion by the single 
justice; that the decision is not supported by substantial evidence; 
that the sanction is markedly disparate from the sanctions imposed 
in other cases involving similar circumstances; or that for other 
reasons the decision will result in a substantial injustice.67 Based on 
this record, the full Court may aﬃrm, reverse, or modify the order or 
judgment of the single justice without oral argument and without a 
reply memorandum from the appellee. Alternatively, the full Court 
may direct the appeal to proceed in the regular course, in which case 
the parties are permitted to ﬁle full briefs in conformance with the 
Rules of Appellate Procedure and the case is scheduled for oral argu-
ment.68 In almost all instances, the full Court decides the matter on 
the record and the Rule 2:23 preliminary memorandum of the 
appellant and renders its decision without full brieﬁng and even 
65 SJC Rule 4:01 § 8(6).
66 SJC Rule 2:23(a).
67 SJC Rule 2:23(b).
68 SJC Rule 2:23(c).
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without requesting a reply from the appellee to the Rule 2:23 
preliminary memorandum.
30. Resignation. At any time during the disciplinary process after the 
OBC has begun an investigation, a lawyer under investigation may 
resign from the bar by submitting an aﬃdavit of resignation.69 Chap-
ter 21, Section II(A) describes the resignation process in more detail. 
The Court may accept the aﬃdavit of resignation as a disciplinary 
sanction or, more commonly, may also disbar the lawyer in connection 
with the resignation (called a “resignation and disbarment”). Either 
way, the lawyer cannot apply for reinstatement for eight years.70
31. Temporary suspension. If the OBC learns that a lawyer poses a 
“threat of substantial harm” to clients or prospective clients (which 
usually means that the lawyer is currently misappropriating client 
funds), or if the lawyer’s whereabouts are unknown, the OBC can ﬁle 
a petition with the Court for the lawyer’s “immediate suspension” 
under SJC Rule 4:01 § 12A. The Court then gives notice to the 
respondent lawyer and schedules a hearing on whether to suspend 
the lawyer “as protection of the public.” A section 12A temporary 
suspension does not replace a disciplinary suspension, and the OBC 
is expected to ﬁle a petition for discipline under SJC Rule 4:01 § 8(3) 
within a reasonable time.71
32. Administrative suspension. If during the course of the OBC’s 
investigation, a respondent does not (or ceases to) cooperate with the 
OBC’s investigation, the OBC may, after notice to the lawyer of the 
consequences of such noncooperation, petition the Court for the 
respondent’s administrative suspension.72 If the respondent thereaf-
ter cooperates with the OBC’s investigation, the respondent can ﬁle 
an aﬃdavit of compliance and request reinstatement.73 In addition, 
the failure to cooperate with the OBC’s investigation can be separate 
grounds for bar discipline.74
69 SJC Rule 4:01 § 15; BBO Rules § 4.1.
70 SJC Rule 4:01 § 18(2).
71 See Matter of Ellis, 425 Mass. 332, 337 (1997).
72 SJC Rule 4:01 §§ 3(1), 3(2).
73 SJC Rule 4:01 § 3(3).
74 Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(g).
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33. Disability inactive status. At any time during the disciplinary pro-
cess (although it can also occur apart from it), a lawyer may, by Court 
order, be placed on disability inactive status. This can occur in one of 
three contexts: (1) a lawyer has been judicially declared incompetent 
or committed to a mental hospital after a court hearing, placed in a 
mental hospital, or by court order placed under a guardianship or 
conservatorship; (2) a lawyer under OBC investigation admits to 
lack of capacity to practice law; or (3) a lawyer under OBC investi-
gation alleges the inability to assist in the defense due to a mental or 
physical disability.75 An application is then made to the Court to 
place the lawyer on disability inactive status; as discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 21, the mechanisms depend on whether the OBC 
or the lawyer disputes the allegation of disability.76 Once placed on 
disability inactive status, a lawyer cannot practice law and, moreover, 
cannot petition for transfer back to active status for at least one 
year.77 Disability status stays, but does not terminate, any pending 
investigation or bar disciplinary proceedings, which may resume 
once the lawyer returns to active status.78
34. Petition for reinstatement. As discussed in more detail in Chapter 23, 
a lawyer can be suspended from practicing law in Massachusetts 
anywhere from thirty days to indeﬁnitely (which in Massachusetts 
means a minimum suspension of ﬁve years), to disbarment (which in 
Massachusetts means a minimum suspension of eight years).79 To be 
reinstated after a suspension depends on the type and length of the 
suspension.
35. Reinstatement from a six-month or less suspension. A lawyer sus-
pended for six months or less can be reinstated without a hearing by 
ﬁling with the Court and serving upon the OBC an aﬃdavit, the 
required contents of which are described in more detail in Chapter 23, 
Section II.80
75 SJC Rule 4:01 §§ 13(1)–13(3).
76 SJC Rule 4:01 § 13(4).
77 SJC Rule 4:01 § 13(6).
78 SJC Rule 4:01 § 13(4)(f ).
79 SJC Rule 4:01 § 18.
80 SJC Rule 4:01 § 18(1)(a).
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36. Reinstatement from a six-month to a year suspension. A lawyer 
suspended for more than six months but not more than one year can 
be reinstated without a hearing by taking and passing the Multi-State 
Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE) and complying 
with the terms for reinstatement from the shorter suspension.81
   These “automatic reinstatements” come with two caveats under 
SJC Rule 4:01 § 18(1): First, automatic reinstatement is forfeited if 
the suspended lawyer fails to ﬁle the required aﬃdavit within six 
months after the suspension period ends.82 Second, the Court may 
require a reinstatement hearing for a suspension of one year or less, a 
condition that is required for a suspension of more than one year 
(including an indeﬁnite suspension or disbarment).
37. Reinstatement from a suspension of more than one year. A lawyer 
who has been suspended for more than a year (including suspensions 
referred to as “a year and a day”), as well as a lawyer who has been 
indeﬁnitely suspended or disbarred, must petition the Court for 
reinstatement. (This also applies to a lawyer who has been suspended 
for a shorter term, but where the Court required a reinstatement 
hearing.) SJC Rule 4:01 § 18(4) summarizes the required contents 
of the petition for reinstatement, which Chapter 23 discusses in 
more detail. The Court refers reinstatement petitions to the BBO, 
which convenes a hearing panel of three BBO members to hear the 
petition. The petitioner bears the burden of proving, by a preponder-
ance of evidence, that he or she possesses (1) the moral qualiﬁcations 
and (2) the competency and learning in law required for admission 
to practice law in this Commonwealth, as well as (3) that resuming 
the practice of law will not be detrimental to the integrity and 
standing of the bar, the administration of justice, or to the public 
interest. After conducting a hearing, the panel submits a report to 
the BBO, which then acts upon it and submits its report to the 
Court. The ﬁndings and subsidiary facts the BBO ﬁnds are upheld if 
supported by substantial evidence.83
81 SJC Rule 4:01 § 18(1)(b).
82 SJC Rule 4:01 §§ 18(1)(a)–(d).
83 SJC Rule 4:01 § 18(5).
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Discipline: Grounds and Types
I. GROUNDS FOR DISCIPLINE
This chapter explains the distinctions among the several kinds of discipli-
nary sanctions and describes how and when the respective sanctions should apply. 
While the American Bar Association (ABA) has published its model Standards 
for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions,1 the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) has tradition-
ally not followed the ABA standards but has developed its own sanction stan-
dards. Part III, comprising Chapters 7 through 17, discusses various types of 
lawyer misconduct in more detail and the sanctions that a lawyer might expect 
for engaging in that misconduct.
II. TYPES OF DISPOSITIONS, INCLUDING FORMAL SANCTIONS
This section describes the possible dispositions available within the disci-
plinary system, from the most lenient to the most severe.
A. Attorney and Consumer Assistance Program Informal Resolution
The Oﬃce of the Bar Counsel (OBC) maintains a unit within its program 
known as the Attorney and Consumer Assistance Program (ACAP). ACAP’s 
mission is to attempt to resolve the less-critical problems or complaints that 
the OBC receives and to mediate a satisfactory resolution to many of the prob-
lems that otherwise would be dismissed under the standards. 
Almost every communication about a lawyer that the OBC receives starts 
with ACAP, which serves as the OBC’s central intake system.2 ACAP is staﬀed 
1 American Bar Association, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions § 2.7 (2012) 
[hereinafter ABA Standards].
2 Anne Kaufmann, Five Years of ACAP (2004), https://bbopublic.blob.core.windows.net/web/f/
acap5.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2018).
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3 ACAP, https://www.massbbo.org/Who_We_Are_OBC_ACAP#OBC (last visited March 11, 
2018) (“A complaint form will be sent immediately [to the person who has complained about 
the lawyer] where serious unethical conduct may be involved.”).
4 Massachusetts Office of the Bar Counsel of the Supreme Judicial Court, Annual 
Report to the Supreme Judicial Court, Fiscal Year  [hereinafter Bar Counsel  
Annual Report] at 3 (“ACAP resolved more than 91% of inquiries without referral for inves-
tigation” in ﬁscal year 2015).
by assistant bar counsel and investigators, who, after receiving a claim, contact 
the complainant to determine the nature of the problem that led to the call, 
letter, or ﬁling. The matter is known within ACAP as an inquiry, to be distin-
guished from a complaint docketed when the OBC opens a formal case.
The ACAP staﬀ frequently speaks with the lawyer whose conduct is at issue 
and obtains copies of relevant documents, including court docket sheets and 
pleadings, as part of its evaluation. If the ACAP staﬀ determines that the allega-
tion concerns serious misconduct that could lead to disciplinary action, ACAP’s 
role ends. If ACAP receives a serious complaint in writing, the matter is opened as 
a formal complaint within the OBC for further investigation. If ACAP receives 
a serious complaint by telephone, ACAP sends the complainant a formal com-
plaint form to complete and ﬁle.3 In fact, regardless of whether the complainant 
submits a written statement, if the claim is suﬃciently troubling, the OBC inves-
tigates the matter.
If the inquiry involves a matter that ACAP can help resolve, ACAP attempts 
to resolve the complainant’s concerns. For example, if the problem is that the law-
yer does not respond to the client, ACAP may nudge the attorney with a tele-
phone call to receive a response. Most of the time (although, remarkably, not 
all of the time), lawyers respond promptly to a phone call from the OBC, even 
if the lawyer has not been responsive to clients. If a lawyer fails to return a ﬁle, 
for example, ACAP advises the lawyer that Rule 1.16 of the Massachusetts Rules 
of Professional Conduct requires returning the appropriate papers to the client. 
Many conﬂicts between lawyers and clients can be resolved this way, and ACAP 
resolves the vast majority of inquiries it receives without opening a formal com-
plaint.4 If ACAP resolves a matter, the lawyer avoids any formal complaint related 
to the matter (but the OBC maintains a record of the interaction for future ref-
erence). Chapter 5 discusses the ACAP process in more detail.
B. Dismissal
If ACAP does not resolve an inquiry, the OBC opens and dockets a com-
plaint. Many complaints that the OBC opens and investigates result in closing 
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the matter with no discipline, either public or private. The OBC will dismiss a 
complaint if it concludes it has no merit. For instance, a dissatisﬁed client may 
complain that the lawyer acted too slowly, obtained a bad result, or charged too 
much. On reviewing the facts alleged, the OBC may conclude that, despite the 
client’s sincere feelings, the lawyer violated no rule. Other times, the OBC 
dismisses a complaint because the Board of Bar Overseers (BBO) lacks juris-
diction (for instance, disputes about whether a fee is owed) or because the mat-
ter is too old.5
Other times, the OBC closes or dismisses a complaint that alleges the 
lawyer violated a rule of professional conduct, but which the OBC concludes 
should be resolved in a diﬀerent forum, at least at ﬁrst. For example, if a party 
in the middle of protracted and contentious litigation accuses the lawyer for 
the adverse party of misconduct arising from that litigation, the OBC may 
close the matter without ﬁling charges and without extensive investigation if it 
appears that the trial judge is better suited to monitor and address the alleged 
misconduct. The OBC may, however, advise the complainant to notify the 
OBC if the court ﬁnds attorney misconduct. 
A complainant has the right to request that the BBO review the OBC’s deci-
sion to close a matter with no formal charge or resolution.6 If the BBO receives 
such a review request, the OBC makes the ﬁle available to a BBO member for 
examination. The attorney who conducted the investigation and made the rec-
ommendation to close the ﬁle is also available for further questions. Com-
plainant requests for this kind of review are not uncommon, and while it is rare 
for a BBO member to reverse the OBC’s decision not to pursue a matter, it 
does occasionally happen.7 If the BBO member upholds the decision to close 
the matter, the complainant has no further right to challenge the decision.8
In many instances, the OBC dismisses an inquiry that otherwise may have 
some merit after the complainant’s concerns have been informally resolved. Cases 
may also be closed as a result of an agreement between the OBC and the lawyer 
5 See Rules of the Board of Bar Overseers § 2.1(b)(1) [hereinafter BBO Rules] (“Bar 
Counsel need not investigate any complaint arising out of acts or omissions occurring more than 
six years prior to the date of the complaint.”); Jerry Cohen, Appropriate Dispositions in Cases of Law-
yer Misconduct, 82 Mass. L. Rev. 295, 296 (1997).
6 See BBO Rules § 2.8(a)(1).
7 See Bar Counsel  Annual Report, supra note 4, at 5 (OBC declined to open an investi-
gation in 210 complaints ﬁled in ﬁscal year 2015; 79 of those complainants sought BBO review; 
the reviewing BBO member conﬁrmed the OBC’s decision in all of those reviews).
8 See Matter of a Request for an Investigation of an Attorney, 449 Mass. 1013, 1014 (2007) (“An 
individual who ﬁles a complaint with the board lacks standing to challenge in a court action the 
board’s decision not to prosecute the complaint.”).
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as to remedial measures. This process is known as diversion and is discussed in 
the following section.
C. Diversion / Probation
For matters involving comparatively minor misconduct that might other-
wise warrant discipline, the OBC may determine that the attorney is best suited 
for its Diversion Program. According to the OBC’s Diversion Policy, this rem-
edy may apply:
If Bar Counsel concludes that the professional misconduct was not the 
result of any willful or dishonest conduct, the basis of the misconduct or 
incapacity is subject to remediation or resolution through alternative 
mechanisms, and the public interest and the welfare of the respondent’s 
clients and prospective clients will not be harmed if the respondent 
complies with the program.9
The Diversion Program may refer the attorney to a lawyer assistance pro-
gram, such as Lawyers Concerned for Lawyers (LCL),10 the Massachusetts Law 
Oﬃce Management Assistance Program (LOMAP),11 or the OBC’s monthly 
program on maintaining client trust accounts. Lawyers may also be referred to 
other forms of support, including trust account monitoring or psychological help. 
The attorney and the OBC enter into a written agreement containing the stip-
ulated facts and the terms of the diversion, and the OBC monitors the lawyer’s 
compliance. If the lawyer satisﬁes the terms of the agreement, the ﬁle is closed 
without discipline. If the lawyer fails to satisfy the terms of the agreement, the 
OBC may reopen the disciplinary matter and pursue formal discipline. In such 
cases, the alleged violations, but not the facts of what occurred, would be at issue. 
Chapter 2 discusses the LCL and LOMAP in more detail.
9 Board of Bar Overseers, Diversion Program Policy Statement, https://bbopublic.blob.core.windows
.net/web/f/divpolicy.pdf (last visited March 16, 2018).
10 See Lawyers Concerned for Lawyers, http://www.lclma.org/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2018). As 
described on that website, the LCL, a private, nonproﬁt Massachusetts corporation, “assists law-
yers, judges, law students, and their families who are experiencing any level of impairment in 
their ability to function as a result of personal, mental health, addiction or medical problems.”
11 See Law Office Management Assistance Project, http://masslomap.org/ (last visited Feb. 7, 
2018). LOMAP, which is part of the LCL, “makes itself available to help attorneys licensed in 
Massachusetts (or soon to be) establish and institutionalize professional oﬃce practices and 
procedures to increase their ability to deliver high quality legal services, strengthen client rela-
tionships, and enhance their quality of life.”
39
Discipline: Grounds and Types
Separate from the Diversion Program, the SJC and the BBO can also put the 
lawyer on probation, such as with a stayed suspension, in lieu of removing an attor-
ney from practice.12 Section F(3) discusses stayed suspensions in more detail.
D. Admonition
If ACAP or the Diversion Program does not resolve the complaint against 
a lawyer, or the complaint is not appropriate for them, the OBC may pursue dis-
ciplinary charges. If discipline ensues, the ﬁrst, or least severe, level of discipline 
is an admonition. An admonition is “a form of non-public discipline which declares 
the lawyer’s conduct improper, but does not limit the lawyer’s right to practice.”13
It results when the lawyer has committed misconduct that violates the Massa-
chusetts Rules of Professional Conduct, but causes little or no harm and otherwise 
does not evidence bad faith on the part of the respondent.
Practice Tips
While an admonition that has been dismissed after eight 
years may not be introduced as evidence in aggravation 
in an unrelated future proceeding, and may not be 
weighed by the BBO as an aggravating factor in deter-
mining discipline for an unrelated later offense, the OBC 
may still take it into account in making future prosecuto-
rial decisions.
* * *
Any discipline, including a nonpublic admonition, likely 
must be disclosed to the lawyer’s insurance carrier. If not, 
the lawyer’s policy may not cover any future incidents. 
All discipline must also be disclosed to any jurisdiction 
where the attorney is licensed to practice.
Summaries of admonitions are published in the Massachusetts Disciplinary 
Reports (the published volumes containing all reported disciplinary matters, orga-
nized by year) and on the BBO website, but do not identify the respondent by 
12 See, e.g., Matter of Rosencranz, 27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 754 (2011) (cooperation with the LCL); 
Matter of Betts, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 44 (2010) (twelve-month suspension, six months stayed, 
with conditions including abstention from drugs and alcohol and reports from the LCL). See also
Matter of O’Neill, 30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 289 (2014) (rejecting a proposed stayed suspension).
13 ABA Standards supra note 1, at § 2.6.
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name. Admonitions remain on the lawyer’s record at the BBO for eight years. 
After eight years, if the lawyer remains free of any further misconduct and no 
complaints are pending, the admonition is annulled and the complaint dis-
missed.14 While the admonition is in eﬀect, it serves as an aggravating factor 
should the lawyer face later disciplinary proceedings. When applying for or 
renewing a professional liability policy, the lawyer will likely have to report the 
admonition to the insurance company. In addition, the admonition may need 
to be reported to any other jurisdiction in which the lawyer is licensed to prac-
tice and possibly to any court to which the lawyer seeks pro hac vice status (prac-
ticing temporarily in a state in which the lawyer is not licensed).15
Examples of Admonition Sanction Standards
Neglecting a client matter: An admonition is generally 
appropriate when the lawyer fails to act with reasonable 
diligence in representing a client or otherwise neglects a 
legal matter, and the lawyer’s misconduct causes little or 
no actual or potential injury to the client.16
Mishandling client funds: An admonition is given if the 
lawyer intentionally commingles client funds with the 
lawyer’s funds, provided that the lawyer commits no 
other misconduct and the client loses no money and 
otherwise suffers no harm.17
Conﬂicts of interest: An admonition is given if the lawyer 
engages in a conﬂict of interest not motivated by 
self-interest and causing little to no harm to the affected 
client or clients.18
14 BBO Rules § 4.3(a).
15 Whether a lawyer must report on such an application a vacated admonition is a question whose 
answer likely turns on the language of the particular application.
16 Matter of Kane, 13 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 321 (1997).
17 “Intentional commingling of clients’ funds with those of an attorney should be disciplined by 
private reprimand.” Matter of Schoepfer, 426 Mass. 183, 186 n.2 (1997) (quoting Matter of the 
Discipline of an Attorney, 392 Mass. 827, 836 (1984)). Many admonition reports involve that 
kind of misconduct. See, e.g., Ad. 12-02, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 915 (2012); Ad. 10-01, 26 Mass. 
Att’y Disc. R. 761 (2010); Ad. 09-19, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 687 (2009); Ad. 08-05, 24 Mass. 
Att’y Disc. R. 849 (2008); Ad. 07-44, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 1036 (2007).
18 Matter of Discipline of an Attorney, 449 Mass. 1001, 1002 (2007). See also Ad. 11-04, 27 
Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 930 (2011); Ad. 10-19, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 797 (2010); Ad. 10-18, 26 
Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 794 (2010); Ad. 08-11, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 860 (2008).
41
Discipline: Grounds and Types
Admonitions are a common form of discipline. The BBO may approve admo-
nitions when the lawyer has committed minor misconduct, often without harm 
resulting to a client or third person, and where the respondent did not act with 
malice or similar motive. The BBO imposed admonitions on twenty-six lawyers 
in ﬁscal year 2015,19 twenty-two lawyers in ﬁscal year 2014,20 and nineteen law-
yers in ﬁscal year 2013.21
E. Public Reprimand
The next more serious form of discipline is a public reprimand, which is “a 
form of public discipline that declares the lawyer’s conduct improper, but does 
not limit the lawyer’s right to practice.”22 The discipline is “public” because it 
identiﬁes the attorney by name. The sanction is brought to public attention in 
three ways:
1. First, and most widely noticed, the BBO publishes in the state’s lead-
ing legal newspaper, the Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly, the lawyer’s 
name along with the full BBO report describing the misconduct the 
lawyer committed and the BBO’s reason for imposing the sanction. 
Many lawyers read this newspaper regularly, so the discipline is likely 
to become known within the attorney’s professional community. 
2. Second, the BBO report published in the Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly
also becomes a formal Massachusetts disciplinary report, available in 
the online library at the Social Law Library, on the BBO website, and 
in the hard copy of the Massachusetts Attorney Discipline Reports. It is 
also distributed to newspapers, including the lawyer’s hometown daily 
or weekly. 
3. Finally, the discipline becomes part of the BBO’s public record of the 
attorney and appears in the lawyer’s information on the BBO website.
The diﬀerence to a lawyer’s practice between an admonition and a public rep-
rimand can be signiﬁcant. Only the OBC, the BBO, the client, and the lawyer 
19 Bar Counsel  Annual Report, supra note 4, at 15.
20 Massachusetts Office of the Bar Counsel of the Supreme Judicial Court, Annual 
Report to the Supreme Judicial Court, Fiscal Year , at 15 [hereinafter “Bar Counsel 
 Annual Report”].
21 Massachusetts Office of the Bar Counsel of the Supreme Judicial Court, Annual 
Report to the Supreme Judicial Court, Fiscal Year , at 15 [hereinafter “Bar Coun-
sel  Annual Report”].
22 ABA Standards, supra note 1, at § 2.5.
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Practice Tip
The BBO website includes a lawyer’s history of public 
discipline, regardless of when imposed, with disciplinary 
reports since 1999.
Examples of Public Reprimand Sanction Standards
Neglecting a client matter: A public reprimand is generally 
appropriate when a lawyer fails to act with reasonable 
diligence in representing a client or otherwise neglects a 
legal matter, and the lawyer’s misconduct causes serious 
injury or potentially serious injury to a client.23
Mishandling client funds: A public reprimand is given if 
the lawyer carelessly uses client funds, provided that the 
client is not deprived of the funds even temporarily and 
otherwise suffers no harm, and there are no aggravating 
factors, such as prior discipline or a failure to cooperate 
with the OBC.24
Conﬂict of interest entailing some risk of harm: A public 
reprimand is given if the lawyer engages in an obvious 
conﬂict of interest that risks some harm to a client or 
clients, but does not cause substantial harm.25
23 Kane, 13 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. at 327–28.
24 “Unintentional, careless use of clients’ funds should be disciplined by public censure.” Schoepfer,
426 Mass. 186 n.2 (1997) (quoting Matter of the Discipline of an Attorney, 392 Mass. 827, 
836 (1984)). Some public reprimand reports show that kind of misconduct. See, e.g., Matter of 
LaPre, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 302 (2010) (attorney negligently misused client funds in his 
IOLTA account, which resulted in a check he wrote to the client being dishonored due to insuf-
ﬁcient funds, but restored the amount to his client from his personal funds as soon as he became 
aware of the deprivation); Matter of McCabe, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 367 (2009) (lawyer neg-
ligently maintained two separate IOLTA accounts, which resulted in the bank not honoring a 
check the respondent had issued to a client, but promptly issued a replacement check to the 
client to repair the problem).
25 See Matter of Carnahan, 449 Mass. 1003, 1004–05 (2007); Matter of Morrow, 23 Mass. Att’y 
Disc. R. 486, 489 (2007); Matter of Abbene, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 2, 2 (2007).
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know the identity of the lawyer who receives a private admonition, so the law-
yer’s practice may proceed without disruption after an admonition.26 The public 
reprimand, while probably unknown to clients, will become known in the lawyer’s 
working community and may cause the lawyer considerable embarrassment or 
injure the lawyer’s professional reputation. As with admonitions, the fact that a 
lawyer has received a reprimand likely must be reported to the lawyer’s insur-
ance carrier as well as to other bars or courts in which the lawyer is admitted or 
seeks admission. It is, therefore, a serious sanction for any lawyer.
The BBO may impose a public reprimand when the lawyer’s misconduct 
risks important harm to a client or third party but not to an extent warranting 
suspension. Unlike an admonition, a public reprimand remains on the lawyer’s 
record permanently. Of course, it also serves as a signiﬁcant aggravating factor 
in any later disciplinary proceedings involving the lawyer.
Public reprimands are common in Massachusetts.27 The BBO imposed pub-
lic reprimands on sixteen lawyers in ﬁscal year 2015,28 eighteen lawyers in ﬁscal 
year 2014,29 and thirty-two lawyers in ﬁscal year 2013.30
F. Suspension
1. Suspensions Generally
When a lawyer has committed serious misconduct, with signiﬁcant actual 
or potential harm to others, the SJC may suspend the lawyer from practice for a 
speciﬁed period of time, or even indeﬁnitely (equal to a ﬁve-year minimum loss 
of license); this is the most serious sanction short of disbarment. While the 
BBO may recommend suspending a lawyer, only the SJC may impose this sanc-
tion. A suspension removes the lawyer from the practice of law but permits the 
attorney to resume practice after the suspension ends and the SJC reinstates 
the lawyer.31
26 If the bar counsel commences a public proceeding against a lawyer and that proceeding results 
in an admonition, the bar counsel will “claw back” and eliminate any public references to the law-
yer’s name and the proceedings beyond the admonition report.
27 Between 1999 and 2013, more than 290 lawyers received public reprimands in Massachusetts, 
according to a Westlaw search.
28 Bar Counsel  Annual Report, supra note 4, at 15.
29 Bar Counsel  Annual Report, supra note 20, at 15.
30 Bar Counsel  Annual Report, supra note 21, at 15.
31 The ABA has described the suspension sanction as follows:
Suspension is the removal of a lawyer from the practice of law for a speciﬁed minimum 
period of time. Generally, suspension should be for a period of time equal to or greater than 
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Massachusetts departs from the ABA guidelines, which recommend sus-
pensions between six months and three years in length. The SJC has frequently 
imposed suspensions shorter than six months, with some as short as thirty days.32
The SJC has occasionally imposed suspensions longer than three years and, as 
noted earlier, the SJC has often suspended lawyers indeﬁnitely, that is, for the 
minimum ﬁve years.33
The following subsections discuss and compare several discrete types of sus-
pensions. All suspensions, though, regardless of type, share certain qualities and 
responsibilities.34 A suspension means that the lawyer must stop practicing law 
and inform all clients of the opportunity to locate replacement counsel, as of the 
suspension’s eﬀective date. This aspect of the sanction demonstrates what a pro-
foundly disruptive penalty it is, causing substantial harm to a lawyer’s career, and 
not just for solo practitioners. After the SJC enters the order, the lawyer must, 
within fourteen days, complete all of the steps necessary to cease practice, includ-
ing closing Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts (IOLTA) and other trust accounts 
and returning fee advances. Seven days later, which means within twenty-one days 
after the order has been entered, the lawyer must ﬁle with the OBC an aﬃdavit 
certifying completion of the steps necessary to suspend practice. Most suspen-
sions take eﬀect within thirty days after the SJC order imposing the sanction, so 
the lawyer has a short time in which to notify clients, arrange for replacement 
counsel, and wrap up all active matters.35
At the end of the suspension, the lawyer may seek reinstatement. As described 
in the following pages, sometimes the reinstatement is without a hearing, unless 
the OBC objects; in other instances it requires a petition and proceedings before 
the BBO, along with SJC approval.
six months, but in no event should the time period prior to application for reinstatement 
be more than three years. Procedures should be established to allow a suspended lawyer to 
apply for reinstatement, but a lawyer who has been suspended should not be permitted to 
return to practice until he has completed a reinstatement process demonstrating rehabili-
tation, compliance with applicable discipline or disability orders, and ﬁtness to practice law.
ABA Standards, supra note 1, at § 2.3.
32 See, e.g., Matter of Guinane, 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 191 (2004).
33 See, e.g., Matter of Nagy, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 483 (2013) (indeﬁnite suspension based on 
reciprocal discipline); Matter of Eleey, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 275 (2012) (indeﬁnite suspension 
for misappropriation of client funds).
34 The descriptions in this paragraph come from SJC Rule 4:01 § 17.
35 A lawyer subject to a temporary suspension, which is an interim suspension pending the com-
pletion of disciplinary proceedings, must accomplish the steps within fourteen days. Section F(5) 
discusses temporary suspensions in more detail.)
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During the suspension period, the lawyer may not earn a living through 
any connection to the practice of law in Massachusetts. While in theory a law-
yer with a valid out-of-state law license could practice lawfully in another juris-
diction, given the prevalence of reciprocal discipline, the lawyer’s license in the 
other state may well be aﬀected by the Massachusetts suspension. (Chapter 20 
discusses reciprocal discipline in more detail.) The suspended lawyer may not 
work as a paralegal or legal assistant during the suspension period and may not 
be hired in any capacity by, or volunteer for, a lawyer or a law ﬁrm, absent leave 
of the SJC.36 Therefore, a suspended lawyer cannot even work as a receptionist, 
secretary, or custodian in a law oﬃce or for a lawyer.37
2. Term Suspensions
Most suspensions in Massachusetts are “term suspensions,” with a deﬁnite 
expiration date. The length of a term suspension has important consequences 
in Massachusetts and aﬀects the reinstatement process for the suspended law-
yer. According to SJC Rule 4:01 § 18, the Massachusetts reinstatement guide-
lines operate as follows:
• Six months or less: “A lawyer who has been suspended for six months 
or less pursuant to disciplinary proceedings shall be reinstated at the end 
of the period of suspension”38 by ﬁling an aﬃdavit with the SJC and the 
OBC aﬃrming that the lawyer has (1) complied with all the terms of 
the order of suspension, (2) paid all costs imposed in connection with 
the disciplinary process, and (3) reimbursed the Clients’ Security Board 
any funds it paid on the lawyer’s behalf. Upon the ﬁling of that aﬃdavit, 
the lawyer is reinstated automatically ten days after ﬁling the aﬃdavit, 
unless the OBC ﬁles an objection with the SJC. If the OBC ﬁles such 
an objection, the Court holds a hearing, typically before a single justice, 
to determine whether a formal petition for reinstatement and an accom-
panying hearing is necessary.39 If the lawyer fails to submit the aﬃdavit 
36 SJC Rule 4:01 § 17(7). Section 18(3) authorizes a lawyer whose suspension term has expired 
(but whose license to practice has not yet been reinstated), or who has been suspended for at 
least four years as part of an indeﬁnite sanction, to ﬁle a motion with the SJC for leave to work 
as a paralegal.
37 Depending on the circumstances, a lawyer might be permitted to perform the duties of a 
mediator during the suspension period. See Matter of Bott, 462 Mass. 430, 439 (2012) (media-
tion sometimes qualiﬁes as practicing law).
38 SJC Rule 4:01 § 18(1)(a).
39 Id. at § 18(1)(c).
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within six months of the end of the suspension, the lawyer must ﬁle a 
petition for reinstatement using the procedures described below.
    Suspensions for less than six months demonstrate the SJC’s conclu-
sion that the misconduct in question, while serious, does not reﬂect so 
badly on the lawyer as to require a showing of ﬁtness before the lawyer 
may resume practice.
• More than six months but not more than one year: “Suspensions longer 
than six months in duration typically involve substantial violations 
of the ethical rules, such as fraud, deliberate ﬁnancial malfeasance, 
or intentional misrepresentation.”40 If the lawyer’s suspension is more 
than six months but less than one year and one day, the lawyer can be 
reinstated only after successfully completing the Multi-State Profes-
sional Responsibility Examination (MPRE), which is administered 
by the Law School Admission Council on behalf of the National 
Conference of Bar Examiners every April, August, and November.41
Successful completion of the MPRE is deﬁned in the Common-
wealth as obtaining a score of eighty-ﬁve or more.42 The lawyer must 
ﬁle the same aﬃdavit as described in the previous paragraph with 
the SJC and the OBC in addition to successfully completing the 
MPRE.43 The same procedures apply to submitting the aﬃdavit and 
the automatic reinstatement as described in the previous guideline. 
Because of this added requirement, some disciplinary dispositions 
deliberately add one day to a six-month suspension to require that the 
respondent pass the MPRE.44
40 Matter of Donaldson, 27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 221, 227 (2011).
41 SJC Rule 4:01 § 18(1)(b).
42 See Board of Bar Examiners, Petition for Admission to the Massachusetts Bar by Transfer of Uniform 
Bar Examination Score, https://www.mass.gov/how-to/petition-for-admission-to-the-massachusetts
-bar-by-transfer-of-uniform-bar-examination-score (last visited March 15, 2018).
43 SJC Rule 4:01 § 18(1)(b). It is worth noting that prior to January 2000, suspensions longer 
than six months required a petition for reinstatement. Section 18 of SJC Rule 4:01 was amended 
eﬀective January 3, 2000. The SJC’s Transitional Order in Aid of Construction explains that “a 
person who is suspended before January 3, 2000, for a term exceeding six months shall be 
required to petition for reinstatement under paragraph (4) of § 18.”
44 See, e.g., Matter of Firstenberger, 450 Mass. 1018, 1019, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 136 (2007) 
(knowing and intentionally deceptive breach of arrangement with mortgagee; suspension for six 
months and one day imposed); Matter of Dash, 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 179, 180 (2006) (failure 
to supervise nonlawyer employee, commingling of trust account, and false statements to insur-
ance adjuster; suspension for six months and one day imposed).
47
Discipline: Grounds and Types
Practice Tip
Because the MPRE is offered only three times per year, a 
lawyer must sit for the test in time to have the results 
available when the lawyer expects to resume practice. 
Lawyers who have not taken the test in time may wish 
to negotiate with the OBC for an extension in which to 
apply for automatic reinstatement.
• More than one year: A lawyer suspended for more than one year must 
petition the SJC for reinstatement, and the BBO conducts a hearing 
on the petition. The lawyer may not submit the petition earlier than 
three months prior to the suspension expiration date. The petition 
must include assertions similar to those described in the previous 
guidelines for the aﬃdavits required for automatic reinstatements, 
including completing the MPRE. Chapter 23 provides a full descrip-
tion of the reinstatement process. Because of this signiﬁcant addi-
tional requirement, many disciplinary decisions add one day to a 
one-year suspension, triggering the reinstatement petition process.45
    The year-and-a-day suspension has a very clear message. It indicates 
the Court’s view that the lawyer needs to prove suﬃcient trustworthi-
ness and knowledge to resume the practice of law. Two suspension 
reports exemplify the BBO’s and the Court’s use of this sanction. In
Matter of Hopwood,46 despite numerous violations, including a failure 
to cooperate with the OBC, the single justice rejected a year-and-a-day 
suspension in favor of a one-year suspension, explaining that “[w]e do 
not impose the additional day recommended by the hearing oﬃcer 
because we do not believe that the respondent’s misconduct is so griev-
ous that he needs to demonstrate his ﬁtness to resume the practice of 
45 See, e.g., Matter of Cohen, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 83 (2010) (year-and-a-day suspension for 
numerous “ethical lapses,” including incompetence, failure to communicate, failure to refund 
money, and dishonesty with the OBC; respondent’s ultimate cooperation with the OBC per-
suades single justice to allow respondent to petition for reinstatement three months prior to the 
expiration of the suspension); Matter of Ellsworth, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 232 (2013) (failure 
to report felony conviction, plus repeated defaults and failure to cooperate with the OBC, yields 
suspension for a year and a day with the condition that “the respondent was not permitted to 
petition for reinstatement to the practice of law in the Commonwealth until one year and one 
day after she ﬁled a full and truthful aﬃdavit of compliance”).
46 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 354, 363 (2008).
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law. The requirement that he take and pass the Multi-State Professional 
Responsibility Examination will help assure that he is cognizant of his 
ethical obligations in this respect.” In Matter of Pudlo,47 the single jus-
tice accepted the BBO’s recommended discipline of an attorney who 
negligently misused client funds and attempted to conceal his conduct 
by making false statements. The single justice wrote that “the additional 
day of suspension has the eﬀect of requiring the respondent to demon-
strate his ﬁtness to resume practice at a reinstatement hearing . . . .”48
Recap of the Reinstatement Requirements
Suspensions of six months or less: Reinstatement effec-
tively automatic, unless the OBC objects to afﬁdavit.
Suspensions of six months to one year: Reinstatement 
effectively automatic, if the attorney conﬁrms successful 
completion of the MPRE, unless the OBC objects to the 
afﬁdavit.
Suspensions of more than one year: Reinstatement 
requires successfully completing the MPRE, a petition to 
the SJC, and a BBO hearing.
Every term suspension longer than one year requires the ﬁling of a reinstate-
ment petition. For more serious misconduct, lawyers may receive lengthy term 
suspensions, including two or three years. The longest suspension term in the 
disciplinary reports is four years,49 although this is rare.
In addition to the reinstatement provisions in SJC Rule 4:01, the SJC some-
times requires an attorney to petition for reinstatement even though the suspen-
sion is shorter than one year and one day. For instance, in Matter of Kolofolias,50
the respondent, while on disability inactive status, engaged in paralegal work with-
out the Court’s permission. The parties’ stipulation provided for a suspension of 
six months and one day, but the single justice required that reinstatement be
47 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 712 (2012).
48 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. at 721. The attorney was later reinstated, but not until 2015, close to 
four years after the eﬀective date of the year-and-one-day suspension. Matter of Pudlo, 31 Mass. 
Att’y Disc. R. 537 (2015).
49 See, e.g., Matter of Balser, 32 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___, 2016 WL 6093188 (2016); Matter of 
Beaulieu 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 33 (2013).
50 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 334, 335 (2009).
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Practice Tip
A lawyer may, and typically will, ﬁle a petition for rein-
statement three months before the suspension expires. 
Even with that advance ﬁling, a term suspension of 
more than one year will ordinarily last at least six 
months longer than the identiﬁed term because of the 
time needed to arrange and complete the reinstate-
ment hearing.
subject to a formal petition proceeding. In Matter of Krabbenhoft,51 for miscon-
duct including neglect, intentional misrepresentation to a client, failure to 
cooperate with the OBC, and failure to comply fully with an administrative 
suspension, all aggravated by a prior admonition, the lawyer received a “six-
month suspension, together with the requirement that [he] petition for rein-
statement in order to show that adequate steps have been taken to address 
[these] concerns.” And in Matter of Barrat,52 the respondent was suspended for 
six months for misconduct in two matters, including misrepresentations to the 
client, but was required to petition for reinstatement.
The SJC occasionally imposes other conditions that a lawyer must meet be-
fore reinstatement. For instance, in Matter of Johnson,53 the respondent received a 
three-month suspension for lack of diligent and competent representation. The 
reinstatement was conditioned on attending the Massachusetts Continuing Legal 
Education (MCLE) program How to Make Money and Stay Out of Trouble,
maintaining legal malpractice insurance for at least two years after reinstate-
ment, and undergoing an evaluation at LOMAP.
The SJC imposed a term suspension on forty-ﬁve lawyers in ﬁscal year 2016,54
thirty-ﬁve lawyers in ﬁscal year 2015,55 and forty-four lawyers in ﬁscal year 2014.56
In each year, term suspension was the most common form of discipline imposed.
51 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 362, 383 (2007).
52 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 27, 39 (2004).
53 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 276 (2010).
54 Massachusetts Office of the Bar Counsel of the Supreme Judicial Court, Annual 
Report to the Supreme Judicial Court, Fiscal Year , at 14 [hereinafter Bar Coun-
sel  Annual Report].
55 Bar Counsel  Annual Report, supra note 4, at 15
56 Bar Counsel  Annual Report, supra note 20, at 15.
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Examples of Term Suspension Sanction Standards
Neglecting a client matter: A “term suspension is appro-
priate for a pattern of neglect resulting in serious 
harm.”57
Mishandling client funds: “The intentional use of clients’ 
funds normally calls for ‘a term suspension of appropri-
ate length.’  ”58
Presenting false testimony: A term suspension of twenty- 
seven months was appropriate for misconduct that 
included the attorney’s making “false statements under 
oath to one or more courts.”59
3. Stayed Suspensions
In recent years, the disciplinary reports have shown an increase in an unu-
sual form of discipline—a term suspension whose term is stayed. In this type of 
suspension, the lawyer does not lose the right to practice, or loses that right for 
a shorter period than the suspension term would have indicated, and it is akin to 
a suspended sentence in criminal law. Two examples demonstrate how the 
“stayed suspensions” work. In Matter of Kydd,60 the lawyer was disciplined for 
lack of competence and failure to cooperate with the OBC. The single justice 
imposed a three-month suspension, with conditions, but stayed the ban on the 
lawyer’s practice for one year. The eﬀect was that the lawyer had to comply with 
the imposed conditions for a period of a year. If the lawyer did so, the “suspen-
sion” would be over, with no interruption in the law practice. If the lawyer did 
not comply with the conditions, the three-month suspension would go into 
eﬀect. The single justice explained this sanction as follows: “While I agree with 
the board that the respondent’s conduct involved repeated failures to act with 
due diligence, albeit on a single matter, and that a suspension of three months 
on that basis might generally be appropriate, I ﬁnd the conduct to be on the 
borderline to that which might be appropriately sanctioned by a public repri-
57 Matter of Espinosa, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 307 (2012) (citing Matter of Kane, 13 Mass. Att’y 
Disc. R. 321 (1997)).
58 Matter of Schoepfer, 426 Mass. 183, 187 (1997) (quoting Matter of the Discipline of an Attor-
ney, 392 Mass. 827, 836 (1984)).
59 Matter of Diviacchi, 475 Mass. 1013, 1020 (2016).
60 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 341 (2009).
51
Discipline: Grounds and Types
mand.”61 In this respect, the stayed suspension was eﬀectively a public repri-
mand, but with more teeth and a greater opportunity for ongoing monitoring.
Compare that report to Matter of Lee, in which the lawyer was convicted 
of engaging in domestic violence and violating abuse-prevention orders.62 The 
BBO recommended a six-month suspension, which was stayed for two years, 
subject to terms of probation. The single justice described this discipline as “mod-
est” and expressed concern that the sanction “fails to give adequate force to the 
need to treat violence in the home as seriously as the Court has indicated [in 
past decisions].”63 The Court settled on a six-month suspension, with the last 
three months suspended for two years subject to certain probationary terms. 
The Court added a further condition: any material breach of the probation 
terms would result, in addition to a full six-month suspension, in surrendering 
the right to the automatic reinstatement that accompanies a six-month sus-
pension under SJC Rule 4:01.
Most of the disciplinary reports involving suspension where the SJC refers 
the lawyer to LOMAP have been stayed suspensions, with LOMAP referral 
serving as a condition of probation.64
You Should Know
The use of a stayed suspension appears most often 
when the probationary terms imposed upon the respon-
dent are designed to remediate shortcomings in the 
lawyer’s practice, such as poor accounting, or relate to 
medical or psychological conditions that can be evalu-
ated and monitored.65
61 Id. at 345.
62 17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 357 (2001).
63 Id. at 364.
64 See, e.g., Matter of Brassard, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 55 (2013); Matter of Brunelle, 29 Mass. 
Att’y Disc. R. 62 (2013); Matter of Ellis, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 301 (2012); Matter of Lagana, 
26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 295 (2010).
65 In Matter of O’Neill, 30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 289 (2014) (Board Memorandum), the BBO 
articulated its intended use of a stayed suspension:
We believe staying all or part of a suspension that would otherwise be appropriate for the 
misconduct involved should be reserved for matters in which the stay itself functions as 
an incentive or a deterrent, as the case may be, to encourage or discourage certain 
conduct, whether for the sake of safeguarding the public or assisting the lawyer to take 
certain remedial steps, or both.)
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4. Indefinite Suspensions
Not all suspensions include a term. On occasion, the SJC will suspend a law-
 yer indeﬁnitely, which is the most serious discipline short of disbarment. An in-
deﬁnite suspension lasts a minimum of ﬁve years, as this subsection discusses. 
At least a hundred Massachusetts lawyers received indeﬁnite suspensions be-
tween 1999 and 2017.66
Indeﬁnite suspension is an apparent eﬀort to impose serious discipline but 
without disbarment. For example, while the SJC has not articulated an accepted 
sanction of indeﬁnite suspension for neglect (as it has for the sanctions dis-
cussed up to now), it has imposed that sanction in serious instances of neglect 
with harm suﬀered by clients.67 Also, the presumptive sanction for the inten-
tional misuse of client funds, with an intent to deprive and actual deprivation 
of the funds, is “an indeﬁnite suspension or disbarment.”68 Several reports 
applying the Schoepfer standard result in an indeﬁnite suspension instead of dis-
barment, as the SJC or single justice concluded that some facts warranted a 
sanction just below the most severe. For instance, in Matter of Osagiede69 and
Matter of Ragan70 the respondent lawyer in each case misused client funds, had 
prior discipline for that misconduct, and made restitution. Each lawyer received 
an indeﬁnite suspension.
Practice Tip
Because the BBO wants to encourage lawyers who have 
misused client funds to make restitution to the affected 
clients, it often recommends an indeﬁnite suspension 
instead of disbarment where the lawyer has repaid the 
amounts owed.
66 Westlaw search, February 4, 2017.
67 See, e.g., Matter of Gomez, 19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 182 (2003) (lawyer abandoned his practice, 
leaving all clients to ﬁnd other assistance); Matter of Mickiewicz, 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 491 
(2005) (serious neglect of two client matters and of the BBO inquiries, aggravated by previous 
sanction for neglect).
68 Matter of Schoepfer, 426 Mass. 183, 187 (1997) (citing Matter of the Discipline of an 
Attorney, 392 Mass. 827, 836 (1984)); see also Matter of Bryan, 411 Mass. 288, 292 (1991) 
(explaining the diﬀerence between the two sanctions).
69 453 Mass. 1001, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 478 (2009).
70 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 587 (2007).
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Some of the reports involving an indeﬁnite suspension result from recip-
rocal discipline, discussed in more detail in Chapter 20. A lawyer disbarred in 
another jurisdiction may receive an indeﬁnite suspension in the Commonwealth, 
if an indeﬁnite suspension, rather than disbarment or a term suspension, is the 
appropriate sanction here.71
A lawyer who has received an indeﬁnite suspension may not petition for rein-
statement “until the expiration of at least three months prior to ﬁve years from 
the eﬀective date of the order of suspension.”72
Examples of Indeﬁnite Suspension Sanction Standards
Mishandling client funds: The accepted sanction for the 
intentional misuse of client funds, with an intent to 
deprive and actual deprivation of the funds, is “an indeﬁ-
nite suspension or disbarment.”73 Indeﬁnite suspension 
typically occurs when restitution has been made, and 
disbarment when it has not. Mishandling client funds is 
the most common basis for an indeﬁnite suspension.
After a criminal conviction: Lawyers convicted of crimes 
involving fraud or bribery have received indeﬁnite 
suspensions.74
The SJC imposed indeﬁnite suspensions on eight lawyers in ﬁscal year 
2016,75 seven lawyers in ﬁscal year 2015,76 and four lawyers in ﬁscal year 2014.77
In each such year, the indeﬁnite suspension was the least frequent form of dis-
cipline imposed.
71 See, e.g., Matter of Amaral, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 7 (2010) (intentional misuse use of funds 
with full restitution). Cf. Matter of Ladas, 17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 341 (2001) (indeﬁnite suspen-
sion in Massachusetts on petition for reciprocal discipline based on conduct resulting in two-year 
suspension in New York; intentional misuse of funds with full restitution).
72 SJC Rule 4:01 § 18(2)(b).
73 Matter of Schoepfer, 426 Mass. 183, 187 (1997) (citing Matter of the Discipline of an Attor-
ney, 392 Mass. 827, 836 (1984)).
74 See Matter of Curtis, 17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 157 (2001) (commercial bribery); Matter of 
Gibson, 15 Mass. Att’y Disc. R 220 (1999) (conviction for falsifying student loan records); Mat-
ter of Greene, 31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 221 (2015) (real estate fraud).
75 Bar Counsel  Annual Report, supra note 54, at 14.
76 Bar Counsel  Annual Report, supra note 4, at 15.
77 Bar Counsel  Annual Report, supra note 20, at 15.
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5. Temporary Suspensions
SJC Rule 4:01 refers several times to the concept of a “temporary suspension,”78
even though the rule does not deﬁne the term. BBO reports and SJC opinions use 
this term to refer to an immediate suspension, under Rule 4:01 § 12A, of a law-
yer who “poses a threat of substantial harm to clients or potential clients, or [whose] 
whereabouts are unknown . . . .”79 Under section 12A, if the OBC ﬁles a petition 
with the SJC alleging facts showing such a threat or that the lawyer cannot be 
found, the Court will enter an order to show cause why the lawyer should not 
be immediately suspended pending ﬁnal disposition of the current or forthcom-
ing OBC disciplinary proceeding against the lawyer.80 The lawyer must have an 
opportunity to be heard on the matter, and after that hearing the single justice 
“may make such order of suspension or restriction as protection of the public may 
make appropriate.”81
The SJC has concluded that, at the hearing on the order to show cause, the 
standard is essentially the same as that applicable to the issuance of a prelimi-
nary injunction, with protecting the public interest replacing the concept of irrep-
arable harm.82 Unlike all other forms of suspension, which usually take eﬀect 
thirty days after the order is entered, the temporary suspension takes eﬀect imme-
diately.83 However, as with all other suspensions, once the order is entered, the 
lawyer has fourteen days to provide the requisite notices to clients and others, as 
described in Section II(F)(1), “Suspensions Generally,” and to resign or withdraw 
from appointments.84 The temporary suspension typically remains in eﬀect until 
the disciplinary process arrives at some other conclusion or produces a diﬀer-
ent order.85
In addition to this process, upon conviction of a “serious” crime, a lawyer 
must show cause why a temporary suspension should not be ordered. In that 
instance, the OBC need not show threat of substantial harm to clients or that 
the lawyer’s whereabouts are unknown.86
78 See, e.g., SJC Rule 4:01 §§ 17(1)–17(6).
79 SJC Rule 4:01 § 12A.
80 Matter of Kenney, 399 Mass. 431, 437 (1987).
81 SJC Rule 4:01 § 12A.
82 Matter of Ellis, 425 Mass. 332, 13 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 181 (1997) (referring to a § 12A sus-
pension as a “temporary suspension”).
83 SJC Rule 4:01 § 17(3).
84 SJC Rule 4:01 § 17(1).
85 In Matter of Eberle, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 181 (2009), the single justice imposed a four-
month temporary suspension, that term having a relationship to the expected term suspension 
the respondent was likely to receive after the disciplinary process was complete.
86 SJC Rule 4:01 § 12.
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Practice Tips
An indictment on felony charges may serve as a factor 
demonstrating that a lawyer “poses a threat of substan-
tial harm to clients or potential clients.”87
* * *
In some instances, accepting a temporary suspension 
serves a respondent’s interests, especially if the lawyer is 
not practicing law at the time. If the lawyer ultimately 
receives a term suspension for the misconduct the OBC 
is investigating, that term begins running at the time the 
temporary suspension is imposed, assuming full compli-
ance with the terms of suspension, including ﬁling an 
afﬁdavit of compliance with the Court and the OBC. 
Therefore, the time the OBC spent obtaining the term 
suspension “counts” in the running of that term.
6. Administrative Suspensions
Separate from a disciplinary suspension issued after a full BBO and SJC 
review, and separate from a temporary suspension described in the previous sub-
section, is an “administrative suspension.” This sanction is a real suspension—it 
prohibits the lawyer from practicing law during its term. However, it results 
from diﬀerent kinds of misconduct and takes eﬀect without a hearing. It can 
arise in two contexts.
First, and most commonly, the BBO seeks administrative suspension of a 
lawyer who fails to pay bar registration fees and complete registration duties in 
a given year. The BBO requires every registered lawyer to complete an annual 
registration statement and pay a registration fee by an identiﬁed deadline. Fail-
ure to pay results in a note that a late fee will be assessed after ﬁfteen days. Law-
yers who still fail to pay are notiﬁed that nonpayment will lead to a petition for 
suspension being ﬁled.88 The BBO then ﬁles a petition for administrative sus-
pension with the SJC based on the lawyer’s failure to register or pay the regis-
tration fee. The petition is granted without hearing and as a matter of routine. 
Upon entry of such an order, the lawyer is suspended from practicing law.
87 Matter of Ellis, 425 Mass. 332, 13 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 181 (1997).
88 SJC Rule 4:03 § 2.
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Practice Tip
Many administrative suspensions for failure to register 
occur because the lawyer fails to notify the BBO’s regis-
tration department of ofﬁce or e-mail address changes 
and thus fails to receive notice to register. The BBO noti-
ﬁes the OBC of the administratively suspended lawyer’s 
request for reinstatement, in case the OBC wishes to 
oppose reinstatement or to investigate the circumstances 
of the suspension and the extent to which the lawyer prac-
ticed while suspended. If the failure to register is not egre-
gious or prolonged, and if a lawyer continued to practice 
because he or she was unaware of the suspension, rein-
statement is more easily obtained.
Second, the OBC seeks an administrative suspension when a lawyer fails 
to cooperate with an OBC investigation. Under SJC Rule 4:01 § 3, failure to 
comply with a validly issued subpoena, to respond to the OBC’s or BBO’s re-
quests for information made in the course of processing a complaint for disci-
pline, or to ﬁle an answer in such a proceeding or appear at a hearing before a 
hearing committee will result in the OBC’s seeking an administrative suspen-
sion as described in the previous subsection.
Both forms of administrative suspension require the lawyer to cease prac-
ticing law, but an administrative suspension does not immediately require a law-
yer to close shop. An OBC article on this topic explains:
If an administratively suspended lawyer is not reinstated within 30 days 
after the entry of the order, she becomes subject to the same require-
ments imposed by S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 17, on lawyers under disciplinary 
suspension. These include withdrawing all appearances as counsel, resign-
ing all ﬁduciary appointments, and giving notice of the suspension to all 
clients, opposing counsel, wards, heirs and beneﬁciaries. In addition, admin-
istratively suspended lawyers must refund all unearned fees, close all IOLTA 
or other trust accounts, and properly disburse all client, ﬁduciary and 
other trust funds in their control. They are also required to ﬁle an aﬃdavit 
and documentation of compliance with the court and Bar Counsel.89
89 Roger Geller & Susan Strauss Weisberg, Dues and Don’ts (2002), https://bbopublic.blob.core
.windows.net/web/f/dues.pdf (last visited March 16, 2018).
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A lawyer who has been administratively suspended must therefore cease prac-
tice immediately, but need not formally withdraw appearances or terminate 
any client relationships unless the administrative suspension lasts at least thirty 
days. Obviously, the lawyer must scramble to ﬁnd coverage for any active mat-
ters that require legal attention during the suspension. As with any other sus-
pended lawyer, the administratively suspended lawyer may not practice as a 
legal assistant or paralegal without leave of the Court.90
How the administrative suspension ends depends on how it arose. If the 
administrative suspension occurred because the lawyer failed to register, the law-
yer may be reinstated by registering, paying the past-due annual fees (including 
a late assessment), and paying a reinstatement fee. An aﬃdavit must be ﬁled with 
the BBO explaining compliance with the obligations the lawyer failed to meet 
that led to the suspension.91 The rule implies, in cases where the administrative 
suspension resulted from a default on bar registration and nonpayment of fees, 
that reinstatement rests with the discretion of the BBO and the Court. In prac-
tice, however, reinstatement is automatic upon the lawyer’s registering and pay-
ing all fees and the late assessment, although the matter may be referred to the 
OBC for investigation of unauthorized practice while suspended or other issues 
the suspension and reinstatement raised.
If the administrative suspension resulted instead from a failure to cooper-
ate with the OBC’s investigation of a disciplinary complaint, a similar process 
applies, but the Court’s discretion about reinstatement may be exercised with 
more deliberation, depending upon how well the lawyer cooperates.
As discussed in Chapters 14 and 22, many lawyers ﬁnd themselves in even 
more serious trouble if they continue to practice after administrative suspension.
G. Disbarment
The most serious discipline is disbarment, imposed when the misconduct is 
so grave that the lawyer forfeits the privilege to practice law in Massachusetts for 
a minimum of eight years. As with suspensions, the SJC imposes disbarment, 
not the BBO. Unlike other states,92 Massachusetts’s disciplinary process does not 
90 SJC Rule 4:01 §§ 17(7), 18(3). Because an attorney may not request leave of the Court to work 
with a lawyer until after four years of an indeﬁnite suspension (id. at § 18(3)), it would be remark-
able for an administratively suspended lawyer to obtain such permission.
91 SJC Rule 4:03 § 3. In 2017, the late fee was $50 and the reinstatement fee was $100.
92 See, e.g., In re Amendments to Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, 718 So. 2d 1179, 1181 (Fla. 
1998) (amending R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-5.1(f ) “to authorize permanent disbarment as a dis-
ciplinary sanction”).
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provide for permanent disbarment.93 In Massachusetts, SJC Rule 4:01 permits 
a disbarred attorney to apply for reinstatement eight years after the disbarment 
order.94 (The disbarred lawyer may submit an application for reinstatement 
three months before the end of the eight-year limit.95) The procedures previ-
ously described for implementing a suspension, including ceasing all practice, 
withdrawing from all appearances, closing IOLTA and trust accounts, return-
ing fees, etc., apply to disbarment. As with any non-temporary suspension, a 
disbarment order takes eﬀect thirty days from the date of the SJC’s ruling, and 
the lawyer must complete all requirements within fourteen days after the order 
date. Within seven days thereafter, the disbarred lawyer must ﬁle an aﬃdavit 
with the BBO describing the steps taken to close the law practice.96
Disbarment is reserved for the most serious instances of misconduct, and 
most reports of disbarment include multiple examples of wrongdoing with aggra-
vating factors. For example, in neglect matters, even the most severe neglect of 
client matters will not lead to disbarment, but signiﬁcant neglect combined with 
other misconduct will result in disbarment.97 In matters involving misuse of cli-
ent funds, “[w]hen an attorney ‘intended to deprive the client of funds, perma-
nently or temporarily, or if the client was deprived of funds (no matter what the 
attorney intended), the standard discipline is disbarment or indeﬁnite suspen-
sion.’   ”98 The SJC imposes disbarment when the facts of the lawyer’s misappro-
priation of client funds is most serious, and where other aggravating factors are 
present, including failure to make restitution.99 Disbarment is the recognized sanc-
tion for conviction of a serious crime within the practice of law.100 Chapter 23 dis-
cusses the standards and procedures governing reinstatement.
At least 175 Massachusetts lawyers have been disbarred between 1999 and 
2017, not counting the many lawyers who resigned in the face of possible dis-
93 Matter of Hiss, 368 Mass. 447, 1 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 122 (1975).
94 SJC Rule 4:01 § 18(2)(a).
95 Id.
96 SJC Rule 4:01 § 17.
97 See, e.g., Matter of Espinosa, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 307 (2012) (repeated neglect would war-
rant a lengthy term suspension, but lawyer’s misrepresentations to clients and to the OBC, and 
his misuse of client funds, warranted disbarment).
98 Matter of McBride, 449 Mass. 154, 163 (2007) (quoting Matter of Schoepfer, 426 Mass. 183, 
187 (1997)).
99 See, e.g., Matter of Dasent, 446 Mass. 1010, 1012–13, 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 173 (2006) 
(imposing sanction of disbarment where attorney intentionally misused client funds, failed to 
repay full amount owed, committed multiple ethical violations, and showed no special mitigat-
ing factors).
100 Matter of Otis, 438 Mass. 1016, 1017, 19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 344 (2003); Matter of 
Concemi, 422 Mass. 326, 330, 12 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 63, 69 (1996).
59
Discipline: Grounds and Types
barment. The SJC disbarred twenty-three lawyers in ﬁscal year 2016,101 ﬁfteen 
lawyers in ﬁscal year 2015,102 and nineteen lawyers in ﬁscal year 2014,103 includ-
ing lawyers disbarred after submitting disciplinary resignations.
Examples of Disbarment Sanction Standards
Neglecting a client matter: Even the most severe neglect 
of client matters does not result in disbarment. Signiﬁ-
cant neglect combined with other misconduct may 
result in disbarment.104
Mishandling client funds: “When an attorney ‘intended to 
deprive the client of funds, permanently or temporarily, 
or if the client was deprived of funds (no matter what 
the attorney intended), the standard discipline is disbar-
ment or indeﬁnite suspension.’  ”105 The SJC imposes dis-
barment when restitution has not been made or where 
other violations or aggravating factors are present.106
Conviction of a “serious crime”: “Disbarment is the ‘usual and 
presumptive sanction’ for conviction of a serious crime.”107 
A “serious crime” is deﬁned in SJC Rule 4:01 § 12(3).
H. Disciplinary Resignation
The ﬁnal disciplinary avenue is voluntary resignation while subject to a BBO 
investigation or proceeding. This section distinguishes truly voluntary resigna-
tions from those pursued while the lawyer faces discipline.
101 Bar Counsel  Annual Report, supra note 54, at 14.
102 Bar Counsel  Annual Report, supra note 4, at 15.
103 Bar Counsel  Annual Report, supra note 20, at 15.
104 See, e.g., Matter of Espinosa, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 307 (2012) (repeated neglect would war-
rant a lengthy term suspension, but lawyer’s misrepresentations to clients and to the OBC, and 
his misuse of client funds, warranted disbarment).
105 Matter of McBride, 449 Mass. 154, 163 (2007) (quoting Matter of Schoepfer, 426 Mass. 183, 
187 (1997)).
106 See, e.g., Matter of Dasent, 446 Mass. 1010, 1012–13, 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 173 (2006) 
(imposing sanction of disbarment where attorney intentionally misused client funds, failed to 
repay full amount owed, committed multiple ethical violations, and showed no special mitigat-
ing factors).
107 Otis, 438 Mass. at 1017 (quoting Matter of Concemi, 422 Mass. 326, 330 (1996)).
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1. Voluntary Resignations
A lawyer who is in good standing and not the subject of a disciplinary 
investigation may resign from the practice of law by submitting a request to the 
BBO. After determining that the resignation is not related to a forthcoming 
OBC investigation, the BBO forwards the resignation request to the SJC, which 
will allow it. To become an attorney again after resigning, the former lawyer 
may have to retake the bar examination and satisfy all other admissions require-
ments.108 This kind of “normal, voluntary” resignation has no disciplinary impli-
cations whatsoever. It almost never occurs, since most lawyers who no longer 
wish to practice simply retire, which eliminates the need to retake the bar exam 
in order to resume practice. To become active again, the retired lawyer pays the 
fees for the years in retirement.109
2. Disciplinary Resignations
An entirely diﬀerent process applies if a lawyer is the subject of an OBC in-
vestigation, or is in the middle of disciplinary proceedings, and wishes to resign. 
SJC Rule 4:01 establishes a process for these resignations.110 In order to resign, 
the lawyer must submit an aﬃdavit to the BBO with several components, in-
cluding conceding that the resignation is voluntary and not the subject of coer-
cion or duress, as well as a statement that the allegations are warranted, or at 
least that they can be proven:
108 The process for a good-standing resignation, as described in an unpublished BBO state-
ment, is as follows:
[I]f you are in good standing and you wish to resign voluntarily from the bar, the General 
Counsel will place your request before the Board, which will make a recommendation to 
the Court. It is the Board’s practice to hold such requests for six months in case discipli-
nary charges surface. This kind of resignation will also have the eﬀect of removing your 
name from the rolls and would likely require you to take and pass the bar examination and 
fulﬁll other requirements for readmission should you decide to return to the practice of 
law in Massachusetts.
109 The process for retirement is as follows:
Alternatively [to a voluntary resignation], you may elect Retirement Status, for which you 
do not pay an annual fee, in the event you deem it unlikely you would be practicing law in 
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in the future. You obtain the same result without all 
the negative eﬀects of an actual resignation from the bar. If you wish to resume active status 
from retirement, however, you are required to pay the active fee for all the years while on 
retirement status.
Id.
110 SJC Rule 4:01 § 15.
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The lawyer acknowledges that the material facts, or speciﬁed material 
portions of them, upon which the complaint is predicated are true or can 
be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.111
The BBO acts on the aﬃdavit of resignation, after which the matter goes to 
the SJC. After the Court accepts the resignation, the lawyer may still be disbarred, 
as an order accepting the resignation and disbarring the lawyer sometimes (but not 
always) is entered as a result.112 In either event, the lawyer is prohibited from prac-
ticing in the same manner as any disbarred attorney and may not seek reinstate-
ment any sooner than if disbarred, that is, for eight years. Still, some lawyers prefer 
a resignation leading to a disbarment order over an involuntary disbarment order.
Resignation has other advantages for the disciplinary process as a whole. As 
one single justice wrote, “The purpose of the resignation provision is to permit 
respondent attorneys who wish to acknowledge their wrongdoing and exit the pro-
fession with dignity to do so forthwith, while saving Bar Counsel, the BBO and 
the Court the time and expense of lengthy disciplinary proceedings.”113 The fact 
that a resignation oﬀers a lawyer some advantages is demonstrated by the fact that 
on at least two occasions the OBC has attempted to prevent a lawyer from resign-
ing at the last minute to avoid a disbarment, eﬀorts that did not succeed.114
Practice Tip
The SJC disbars most lawyers who resign during disci-
plinary proceedings or investigation but will not enter 
a disbarment order if the underlying misconduct would 
not warrant disbarment. In either instance, a disciplinary 
resignation has the same effect on the attorney’s future 
practice as a formal disbarment.
111 Id.
112 In most reported instances of a lawyer submitting an aﬃdavit of resignation in lieu of facing 
possible disbarment, the SJC orders disbarment. See, e.g., Matter of Lamond, 26 Mass. Att’y 
Disc. R. 299 (2010); Matter of Gregson, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 312 (2008). Occasionally, 
though, the resignation itself serves as the sanction, and no order of disbarment appears. See, e.g.,
Matter of Sohmer, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 553 (2009) (“the Court entered a judgment accepting 
the aﬃdavit of resignation as a disciplinary sanction eﬀective immediately”; no order of disbar-
ment issued); Matter of Lallier, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 388 (2007) (same).
113 Matter of Oates, 5 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 274, 277 (1986).
114 Matter of Lee, 3 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 129 (1983); Matter of Orme, 27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 
677 (2011). In Matter of Toscano, 5 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 364 (1987), the OBC supported an 
attorney’s request to resign, but the SJC refused the lawyer’s request.
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The SJC accepted disciplinary resignations without using the word disbar-
ment from three lawyers in ﬁscal year 2016,115 ten lawyers in ﬁscal year 2015,116
and three lawyers in ﬁscal year 2014.117
III. MITIGATING AND AGGRAVATING FACTORS
The sanctions described in the preceding sections must be applied fairly. 
As the SJC has written, “When considering a disciplinary sanction, we exam-
ine whether the sanction is markedly disparate from judgments in comparable 
cases.”118 The BBO and the SJC “need not endeavor to ﬁnd perfectly analogous 
cases, nor must [they] concern [themselves] with anything less than marked dispar-
ity in the sanctions imposed.”119 In assessing the appropriate level of discipline, 
the BBO and the SJC must also consider factors that mitigate, and those that 
aggravate, the misconduct the lawyer committed. A lawyer may receive a lesser 
sanction compared to another lawyer who engaged in the same misconduct if there 
are signiﬁcant mitigating factors, and, correspondingly, that lawyer may receive a 
more severe sanction if aggravating factors are present. Chapter 18 discusses mit-
igating and aggravating factors in more detail. 
IV. DISABILITY INACTIVE STATUS
While not a disciplinary sanction based upon misconduct, the SJC may 
impose disability inactive status upon a lawyer who lacks the mental or physical 
capacity to maintain the practice of law. If a court has declared a lawyer incom-
petent or in need of a guardian, the SJC enters an order transferring the lawyer 
to disability inactive status.120 If no such adjudication has occurred, but the OBC 
learns of facts showing such incapacity (including, at times, from the lawyer), the 
OBC may initiate formal proceedings to transfer the lawyer to disability inactive 
status.121 The lawyer assigned such status may later petition to be reinstated.122
Chapter 21 discusses disability inactive status in more detail.
115 Bar Counsel  Annual Report, supra note 54, at 14.
116 Bar Counsel  Annual Report, supra note 4, at 15.
117 Bar Counsel  Annual Report, supra  note 20, at 15.
118 Matter of Balliro, 453 Mass. 75, 85, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 31 (2009) (quoting Matter of 
Finn, 433 Mass. 418, 423 (2001)).
119 Matter of Hurley, 418 Mass. 649, 655 (1994).
120 SJC Rule 4:01 § 13(1).
121 Id. at § 13(4).
122 Id. at § 13 (6).
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The Disciplinary Process
chapter five
Complaints, Attorney and Consumer Assistance 
Program, Investigation, and Stipulations
This chapter outlines and describes the disciplinary process, from a com-
plainant’s initial contact, through the Oﬃce of the Bar Counsel (OBC) investiga-
tion, to resolution through informal measures or stipulations. Chapter 6 covers the 
procedures for matters that are not resolved by informal resolution or by stipula-
tion, including the rules, standards, and practices for evidentiary hearings.
I. THE COMPLAINT
The disciplinary process starts when someone or something comes to the 
attention of disciplinary personnel. This section explains how this intake oper-
ates. The process starts with the OBC, not with the Board of Bar Overseers (BBO) 
or the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC). A potential matter may come to the atten-
tion of the OBC in several ways:
• A telephone call or a letter to the OBC
• A formal written complaint to the OBC 
• A lawyer’s mistake in connection with the BBO’s registration depart-
ment, such as failure to register and pay fees or paying bar fees from 
an Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts (IOLTA) account
• The OBC becoming aware of misconduct through a newspaper 
article or a court decision
• Receipt of a notice of a bounced check on an IOLTA account,
based upon the required reporting by an IOLTA account bank 
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(Chapter 14 discusses the dishonored check notiﬁcation policy in 
more detail.)
• Self-reporting by the attorney
Any one of these, or information from any source about possible miscon-
duct, can cause the OBC to take steps, which are described later in this section.
Most complaints come from a person—often a client, sometimes an oppos-
ing party or lawyer, or even a judge who has observed the lawyer—writing a letter 
or calling the OBC to register a grievance. The complainant may also use an oﬃ-
cial complaint form, entitled Request for Investigation.1 (The BBO does not have 
an e-mail address through which to send a grievance electronically and does not 
currently accept e-mail complaints.) The OBC does not accept anonymous com-
plaints unless the complaint contains clear evidence of serious misconduct on which 
to base an investigation. However, if a judge makes a report, the OBC protects 
the identity of the complaining judge where possible, unless the judge has already 
advised the lawyer or given permission to disclose the judge’s identity. 
When the OBC receives a telephone call, letter, or complaint form, it 
refers the matter to the Attorney and Consumer Assistance Program (ACAP) 
within the OBC, unless the matter is serious enough to warrant immediate 
attention. When ACAP reviews a telephone complaint, if no resolution is pos-
sible, or if it determines that a formal investigation is appropriate, ACAP pro-
vides the complainant with a complaint form to complete. If ACAP receives a 
letter or written complaint and it is unable to resolve the matter, or it concerns 
a serious issue, the complaint is referred for formal investigation and logged in 
as a formal case on the OBC’s docket. Even if the complainant does not submit 
an oﬃcial OBC complaint form, the OBC may initiate a formal disciplinary 
investigation against the lawyer on its own, if warranted.
All complaints submitted to the BBO or to the OBC “shall be conﬁdential 
and absolutely privileged,”2 although no authority prevents complainants from 
disclosing that they submitted a complaint or revealing the contents of the com-
plaint. The person making the complaint is immune from any civil liability for 
statements made in the complaint (but not for statements made outside of that 
process, including sharing the complaint with others3). According to the OBC 
1 A copy of the form appears on the BBO website, https://bbopublic.blob.core.windows.net/web/f/
Conﬁdential-Application.pdf (last visited May 14, 2018).
2 Supreme Judicial Court, Rule 4:01 § 9(1) [hereinafter SJC Rule].
3 Id. See also Bar Counsel v. Farber, 464 Mass. 784 (2013) (complainant’s immunity remains even 
though the disciplinary proceedings become public).
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website, the “conﬁdential” part of that commitment means that “[u]ntil the 
lawyer has been served with a petition for discipline instituting formal charges or 
has agreed to be formally disciplined, the Board and Bar Counsel may not pub-
licly disclose that the complaint has been ﬁled.”4 The OBC ordinarily discloses 
the complainant’s name and the content of the complaint to the respondent 
lawyer, and after that the lawyer may disclose otherwise conﬁdential informa-
tion, if necessary, in defense.5
The SJC Rules describe some narrow exceptions to the OBC’s conﬁdenti-
ality duty except as otherwise provided in the Rules. The OBC may disclose the 
pendency and the status of its investigation (which presumably includes the iden-
tity of the respondent lawyer) in the following circumstances:
• If the lawyer consents
• If the investigation has been triggered by the lawyer’s conviction for a 
“serious crime”6
• If the underlying allegations have become generally known
• If a person or organization needs to be notiﬁed in order to protect the 
public, the administration of justice, or the legal profession.7
After a petition for public discipline is ﬁled, the allegations in that petition be-
come public.
Finally, some administrative and disciplinary actions commence without 
an outside complaint. If a lawyer fails to comply with the annual registration and 
renewal procedures, as well as reminders regarding expiration of applicable 
grace periods, the BBO will proceed to seek the lawyer’s administrative sus-
pension. If a lawyer overdraws an IOLTA account or an individual trust account 
and a check is dishonored for insuﬃcient funds, a bank approved by the IOLTA 
committee is required to notify the OBC.8 Since overdrawing a client trust 
account indicates some trust account record-keeping issues, the OBC auto-
matically opens an investigation. The OBC also acts proactively if a lawyer pays 
bar dues from the IOLTA account.
4 Filing a Complaint Against an Attorney, Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers, https://
www.massbbo.org/Complaints#how (last visited Feb. 8, 2018).
5 See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.6(b)(5) (permitting disclosure of protected client information where nec-
essary “to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer’s representation of the 
client”).
6 See SJC Rule 4:01 § 12(3), discussed in Chapter 4.
7 SJC Rule 4:01 §§ 20(2)(a)–(d). See Rule 4.01 § 12A.
8 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(h)(1).
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The OBC reports the nature of the complaints it receives annually in a pub-
lic report that appears on the OBC website.9 An earlier article from the bar 
counsel reported that “[w]ithout fail, domestic relations cases generate the most 
complaints,”10 and that pattern has remained consistent.11 After family matters, 
the next most common subject matters leading to complaints tend to be civil lit-
igation (non–motor vehicle injuries), real estate, motor vehicle personal injury, 
criminal matters, and trust and estate matters.12 Of the reasons why people con-
tact the OBC, the most common complaints, by far, concern neglect and com-
petence, followed by fee issues.
II. THE ATTORNEY AND CONSUMER ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
Almost all complaints to the OBC, whether written or telephonic, are 
assigned initially to ACAP. The OBC created ACAP in 1999, after years of con-
cern that the oﬃce was overwhelmed with its caseload.13 ACAP has been suc-
cessful in resolving most of the complaints against lawyers and in separating out 
those that need serious disciplinary attention. A 2016 report stated that ACAP 
resolved 86% of the matters it received without needing to initiate any formal 
disciplinary proceedings.14
The ACAP intake process works as follows: The ACAP staﬀ (consisting of 
attorneys and investigators experienced in bar discipline) respond to all telephone 
complaints and are assigned the written complaints deemed appropriate for 
ACAP resolution. The assigned ACAP staﬀ person ﬁrst hears from the com-
plainant, usually a client of the lawyer but sometimes someone diﬀerent, such 
as a criminal defendant’s parent or companion, or a relative who has agreed to 
9 Annual Reports,Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers, https://www.massbbo.org/Reports 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2018).
10 Anne Kaufmann, Five Years of ACAP (2004), https://bbopublic.blob.core.windows.net/web/f/
acap5.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2018). (“Five years in a row, family law concerns constituted more 
than 15% of all matters screened by ACAP.”).
11 The OBC annual reports for 2012 through 2016 list domestic relations as the most common 
practice area generating complaints about lawyer misconduct.
12 See Kaufman, supra note 10. The recent annual OBC reports conﬁrm that list of practice areas.
13 See, e.g., Massachusetts Bar Association, Report of the MBA Task Force on Lawyer 
Discipline—Protecting the Public: Reforming the Disciplinary Process – (2005) 
[hereinafter MBA Task Force] (describing the history).
14 See Massachusetts Office of the Bar Counsel of the Supreme Judicial Court, Annual 
Report to the Supreme Judicial Court, Fiscal Year , at 3. Cf. Daniel C. Crane, The 
Future for Lawyer Discipline (2005), https://bbopublic.blob.core.windows.net/web/f/future.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2018) (in 2005, ACAP resolved 75% of its matters without formal discipline).
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pay for an individual’s legal fees, or the opposing client or counsel. The ACAP 
staﬀ person ﬁrst explores the underlying story and the reasons for the com-
plaint. ACAP ascertains the identity of the lawyer complained about. ACAP 
maintains a record of such complaints for future reference, regardless of how 
the complaint is concluded or resolved. This record may protect the lawyer, as 
some complainants contact the OBC on more than one occasion with the same 
complaint.
The complaint can lead to one of three diﬀerent dispositions:
• If the complaint does not constitute misconduct or is not appropriate 
for ACAP intervention, the ACAP staﬀ provides the complainant 
with reasons why the complaint does not constitute a rules violation 
or otherwise does not ﬁt within the OBC’s purview. The complainant 
does not have to accept this determination, however, and has the right 
to submit a written complaint for the OBC’s review. 
• If the OBC believes the complaint is valid, it is docketed for further 
investigation, which may include diversion. 
• If the OBC agrees that the matter should not be investigated further, 
the complainant is informed and provided with an explanation in 
writing. The complainant also receives notice of the right to request a 
review of the OBC’s decision to take no action, as described in 
Section V. In these instances, the lawyer complained about receives no 
notice from ACAP or the OBC.
At the other end of the spectrum are complaints that ACAP determines, 
from the facts alleged, to warrant formal OBC investigation. If the allegations 
show, without the need for further inquiry, suﬃcient cause to believe that the 
lawyer in question has engaged in serious misconduct, the complainant is asked 
to submit the complaint in writing (either by letter or using the OBC complaint 
form),15 and the matter is referred directly to the OBC staﬀ who investigate 
and prosecute lawyers. ACAP’s role is concluded once it makes that referral.
The vast majority of calls fall somewhere in the middle, where ACAP’s 
intervention might resolve the dispute without the need for a petition for dis-
cipline, or where there is a plausible chance of that happening. In those mat-
ters, ACAP ascertains the complainant’s allegations and contacts the lawyer 
(typically by telephone) regarding a mediation-type process in an attempt to 
15 Filing a Complaint Against an Attorney, Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers, https://
www.massbbo.org/Complaints (last visited Feb. 8, 2018).
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resolve the complaint. ACAP has access to any publicly available court dockets 
and pleadings, so its staﬀ may review court or agency records to help under-
stand what possibly led to the complaint. ACAP may also request that the law-
yer or the complainant provide documents to establish the facts in question.
Once ACAP has a fuller understanding of the facts underlying the com-
plaint and the lawyer’s version of the events, it may seek to broker a resolution 
that satisﬁes both parties. Some dispute categories readily lend themselves to 
this kind of mediated resolution. For instance, if a client calls ACAP because a 
lawyer has not provided the case ﬁle to a successor counsel, a telephone call to 
the lawyer often results in the ﬁle being delivered. Or if the client has not yet 
received the proceeds from a personal injury matter settled a few months prior, 
ACAP might be able to explain the payment delay, such as an unresolved lien, 
to the client’s satisfaction. Sometimes it can be as simple as getting the lawyer 
to contact the client with a status update on the client’s matter.
While ACAP does not resolve fee disputes,16 sometimes a complainant’s 
objection to the fee amount will include underlying allegations about less-than-
competent lawyering or an error in calculating the fees charged. In such settings, 
a call from ACAP might lead to an agreement between the lawyer and the cli-
ent to correct the mistake, forgive the fee, or return the attorney’s fees, without 
any further action against the lawyer.
As previously noted, ACAP resolves the vast majority of complaints the 
OBC receives. While ACAP keeps an electronic record of the complaint and 
its resolution for internal use, when it resolves a matter this way, no formal 
complaint exists on the attorney’s BBO record.
III. THE OFFICE OF BAR COUNSEL INVESTIGATION
In the small proportion of matters that the OBC receives where ACAP 
feels a formal complaint is merited, ACAP staﬀ either invites the complainant 
to ﬁle a formal request for investigation, which is essentially a complaint form, 
or transfers the written complaint letter, if received, to be docketed and assigned 
to an assistant bar counsel. When the OBC receives the complaint, it investi-
gates the underlying facts and claims. Commencing an investigation is not the 
same thing as filing disciplinary charges against a lawyer. The “ﬁling of charges” 
16 If a dispute about fees does not rest on a claim of a “clearly excessive fee” in violation of SJC 
Rule 1.5(a), or a claim of dishonesty in billing in violation of SJC Rules 8.4(c) and 8.4(h), the 
matter is not properly before the OBC. Instead, ACAP urges the parties to seek the aid of the 
Massachusetts Bar Association Legal Fee Arbitration Board or go to small claims court.)
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refers to a “petition for discipline,” whereby the OBC, with the approval of the 
BBO, institutes formal proceedings to impose public discipline.17 The OBC 
must, through its investigation, be satisﬁed that charges are warranted before 
ﬁling charges. That investigation process can take time.18 In most cases, the 
OBC investigation does not lead to disciplinary charges being ﬁled.
The OBC investigation process develops as follows:
1. The complainant’s ﬁling of the written request for investigation causes 
the OBC to docket the matter and initiate an investigation. The BBO 
Rules require the OBC to “forward to the Respondent a request for a 
statement of the Respondent’s position . . . . ”19 That notiﬁcation 
includes the nature of the complaint and the name and address of the 
complainant (unless the OBC has good cause not to disclose that 
information). The BBO Rules do not state that the OBC must share 
the actual complaint form with the respondent, but the OBC’s 
practice is to forward the written complaint to the respondent, unless 
it comes from a judge who prefers that the respondent not know the 
identity of the judge who notiﬁed the OBC. When a judge is the 
complainant, the ﬁle is typically opened as a “Bar Counsel” ﬁle; the 
same is true when the OBC opens the matter on its own initiative. 
Otherwise, the ﬁle is opened in the name of the complainant.
2. The respondent has twenty days to reply to the OBC’s notice. As
every practitioner manual or article about this topic emphasizes, a 
lawyer who receives such a notice from the OBC must take it seri-
ously and respond within the time permitted (which may include an 
extension upon request).20 Not only is it good strategic judgment to 
17 SJC Rule 4:01 § 7(2)(c).
18 In its 2005 report on the state of the disciplinary process in Massachusetts at that time, the MBA 
Task Force criticized the excessively long time between the start of an investigation and the deci-
sion to ﬁle charges, noting that “[a]pproximately half of the cases decided by the BBO in the last 
two ﬁscal years had investigatory periods (i.e., the period between the initial complaint against the 
lawyer and the ﬁling of formal charges) of four years or longer.” The report also described one 
matter where the investigatory period was ten years. MBA Task Force, supra note 13, at 23. The 
process seems to be much more eﬃcient now. According to the 2014 OBC report, “For the ﬁrst 
time Bar Counsel ended the ﬁscal year with no ﬁles over two years old that are not in petition or 
deferred. Only four lawyers had ﬁles over eighteen months old that were not in petition and that 
had not been deferred.” Massachusetts Office of the Bar Counsel of the Supreme Judi-
cial Court, Annual Report to the Supreme Judicial Court, Fiscal Year .
19 Rules of the Board of Bar Overseers, § 2.6 [hereinafter BBO Rules].
20 See, e.g., James S. Bolan, The Disciplinary Process, in Ethical Lawyering in Massachusetts,
Chapter 1 (Mass. Cont. Legal Educ.) (2009); Ronald F. Kehoe, How to Settle Cases with the Office 
of Bar Counsel, in Practicing Before the BBO 269, 270 (Mass. Cont. Legal Educ.) (1994).
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treat such a development with the respect it deserves, but failure to
respond to a request for information from the OBC may itself be the 
basis for discipline, above and beyond the grounds on which the
underlying complaint was ﬁled.21 The response at this stage is diﬀer-
ent from the answer the respondent must ﬁle to a petition for disci-
pline if formal disciplinary proceedings commence. The response at 
this stage of the investigation should include the lawyer’s version of 
the facts surrounding the dispute and the lawyer’s position about the 
merits of the complaint, with supporting documents. The respondent 
provides an original and a copy of the response, with the copy intended 
for the complainant. The complaining party has the opportunity to 
read the lawyer’s response to the OBC’s notice and to comment on it.
    The respondent may answer by e-mail, attaching scanned copies of 
the response and any attachments. While not a requirement, it is good 
practice for a respondent or respondent’s counsel to number the pages 
of the response and to use Bates numbers22 on the response and the 
supporting documents.
    Whether a respondent should retain counsel at this stage is a 
matter of professional judgment, inﬂuenced by the seriousness of the 
misconduct alleged in the request for investigation. Most observers 
remind respondents that there is considerable beneﬁt to having 
objective, independent advice about the risks the lawyer might face. 
Every person is subject to pervasive and powerful self-serving biases,23
and those biases may distort a lawyer’s judgment about how to 
respond to claims of misconduct. Also, the lawyer’s response to the 
OBC waives any right the respondent may have under the privilege 
against self-incrimination relating to any admissions made in that 
response.24 If a respondent would like to be represented by counsel 
21 SJC Rule 4:01 § 3(1)(b).
22 Bates numbering is the process most law ﬁrms use to assign successive numbers to the pages 
of a collection of documents.
23 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011); Robert A. Prentice, The SEC 
and MDP: Implications of the Self-Serving Bias for Independent Auditing, 61 Ohio St. L.J. 1597
(2000).
24 The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination can apply in disciplinary proceed-
ings if some likelihood exists of criminal charges, but its assertion may trigger adverse inferences. 
See Matter of Boxer, 14 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 74, 78–79 (1998) (proper to draw an adverse infer-
ence from respondent’s refusal to testify) (citing Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 514 (1967)) 
(lawyer may not be disciplined solely for asserting the privilege against self-incrimination in bar 
disciplinary proceedings); Matter of Kenney, 399 Mass. 431, 437 (1987) (same).
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but cannot aﬀord it, the BBO’s Oﬃce of the General Counsel will 
attempt to assist the respondent in obtaining pro bono representa-
tion.25 Many professional liability insurance policies cover the cost of 
counsel to respond to bar discipline proceedings, or some amount 
toward it, and a respondent would be well served to review the 
insurance policy, if there is one, both to obtain defense counsel and to 
provide the requisite notice of the claim to ensure coverage.
3. After receiving the respondent’s position and response to the allega-
tions, the OBC may need to investigate further, especially if it has 
reason to believe that it may recommend that the BBO initiate pro-
ceedings for public discipline. The OBC may use investigatory sub-
poenas to explore the underlying facts of the dispute. The BBO Rules 
permit the OBC to request that the BBO (through any BBO mem-
ber) issue a subpoena “requiring the attendance and testimony of a 
witness, including the Respondent, and the production of any evidence, 
including books, records, correspondence or documents, relating to 
any matter in question in the investigation” (emphasis added).26 The 
BBO regularly issues such subpoenas when the OBC requests them.
    The subpoena will require that the witness appear before the OBC 
at a speciﬁed time and place, with the requested papers or items. 
While Massachusetts and federal civil practice both permit a “docu-
ments only” subpoena,27 that option is not available in OBC investi-
gations. However, if an OBC subpoena requests only documents, the 
OBC may advise the subpoenaed witness that appearance is unneces-
sary as long as the witness provides the subpoenaed documents in a 
timely manner and with an aﬃdavit authenticating the documents. If 
a meeting does occur, the respondent has no right to be present and 
has no right to know when and where the meeting will take place. 
This investigatory process is quite diﬀerent from a deposition in a civil 
court action, where the other party has the right not only to attend 
but to participate in asking questions.28 If the OBC records the 
25 BBO Rules § 3.4(d).
26 BBO Rules § 4.4(a).
27 See, e.g., Mass. R. Civ. P. 45(b), Reporter’s Note (2015) (“the most signiﬁcant change in Rule 
45 as result of this [2015 amendment] was the adoption for Massachusetts practice of a ‘docu-
ments only’ subpoena directed to a non-party, a practice that has existed under Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure since 1991.”
28 See Mass. R. Civ. P. 30(b), (c).
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meeting resulting from the subpoena, it will supply a copy of the 
recording to the respondent prior to a hearing on a petition for 
discipline. Otherwise, the OBC has no obligation to share the prod-
uct of this meeting with the respondent. The BBO Rules require that 
the OBC shall “maintain the absolute conﬁdentiality of the investiga-
tion,” including the information obtained pursuant to its subpoena.29
    If ﬁnancial misconduct is a potential issue, the OBC can, and will, 
demand that the respondent provide records that all lawyers are 
required to maintain by the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 1.1530 and subpoena all relevant ﬁnancial records directly from 
the appropriate banks or other ﬁnancial institutions. The OBC will, 
depending on the needs of the investigation, also obtain pertinent 
court pleadings, transcripts, and/or audio recordings of hearings or 
trials, insurance company ﬁles, mortgage lenders’ ﬁles, and any other 
relevant third-party ﬁles. In addition, the OBC may speak to oppos-
ing counsel, clients, or any other persons having relevant information. 
The conﬁdentiality requirements of the OBC’s investigation do not 
preclude such investigations; however, the OBC advises persons and 
institutions that it contacts that its investigation is conﬁdential, and 
the OBC requests that the contacted person or organization honor 
that conﬁdentiality.
    During the OBC’s investigation, a respondent has no right to 
subpoena witnesses to any corresponding meeting or to seek leave of 
the BBO to do so. As described in Chapter 6, the respondent has 
some limited discovery opportunities after charges are ﬁled and a 
hearing is expected.
IV. RESOLUTION BY AGREEMENT AFTER INVESTIGATION COMPLETE
After the OBC completes its investigation, the oﬃce determines how to pro-
ceed. If the investigation does not provide the OBC with good cause to seek 
some form of discipline, the OBC closes the matter and informs the respondent 
and the complainant. The complainant has the review rights described in the next 
section. The OBC may also “close the matter after adjustment, informal confer-
ence, or reference to and completion of diversion to an educational, remedial, 
29 BBO Rules § 4.7(a).
30 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f )(1) (itemizing documentation required of all trust accounts).
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or rehabilitation program.”31 That closing usually comes through an agreement 
with the respondent, but may conclude with a warning to a respondent or sug-
gestions on how to seek help or avoid future problems. The parties may agree to 
any satisfactory diversionary or remedial arrangement, but quite often the law-
yer agrees to participate in a program oﬀered by Lawyers Concerned for Lawyers 
(LCL),32 the Massachusetts organization that assists lawyers “who are experienc-
ing any level of impairment in their ability to function as a result of personal, 
mental health, addiction or medical problems,”33 or the Law Oﬃce Manage-
ment Assistance Program (LOMAP),34 a program within LCL established “to 
help attorneys licensed in Massachusetts (or soon to be) establish and institu-
tionalize professional oﬃce practices and procedures to increase their ability to 
deliver high quality legal services, strengthen client relationships, and enhance 
their quality of life.”35
A stipulation may also (or alternatively) include an agreement to “account-
ing probation,” whereby a ﬁnancial professional audits the respondent’s 
accounts, at the respondent’s expense, for a speciﬁed period of time. For 
accounting violations, the OBC may also require the respondent to attend one 
or more courses addressing law oﬃce ﬁscal management.
If the OBC determines that some formal discipline is warranted, it informs 
the respondent and invites the lawyer to agree to the recommended discipline. 
If the respondent disagrees with the proposed sanction, and if further negotia-
tions about that topic are fruitless, then the OBC proceeds with formal disci-
pline proceedings, as described in the next chapter. If the respondent and the 
OBC agree about the facts and the appropriate public discipline, then the 
OBC prepares and serves a petition for discipline and serves it on the respon-
dent. If the proposed sanction is an admonition, the OBC recommends that 
the BBO impose an admonition and, with the respondent’s agreement, sends 
the lawyer a notiﬁcation of the admonition, including a summary of the basis 
of the charges. Chapter 6 discusses the procedures if the respondent does not 
consent to the admonition.
If the parties agree that the proposed sanction be some form of public 
discipline, the matter proceeds as follows:36 Bar counsel prepares a petition for 
31 BBO Rules § 2.7(2).
32 See Lawyers Concerned for Lawyers, http://www.lclma.org/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2018).
33 Id.
34 See Law Office Management Assistance Project, http://masslomap.org/ (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2018).
35 Id.
36 See BBO Rules §§ 3.19(d), (e) for the description of this process.
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discipline, and the respondent ﬁles an answer and stipulation, also signed by 
bar counsel, admitting certain charges (or agreeing they could be proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence) and waiving any right to be heard on the ques-
tion of mitigation. If either party wishes to reserve the right to a hearing should 
the BBO reject the agreement, such reservation must be made at this time. 
After the answer/stipulation is ﬁled, the matter is referred directly to the BBO, 
along with a description of the joint recommendation for discipline.37 Where 
the agreement is for a public reprimand, and if the BBO agrees with the joint 
recommendation, it orders the public reprimand.38 If the agreement is for a sus-
pension or disbarment, and the BBO agrees with the joint recommendation, 
the BBO ﬁles a pleading with the SJC known as an Information, which moves 
the proceedings from the BBO to the SJC. The BBO must also transmit to the 
SJC a full record of the matter. Because only the SJC may suspend or disbar an 
attorney, the Court must approve the joint recommendation.
If the BBO rejects the parties’ joint recommendation, it must specify its 
reasons for doing so and notify the parties. This rejection constitutes a prelim-
inary determination. The parties then have fourteen days from that notice to 
ﬁle briefs arguing for acceptance of the joint proposal.39 If the BBO remains 
unpersuaded, then one of two avenues exist. If either of the parties has reserved 
the right to a hearing, then the parties may amend their pleadings and proceed 
to a hearing, as discussed in Chapter 6. If neither party has reserved that right, 
the matter proceeds to the SJC for the appropriate disposition.
As a practical matter, the respondent’s best opportunity to negotiate an 
agreed-upon resolution with the OBC is before the petition for discipline is 
ﬁled. Unlike civil cases where the plaintiﬀs conduct discovery to learn more 
about the strengths and weaknesses of their case, the OBC already knows the 
case before the petition for discipline is ﬁled. If the respondent has a defense 
or mitigating factor, that evidence should be presented to the OBC in the 
course of the investigation in an eﬀort to negotiate the best possible resolution 
at that time. A respondent should not expect the OBC to agree to a disposition 
that is below the sanctions range for that misconduct. (Part III discusses the 
typical sanctions for diﬀerent types of misconduct in more detail.)
If the respondent agrees to a sanction recommendation that is appropriate 
for the agreed misconduct, the OBC may, in some circumstances, be willing to 
37 BBO Rules § 2.8(c).
38 Id. § 3.19(d).
39 Id. § 3.19(e).
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omit disputed issues. The lesser charge might be to a respondent’s beneﬁt at a 
later reinstatement hearing.
If a lawyer expects to agree to a suspension recommendation, or expects to 
go to a hearing when the real question is the appropriate length of the suspen-
sion, and if the lawyer has ceased or is willing to cease practicing law, the lawyer 
should consider a temporary suspension under SJC Rule 4:01 § 12A. (Chapter 4 
discusses temporary suspensions under this rule.) The understanding is that when 
the disciplinary sanction takes eﬀect, it is retroactive to the eﬀective date of the 
temporary suspension. The BBO and the SJC have approved such agreements in 
the past, assuming timely compliance by the respondent with the terms of the 
suspension or disbarment.40
As an alternative to ﬁling an answer and stipulation along with the OBC’s 
petition for discipline, a respondent who has committed serious misconduct 
may choose to submit an aﬃdavit of resignation. As discussed in Chapter 4, a 
respondent who resigns cannot apply for reinstatement for at least eight years. 
As noted in the previous paragraph, the resignation may be retroactive to the 
date of a temporary suspension; otherwise, SJC Rule 4:01, §§ 15 and 17(1) 
aﬀord the respondent with fourteen days to close the lawyer’s practice.
V. COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO REVIEW
As noted in Section II, if the OBC decides to close a request for investiga-
tion without any discipline, the complaining party is entitled to have the BBO 
review that decision. When the OBC decides not to prepare a petition for dis-
cipline, it sends the complainant a notice, as required by SJC Rule 4:01, “inform-
ing the complainant in writing of the reasons for not investigating a complaint 
or for closing the ﬁle and of the complainant’s right to request review by a 
member of the board[.]”41 The BBO Rules require that the complainant apply 
for such review within fourteen days of receiving the OBC’s notice.42
40 See, e.g., Matter of Pomeroy, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 515 (2010) (aﬃdavit of resignation, with 
disbarment retroactive to the date of the § 12A temporary suspension); Matter of Khoury, 24 
Mass. Att’y Disc. 395, 397 (2008) (respondent defaulted; disbarment retroactive to date of com-
pliance with § 12A suspension); Matter of Golden, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. 196, 202 (2007) (stip-
ulation to indeﬁnite suspension accepted by the Court; retroactive to date of § 12A temporary 
suspension).
41 SJC Rule 4:01 § 3(1)(b).
42 BBO Rules § 2.10(1)(A).
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According to the OBC’s experiences in recent years, in the vast majority of 
cases in which the OBC decided to close a ﬁle, the complainant did not seek BBO 
review. When the complainant requests a review, the OBC submits the ﬁle to 
a reviewing BBO member, and the reviewing BBO member may adopt, reject, 
or modify the OBC’s decision.43 In recent years, the reviewing BBO member has 
rarely overruled or modiﬁed the OBC’s decision not to pursue discipline.
A complainant who is not satisﬁed with the OBC’s decision not to pursue 
discipline may have other remedies against the respondent, including a malprac-
tice action or a fee arbitration board. The OBC advises the complainant of such 
alternative avenues when appropriate. However, a complainant has no standing 
to seek to compel the OBC to investigate or prosecute a case.44
43 Section 2.10 of the BBO Rules states that, should a complainant seek review of a decision not 
to pursue discipline, the procedures outlined in section 2.8 apply. Section 2.8 outlines the proce-
dures by which a BBO member reviews the OBC’s recommendations generally.
44 Binns v. Board of Bar Overseers, 369 Mass. 975 (1976); Matter of a Request for an Investiga-
tion of an Attorney, 449 Mass. 1013 (2007).
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Proceedings Before the Board of Bar Overseers
I. INTRODUCTION
The chapter explains the adjudicatory process before the Board of Bar Over-
seers (BBO). It describes the steps leading up to a disciplinary hearing, the hear-
ing itself, and the hearing committee’s or oﬃcer’s resulting written report to the 
BBO. The end of the chapter discusses the somewhat diﬀerent procedures in dis-
ciplinary hearings for criminal convictions, expedited hearings to review impos-
ing an admonition, and reinstatements.
II. THE PETITION FOR DISCIPLINE
A. Filing
After the Oﬃce of Bar Counsel (OBC) decides to institute disciplinary 
proceedings against an attorney—including a Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) 
referral to the BBO after a lawyer is convicted of a crime1—and, where required, 
the BBO has approved the matter for prosecution,2 it ﬁles a petition for discipline 
with the BBO. The petition must specify the charges of the attorney’s alleged 
misconduct3 and include a caption listing the bar counsel as the petitioner and 
1 See Massachusetts Rules and Orders of the Supreme Judicial Court r. 4:01 §§ 12(4), 
(5) [hereinafter SJC Rule]. Section 12(4) states that the SJC shall refer to the BBO any convic-
tion involving a “serious crime” for which an order to show cause why the lawyer should not be 
immediately suspended was issued. Section 12(5) permits the SJC to refer to the BBO any other 
conviction. Chapter 4, Section II(F)(5) discusses the immediate suspension process after a con-
viction for a serious crime.
2 After investigation, if the OBC determines that there is a basis for public discipline, and the OBC 
and the respondent have not agreed on a disposition, the matter is presented to a BBO member 
for approval for prosecution. SJC Rule 4:01 §§ 8(1)(c), (3); Rules of the Board of Bar Over-
seers § 2.7(3) [hereinafter BBO Rules]. No such approval is needed when the discipline results from 
the lawyer’s conviction of a “serious crime,” as provided for in SJC Rule 4:01 § 12(4). Chapter 4, 
Section II(F)(5) discusses this discipline process.
3 BBO Rules § 3.14(b).
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4 BBO Rules § 4.14(a).
5 As indicated elsewhere, SJC Rule 4:01 § 3 identiﬁes the grounds for professional discipline, 
which include both violations of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct set forth in SJC 
Rule 3:07 and violations of the rules governing the legal profession set forth in Chapter 4 of the 
SJC Rules.
6 SJC Rule 4:01 § 20(1)(c); BBO Rules § 3.22.
7 BBO Rules § 3.4(c).
the attorney as the respondent.4 The geographic area in which the respondent 
practices and the ﬁling year determine the ﬁling number. The petition is signed by 
an assistant bar counsel.
The petition typically includes one or more counts, each of which alleges, in 
numbered paragraphs, the details concerning the transactions or activities regard-
ing the alleged misconduct, identiﬁes the relevant dates and names of individ-
uals or organizations, and includes, where appropriate, the client or clients the 
alleged misconduct aﬀected. The petition must identify the grounds for disci-
pline, including the Rules of Professional Conduct or other rules5 that the OBC 
claims the respondent violated. The petition also typically includes, after the 
counts, the full text of the cited rules, omitting the comments. See Appendix A 
for a sample, ﬁctitious Petition for Discipline.
You Should Know
Once a petition for discipline is ﬁled, all of the proceed-
ings are open to the public, and all ﬁled documents, 
including the petition and the respondent’s answer, are 
available for public inspection, absent the SJC’s or the 
BBO’s issuance, in rare circumstances, of a protective 
order.6
B.  Service and Filing of the Petition and Accompanying Notice
from the BBO
Before ﬁling the petition with the BBO, the OBC must serve the petition 
upon the respondent by certiﬁed mail, return receipt requested, and by ﬁrst 
class mail. Service is made at the address the BBO has on record.7 The petition 
when ﬁled with the BBO includes a certiﬁcate of service signed by the assis-
tant bar counsel of record, attesting to the date and means of service.
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When served, the petition must include a Notice to Respondent Accom-
panying Petition for Discipline from the BBO informing the respondent of the 
responsibilities upon receiving the petition,8 including the following items:
1. A notice that the respondent must ﬁle an answer within twenty days 
from receipt of the petition for discipline, along with information 
about the acceptable method of ﬁling and serving the answer.
2. Advice to the respondent that failure to ﬁle a timely answer will be 
deemed an admission of the charges, and assertions in the petition 
that are not denied in the answer will be deemed admitted.
3. Advice to the respondent that failure without good cause to ﬁle a 
timely answer will itself be deemed both as an act of professional 
misconduct and also as grounds for administrative suspension pursu-
ant to SJC Rule 4:01 § 3(2).9
See Appendix B for a sample ﬁctitious Notice to Respondent Accompany-
ing Petition for Discipline.
III. ANSWER OF THE RESPONDENT; FILING AND SERVICE
A. When to File the Answer
After service by the OBC, the respondent has twenty days from the date 
of service to ﬁle an answer to the petition for discipline with the BBO and to 
serve the answer on the bar counsel.10 Filing the answer is complete when the 
BBO receives the document.11 Failure to ﬁle the answer on time will result, 
according to the BBO Rules, in each allegation of the complaint being deemed 
admitted, as described in the previous section. If the respondent has good cause 
for ﬁling the answer later than twenty days after receipt, a motion may be ﬁled 
with the chair of the BBO requesting an extension. Section IV discusses the 
procedure for ﬁling and serving motions.
If the respondent fails to ﬁle either an answer or a motion for an extension 
of time, the BBO “promptly” notiﬁes the respondent that the allegations on the 
petition are deemed admitted and the opportunity to present mitigating evidence 
8 Id. at §§ 3.15(a)(1)–(3).
9 See Chapter 4, Section (II)(F)(6) for a discussion of administrative suspensions.
10 SJC Rule 4:01 § 21.
11 BBO Rules § 3.3.
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Practice Tips
In calculating the time when the respondent’s answer is 
due, the period runs from the date the petition is mailed. 
The BBO Rules do not incorporate the principles of Rule 
6(d) of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, 
which adds three days to the relevant time period when 
a document is served by mail.12 In practice, that time 
period is not strictly enforced, as it might be in some 
contentious civil litigation contexts. In fact, when an 
answer is not ﬁled by the expected deadline, the BBO 
informs the respondent of the opportunity to ﬁle a 
motion to remove a default.
* * *
If a respondent needs more time to answer, the best 
practice is to contact the assistant bar counsel and 
request an extension. Such requests are routinely granted 
if made in good faith. If granted, the parties prepare a 
joint motion, or the OBC will not oppose respondent’s 
motion to the BBO for the extension.
is waived.13 Within twenty days of the date of that notice, the respondent may 
seek relief from that default by a motion showing good cause for having missed 
the ﬁling deadline.14 In practice, such motions are allowed if the respondent 
has a reasonable explanation for failing to meet the ﬁling deadline.
If the respondent defaults and does not successfully ﬁle a motion for relief 
from the default, the BBO notiﬁes the respondent that the allegations in the 
petition are deemed admitted and that the opportunity to present mitigating 
evidence is waived. Unless the OBC requests a hearing on matters in aggrava-
tion, in which the respondent may participate and oﬀer evidence, the BBO 
considers the matter on the basis of the admitted allegations. If the BBO orders 
12 Mass. R. Civ. P. 6(d), which reads as follows:
(d) Additional Time After Service by Mail. Whenever a party has the right or is required 
to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of 
a notice or other papers upon him and the notice or paper is served upon him by mail, 
3 days shall be added to the prescribed period.
13 BBO Rules § 3.15(g).
14 Id. at § 3.15(h).
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the parties to submit briefs, the respondent may submit a brief on any con-
tested issue, even after defaulting.15
B. The Contents of the Answer
The answer must “state fully and completely the nature of the defense” and 
must admit or deny each allegation included in the petition, “speciﬁcally, and in 
reasonable detail.”16 The respondent may also deny an allegation on the basis of 
insuﬃcient information on which to admit or deny the assertion.17 The answer 
must also state in concise fashion any facts and law the respondent relies on in 
defense. A general denial (simply stating “denied”) is not permitted. In addition, 
if the respondent intends to assert any mitigating facts, these must be alleged in 
the answer. Failure to allege such facts will waive the right to present evidence 
of those facts.
Practice Tip
A general denial, or a denial in an answer of a factual 
assertion on the grounds that the respondent has 
insufﬁcient information on which to admit or deny the 
allegation, is risky. It invites a motion from the OBC to 
deem the matter admitted, unless the lack of informa-
tion is plausible under the circumstances.
* * *
In the answer, a respondent might admit the facts 
and claim mitigation in defense. That strategy limits the 
proceeding to mitigating and aggravating matters. This 
strategy can be effective if there is no defense on the 
facts, little in aggravation, but powerful mitigation.
In the answer, the respondent “may request that a hearing be held on the 
issue of mitigation.”18 The BBO’s practice is to treat the pleading of mitigating 
matters as a request that the disciplinary hearing include evidence in mitigation, 
even if the respondent has not expressly requested a hearing on mitigation. 
15 Id. at § 3.15(g).
16 Id. at § 3.15(d).
17 While the BBO Rules do not speciﬁcally allow such a response, it is an accepted practice when 
used appropriately.
18 BBO Rules § 3.15(d).
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The answer must be signed by the pro se respondent or by the counsel of 
record. (The answer need not be, and in practice is never, signed under the pen-
alties of perjury.)
A lawyer appearing on behalf of a respondent in a disciplinary proceeding 
must be licensed in Massachusetts, as practice before the BBO constitutes the prac-
tice of law. A lawyer licensed in another jurisdiction but not licensed in Massa-
chusetts may request permission to appear on behalf of a respondent, and such 
requests have been granted in the past.19
See Appendix C for a sample ﬁctitious Answer to Petition for Discipline.
Practice Tip
Having the advice of counsel at the pleading stage can 
be critical to a respondent in the disciplinary process. If 
a respondent cannot afford counsel, the Ofﬁce of the 
General Counsel (OGC) of the BBO will assist the 
respondent to locate pro bono representation, although 
there is no right to counsel in disciplinary proceedings. 
Every participant in the disciplinary process in Massa-
chusetts emphasizes the critical role counsel can play 
for a respondent.20 Many liability insurance policies 
provide some degree of coverage for representation to 
defend against disciplinary charges.
IV. MOTIONS BEFORE FILING AN ANSWER
Before ﬁling an answer, a respondent may ﬁle a motion to extend the time to 
answer, if the respondent has good cause for such a request. Unlike proceedings 
governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, a respondent has no right under the 
BBO Rules to ﬁle a motion to dismiss or for a more deﬁnite statement in lieu 
of ﬁling an answer, although a respondent may ﬁle a motion to dismiss after having 
19 Such requests typically involve counsel from another jurisdiction who already represents the 
respondent in that jurisdiction. That circumstance would qualify the lawyer to practice under 
Mass. R. Prof. C. § 5.5(c)(4), which permits temporary practice in Massachusetts by an out-of-
state lawyer in matters that “arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer’s practice in a 
jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice.” Mass. R. Prof. C. 5.5(c)(4).
20 There is no right to counsel in discipline matters. BBO Rules § 3.4(d); Matter of Jones, 425 
Mass. 1005, 1006, 13 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 290, 295 (1997) (rescript).
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answered the petition.21 A respondent who ﬁles a prehearing motion to dismiss 
should accompany that motion with a motion to stay the proceedings, as the ﬁl-
ing of a motion to dismiss does not by itself extend the time to ﬁle an answer.22
The BBO Rules include general provisions for ﬁling motions.23 Those rules 
do not describe the procedure for a motion to extend the time to answer, but the 
BBO’s practice is as follows: The respondent must ﬁle the motion with the BBO, 
with a copy to the assistant bar counsel. The motion must provide speciﬁc facts 
supporting the extension request, and the facts must be included in an aﬃdavit 
signed under the penalties of perjury. The BBO chair rules on the motion with-
out a hearing. In practice, most such motions have the OBC’s assent, after the 
parties have discussed the respondent’s need for more time.
The same process applies when a respondent ﬁles a motion for relief from 
default, although the rules are explicit for this motion. It must be ﬁled within twenty 
days of the BBO’s notice indicating that the allegations in the petition are deemed 
admitted and the opportunity to present evidence in mitigation is waived.24 That 
motion must be accompanied by an aﬃdavit demonstrating good cause for such 
relief, and the BBO chair decides the matter without a hearing.
V. SELECTION OF THE HEARING COMMITTEE
OR THE SPECIAL HEARING OFFICER
After the respondent ﬁles an answer, the BBO assigns the matter to a hear-
ing committee or, on occasion, a special hearing oﬃcer (SHO).25 The process for 
selecting the committee or the SHO is as follows:26
1. The BBO, through the OGC, elicits from the OBC and the respondent 
or respondent’s counsel estimates of the likely length of the hearing and 
the complexity of the issues. 
21 See BBO Rules § 3.18(a). Section 3.18, entitled “Motions,” refers almost exclusively to motions 
directed to the hearing committee, hearing panel, or special hearing oﬃcer, and similarly refers 
to the eﬀect of such motions on the hearing. That rule does not address motions to extend time 
for ﬁling of an answer, and no other rule addresses that topic.
22 BBO Rules §§ 3.18(b)(1), (2).
23 Id. at § 3.15(d).
24 Id. at §§ 3.15(g)–(h).
25 For matters involving reinstatement of a suspended or disbarred attorney, or involving disci-
pline based on a criminal conviction, the BBO assigns a hearing panel, which consists of mem-
bers of the BBO, and is distinguished from the hearing committee described in the text.
26 For a description of this process, see Board of Bar Overseers Policies and Practices ¶ 9 (2011), 
Board of Bar Overseers, https://www.massbbo.org/Files?ﬁleName=bbopolicy.pdf (last visited 
March 20, 2018).
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2. With that knowledge, the general counsel’s staﬀ ordinarily appoints a 
hearing committee, consisting of three volunteer hearing committee 
members, one of whom is typically a layperson. The chair will always be 
a lawyer who has served on at least one previous hearing committee.
3. The timing of the likely hearings and the scheduling needs inﬂuence 
which volunteers are assigned to a committee as well as the hearing’s 
location.
4. In unusual circumstances, typically because a matter is expected to be 
extremely complex and lengthy, the OGC staﬀ assigns the matter to an 
SHO, a single volunteer attorney who conducts the proceedings alone.
For the purposes of the following discussion of the processes leading up to 
and through the hearing, this chapter will refer to a hearing committee rather 
than repeatedly referring to a hearing committee or an SHO. The SHO handles 
everything that the hearing committee can.27
VI. DISCOVERY
Discovery in BBO disciplinary proceedings is very limited and is governed 
by BBO Rules § 3.17. The following avenues exist for the parties to conduct 
discovery and obtain information from one another.
A. Required Document and Information Production
Within twenty days of the respondent’s ﬁling of an answer, each party must 
disclose to the other the names and addresses of “all persons having knowledge 
of facts relevant to the proceedings.”28 Within thirty days of the ﬁling of an 
answer, each party may make a reasonable request to the other party for non-
privileged information and evidence relevant to the charges or to the respon-
dent, and upon that request the other party must comply within ten days. The 
rule also provides that, with the approval of the hearing committee chair, a 
party may obtain information other than that just described. There is no pro-
vision for interrogatories, requests for production, or requests for admissions.29
27 BBO Rules § 3.19(a).
28 Id. at § 3.17(a). The rule does not require disclosure of e-mail addresses of the persons identiﬁed.
29 Id. The rule permits “other material” beyond “non-privileged information and evidence rele-
vant to the charges or the Respondent.” “The Massachusetts work product doctrine . . . may be 
invoked to protect from discovery certain types of documents prepared by a party’s attorney, or 
nonlawyer representative, in anticipation of litigation. [Certain types of ] work product may be 
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Practice Tip
BBO disciplinary proceedings are intended to be fair 
and expeditious. Both parties fare better when partici-
pants cooperate and demonstrate good faith compli-
ance with the rules. Prompt and accommodating 
compliance with the required sharing of information 
helps set a tone that is useful as the matter continues to 
resolution. Disputes or uncertainties about the informa-
tion required to be shared are best resolved by conver-
sations between the parties or their counsel.
B. Medical Records
In cases where a respondent’s physical or mental status is at issue (typically 
as an argument in mitigation), the rules require the respondent to provide the 
OBC with detailed disclosures about any such condition and any medical or sim-
ilar records related to it.30 The deadline for those disclosures is set at the man-
datory prehearing conference described in Section VIII. A respondent whose 
medical condition is at issue must do the following:
1. Identify and disclose in writing to the OBC the nature of every 
condition the respondent claims may have aﬀected professional 
conduct or is otherwise at issue, and for which the respondent has 
“received consultation, evaluation, treatment, counseling or other 
services,” including “the dates” of each such condition.31
2. For each such condition, identify the name and address of each 
hospital, doctor, therapist, counselor, or other provider from whom 
the respondent received any services.
subject to disclosure upon a showing of a substantial need for the material and that its equivalent 
cannot be obtained by other means.” Cahaly v. Benistar Property Exchange Trust Co., Inc., 85 
Mass. App. Ct. 418 (2014). See also Mass. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
30 BBO Rules § 3.23(b)(6)(b). The disclosure requirements for medical records are found in the 
part of the BBO Rules governing the mandatory prehearing conference.
31 Id. Presumably, the rule’s reference to the “dates” of such conditions is intended to elicit the time 
periods when the respondent suﬀered from such conditions, as well as the speciﬁc dates of each 
consultation, evaluation, treatment, counseling, or other service. The “dates” of conditions 
claimed in mitigation are relevant to the required determination whether the condition had a 
causal relationship to the charged misconduct. See, e.g., Matter of Johnson, 452 Mass. 1010, 
1011, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 380, 383 (2008) (rescript).
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3. For each such condition, produce all hospital, medical, psychiatric 
psychological, counseling, and other records and reports in the 
respondent’s possession and control. 
4. Sign releases that permit the OBC or its agents to obtain all medical 
records from the identiﬁed providers relating to the conditions at 
issue.32
C. Depositions
A party may take a deposition in a BBO disciplinary proceeding under 
two circumstances, one relatively easy to satisfy and the other quite diﬃcult:
• A party may take the deposition upon oral examination of an 
“unavailable witness,” deﬁned in the rules as a witness “not subject to 
service of a subpoena or unable to attend a hearing due to age, illness 
of other inﬁrmity[.]”33 A respondent or the OBC may seek permis-
sion from the BBO for such a testimony-preserving purpose either 
before34 or after35 formal proceedings have commenced. A request 
made after the petition is ﬁled must be granted for a witness at the 
hearing. A request made before a petition is ﬁled is granted only if “in 
the interest of justice.” 
• A party may also take a deposition upon oral examination “upon 
showing of a substantial need for the deposition in the preparation of 
the applicant’s case[.]”36 Permission to take such a discovery deposi-
tion is much rarer, and the burden on the applicant is signiﬁcantly 
higher.
32 Section 3.23(b)(6)(b)’s use of the phrase “for each such condition” in tandem with the require-
ment that the respondent “identify” the claimed mitigating physical or mental condition indi-
cates that the respondent has a burden of identifying which doctors, treatments, records, etc., are 
pertinent to which claim of mitigating physical or mental status.
33 BBO Rules § 4.10(b). This procedure is available to the parties before formal proceedings start 
as well, if the same test is met. BBO Rules § 4.10(a).
34 BBO Rules § 4.10(a). For a deposition of an unavailable witness before proceedings start, the 
BBO chair or designee may grant permission if deemed “to be in the interest of justice.” Id.
35 Id. at § 4.10(b). The “interest of justice” factor is not explicitly identiﬁed in this rule, which states 
that such requests “shall be approved” by the BBO chair, the designee, or the hearing committee 
or oﬃcer. Id.
36 BBO Rules § 4.9(a)(2). That rule lists the factors that determine whether substantial need 
exists. See BBO Rules §§ 4.9(a)(2)(a)–(c).
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Practice Tip
A party needing to take a deposition to preserve the 
relevant testimony of a witness who genuinely cannot 
be available for a hearing will be able to do so. A party 
wanting to take a deposition to prepare its case more 
effectively will typically not obtain permission. In the 
BBO disciplinary hearing process, discovery depositions 
are discouraged and rarely occur.
The BBO allows a witness who is unable to appear 
in-person to testify by videoconference, reducing some 
concerns about a witness’s unavailability. When a hear-
ing witness is not present in the hearing room, the 
witness must be sworn in by a notary public who is at 
the same location as the witness.
To obtain permission to conduct a testimonial deposition of an unavailable 
witness before a hearing committee has been assigned, the party must ﬁle a writ-
ten notice and application to the BBO chair or the chair’s designee, seeking leave 
to take the deposition and (if applicable) to request the deponent to produce doc-
uments at the time of the deposition.37 The rules identify no time limit for such 
a request (unlike the process for requesting documents and information from the 
other party, which is subject to deﬁned time limits), except that all depositions 
must be completed within twenty-one days prior to the hearing date.38 The appli-
cation to conduct a deposition must identify the reasons for taking the deposi-
tion; the deponent’s name and address; the subject matter on which the person 
will be deposed; the date, time, and place of the proposed deposition; and the 
name of the notary before whom the deposition will take place.39 The rules per-
mit a deposition to be taken before the BBO chair or designee, a member of the 
hearing committee, any notary public, or any other disinterested person autho-
rized to administer oaths.40
37 Id. at § 4.11.
38 Id. at §§ 4.9(b), 4.10(b).
39 Id. at § 4.11(a).
40 BBO Rules § 4.12(a) describes those persons entitled to oversee depositions under SJC Rule 1:02 
§ 2(a), which covers notaries public in the Commonwealth and other similar agents outside the 
Commonwealth.
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The other party may object or otherwise respond to the request within seven 
days after service of the application.41 After the time for objection has passed, 
the hearing committee or the BBO chair will either allow or deny the applica-
tion.42 If the deposition is authorized, the order will identify the time and place 
of the deposition and the name of the notary who will preside over the depo-
sition. The order allowing a deposition may also include protective provisions 
limiting the deposition’s scope.43 If necessary (meaning that the witness refuses 
to voluntarily attend the deposition), the BBO chair will issue a subpoena to the 
deponent requiring attendance and the production of any documents covered 
by the order. Once the subpoena is issued, the requesting party must arrange for 
the subpoena to be served on the witness and (unless the subpoenaed witness is 
a lawyer) must follow the procedures for service of a summons in Massachusetts 
courts (which is diﬀerent from the procedure for service of a subpoena).44 If a 
testimonial deposition is sought after a hearing committee has been assigned, 
it may enter the same orders and take the same actions as the board chair.45
If a party needs to subpoena a witness from another jurisdiction to appear 
at a deposition, that party must ﬁrst seek permission from the hearing commit-
tee or oﬃcer.46 If permission is granted, the BBO chair requests that the disci-
plinary board or entity in the jurisdiction in which the deposition is to be taken 
issue an appropriate subpoena.47 If that entity cannot, or declines to, issue the 
requested subpoena, the party must petition the SJC pursuant to Mass. Gen. 
Laws ch. 223A, § 10 to issue a “letter rogatory,” or a formal written request.48
The deposition proceeds as in civil litigation settings, with the deponent’s 
testimony taken under oath, and with the opportunity for deponent’s counsel to
41 BBO Rules § 4.11(a).
42 Id. at § 4.11(b).
43 Id. at § 4.11(c).
44 BBO Rules § 4.6 (“Each subpoena issued in accordance with this subchapter shall be served in 
the manner provided for service of summonses in the Courts of the Commonwealth.”). In Massa-
chusetts courts, service of a summons requires an authorized process server, while service of a sub-
poena may occur by any person who is not a party and is at least 18 years of age. Compare Mass. R. 
Civ. P. 4(c) with Mass. R. Civ. P. 45.
45 BBO Rules § 4.11(c).
46 BBO Rules § 4.5B(a).
47 BBO Rules § 4.5B(b).
48 BBO Rules § 4.5B(c). See also SJC Rule 4:01 § 22(2) (when a party seeks a subpoena pursuant 
to the law of some other jurisdiction for use in a disciplinary proceeding there, a member of the 
BBO “may issue a subpoena” to compel the attendance of witnesses and production of documents, 
but only after the issuance of the subpoena “has been duly approved under the law of the other 
jurisdiction”).
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Practice Tip
In disciplinary hearing settings, the parties seldom resort 
to formal use of subpoenas served in the manner the 
rules require. Deponents typically agree to appear and 
accept service of subpoenas in an informal matter, if a 
party uses a subpoena at all.
examine the witness after the direct testimony.49 The rules imply that the prin-
ciple expressed in Rule 32(d)(3)(B) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, that objec-
tions regarding the form of the question are waived if not made during the 
deposition,50 apply regardless of who oversees the deposition. In depositions con-
ducted without the hearing oﬃcer presiding, objections “to the competency of 
the witness or to the competency, relevancy or materiality of the testimony are 
not waived by failure to make them before or during the taking of the deposi-
tion.”51 If a party elects to take the deposition before a member of the hearing 
committee, the presiding person rules on objections when they are made.52
After the deposition is concluded, the deponent has the opportunity to read 
and sign the transcript as well as to make changes “in form or substance” to the 
transcript.53 The notarial oﬃcer enters these changes on the deposition, along 
with the deponent’s reasons for the changes.54 If the deponent fails or refuses to 
sign the transcript, the deposition may be used as though it had been signed. After 
the transcript is signed or the time for signing has passed, the notarial oﬃcer dis-
tributes the deposition. For depositions taken after formal proceedings start and 
to secure the testimony of an unavailable witness, the notarial oﬃcer must certify 
the deposition and deliver it to the BBO, which ﬁles the original and provides 
49 BBO Rules §§ 4.11, 4.13.
50 Mass. R. Civ. P. 32(d)(3)(B), which reads as follows:
Errors and irregularities occurring at the oral examination in the manner of taking the 
deposition, in the form of the questions or answers, in the oath or aﬃrmation, or in the 
conduct of parties, and errors of any kind which might be obviated, removed, or cured if 
promptly presented, are waived unless seasonable objection thereto is made at the taking of 
the deposition.
51 BBO Rules § 4.14(a).
52 Id. at § 4.14(b).
53 Id. at § 4.13(a).
54 Id. The rules do not establish a time limit during which the deponent must sign the deposition. 
The parties must agree upon that schedule.)
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a copy to each party and member of the hearing committee.55 For all other dep-
ositions, the oﬃcer must give notice to the parties of the transcript’s availabil-
ity, and any party or the deponent may then obtain a copy from the oﬃcer by 
paying a fee for the copy.56
A deposition is not evidence in a disciplinary proceeding (and therefore not 
available for public inspection) unless and until a party oﬀers the transcript or 
a part of the transcript into evidence at the hearing. (This is true even when the 
deposition transcript is delivered to members of the hearing committee prior 
to the hearing.) When oﬀered, the recorded testimony is treated as though the 
deponent were present at the hearing and testifying.57
VII. MOTIONS AFTER THE FILING OF AN ANSWER
A party may ﬁle a motion, including a motion to dismiss the petition for 
discipline, prior to the start of the hearing.58 Any such motion must be ﬁled with 
the BBO at least ten days before the hearing, absent good cause for a later ﬁling. 
As with the petition, service may be made by mail and is complete upon mail-
ing or in-hand service.59 A party wishing to respond to the motion must ﬁle a 
response within seven days of the date of service, not receipt, of the motion.60 If 
the motion is based on assertions of fact, the moving party must support the 
motion with an aﬃdavit, unless the facts are established by the pleadings or an 
agreement between the parties.61 Except for motions to dismiss or for issue pre-
clusion, the chair of the hearing committee decides all motions, and all are de-
cided without a hearing or oral argument.62
55 Id. at § 4.13(b)(1).
56 Id. at § 4.13(b)(2). The BBO Rules oﬀer no way for a party or deponent to obtain a copy of 
the transcript without payment.
57 Id. at § 4.15.
58 BBO Rules § 3.18 sets forth the procedure for motions ﬁled after an answer.
59 BBO Rules §§ 3.9, 3.10.
60 This procedure diﬀers from the typical civil litigation arrangement. Cf. Mass. R. Civ. P. 6(d), 
which reads as follows:
Errors and irregularities occurring at the oral examination in the manner of taking the 
deposition, in the form of the questions or answers, in the oath or aﬃrmation, or in the 
conduct of parties, and errors of any kind which might be obviated, removed, or cured if 
promptly presented, are waived unless seasonable objection thereto is made at the taking of 
the deposition.
61 BBO Rules § 3.18(a)(3).
62 Id. at §§ 3.18(a)(4), (5).
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Motions to dismiss the petition or the charges must be heard by the BBO 
chair or a BBO member the chair designates; motions to preclude issues must 
be heard by the chair or the chair’s designee, which can be another BBO mem-
ber or the hearing committee chair.63
A party may not immediately appeal an unfavorable ruling on a motion, 
except for the allowance of a motion to dismiss or rulings that the moving party 
alleges exceed the jurisdiction or the authority of the hearing committee. For all 
other motion rulings, the dissatisﬁed party must reserve any review until after 
the hearing report is issued.64
VIII. MANDATORY PREHEARING CONFERENCE
A prehearing conference is required before a disciplinary hearing. The con-
ference is typically scheduled at the time the BBO notiﬁes the parties of the 
hearing dates and the appointment of the hearing committee. The date for the 
conference is chosen without input from the parties. The purpose of the pre-
hearing conference is for the chair to:
• Set dates for the parties to exchange witness lists, expert witness dis-
closures, and proposed exhibits; to ﬁle ﬁnal witness lists and agreed 
exhibits; any stipulations of the parties; lists of objected-to exhibits; 
deadlines for ﬁling motions; and deadlines for requesting hearing
subpoenas
• Issue orders to reﬁne the issues in dispute
• Resolve any remaining discovery matters
• Identify evidence the parties are submitting for their cases in chief 
and eliminate unnecessary witnesses
• Address any other matters that will result in “the prompt and orderly 
conduct and disposition of the proceeding”65
The parties and their counsel must attend the prehearing conference and 
must have authority to make commitments about the matters to be addressed.66
The conference establishes any revised hearing dates. The parties assist in arrang-
ing the hearing date or dates.
63 Id. at §§ 3.18(b)1, 3.18(c).
64 Id. at § 3.18(a)(7).
65 Id. at § 3.23(b).
66 BBO Rules § 3.23 outlines the mandatory prehearing conference requirements.
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You Should Know
BBO policy prohibits the hearing committee from engag-
ing in or encouraging settlement discussions.67 Notwith-
standing that policy, the mandatory prehearing conference 
is an opportunity for the parties, before or after the con-
ference but without the participation of the hearing 
ofﬁcer, to explore settlement or stipulation possibilities. 
If the parties agree on the charges to remain in place 
and a recommended sanction, that agreement is set down 
in writing and presented to the BBO for its approval, and 
the committee is discharged.68  While the conference is 
not intended for settlement discussion about the charges, 
it is intended to achieve stipulations about facts and 
documents.
An important purpose of the prehearing conference is to identify and resolve 
any disputes about the documentary evidence being oﬀered during the hearing. 
Prior to the disciplinary hearing, each party must identify all documents being 
oﬀered through the party’s case in chief or matters in aggravation. Parties must 
raise any objection to those documents during the exhibit exchange set up by the 
prehearing order issued as a result of the conference. The Prehearing Confer-
ence Order requires “preﬁling” all agreed exhibits within an identiﬁed period of 
time. Lists of disputed exhibits, with reasons for the objections, must also be ﬁled. 
Absent good cause, failure to object to a proposed exhibit precludes the party from 
objecting to the admission of the exhibit at the hearing.69 Also absent good cause, 
a party may be precluded from calling any witness or introducing any exhibit, 
except for rebuttal, that is not disclosed pursuant to the prehearing order.70
The prehearing conference also addresses the disclosure of medical records 
and releases to medical providers for those records by a respondent who has 
67 BBO Policies and Practices ¶ 10, Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers, https://bbopublic
.blob.core.windows.net/web/f/bbopolicy.pdf (“The [B]oard prohibits [hearing] panel members from 
encouraging Bar Counsel and the respondent to settle matters assigned to a hearing.”) (last vis-
ited Feb. 9, 2018).
68 Chapter 5 discusses stipulations and the process by which the BBO and, if necessary, the SJC 
review the agreement.
69 BBO Rules § 3.23(b)(6).
70 Id.
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placed a medical or other condition as an issue in the proceeding, as discussed 
in Section VI(B).
The rulings of the hearing committee chair presiding at the prehearing con-
ference control the remainder of the proceeding, unless the BBO chair modi-
ﬁes any such rulings.71 Except for certain motions concerning amendments to 
pleadings and protective orders, rulings on motions cannot be appealed or re-
viewed prior to the issuance of the hearing report.72
After completing the prehearing conference, the hearing committee chair 
serves the parties with a Prehearing Conference Order that describes all the 
matters covered during the conference. See Appendix F for a sample, ﬁctitious 
Prehearing Conference Order.
IX. THE HEARING
A. An Overview of the Disciplinary Hearing
If the matter is not resolved after the prehearing conference, the parties pro-
ceed to a hearing before the hearing committee. The usual location for all hear-
ings is the BBO oﬃce in Boston, but hearings may take place at other locations, 
such as Dartmouth, Springﬁeld, or Worcester, based on convenience for the 
parties, the committee members, and the witnesses.73 The BBO’s letter to the 
parties notifying them of the appointment of the hearing committee includes 
the prehearing conference date and the hearing dates. The hearing is open to 
the pub lic (including news media and television cameras) and is subject to any 
protective orders the BBO or the SJC issues.74 The committee chair attempts 
to accommodate the schedules of the parties and their counsel, but at the same 
time is rigorous in ensuring that the hearing takes place in a time-sensitive 
manner. 
The BBO must give the parties at least ﬁfteen days’ notice of the hearing.75
That notice must advise the respondent that failure to appear at the hearing is 
71 BBO Rules §§ 3.25, 3.26. In practice, the other hearing committee members may review and 
revise rulings made at the prehearing conference, although the BBO Rules do not expressly allow 
for that practice.
72 BBO Rules § 3.18(a)(7). Presumably, one could try a discretionary appeal to the single justice 
under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211 § 3.
73 BBO Rules at § 3.20.
74 Id. at § 3.22(c).
75 SJC Rule 4:01 § 8(3)(b).
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deemed an act of professional misconduct and may be grounds for administrative 
suspension.76 In practice, because the hearing notice is in the BBO letter advis-
ing the parties of the prehearing conference date and the appointment of the 
hearing committee, the parties receive notice of the hearing months, rather 
than days, in advance. The prehearing conference is typically held six weeks or 
more before the hearing, and that conference permits the parties an opportu-
nity to review the hearing dates.
No hearing continuance is required if a hearing committee member is absent, 
as long as a quorum of the hearing committee is present. The absent member 
may participate fully in all committee deliberations so long as that person has the 
transcript of the missed proceedings.77
Generally, the OBC has the burden of proving the elements of professional 
misconduct by a preponderance of the evidence; the respondent has the burden 
of proof on aﬃrmative defenses and mitigation.78
When the hearing starts, and before the assistant bar counsel calls the ﬁrst 
witness, the hearing committee chair accepts into evidence all exhibits that the 
parties have agreed are admissible. (The parties should formally move them into 
evidence.) Each exhibit received during the hearing receives an identifying num-
ber or letter, and some exhibits may be admitted for a limited purpose.
B. Opening Statements
At the discretion of the hearing committee chair, the parties may make brief 
opening statements at the start of the hearing.79 Those statements must refer to 
facts and must not include argument. The bar counsel’s opening statement typ-
ically does not request a particular sanction, which it reserves for the closing 
argument or posthearing brief. The respondent may defer making an opening 
statement until after the bar counsel has completed the main part of its case. 
76 BBO Rules § 3.21. Chapter 4, Section II(F)(6) discusses administrative suspensions.
77 BBO Rules at § 3.7(c).
78 Id. at § 3.28. See Matter of Balliro, 453 Mass. 75, 84, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 31 (2009) (Bar 
counsel has burden to prove misconduct); Matter of Hoicka, 442 Mass. 1004, 1006, 20 Mass. 
Att’y Disc. R. 239, 242 (2004) (respondent bears burden to prove informed consent to a conﬂict); 
Matter of Eisenhauer, 426 Mass. 448, 452, 14 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 251, 256, cert. denied, 524 U.S. 
919 (1998) (same); Matter of Murray, 455 Mass. 872, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 406 (2010) (bur-
den of proof on certain elements of intentional misuse with deprivation prospectively shifted to 
attorneys who receive cash, fail to deposit it in an account, then are unable to account for it).
79 The BBO Rules do not expressly allow for opening statements, but this paragraph describes the 
typical practice.
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C. Subpoenas to Witnesses
The procedure for using subpoenas in discipline proceedings to compel a 
witness to attend the hearing diﬀers markedly from state civil practice, where 
the parties’ attorneys may cause a notary to issue a subpoena without prior court 
approval. In a bar discipline case, a party wishing to compel a witness to testify or 
to produce documents must submit a written request for a subpoena to the BBO 
or the hearing committee.80 The committee chair and any BBO member have 
authority in Massachusetts to issue a hearing subpoena.81 As noted in the discus-
sion of depositions in Section VI(C), once the subpoena is issued, the request-
ing party must arrange for service of the subpoena upon the witness and, unless 
the witness is a lawyer licensed in Massachusetts, must follow the procedures 
for service of a summons in Massachusetts courts (which is diﬀerent from the 
procedure for service of a subpoena).82
The hearing committee members may issue a subpoena on their own motion 
for attendance of a witness and for production of evidence at the hearing.83
Practice Tip
The subpoena provisions in the BBO Rules authorize 
requiring a witness to come to a hearing with as-yet- 
unexamined documentary evidence, which could then 
be admitted into evidence subject to any objections by 
the parties. In practice, it is very unusual for a party to 
obtain and introduce evidence in this fashion without 
the parties reviewing the evidence in advance.
80 BBO Rules § 4.5(a). Typically, the prehearing order sets a deadline for submission of sub-
poena requests two weeks before the start of hearings. In the ordinary course, a BBO member 
acts on these. Parties may, however, ask the hearing committee chair to issue a subpoena, which 
might be necessary in pressing circumstances. The OBC may use a subpoena to compel the respon-
dent to attend the hearing, but also has available the threat of administrative suspension for that 
purpose. See SJC Rule 4:01 § 3(2). A hearing subpoena is more likely when the OBC seeks to 
compel the production of documents.
81 SJC Rule 4:01 § 22; BBO Rules § 4.5.
82 BBO Rules § 4.6 (“Each subpoena issued in accordance with this subchapter shall be served 
in the manner provided for service of summonses in the Courts of the Commonwealth.”). See 
note 44 supra.
83 BBO Rules at § 4.5(d).
96
The Disciplinary Process
D. Examination of Witnesses
Each witness testiﬁes under oath or aﬃrmation. A party calls its witness, 
examines that witness, and the other party is permitted to cross-examine. Redi-
rect and recross examinations may be permitted at the discretion of the hearing 
committee chair. On occasion, witnesses testify by Skype or similar videocon-
ferencing arrangement. More rarely, and typically only with the assent of the 
parties and hearing committee, a witness testiﬁes via telephone. Usually the wit-
nesses are sworn by the court reporter transcribing the testimony, but where a 
witness is testifying remotely, the proponent of the testimony must arrange for 
the oath to be administered at the witness’s location.
E. Bar Counsel’s Case in Chief
As noted previously, the OBC generally bears the burden of proof on all 
charged violations and on matters in aggravation of the charged violations. 
“[B]ar discipline charges need only be proven by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.”84 The OBC’s case in chief will consist of witnesses, documentary evi-
dence, stipulations, and admissions in the pleadings. As discussed in Section I, 
the OBC may also rely on issue preclusion to establish one or more elements 
of the case in chief.
F. Respondent’s Presentation
After the OBC presents the case in chief, the respondent presents evidence 
in defense and evidence that supports any claim of mitigation raised in the answer 
to petition for discipline. If the respondent did not include a claim of mitigation 
in the answer, the respondent may not oﬀer mitigating evidence at the hearing. 
A request to amend an answer at the hearing to permit mitigating evidence is 
left to the discretion of the hearing committee.85 As noted in Section IX(A), 
the respondent bears the burden of proof on all claims of mitigation. Chapter 18 
discusses mitigation factors in more detail.
84 Matter of Budnitz, 425 Mass. 1018, 1018 n.1, 13 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 62, 63 n.1 (1997), citing 
Matter of Mayberry, 295 Mass. 155, 167 (1936).
85 See Matter of Patch, 466 Mass. 1016, 1018, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 523, 527 (2013) (respon-
dent did not plead mitigation, and did not oﬀer any evidence to support mitigation; Court implies 
that the respondent may have been permitted to oﬀer such evidence).
97
Proceedings Before the Board of Bar Overseers
G. Expert Witnesses
The parties may, and on rare occasions must, rely upon expert witnesses in 
disciplinary hearings. The BBO’s policy memorandum states the following:
In any disciplinary hearing in which the hearing committee determines 
that the attorney’s compliance with the degree of learning and skill 
required to be possessed by attorneys practicing in a particular area or 
areas of the law is relevant to the decision of the committee, expert 
testimony concerning the standard of care applicable to the attorney’s 
conduct may, in the discretion of the committee, be admitted into 
evidence, subject to the caveat that an expert’s opinion to the eﬀect 
either (1) that there has or has not been a violation of law or (2) that 
there has or has not been an ethical violation, is not admissible and must 
be rejected. As in the case of other evidence, the committee is not 
required to credit such expert testimony if it is admitted or because it is 
uncontradicted, Matter of Minkel, 13 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 548 (1997), 
and, if credited, may determine what weight is to be given to it.86
Just as in Massachusetts trial courts, expert testimony regarding the mean-
ing of the Rules of Professional Conduct or whether an ethical rule has been vio-
lated is not permitted in disciplinary hearings, as that issue is a matter of law 
for the parties to argue and for the hearing committee, the BBO, and ultimately 
the Court to determine.87 Where, by contrast, a matter in dispute concerns the 
standard of care, expert testimony is permitted and is often essential. For exam-
ple, in a disciplinary hearing involving an assertion that a lawyer charged or col-
lected an excessive fee, the hearing committee must make ﬁndings about “the 
86 BBO Policies and Practices ¶ 12.
87 Matter of Diviacchi, 475 Mass. 1013, 1020 (2016) (expert testimony is not necessary to deter-
mine whether an attorney has violated the rules of professional conduct). See Matter of Crossen, 
450 Mass. 533, 570, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 122, 168 (2008), (quoting Fishman v. Brooks, 396 
Mass. 643, 650 (1986) (“ ‘[e]xpert testimony concerning the fact of an ethical violation is not 
appropriate’ in bar discipline proceedings because the fact-ﬁnder does not need assistance 
understanding and applying the ethical rules”)). This reasoning carries additional force where the 
“jury” includes lawyers who are being asked to interpret “ethical rules of the profession ‘written 
by and for lawyers,’ ” Matter of Discipline of Attorney, 442 Mass. 660, 669, 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. 
R. 585, 595 (2004), and who are permitted to bring some of their expertise to bear in reaching 
their conclusions. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 30A § 11(3) (“Agencies . . . may take notice of gen-
eral, technical or scientiﬁc facts within their specialized knowledge”); BBO Rules § 3.2 (except 
where inconsistent with the BBO Rules, disciplinary proceedings “shall conform generally to the 
practice in adjudicatory proceedings under Chapter 30A of the General Laws”).
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fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services,”88 among other 
factors. On occasion, expert testimony is necessary to establish the customary 
charge for the legal services provided.
When a party discloses its intention to rely on expert testimony, the hear-
ing committee requires that the party disclose to the other party information about 
the expert’s qualiﬁcations and opinions similar to that required by Rule 26(b)(4)
(A)(i) of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure.89 The timing and content of 
expert disclosures is governed by the rules concerning the prehearing confer-
ence and the prehearing order that results from it.90
You Should Know
Most hearing committee members are practicing lawyers 
and may have their own well-founded understanding of 
what constitutes the appropriate standard of care in a 
given practice setting. Parties in a disciplinary hearing 
must be aware that the hearing committee members 
may rely on their own experience when deciding whether 
a duty of care has been breached. No rule or court opin-
ion prohibits hearing committee members from relying 
upon their own experience in this way, and the state 
Administrative Procedure Act permits such reliance.91
H. Objections
A party may object to evidence on the grounds that the testimony or docu-
ment should not be admitted. In ruling on such objections, the hearing commit-
tee chair does not apply the law of admissibility of evidence in the trial courts. 
Instead, “[i]n any proceeding the admissibility of evidence shall be governed by the 
88 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5; Matter of Fordham, 423 Mass. 481, 12 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 161 (1996). 
See also Chapter 11, Section II.
89 See Mass. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i), which reads as follows:
A party may through interrogatories require any other party to identify each person whom 
the other party expects to call as an expert witness at trial, to state the subject matter on 
which the expert is expected to testify, and to state the substance of the facts and opinions to 
which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for each opinion.
90 See BBO Rules § 3.23(b)(6)(a) See Appendix F for a sample, ﬁctitious Prehearing Conference 
Order.
91 See note 87 supra.
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Rules of Evidence observed in adjudicatory proceedings under Chapter 30A of 
the General Laws (State Administrative Procedure).”92 According to Chapter 30A:
Unless otherwise provided by any law, agencies need not observe the 
rules of evidence observed by courts, but shall observe the rules of 
privilege recognized by law. Evidence may be admitted and given 
probative eﬀect only if it is the kind of evidence on which reasonable 
persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct of serious aﬀairs.93
The following objections might arise in the course of a disciplinary hearing:
• Hearsay: Hearsay evidence may be accepted as evidence in disciplinary 
hearings (as in other state administrative proceedings) as long as the 
evidence has “indicia of reliability.”94 In Massachusetts, even sec-
ond-level hearsay that would not be admissible in court may consti-
tute substantial evidence in an administrative proceeding if it is 
suﬃciently reliable.95 Any hearsay, such as that contained in docu-
ments, must satisfy foundation requirements—that is, the fact-ﬁnder 
must be satisﬁed that the evidence is what it purports to be.96
Practice Tip
A hearing committee ordinarily accepts reliable hearsay 
as substantial evidence, but a charge based primarily on 
questionable hearsay evidence will likely not survive. Any 
such hearsay must have sufﬁcient “indicia of reliability.”97
92 BBO Rules § 3.39.
93 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 30A § 11(2).
94 Matter of Segal, 15 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 544 (1999) (a criminal trial transcript contains suﬃcient 
indicia of reliability). See also 38 Alexander J. Cella et al., Massachusetts Practice, Admin-
istrative Law & Practice § 248 (2013); 17C Richard W. Bishop, Massachusetts Practice, 
Prima Facie Case § 66.1 (5th ed. 2013); James P. Rooney, Evidentiary Issues in Administrative 
Hearings: Hearsay, Expert Testimony and Prior Proceedings, Boston B.J., Mar./Apr. 1998, at 4.
95 See, e.g., Murphy v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional, 396 Mass. 830, 834 (1986); Town of 
Shrewsbury v. Commissioner of the Dept. of Environmental Protection, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 946 
(1995) (rescript).
96 Rooney, supra note 94, at 4.
97 Embers of Salisbury v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission, 402 Mass. 526 (1988) (“sub-
stantial evidence” to support an administrative ﬁnding may be hearsay if it bears indicia of reliabil-
ity); Matter of Levy, 32 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___, 2016 WL 6696063 (2016) (“hearsay evidence is 
admissible in disciplinary proceedings when it bears suﬃcient indicia of reliability”); SJC Rule 4:01 
§ 8(6) (subsidiary facts found by the board will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence).
100
The Disciplinary Process
• Privilege: As noted earlier in this section, the law governing privileges 
applies in disciplinary proceedings just as in court. A well-founded 
objection to a question on the grounds that it would invade a privilege 
will be sustained, and the proﬀered testimony excluded.
    The privileges that apply include the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination and the attorney-client privilege. As to the 
former, according to the SJC, “There is no doubt that a lawyer may 
not be sanctioned as a penalty for asserting the privilege against 
self-incrimination.”98 Compelling a lawyer to produce documents 
required by law or by the SJC Rules to be maintained as part of 
practice responsibilities does not qualify as an invasion of that privi-
lege, according to the “required records” exception to the privilege.99
Because disciplinary hearings are equivalent to civil proceedings, “a 
reasonable inference adverse to a party may be drawn from the refusal 
of that party to testify on the grounds of self-incrimination.”100 This 
principle applies to proceedings before the BBO.101
• Leading questions: Counsel examining its own witness may not use 
leading questions, and an objection will be sustained. (The exception, 
as in court, is for foundational matters.) Of course, leading questions 
are not terribly persuasive, so good lawyers will not use them, except 
on noncontroversial foundational matters, even if the other party does 
not object. Leading questions are allowed on cross-examination and 
on direct examination with a hostile witness.102
    One issue that arises in disciplinary hearings concerns the respon-
dent’s counsel using leading questions when examining the respon-
dent after the OBC has called the respondent as part of its case in 
chief. The typical practice is for the hearing committee chair to allow 
leading questions on matters covered on direct examination, but the 
hearing committee has discretion to prohibit such questions. Whether 
98 Matter of Kenney, 399 Mass. 431, 437, 5 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 167, 188 (1987) (citing Spevack 
v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 514 (1967) (plurality opinion)).
99 Id. (relying on the “required records” exception announced in Stornanti v. Commonwealth, 389 
Mass. 518 (1983)).
100 Labor Relations Commission v. Fall River Educators’ Ass’n, 382 Mass. 465, 471 (1981).
101 See Matter of Boxer, 14 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 74, 79 (1998) (Board Memorandum).
102 No report or decision arising from a BBO proceeding has stated the “hostile witness” principle, 
but it is a practice the SJC supported in court matters. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones, 319 Mass. 
228 (1946).
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respondent’s testimony is suﬃciently persuasive when elicited through 
leading questions is a strategic matter for respondent’s counsel to 
evaluate.
• Unauthenticated documents: This objection is rare in disciplinary pro-
ceeding hearings. Exhibits must be identiﬁed and shared through the 
prehearing conference process, and a party questioning a document’s 
authenticity must raise the objection at that time. The hearing oﬃcer 
rules on the objection when the exhibit is oﬀered into evidence at the 
hearing. A party may object on any ground, including authenticity, to 
any document the other party oﬀers that was not part of the prehear-
ing exchange and reviewed in advance by the objecting party.103
I. Issue Preclusion
When appropriate, the OBC may introduce factual ﬁndings from other 
civil or criminal adjudications to prove facts necessary for its case in chief. This 
use of collateral estoppel is also known as “issue preclusion” when previously 
established ﬁndings satisfy the OBC’s burden on a particular issue. The SJC has 
held that there is no basis for “withholding preclusive eﬀect of civil ﬁndings in 
a subsequent disciplinary action against an attorney.”104 As the Court noted, “The 
oﬀensive use of collateral estoppel is a generally accepted practice in American 
courts.”105 “For the [oﬀensive collateral estoppel] doctrine to apply, there must 
be ‘an identity of issues, a ﬁnding adverse to the party against whom it is being 
asserted, and a judgment by a court or tribunal of competent jurisdiction.’ ”106
The BBO has wide discretion in permitting the use of collateral estoppel in this 
manner. The OBC may use such prior ﬁndings to establish both misconduct 
charges as well as any claims of aggravation.
To utilize issue preclusion/collateral estoppel, the OBC must present a 
motion to the BBO, which the BBO chair or a BBO member the chair desig-
nates must decide.107
103 Cf. Matter of Moore, 442 Mass. 285, 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 400 (2004) (respondent’s objec-
tion to admission of documents properly overruled where the authenticity of the documents is 
not in dispute).
104 Bar Counsel v. Board of Bar Overseers, 420 Mass. 6, 10, 11 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 291 (1995).
105 Id. at 9.
106 Matter of Cohen, 435 Mass. 7, 15, 17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 129, 143 (2001) (quoting Miles v. 
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 412 Mass. 424, 427 (1992)).
107 BBO Rules § 3.18.
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J. Closing Argument
Practice Tips for Counsel in Disciplinary Hearings
Experienced hearing committee members report that 
some practices and habits by lawyers during disciplinary 
hearings serve their client well, while others are not 
effective. Those who regularly hear these matters offer 
the following suggestions:
•  Aggressive, scorched-earth tactics are particularly 
ineffective in these hearings. Treat witnesses, parties, 
counsel, and the hearing committee with respect.
•  Attacks on complaining witnesses (such as former 
clients) can be particularly counterproductive if not 
focused, respectful, and directed to disputed asser-
tions of identiﬁable facts.
•  Understand the relaxed standard for admissibility of 
evidence at an administrative hearing, the BBO Rules, 
and the differences between those rules and the Rules 
of Civil Procedure. It is not persuasive to argue to the 
committee, “This is how we do things in District 
Court.”
•  Resolve as many disputed legal or evidentiary issues 
as possible during the mandatory prehearing confer-
ence and the procedures following it to permit the 
formal hearing to proceed as smoothly and efﬁciently 
as possible.
•  Stand when questioning witnesses or addressing the 
hearing committee.
•  Keep opening statements and closing arguments brief 
and to the point.
•  Use posttrial briefs to address issues and questions 
the hearing committee members raise during closing 
arguments.
•  Exercise good judgment in conceding what is obvious. 
Counsel do their clients a disservice by refusing to 
acknowledge a plainly proven rule violation or facts 
established by the evidence and by delaying attention 
to the proper sanction.
• Be prepared. Know your case and everything in it.
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After each party rests its case, the hearing committee hears closing argu-
ments, ﬁrst from the respondent, and then from the OBC.108 (On rare occa-
sions, the committee chair will request written argument in lieu of an oral closing 
argument.) The BBO Rules state that such closing argument shall occur “directly 
following the taking of testimony except for good cause shown.”109 In practice, 
the hearing committee may schedule a diﬀerent date for hearing closing argu-
ments if the hearing testimony does not conclude until the end of that day. Un-
like the opening statement, the closing argument includes reasoned argument 
based upon the evidence presented at the hearing, but may not rely on a party’s 
or counsel’s personal opinion or on something not in evidence at the hearing.
The closing argument is diﬀerent from, and precedes, the parties’ ﬁling of 
posthearing briefs, as discussed in Section XI. At closing argument, the hear-
ing committee members may ask questions of counsel or the party making the 
argument. The question of an appropriate sanction is often a topic during the 
closing argument.
K. The Role of the BBO General Counsel in the Hearing
At each disciplinary hearing, an assistant general counsel (AGC) from the 
OGC attends the proceeding. The OGC is counsel to the BBO and has no 
responsibility for the outcome of a hearing or for any factual or credibility ﬁnd-
ings. The AGC’s role is to advise the hearing committee regarding the BBO Rules 
and procedures, the elements of the oﬀenses charged, and legal precedents rel-
evant to rulings and appropriate discipline. Hearing committee members may 
confer with the AGC during the hearing for guidance, and the AGC “may sug-
gest lines of inquiry for questioning by hearing oﬃcers.”110 The AGC does not 
question witnesses or engage in discussions with parties or their counsel. At the 
end of the hearing and after all posthearing briefs are ﬁled, the AGC drafts the 
report of the hearing committee, which the committee must approve.
X. TRANSCRIPT OF THE PROCEEDING
An oﬃcial reporter transcribes all hearings, including argument by coun-
sel and other discussion, unless the parties agree otherwise with the approval of 
108 If the only matter at issue is one of mitigation, then the respondent has the burden of proof 
and the order of closing arguments is reversed.
109 BBO Rules § 3.42.
110 BBO Policies and Practices ¶ 11.
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the hearing committee. After the hearing closes, the oﬃcial reporter prepares 
a transcript of the proceedings and supplies that transcript to the BBO; the 
parties may obtain a copy of the transcript at their own expense. Any correc-
tions to the transcript must be made no later than ten days prior to the due date 
for the posthearing briefs.111
Practice Tip
The BBO Rules state that a respondent purchasing a 
transcript is discretionary, not mandatory. In practice, a 
respondent must arrange to purchase the transcript 
because the posthearing briefs must cite the pages of 
the transcript. No fee waiver procedure exists for coun-
sel who cannot afford to purchase the transcript.112
XI. POSTHEARING BRIEFS
Within thirty days after the BBO receives the ﬁnal transcript of the hearing, 
each party may ﬁle proposed ﬁndings of fact, proposed rulings of law, and a post-
hearing brief.113 It is not unusual for the parties to agree to request an extension 
of the thirty-day deadline. Parties typically ﬁle a pleading containing proposed 
ﬁndings of fact and conclusions of law as well as arguments addressing questions 
of law and the appropriate sanction. The argument should normally include:
• A concise statement of the case
• A discussion or statement of the evidence the ﬁling party relied on, 
with speciﬁc reference to the pages of the record or exhibits where 
such evidence appears
• Proposed ﬁndings and conclusions, together with the reasons and 
authorities supporting them114
Hearing committee members report that the most useful briefs are concise, treat 
the evidence fairly and honestly, cite the record for all evidentiary references 
111 BBO Rules § 3.34.
112 In 2017, a transcript of one full-day hearing would cost approximately $500–$600.
113 BBO Rules § 3.43.
114 Id. at §§ 3.44(a)(1), (2).
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and assertions, and address directly the contested factual and legal issues that 
the hearing committee has to decide.
The respondent must ﬁle the brief and proposed ﬁndings and rulings with 
the BBO and serve copies of each to the other party and to each hearing com-
mittee member either by mail or in-person delivery. Service is complete upon 
in-person delivery or upon deposit in the United States mail.115 Each pleading 
must include a certiﬁcate of service identifying the method and date of service.
Practice Tip
The posthearing brief is an important document. Well- 
written proposed ﬁndings of fact, rulings of law, and a 
proposed sanction recommendation, with accurate cita-
tions to the record and case law, can have a signiﬁcant 
effect on the hearing committee’s decision. Parties are 
well advised to take the opportunity to argue the key 
issues in the case and reasons for the desired outcome.
XII. THE COMMITTEE REPORT
After the ﬁling the briefs, the committee deliberates, and then an AGC 
typically drafts the hearing committee report. Before and while drafting the 
report, the AGC elicits comments from the committee. The hearing commit-
tee must “promptly” submit its report to the BBO116 and exercises full respon-
sibility for the substance of the ﬁnal report. The committee report must include 
the following:117
1. A concise statement of the case
2. A citation for each disciplinary rule the respondent violated
3. The committee’s rulings on admission of evidence and other proce-
dural matters, referring to the pages of the transcript if the committee 
ruled on the matters during the hearing
4. The committee’s ﬁndings of fact
115 Id. at § 3.10.
116 Id. at § 3.46.
117 Id. at § 3.47.
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5. Its conclusions of law
6. Its recommended disposition of the petition
Together with a transcript and record of the proceedings, the committee 
sends the report to the BBO, with copies sent to the parties. The BBO has 
ultimate responsibility to decide the matter, including a decision whether to 
ﬁle an Information transferring the matter to the SJC. Chapter 19 discusses 
the posthearing processes after the hearing committee submits its report to 
the BBO.
XIII. SPECIAL HEARING PROCEDURES
A. Disciplinary Hearings Before an SHO
As noted in Section V, on occasion an SHO presides over a disciplinary 
hearing instead of a hearing committee. All of the procedures described previ-
ously apply with equal force to hearings conducted before an SHO.
B. Disciplinary Hearings Following a Criminal Conviction
A lawyer convicted of a crime must report that conviction to the OBC 
within ten days.118 If the crime for which the lawyer was convicted constitutes 
a “serious crime,” as deﬁned in the SJC Rules,119 the lawyer will be “suspended 
immediately” after a show cause hearing, although the matter will also be referred 
for investigation and the institution of formal disciplinary proceedings.120 “Con-
viction” is deﬁned to include a plea of guilty or nolo contendere and an admission 
to suﬃcient facts for a guilty ﬁnding, even in the absence of a sentence.121
A disciplinary hearing on a petition based on a lawyer’s criminal conviction 
follows the procedures previously described, with one exception: The hearing is 
conducted by a hearing panel made up of BBO members, not a hearing commit-
tee. A hearing panel typically includes one BBO member who is not a lawyer.122
118 SJC Rule 4:01 § 12(8). The clerk of the court in which the lawyer was convicted has an 
accompanying duty to report the matter to the BBO and to the SJC. Id. at § 12(7).
119 Id. at § 12(3).
120 SJC Rule 4:01 § 12(4).
121 SJC Rule 4:01 § 12(1).
122 BBO Policies and Practices ¶ 9.
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The panel’s deliberation is subject to the SJC’s presumptive sanctions following 
a conviction. For a felony conviction, the typical sanction is disbarment123 or, when 
there are special mitigating circumstances, indeﬁnite suspension.124 A misde-
meanor that qualiﬁes as a “serious crime” warrants a suspension.125 Other mis-
demeanor convictions warrant at least a public reprimand.126
The principle of issue preclusion described in Section IX(I) applies in cases 
arising from a conviction: “A conviction of a lawyer for any crime shall be con-
clusive evidence of the commission of that crime in any disciplinary proceed-
ing instituted against that lawyer based upon the conviction.”127 A panel and the 
BBO may not make ﬁndings that are inconsistent with the conviction.128
C. Reinstatement Hearings
As with hearings based upon a criminal conviction, hearings on a petition 
for reinstatement are also heard by a hearing panel of board members and not 
a hearing committee.129 Reinstatement hearings proceed diﬀerently from disci-
plinary hearings in other ways. Chapter 23 discusses the reinstatement process 
in detail, including the hearing process.
D. Expedited Disciplinary Hearings
A respondent who has been admonished may demand in writing that the 
admonition be vacated and an expedited hearing convened to review that sanc-
tion.130 The expedited hearing must be assigned to an SHO and must be held 
within thirty days after the respondent makes the demand for review. An expe-
dited hearing has three possible outcomes: (1) the admonition may be vacated, 
(2) the admonition may be upheld, or (3) the hearing oﬃcer may determine 
that a more substantial sanction is appropriate and recommend that the matter 
be remanded for formal disciplinary proceedings.
123 Matter of Otis, 438 Mass. 1016, 1017, 19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 344, 345 (2003).
124 Matter of Concemi, 422 Mass. 326, 330 n.4, 12 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 63, 69 n.4 (1996).
125 Matter of Eberle, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 150 (2010); Matter of Fraser, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. 
R. 217 (2009).
126 Matter of Coyle, 30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 79 (2014).
127 SJC Rule 4:01 § 12(2).
128 Matter of Concemi, 422 Mass. 326, 328–29, 12 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 63, 67 (1996).
129 BBO Policies and Practices ¶ 9.
130 SJC Rule 4:01 § 20; BBO Rules § 2.12.
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The procedures for an expedited hearing diﬀer from those previously dis-
cussed in the following ways:
• No prehearing conference is held.131 In lieu of such a conference, the 
notice of hearing the OGC prepares must include deadlines for the 
following:
Q  Parties’ exchange of witness lists and exhibits they intend to use 
during their cases in chief as well as a date for objections
Q  Parties’ objections to any exhibits or witnesses as well as for any 
supplemental designation of witnesses or objections
Q  Filing with the BBO a ﬁnal witness and exhibit list, ﬁnal objec-
tions, and any stipulations132
• The hearing is closed to the public because the identities of respon-
dents who receive admonitions is not made public. If, after the 
hearing, the SHO recommends remanding the matter for formal 
proceedings, the matter becomes public when the petition for disci-
pline is ﬁled.133
• The parties do not ﬁle posthearing briefs or ﬁndings of fact and 
conclusions of law, except for good cause shown.134
In all other respects, an expedited hearing proceeds in the same way as 
other disciplinary hearings.
131 BBO Rules § 2.12(2)(e).
132 BBO Rules § 2.12(2)(d).
133 BBO Rules § 3.22(b).
134 BBO Rules § 2.12(2)(g).
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PART III
Misconduct and Typical Sanctions
chapter seven
Problems of Competence: Poor Work, Neglect,
and Failure to Communicate with a Client
(Rules 1.1, 1.2(a) and (c), 1.3, and 1.4)
I. INTRODUCTION
A lawyer in Massachusetts must be competent, diligent, and responsive to 
clients. Failure to provide competent and diligent representation violates the 
Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct and may lead to discipline. These duties 
emerge from the lawyer’s essential ﬁduciary relationship with clients, but they also 
exist as aﬃrmative duties established by several rules of professional conduct:
• Rule 1.1 requires a lawyer to provide competent representation.
• Rule 1.2(a) requires a lawyer to “seek the lawful objectives of his or 
her client through reasonably available means . . . . ” 
• Rule 1.2(c) permits a lawyer to limit the scope of representation with 
informed client consent so long as the limitation is reasonable.
• Rule 1.3 imposes a duty of reasonable diligence and promptness 
regarding client matters.
• Rule 1.4 requires a lawyer to maintain reasonable and timely contact 
with the lawyer’s clients and to keep the client suﬃciently informed to 
make needed decisions.
While Rule 1.2 includes separate duties discussed in Chapter 9, Sections II(a) 
and II(B), and Chapter 13, Sections I–III, these ﬁve rules together establish a 
collection of related duties that warrant treatment together. This chapter de-
scribes the nature of the respective duties and the level of discipline a lawyer 
who violates those duties might expect to face.
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A lawyer who performs less-than-competent service for a client (which may 
involve negligence or a failure to keep a client informed) and causes harm to the 
client may encounter a civil claim for damages through a malpractice action or 
other civil claim. This book does not address those civil claims and their sub-
stantive or procedural requirements, but other helpful resources exist that do so.1
This chapter instead addresses the disciplinary consequences of a lawyer’s breach 
of duties related to competence and diligence.
II. THE NATURE OF THE LAWYER’S RESPONSIBILITIES
REGARDING COMPETENCE
RULE 1.1: COMPETENCE
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. 
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, 
thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the 
representation.
RULE 1.2: SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION AND ALLOCATION
OF AUTHORITY BETWEEN CLIENT AND LAWYER
(a) A lawyer shall seek the lawful objectives of his or her client 
through reasonably available means permitted by law and these 
Rules. A lawyer does not violate this Rule, however, by acceding 
to reasonable requests of opposing counsel which do not preju-
dice the rights of his or her client, by being punctual in fulfilling 
all professional commitments, by avoiding offensive tactics, or 
by treating with courtesy and consideration all persons involved 
in the legal process. A lawyer shall abide by a client’s decision 
whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter. In a crimi-
nal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client’s decision, after 
consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether 
to waive jury trial, and whether the client will testify.
* * *
1 See, e.g., Ronald E. Mallen, Jeffrey M. Smith & Allison D. Rhodes, Legal Malprac-
tice (2013 ed.); David A. Barry & William L. Boesch, Massachusetts Legal Malpractice Cases 2000–
2009, 93 Mass. L. Rev. 321 (2011); see also David A. Barry & William L. Boesch, Legal 
Malpractice Law in Massachusetts, Developments 1993–2000, 85 Mass. L. Rev. 2 (2000).
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RULE 1.2 (cont’d.)
(c) A lawyer may limit the scope of the representation if the 
limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client 
gives informed consent.
A. The Lessons of Rules 1.1, 1.2(a), and 1.2(c)
Rule 1.1 states that a lawyer “shall provide competent representation to a 
client,” and that “[c]ompetent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, 
thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.” A 
lawyer who fails to provide competent representation therefore violates this 
rule and may be subject to discipline for that failure. The level of skill needed 
to qualify as “competent” is measured by the standard of a “reasonably prudent 
and competent lawyer.” That phrase comes from the deﬁnitions section of the
Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct, in Rule 1.0(k), deﬁning reasonable and
reasonably. While no reported Massachusetts opinion has employed that phrase, 
there is no question that this standard governs a lawyer’s performance.2
The comments to Rule 1.1 conﬁrm that the duty of competence is usually 
that of “a general practitioner.”3 No overarching deﬁnition of competence exists 
within Massachusetts law. An American Bar Association (ABA) task force sought 
to catalog the lawyering skills with which “a well-trained generalist should be 
familiar before assuming ultimate responsibility for a client.”4 The task force’s 
MacCrate Report oﬀered lawyers a list of necessary skills for eﬀective law 
practice.5
2 That same phrase appears in the Terminology section of the ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct. See ABA Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct Rule 1.0(h) (2013).
3 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1 cmt. [1]. A lawyer who holds himself out as a specialist will be held to a 
higher standard of care. Fishman v. Brooks, 396 Mass. 643, 646 (1986).
4 ABA Sec. Legal Educ. & Admissions, Legal Education & Professional Development—An Edu-
cational Continuum, Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap
125 (Robert MacCrate ed., 1992).
5 Id. at 138–40. The Report identiﬁed the following skills as those that a competent lawyer must 
master:
1. Problem-solving;
2. Legal analysis and reasoning;
3. Legal research;
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The comments to Rule 1.1 oﬀer some further understanding about what 
constitutes competence. The comments stress the importance of adequate prep-
aration and thoroughness, both of which “are determined in part by what is at 
stake.”6 The timing of the client’s need for services is another factor that a law-
yer may take into account in determining whether the services meet the compe-
tence standard.7 A lawyer need not be familiar with the area of law at the outset 
of the attorney-client relationship if the lawyer obtains training in the relevant 
ﬁeld.8 That training, however, cannot be at the client’s expense. While a lawyer 
may learn the substantive law as part of the client’s paid representation, the over-
all fee charged the client must be reasonable.9 If the lawyer does not have the 
competence to provide the legal services a client needs despite studying, the 
matter may still be accepted if the lawyer associates with another lawyer who 
has the experience and expertise.10 The lawyer must reasonably believe that the 
association will aid in the representation and must obtain the client’s consent.11
The question of the standard or deﬁnition of competence arises more often 
in malpractice cases than in disciplinary cases (even though failure to provide 
competent service is a frequent cause of discipline). The Supreme Judicial Court 
(SJC) has held that a lawyer owes a client “a reasonable degree of care and skill 
in the performance of legal duties.”12 The Appeals Court has qualiﬁed the stan-
dard as follows: “But it must not be understood that an attorney is liable for every 
mistake that may occur in practice, and held responsible for the damages that 
may result. If the attorney acts with a proper degree of attention, with reason-
able care, and to the best of his skill and knowledge, he will not be held respon-
sible. Some allowance must always be made for the imperfection of human 
4. Factual investigation;
5. Oral and written communication;
6. Counseling;
7. Negotiation;
8. Litigation and alternative dispute resolution procedures;
9. Organization and management of legal work; and
10. Recognizing and resolving ethical dilemmas.
6 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1 comment [5].
7 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1 comment [3].
8 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1 comments [2], [4].
9 Matter of Fordham, 423 Mass. 481, 12 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 161 (1996), cert. denied 519 U.S. 1149 
(1997).
10 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1 comment [2].
11 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1 comment [6].
12 Pongonis v. Saab, 396 Mass. 1005, 1006 (1985).
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judgment.”13 Breach of the standard of care for competent lawyering may serve 
both as a basis for discipline under Rule 1.1 and grounds for civil liability under 
the common law of malpractice.
By contrast, the constitutional standard for ineﬀective assistance of coun-
sel in criminal cases, arising from the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article XII of the Massachusetts Constitution, is a narrower 
and more constrained competence standard than the one Rule 1.1 imposes. A 
court’s determination that a lawyer’s performance does not constitute ineﬀec-
tive assistance of counsel does not preclude a ﬁnding that the lawyer has failed 
to provide competent representation under Rule 1.1.14
A lawyer may not provide less-than-competent service to a client in return 
for a lower fee. A lawyer may be tempted to oﬀer meager or incomplete ser-
vices to a client who cannot aﬀord to pay for fully adequate representation, 
believing that some legal assistance to the ﬁnancially strapped client is better 
than nothing. Rule 1.1 does not permit that bargain (even if the logic of that 
supposition were true).15 But a lawyer may, pursuant to Rule 1.2(c), oﬀer to the 
client limited representation as long as the client provides informed consent to 
the limited services, the limitation is reasonable, and the services the lawyer 
delivers are fully competent.16
13 Colucci v. Rosen, Goldberg, Slavet, Levenson & Wekstein, P.C., 25 Mass. App. Ct. 107, 111 
(1987) (quoting Stevens v. Walker & Dexter, 55 Ill. 151, 153 (1870)). A similar principle applies 
in disciplinary cases. Bar Counsel v. Attorneys A & B, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 744, 755 (2010) (in 
the circumstances, failure to attend status conferences was “not the stuﬀ of bar discipline”); Mat-
ter of an Attorney, 18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 586, 598 (2002).
14 See Matter of Abelow, 18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 17 (2002) (attorney’s failure to obtain necessary 
records and information for client’s alibi defense was not found to be ineﬀective assistance of coun-
sel, but constituted failure to act competently under DR 6-101 (the precursor to Rule 1.1); three-
month suspension imposed).
15 See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2 cmt. [7] (“Although this Rule aﬀords the lawyer and client substantial 
latitude to limit the representation, the limitation must be reasonable under the circumstances . . . . 
See Rule 1.1.”); see also ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof ’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-379 (advis-
ing that a fee too low to permit adequate preparation and services will violate Rule 1.1).
16 The legal profession has accepted the evolving concept of “unbundled” legal services, where a 
lawyer agrees to provide some discrete legal service instead of handling a client’s matter in full. 
For discussion of that practice, see Brenda Star Adams, Unbundled Legal Services: A Solution to the 
Problems Caused by Pro Se Litigation in Massachusetts’s Civil Courts, 40 New Eng. L. Rev. 303 (2005); 
Mary Helen McNeal, Redefining Attorney-Client Roles: Unbundling and Moderate-Income Elderly 
Clients, 32 Wake Forest L. Rev. 295 (1997). Several courts in the Commonwealth permit law-
yers to appear in a limited fashion, known as Limited Assistance Representation, introduced in 
2009 by the SJC as a pilot program. See Limited Assistance Representation, http://www.mass.gov/
courts/programs/legal-assistance/lar-gen.html (last visited May 8, 2018).
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Massachusetts is one of the few jurisdictions in the country17 that does not 
require members of its bar to attend annual continuing legal education programs 
as a condition of bar membership renewal, or otherwise to engage systemati-
cally in ongoing education and to report those eﬀorts to the proper authorities. 
While not required, it is advisable for Massachusetts lawyers to participate in 
continuing legal education as a matter of professional responsibility, in order to 
maintain competence in the changing legal profession. A comment to Rule 1.1 
states that a lawyer “should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, 
including the beneﬁts and risks associated with relevant technology.”18
Many reported disciplinary decisions show sanctions imposed for failure to 
provide competent service.19 Other reported decisions have imposed discipline for 
the diﬀerent, but related, problem of lack of diligence, as described in Section III.
Practice Tip
As suggested by comment [2] to Rule 1.1, a lawyer who 
lacks the competence to handle a matter should either 
refer the matter to a more experienced lawyer or, with 
the consent of the client, associate with a more experi-
enced lawyer in the continued handling of the client 
matter.
17 The other jurisdictions are Connecticut, District of Columbia, Maryland, Michigan, and South 
Dakota. See MCLE Information by Jurisdiction, American.org, http://www.americanbar.org/
publications_cle/mandatory_cle/mcle_states.html (last visited May 8, 2018). Massachusetts does 
require newly admitted lawyers to complete a Practicing with Professionalism course within eighteen 
months of their admission. See Massachusetts Rules and Orders of the Supreme Judicial 
Court Rule 3:16 [hereinafter SJC Rule].
18 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1 comment [8]. The ABA, relying on the same language to its comment to 
Rule 1.1, advised in a 2017 ethics opinion of the increasing importance of this component of the 
lawyer’s necessary skill set. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof ’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 17-
477-R (revised May 22, 2017).
19 For a sampling of those decisions, see, e.g., Matter of Dowell, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 244 (2012) 
(year-and-a-day suspension for failure to provide competent representation); Matter of Feeney, 
24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 271 (2008) (attorney misread date of accident on police report, ﬁled suit 
seven days after the statute of limitations had expired; public reprimand); Ad. 01-74, 17 Mass. 
Att’y Disc. R. 804 (2001) (attorney advised client, then eight months pregnant, to enter into a sep-
aration agreement that did not provide for child support so that the client could get her divorce 
“that day,” where the client wanted to pursue child support after the child was born); Ad. 87-14, 
5 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 501 (1987) (failure to associate with a lawyer who had the experience the 
respondent lawyer lacked).
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B. Sanctions for Violating Rules 1.1, 1.2(a), and 1.2(c)
Hundreds of Massachusetts lawyers have been disciplined for failure to pro-
vide competent legal services to clients. Few such reports, however, appear with-
out some other accompanying misconduct, usually neglect or a conﬂict of interest. 
A diligent attorney who tries hard and attends to aﬀairs but makes a mistake will 
likely not receive discipline (although the lawyer may be sued for malpractice 
and may have to forfeit, or not collect, fees). Perhaps because of the scarcity of 
discipline based solely on Rule 1.1, neither the Board of Bar Overseers (BBO) 
nor the SJC has articulated a presumptive sanction for misconduct related to lack 
of competence. As discussed in Section III, the BBO has articulated guidelines 
for misconduct involving the closely related problem of neglect.
You Should Know
The Ofﬁce of the Bar Counsel (OBC) has investigated 
client claims that a lawyer provided less-than-competent 
service even if the client has civil remedies available, such 
as a legal malpractice action, or even if the client has 
successfully availed himself of those remedies.20
   The OBC may defer investigating a complaint until 
after the civil matter is resolved. If the OBC has not done 
so on its own, a lawyer who has been sued for legal mal-
practice, and who is the subject of an OBC disciplinary 
investigation for that same alleged misconduct, may ﬁle 
a motion with the board requesting that the disciplinary 
investigation be stayed pending the outcome of the civil 
proceedings.21
Every reported disciplinary matter involving Rule 1.1 also included other 
misconduct. However, in some reported cases, the Rule 1.1 violation pre-
dominated. In Matter of Bongiovi,22 a lawyer received a public reprimand for 
20 See, e.g., Matter of Pilavis, 17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 459 (2001) (facts established in malpractice 
matter admissible against lawyer in disciplinary hearing; lawyer disbarred for that and other seri-
ous misconduct).
21 SJC Rule 4:01 § 11 (authorizing the BBO or the Court to defer on motion by a respondent; 
ordinarily, no deferral occurs).
22 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 50 (2004).
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“inadequate preparation and incompetent representation” in handling a pro-
bate matter. His prior discipline likely led to the public reprimand. Many 
instances of discipline for lack of competence also involve neglect of the cli-
ent’s matter, which, while a separate type of misconduct, aﬀects a lawyer’s com-
petent representation. For instance, in Matter of Lovett,23 the respondent 
received a public reprimand for neglecting to ﬁle suit after settlement eﬀorts 
were unsuccessful. His prior admonition contributed to the sanction being 
public rather than private discipline. In Matter of Thompson,24 the respondent 
abandoned the law practice and neglected numerous pending client matters, as 
well as failed to communicate with clients and protect their interests. The law-
yer also committed numerous Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts (IOLTA) 
accounting violations and failed to cooperate with the OBC’s investigation. 
Thompson was suspended for a year and a day.25
Most other matters primarily involving Rule 1.1 have resulted in admo-
nitions. In Ad. 05-01,26 a lawyer received an admonition for making serious 
mistakes in handling the client’s immigration matter. In Ad. 00-21,27 the law-
yer admitted to “a serious error of judgment” involving a real estate closing and 
received an admonition. And in Ad. 00-04,28 a lawyer advised a client who be-
lieved she was a victim of race discrimination that she had a longer period of time 
to ﬁle her claim with the state agency than she in fact had. That attorney also re-
ceived an admonition. Several other admonitions involved the same kind of mis-
takes as described but also included an additional item of misconduct, such as 
signing a document dishonestly to cover up a mistake29 or misusing an impounded 
court document when the lawyer did not know the rules of court.30
The most serious discipline involving Rule 1.1 involves not only lack of 
competence but also neglect of client matters, and is discussed in Section III.
23 27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 551 (2011).
24 16 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 390 (2000).
25 See also Matter of Johnson, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 272 (2010) (respondent suspended for three 
months for multiple instances of misconduct stemming largely from a lack of competence); Mat-
ter of Wysocki, 16 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 434 (2000) (respondent neglected numerous client mat-
ters but also engaged in ﬁnancial misconduct; suspended for two years).
26 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 664 (2005).
27 16 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 480 (2000).
28 16 Mass. Atty Disc R. 451 (2000). See also Ad. 00-07, 16 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 457 (2000) 
(lawyers failed to attend to details when submitting a ﬁnancial statement to the Probate and 
Family Court; admonition).
29 Ad. 04-37, 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 728 (2004) (signing a person’s aﬃdavit after failing to have 
it signed properly).
30 Ad. 00-38, 16 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 506 (2000).
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III. THE NATURE OF THE LAWYER’S RESPONSIBILITIES
REGARDING DILIGENCE
RULE 1.3: DILIGENCE
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in 
representing a client. The lawyer should represent a client zeal-
ously within the bounds of the law.
A. The Lessons of Rule 1.3
Neglecting a client’s matter commonly results in discipline. While no rule 
expressly requires that a lawyer not “neglect” a client’s matter, Rule 1.3 states that “a 
lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.” 
Comment [3] to Rule 1.3 states, “Perhaps no professional shortcoming is more 
widely resented than procrastination. A client’s interests can be adversely aﬀected 
by the passage of time or the change of conditions; in extreme instances, as when a 
lawyer overlooks a statute of limitations, the client’s legal position may be destroyed.” 
Neglect, therefore, may constitute a violation of Rule 1.3.31 That lack of diligence 
almost always constitutes less-than-competent representation and, therefore, usu-
ally violates Rule 1.1 as well. A review of Massachusetts disciplinary reports shows 
that lack of diligence is, in fact, a serious problem for many Massachusetts law-
yers.32 Because the disciplinary reports and court opinions tend to employ the term
neglect to refer to lack of diligence, this chapter uses that term as well.
No reported Massachusetts disciplinary decisions oﬀer a discrete deﬁni-
tion of disciplinable neglect, even though hundreds of decisions oﬀer examples 
of neglect suﬃciently problematic to lead to sanctions. However, not all neglect 
violates Rule 1.1 or 1.3. If a lawyer promises to write a demand letter by Friday 
but neglects to do so—simply forgetting—and writes the letter by the following 
Tuesday, with no harm to the client and no eﬀect on the success of the legal strat-
egy, that lapse does not constitute neglect under any of the standards reviewed 
here. By contrast, if a lawyer ignores a client’s matter, the statute of limitations 
31 The predecessor to the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct, the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility expressly referred to neglect. Former Disciplinary Rule 6-101(A)(3) stated, “A lawyer shall 
not . . . (3) Neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.”
32 A Westlaw search shows that between 1999 and 2017 more than seven hundred disciplinary 
reports cited Rule 1.3 as a basis for the attorney’s discipline. More than half of those reports also 
cited Rule 1.1.)
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expires, and the client loses rights, that neglect obviously violates both Rules 1.1 
and 1.3. Between those two extreme examples exist many kinds of neglect that 
may warrant discipline.
The following statement would seem to capture the neglect principle, as 
discerned from the disciplinary reports: 
An inattention to or ignoring of a client matter in such a fashion that the 
lapse causes or risks signiﬁcant harm to the client, was avoidable, and 
represents less diligence than that typically provided by the reasonably 
prudent and competent lawyer in Massachusetts.
No court or authority has articulated that speciﬁc deﬁnition,33 but every 
instance of reported and disciplined neglect ﬁts that description. Neglect is a 
serious matter. Clients entrust their aﬀairs to lawyers and often pay handsomely 
for the lawyer’s promise to pursue the clients’ interests. A lawyer who makes that 
promise and fails to attend to a client’s matter violates a central commitment 
of the legal profession. Most often, neglect causes direct harm to clients and to 
their legal interests, even if the neglect is unintentional.34
While a single instance of neglect may lead to discipline,35 an isolated neglect 
of a matter, with minimal or no risk of harm to a client, has not resulted in dis-
cipline.36 Most reported disciplinary cases involve a pattern of neglect.37
33 The ABA’s Ethics Committee oﬀered the following description of neglect:
Neglect involves indiﬀerence and a consistent failure to carry out the obligations that the 
lawyer has assumed to his client or a conscious disregard for the responsibility owed to 
the client. The concept of ordinary negligence is diﬀerent. Neglect usually involves more 
than a single act or omission. Neglect cannot be found if the acts or omissions com-
plained of were inadvertent or the result of an error of judgment made in good faith. 
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof ’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1273 (1973).
34 In Matter of Horgan, 5 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 156, 158–59 (1987), a single justice stated that the 
discipline in that case “provides a strong warning to all attorneys that neglect, even if unintentional, 
is not to be excused.”
35 See Ad. 12-04, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 919 (2012); Matter of Un, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 698 
(2010) (public reprimand for single instance of neglect of client’s immigration matter); Ad. 05-20, 
21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 712 (2005) (admonition for single instance of neglect involving failure 
to research the eﬀect of divorce on client’s will, causing will not to be probated).
36 Authorities from other jurisdictions that, like Massachusetts, claim that harm to the client is 
not a condition for discipline in neglect matters inevitably refer to a risk of harm, even if no actual 
harm occurred. See, e.g., In re Lewis, 689 A.2d 561, 564 (D.C. 1997) (“failure to take action for a 
signiﬁcant time”); In re Beardsley, 658 N.E. 2d 591, 592 (Ind. 1995) (“potential for serious harm”).
37 See, e.g., Matter of Watson, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 885 (2012) (eighteen-month suspension for 
neglecting the interests of three clients); Matter of Caggiano, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 74 (2008) 
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You Should Know
The fact that a client has discharged a lawyer in a matter 
pending in court does not relieve the lawyer of duties if 
the court does not allow the lawyer to withdraw from 
the pending action.38 In transactional matters, where no 
court action exists, a lawyer who withdraws from the 
representation must take special care to determine when 
the lawyer’s duties to the client terminate.
The seminal disciplinary decision involving neglect, Matter of Kane,39 empha-
sized the severity of the problem. The speciﬁc neglect in Kane was the lawyer’s 
failure to ﬁle available posttrial motions on behalf of an incarcerated client. Kane 
is noteworthy because in that opinion the BBO enunciated important new “guide-
lines for discipline in cases involving neglect or failure of zealous representa-
tion,” after ﬁnding that “existing sanctions for neglect are inadequate.”40 The
Kane guidelines are discussed in the following section. Kane did not attempt to 
deﬁne neglect or to limit its scope.41
(a year-and-a-day suspension for pattern of neglect involving three unrelated client matters); 
Matter of Sterritt, 17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 542 (2001) (a year-and-a-day suspension for multiple 
instances of neglecting to pursue clients’ claims, causing suits to be dismissed); Matter of John-
son,  26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 272 (2010) (three-month suspension for lack of diligent and com-
petent representation in two matters following public reprimand for lack of diligence and pursuit 
of client’s objective in another matter; respondent also failed to communicate adequately with 
clients).
38 See, e.g., Matter of Harsch, 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 227 (2004) (public reprimand). See also 
Matter of Kiley, 459 Mass. 645 (2001) (lawyer in pending case who decided to leave private 
practice ﬁled motion to withdraw; court required remaining lawyer in ﬁrm to continue repre-
senting client, as client was retained in the ﬁrm’s name).
39 13 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 321 (1997).
40 Id. at 326.
41 Other examples of neglect leading to sanctions include Ad. 00-39, 16 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 508 
(2000) (where insurer put claim on hold during criminal prosecution, attorney neglected legal mat-
ter by failing to bring civil action within the two-year limit under the relevant insurance policy); 
Matter of Thompson, 16 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 390 (2000) (abandoning law practice and ignoring sixty 
open client ﬁles); Matter of Chambers, 421 Mass. 256 (1995) (failing to pursue client’s appeal led to 
appeal not being docketed until after client had served his entire sentence); Matter of Garabedian, 
415 Mass. 77, 9 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 121 (1993) (failure to ﬁle personal injury action within the 
statute of limitations).
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B. Discipline for Violating Rule 1.3
In Matter of Kane,42 the BBO announced new guidelines that increased 
the sanctions for incompetence and neglect. As described by the bar counsel at 
the time, the new standards established the following sanctions in neglect 
cases:
The recommendation in each case will be made on an individual basis. 
However, absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the basic 
standards are as follows:
1. Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer has failed to 
act with reasonable diligence in representing a client or other-
wise has neglected a legal matter, and the lawyer’s misconduct 
causes little or no actual or potential injury to a client.
2. Public reprimand is generally appropriate where a lawyer has 
failed to act with reasonable diligence in representing a client
or otherwise has neglected a legal matter and the lawyer’s 
misconduct causes serious injury or potentially serious injury to
a client.
3. Suspension is generally appropriate for misconduct involving 
repeated failures to act with reasonable diligence, or when a 
lawyer has engaged in a pattern of neglect, and the lawyer’s 
misconduct causes serious injury or potentially serious injury to
a client.
It is important to note that if there are aggravating factors present in the 
case, the discipline is likely to be increased.43
Since 1998, the BBO and the SJC have followed the guidelines Kane estab-
lished.44 The following sections describe selected, but typical, examples of dis-
cipline imposed in matters involving neglect.
42 13 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 321 (1997).
43 Arnold R. Rosenfeld, New Standards Clamp Down on Incompetence and Neglect, Board of Bar 
Overseers ( Jan. 1998), https://bbopublic.blob.core.windows.net/web/f/neglect.pdf (last vis-
ited May 8, 2018).
44 See Matter of Shaughnessy, 442 Mass. 1012, 1014, 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 482, 486 (2004) 
(six-month suspension for multiple pre-Kane instances of neglect: “We are satisﬁed that the 
disposition we order today is consistent with our pre-Kane jurisprudence, and note that similar 
conduct today would merit a substantially more serious sanction.”).
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1. Disbarment
While Kane does not address disbarment as a sanction, lawyers have been 
disbarred for serious, repeated neglect when they also engaged in misconduct 
to cover up or escape the consequences of the negligence, and where the mis-
conduct was aggravated by other factors, such as the vulnerability of the aﬀected 
clients or prior discipline. One such example is Matter of Espinosa,45 where the 
respondent “had neglected two immigration matters and a divorce; misrepre-
sented the status of the cases to his clients and, in one of the matters, to an 
immigration judge both orally and in writing; misused an unearned retainer and 
later misrepresented to bar counsel the amount of work expended in an eﬀort to 
justify retaining the unearned fee.” “[A] number of substantial factors in aggra-
vation” were also present. The BBO report approved by the single justice con-
cluded that “ ‘[a]lthough no single act committed by the [respondent] would, 
by itself, normally warrant this severe a penalty, [we] must consider the cumu-
lative eﬀect of the respondent’s many infractions . . . . Given the respondent’s 
demonstrated unwillingness (or inability) to conform to the basic standards of his 
profession, [we] conclude that disbarment is necessary both to protect the pub-
lic and to maintain its conﬁdence in the integrity of the bar.’ ”46 Applying the
Kane standards and the factors in aggravation, the single justice ordered the law-
yer disbarred.
Another example of lawyer neglect resulting in disbarment is Matter of 
Marshall.47 In Marshall, the attorney failed to return client ﬁles, failed to repre-
sent several clients zealously, failed to return unearned retainers, made misrep-
resentations to clients, failed to respond to the OBC’s subpoenas, failed to comply 
with an order of administrative suspension, and failed to ﬁle an answer to the peti-
tion for discipline. In Matter of Ulin,48 a lawyer was disbarred after he “engaged 
in a pattern of negligent conduct spanning several years, has caused pecuniary 
damage to clients, made repeated misrepresentations with the intention of con-
cealing his neglect, and violated more than twenty separate ethical and disci-
plinary rules.”
While neglect—even neglect aggravated by misrepresentation to hide it or 
its consequences—does not typically result in disbarment, when it is joined 
with other intentional misconduct, disbarment may be warranted.
45 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 307 (2012).
46 Id. at 307, 322, 323 (quoting Matter of Ulin, 18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 549, 555 (2002)).
47 16 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 299 (2000).
48 18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 549, 555 (2002).
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You Should Know
While disbarment often results after a progression of 
discipline, it may be a sanction in the ﬁrst instance, as 
the single justice noted in Matter of Ulin. “Step punish-
ment is a policy, not a rule, and the board may impose 
severe sanctions when the circumstances warrant. 
This is particularly appropriate where, as here, an 
attorney frustrates the normal disciplinary process 
(and hence the normal escalation of disciplinary sanc-
tions) by repeatedly refusing to cooperate with board 
investigations.”49
2. Suspension
Term suspensions are common in cases of neglect, particularly when the 
neglect is serious, repeated, and causes some harm. The Kane decision signaled 
an across-the-board increase in sanctions for neglect, including imposing sus-
pensions where previously an admonition or public reprimand would have 
resulted as well as ramping up the length of suspensions.50 
You Should Know
A review of decisions of single justices based on neglect 
since Kane shows term suspensions ranging from two 
months (with the suspension suspended)51 to two 
years,52 with most of the suspensions being four to six 
months.53
49 Matter of Ulin, 18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 549 (2002).
50 See Matter of Shaughnessy, 442 Mass. 1012, 1014, 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 482–85 (2004). 
51 See, e.g., Matter of Long, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 435 (2008). 
52 See, e.g., Matter of Ozulumba, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 515 (2007).
53 In Matter of Matter of Cammarano, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 82, 104–106 (2013), the lawyer 
was suspended indeﬁnitely after he neglected multiple immigration matters over a period of years, 
made misrepresentations to clients, and charged nonrefundable fees; there were also multiple fac-
tors in aggravation, including the clients’ vulnerability.
123
Problems of Competence
An apt example of a suspension for serious neglect is Matter of Barrat.54 In 
Barrat, the attorney neglected two separate client matters and misrepresented 
the facts to one of the clients in an eﬀort to hide the negligence. On one matter 
there was harm to the client (although redressed by the respondent’s malprac-
tice coverage). The single justice imposed a suspension of six months, as recom-
mended by the BBO. The BBO had rejected the respondent’s plea for a public 
reprimand, given the seriousness of the neglect, but it also rejected the OBC’s 
proposed suspension of one year and a day, in part because the lawyer’s diagno-
sis of depression was a factor in mitigation. Similarly, in Matter of MacDonald,55
the lawyer was suspended for six months for neglecting several matters but also 
for proﬀering forged or backdated documents to a court to cover mistakes. This 
lawyer also suﬀered from serious depression, and that mitigating factor inﬂu-
enced the single justice in the decision to limit the suspension to six months, 
with conditions.56
A closer case was Matter of Kydd,57 in which the lawyer neglected one pro-
bate estate matter and misrepresented the activity status to an estate beneﬁciary. 
The hearing committee recommended a three-month suspension. The single 
justice concluded that such a suspension was too long under the Kane stan-
dards for a single instance of neglect with accompanying harm and deceit. The 
justice opted to maintain the three-month suspension but stayed the suspension 
for one year with conditions. In Matter of O’Reilly,58 the respondent neglected 
a client matter and repeatedly lied to the client about the neglect. While the 
Kane analysis would suggest a public reprimand for the single instance of neglect 
with harm to the client, the accompanying misrepresentations justiﬁed a sus-
pension of a year and a day.
In Matter of Lansky,59 a lawyer neglected two probate estate matters and 
engaged in a conﬂict of interest, causing substantial injury to the beneﬁciaries 
54 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 27 (2004).
55 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 411 (2007).
56 See also Matter of Krabbenhoft, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 362 (2007) (analogized to Matter of 
Barrat, 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 27 (2004); six-month suspension for two instances of neglect with 
misrepresentation to a client, mitigated by depression); Matter of Brunelle, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. 
R. 62 (2013) (six-month suspension for single instance of neglect, stayed for two years, with prior 
discipline as aggravation).
57 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 341 (2009).
58 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 466 (2010).
59 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 446 (2006).
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of the estates. The respondent argued that the neglect, which was conceded, 
should receive a lesser sanction under the pre-Kane standards. The single jus-
tice disagreed, as much of the neglect had occurred post-Kane. Applying the 
Kane standard, the single justice imposed a six-month suspension.
3. Public Reprimand
According to the Kane standards, a lawyer who neglects a single matter and 
causes harm ought to receive a public reprimand. The BBO has applied that stan-
dard often, even when the misconduct includes misrepresentation to a client or 
beneﬁciary to conceal the lawyer’s missteps. In Matter of Berkland,60 the lawyer 
neglected a litigation matter, which resulted in the client’s claims being dismissed. 
The insurer made the client whole. In Matter of Kirby,61 the respondent neglected 
a matter, causing “limited harm,” and actively fabricated evidence to cover up the 
neglect. Scores of similar examples appear in the disciplinary reports.62
You Should Know
As seen in Berkland and numerous other cases,63 viola-
tions of Rules 1.1, 1.2(a), 1.3, and 1.4 often occur together. 
It should not be surprising that a lawyer who lacks 
competence to handle a matter (Rule 1.1) often lacks 
diligence (Rule 1.3) and fails to pursue the client’s lawful 
objectives (Rule 1.2(a)). The lawyer is then either too 
uninformed or embarrassed to keep the client apprised 
of relevant information (Rule 1.4(a)) or to know when to 
ask for the client’s input (Rule 1.4(b)).
60 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 40 (2010).
61 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 366 (2013). 
62 See, e.g., Matter of McManus, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 361 (2010); Matter of Un, 26 Mass. 
Att’y Disc. R. 698 (2010); Matter of Griﬃn, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 235 (2009); Matter of 
Fitzgerald, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 153 (2007); Matter of Bagmari, 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 31 
(2006); Matter of Williams, 19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 492 (2003); Matter of Dougherty, 14 Mass. 
Att’y Disc. R. 220 (1998); Matter of Van Dusen, 13 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 813 (1997).
63 See, e.g., Matter of Sousa, 30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 383 (2014); Matter of Fleming, 29 Mass. 
Att’y Disc. R. 257 (2013); Matter of Watson, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 885 (2012); Matter of 
Lynch, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 405 (2007).
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Sometimes attorneys receive public reprimands in circumstances where the 
facts suggest a more serious sanction. For instance, in Matter of Gleason,64 a law-
yer neglected a client matter, causing signiﬁcant harm (redressed by the liability 
insurer), engaged in an improper fee agreement, requested that the client settle 
the malpractice claim without the protections of Rule 1.8(h), and failed to super-
vise staﬀ on the matter. The BBO adopted a proposed stipulation of the parties 
to a public reprimand.
Practice Tip
Misconduct that would warrant a public reprimand under 
the Kane standard may lead to suspension if the lawyer 
misrepresents facts or circumstances to cover up neglect, 
or fails to cooperate with the OBC.65
4. Admonition
Under the Kane standards, a violation of Rule 1.3 results in an admonition 
if “the lawyer’s misconduct causes little or no actual or potential injury to a cli-
ent or others.”66 Many such examples exist in the disciplinary reports.67 For in-
stance, in Ad. 12-04,68 the lawyer neglected a probate estate matter for nearly 
two years and received an admonition for that misconduct despite having a pre-
vious admonition for similar misconduct nine years earlier. In Ad. 13-02,69 the 
lawyer received an admonition after twice permitting a civil action to be dis-
missed because of failure to take some action in the case. The lawyer had no prior 
discipline and fully cooperated both with the OBC and with the resulting mal-
practice claim.
64 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 352 (2010).
65 See, e.g., Matter of Beery, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 46 (2012) (three-month suspension for one 
instance of neglect with failure to cooperate); Matter of Hodgdon, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 295 
(2007) (three-month suspension for two instances of neglect, with reimbursement to the clients, 
plus failure to cooperate; substantial factors in mitigation and conditions on reinstatement).
66 Kane, 13 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. at 327.
67 A Westlaw search generates at least 190 admonition reports between 1999 and 2017 where 
the primary misconduct involves neglect of a client matter.
68 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 919 (2012).
69 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 697 (2013).
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Similar admonitions appeared under the predecessor to Rule 1.3. In Ad. 99-
67,70 the attorney, representing an incarcerated convicted criminal defendant, 
failed to visit the client in jail, in violation of DR 6-101(A)(2) and (A)(3); the 
lawyer received an admonition with conditions. In Ad. 99-71,71 the lawyer’s 
actions and inadequate supervision of an associate created a long delay in resolv-
ing title questions on a real estate closing; the violation of DR 6-101(A)(2) and 
(A)(3) led to an admonition.
5. Diversion
In some instances where an admonition would otherwise be the appropri-
ate sanction for a respondent’s neglect or lack of diligence, the OBC instead may 
enter into a diversion agreement with the respondent. Diversion “to an alterna-
tive educational, remedial, or rehabilitative program” as a substitute to formal dis-
cipline is authorized under SJC Rule 4:01.72 These appear to be instances where 
the OBC believes it is better for the lawyer to receive supervision or guidance 
(for example, how to maintain a tickler system for court appearances and stat-
utes of limitations; how to supervise support staﬀ ) than to be disciplined, only 
to risk making the same mistakes again.
IV. THE NATURE OF THE LAWYER’S RESPONSIBILITIES REGARDING
COMMUNICATION AND KEEPING A CLIENT INFORMED
RULE 1.4: COMMUNICATION
(a)  A lawyer shall:
(1)  promptly inform the client of any decision or circum-
stance with respect to which the client’s informed 
consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(f), is required by these 
Rules;
(2)  reasonably consult with the client about the means by 
which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished;
(3)   keep the client reasonably informed about the status of 
the matter;
70 15 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 775 (1999).
71 15 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 783 (1999).
72 SJC Rule 4:01 § 8(1)(b). For a discussion of diversion, see Chapter 4, Section II(C).
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RULE 1.4 (cont’d.)
(4)  promptly comply with reasonable requests for informa-
tion; and
(5)   consult with the client about any relevant limitation on 
the lawyer’s conduct when the lawyer knows that the 
client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of 
Professional Conduct or other law.
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably nec-
essary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding 
the representation.
A. The Lessons of Discipline Under Rule 1.4
Related to the problems of providing less-than-competent representation 
and neglecting a client’s matter are a lawyer’s failure to maintain adequate con-
tact with a client and failure to communicate relevant information to the cli-
ent. The OBC reports that a lawyer’s failure to stay in contact with a client is 
the most common complaint the oﬃce receives. While few discipline decisions 
involve solely Rule 1.4 violations, ignoring a client often goes hand in hand with 
neglect or lack of competence. A lawyer has a duty, both as a ﬁduciary and under 
the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct, to maintain adequate communi-
cation with a client. Rule 1.4 must be understood to complement Rule 1.2(a), 
which requires a lawyer to “seek the lawful objectives of his or her client through 
reasonably available means permitted by law and these Rules.”73
As with neglect, no clear standard has emerged from the disciplinary deci-
sions concerning this obligation, other than that the communication to a client 
must be of such quality and quantity to meet the standards of a reasonably pru-
dent and competent lawyer. A failure to communicate, combined with a risk of, or 
actual, signiﬁcant harm to the client, may lead to discipline.74 Often, the failure 
73 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2(a).
74 Many of the reported disciplinary decisions involving Rule 1.4 include more deceptive con-
duct, where the lawyer conceals from, or misrepresents to, the client his or her failures. See, e.g.,
Matter of Gillis, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 349 (2012) (failure to inform client of attorney’s failure 
to prosecute); Matter of O’Reilly, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 466 (2010) (neglect concealed by 
misrepresentations); Matter of Waisbren, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 725 (2008) (misrepresentation 
and concealment). However, simple neglect and failure to communicate with the client can be 
the basis of public discipline. See, e.g., Matter of Brandt, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 59 (2010).
128
Misconduct and Typical Sanctions
to maintain contact with a client while neglecting the client’s matter serves as the 
basis for discipline in Massachusetts.75
Practice Tips
It is especially important to communicate bad news to 
clients and to do so promptly. This includes informing 
the client about mistakes the lawyer has made.
* * *
Clients must be informed if their lawyer suffers from 
a mental condition that impairs the lawyer’s ability to 
adequately represent clients.76
While most serious violations of Rule 1.4 also qualify as neglect of a client 
matter in violation of Rule 1.3, the two rules are not equal. A lawyer may pur-
sue a client’s matter diligently and therefore not neglect it, but still fail to dis-
close important facts or developments to the client, or fail to provide the client 
with suﬃcient information for the client to participate meaningfully in deci-
sions concerning the case.77 By contrast, it is hard to imagine, and no Massa-
chusetts cases exist, where the lawyer who seriously neglected a matter did not 
also fail to maintain adequate communication with a client.
75 A Westlaw search shows more than 550 reported disciplinary matters between 1999 and 2017 
where Rule 1.4 is a source of the lawyer’s misconduct. Of those reports, close to ﬁve hundred also 
involve a violation of Rule 1.3. See, e.g., Ad. 10-17, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 792 (2010) (attorney 
violated Rule 1.4 by failing to tell the client she did not plan to pursue her ex-husband’s signa-
ture on the Qualiﬁed Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) that a divorce judgment required); 
Ad. 09-11, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 671 (2009) (attorney’s failure to explain to the client the dif-
ﬁculties of proof she faced, to disclose his lack of knowledge concerning the qualiﬁcations of an 
investigator he had hired, and to disclose that he had not corroborated certain claims by the 
investigator); Ad. 09-07, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 666 (2009) (failure to disclose to the client 
pending discovery and related motions for sanctions that later resulted in dismissal of the client’s 
claims, where the attorney had hoped to avoid those issues by a motion for summary judgment); 
Ad. 03-42, 19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 598 (2003) (general duty to meet with an incarcerated client 
to discuss the client’s case, even when the attorney believes that there was little to discuss); Ad. 
01-58, 17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 769 (2001) (duty to stay in communication with an incarcerated 
client about the case and about requests for continuances).
76 Matter of Gallagher, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 275 (2013).
77 See, e.g., Ad. 10-17, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 792 (2010) (attorney who represented a client in a 
family law matter did not advise client that she considered QDRO preparation outside the scope 
of her engagement).
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B. Discipline for Violating Rule 1.4
Discipline based primarily upon a violation of Rule 1.4 without other 
accompanying misconduct is unusual. The reported sanctions in cases that 
focus on a failure to communicate or to keep a client adequately informed are 
almost all admonitions. More serious discipline arises when something else 
goes wrong in the representation and the lawyer fails to communicate with the 
client because of those problems.
In Matter of Kennedy,78 the respondent received a public reprimand for viola-
tion of this duty. The lawyer advised a client about a possible claim against a 
lender. The client understood that the lawyer was providing representation on that 
matter and believed the lawyer would ﬁle suit. The lawyer understood the role as 
merely advising the client but did not make the limited nature of the relationship 
suﬃciently clear to the client. After the statute of limitations expired without the 
lawyer ﬁling suit, the lawyer received a public reprimand. In Matter of Brandt,79
the respondent had decided not to handle the client’s potential medical malprac-
tice case but “never notiﬁed the client of his decision, did not return the client’s 
medical records and did not advise the client of his right to consult with other 
attorneys, of the statute of limitations, or of the consequences of failing to ﬁle suit 
by the end of the limitations period. The respondent did not take any steps to toll 
the statute of limitations for the client or otherwise protect his rights while he 
sought to consult with other attorneys.”80 The lawyer received a public reprimand.
At least twenty-ﬁve admonitions since 1999 have primarily involved Rule 
1.4. Examples of the kinds of mistakes that have led to such an admonition 
include the following: 
• In Ad. 12-10,81 a lawyer repeatedly failed to respond to inquiries from 
a client and did not respond promptly to OBC inquiries. 
• In Ad. 10-17,82 a lawyer did not follow up adequately with a divorce 
client about whether the lawyer would prepare a Qualiﬁed Domestic 
Relations Order (QDRO), and by the time the parties resolved that 
issue the ex-husband had spent most of the assets. The BBO report 
78 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 284 (2010).
79 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 59 (2010).
80 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. at 59.
81 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 928 (2012).
82 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 792 (2010).
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concluded that the lawyer had not acted less than competently, but 
the failure to keep the client apprised of the limit of the lawyer’s 
responsibilities was a breach of duties. 
• In Ad. 09-07,83 a lawyer representing a tenant failed to apprise the 
client of a deposition notice and subsequent court orders to attend
the deposition; as a result of the client’s subsequent failure to attend 
the deposition, the court dismissed the tenant’s Chapter 93A
counterclaim. The BBO concluded that the counterclaim was not 
meritorious, but the lawyer had failed in the duty to keep a client 
informed. 
• In Ad. 03-42,84 the lawyer, a criminal defense practitioner, did not 
have a driver’s license and could only meet clients who were accessible 
by public transportation. He failed to visit two clients who were 
incarcerated, and by not visiting them in person he failed to maintain 
adequate communication with them.
Practice Tips
A lawyer’s duty to communicate with a client continues 
even if the client fails to pay the legal fees owed for the 
lawyer’s work.85 The proper remedy is to withdraw, not 
to refuse to communicate.
* * *
Appellate criminal defense lawyers are required by 
Committee for Public Counsel Services (CPCS) policy to 
“confer” with clients after receiving the trial transcripts 
to discuss the merits and strategies of the appeal. Failure 
to do so violates Rules 1.4(a) and (b) and may lead to 
discipline.86 Although the CPCS policy applies only to 
appointed counsel, privately retained counsel are well- 
advised to follow the policy as well.
83 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 666 (2009).
84 19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 598 (2003).
85 Ad. 06-45, 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 950 (2006).
86 See, e.g., Ad. 99-74, 15 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 789 (1999).
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Generally, lying to clients to cover up a failure to keep them informed about 
matters results in public discipline.87 Where the lawyer’s false report did not cause 
harm to the client, the resulting discipline was usually an admonition.88
V. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR MATTERS
INVOLVING ALLEGATIONS OF LACK OF COMPETENCE,
NEGLECT OF CLIENT MATTERS, AND FAILURE TO COMMUNICATE
An important relationship exists between the common law of malpractice 
and breach of ﬁduciary duty, as developed in private civil litigation and the dis-
ciplinary process governed by the Rules of Professional Conduct. When the OBC 
asserts that a lawyer’s conduct demonstrates lack of competence or diligence, that 
claim necessarily refers to some benchmark for competent lawyering. For malprac-
tice purposes, that benchmark is the standard of care of an average, prudent, care-
ful lawyer in Massachusetts.89 For BBO disciplinary purposes, one can reasonably 
read Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 as collectively imposing an equivalent standard. 
Violating the Rules of Professional Conduct neither establishes nor constitutes 
the standard of care for a practicing lawyer. The Rules themselves say that, as do 
several cases.90 That assertion might lead one to conclude that a lawyer may vio-
late the Rules and be disciplined, even if the lawyer’s actions comply with the stan-
dard of care of the average qualiﬁed practitioner working in Massachusetts in that 
area of practice. As a practical matter, that conclusion is incorrect, especially in 
the context of issues regarding competence and neglect. The deﬁnitions of compe-
tence, diligence, and maintaining reasonable communication with one’s clients are not 
apparent from the Rules and can be understood only in the context of the stan-
dard of a reasonable practicing attorney familiar with the practice area in question.91
87 See, e.g., Matter of Bixby, 17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 81 (2001) (lawyer publicly reprimanded for 
intentionally misrepresenting to client that the case was still pending when the lawyer had dis-
missed the case; in mitigation, the case may not have been viable).
88 See, e.g., Ad. 09-14, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 678 (2009); Ad. 06-36, 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 926 
(2006) (mitigating factors present).
89 See Fishman v. Brooks, 396 Mass. 643, 646 (1986) (“An attorney who has not held himself out 
as a specialist owes his client a duty to exercise the degree of care and skill of the average quali-
ﬁed practitioner.”).
90 See Mass. R. Prof. C., Scope, comment [6]; see, e.g., Fishman, 396 Mass. at 649; Sullivan v. 
Birmingham, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 359, 369 (1981) (the ethics rules “provide standards of profes-
sional conduct of attorneys and not grounds for civil liability”).
91 See Gilda Tuoni Russell, Massachusetts Professional Responsibility § 1.08, 1–20 (2003) 
(on questions of adequate preparation to satisfy Rule 1.1, “a Massachusetts lawyer must ask . . . 
what would a reasonable lawyer do[?]”).
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In any dispute about whether a lawyer’s conduct breached the applicable 
Massachusetts duty of care, one or both parties may seek to oﬀer expert testimony 
to establish the standard of care to prove the party’s assertion that the conduct
constituted a violation of the duty. The BBO disciplinary process does not per-
mit expert testimony on the meaning of the Rules themselves, whose interpre-
tation calls for the type of legal analysis that the hearing panel or oﬃcer has the 
capacity to make independently.92 Also, the SJC has stated that expert testimony 
is ordinarily not required in disciplinary matters to establish a standard of care.93
But in those disputes where the parties disagree about the nature of the standard 
of care, the BBO process permits expert testimony, at the discretion of the hear-
ing panel or oﬃcer.94 If the lawyer’s actions evidence a clear failure to meet the 
ordinary standards of good practice, the hearing panel or oﬃcer typically denies 
an oﬀer of expert testimony.95 Chapter 6, Section IX(G) discusses the role of an 
expert witness in a disciplinary hearing.
Few, if any, reported Massachusetts disciplinary cases involving claims of 
incompetence or neglect of a client matter, whether leading to admonitions or 
more serious discipline, show a legitimate, good-faith dispute about the nature of 
the standard of care or about whether the standard was, in fact, violated. While 
the parties may, and often do, disagree about the facts (what the respondent law-
yer actually did), they seldom, if ever, disagree about the question of whether the 
facts, as alleged by the OBC, violate the standards of competence, diligence, or 
client communication.
92 See Matter of Crossen, 450 Mass. 533, 570, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 122, 168 (2008).
93 Crossen, 450 Mass. at 570, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. at 168; Matter of Tobin, 417 Mass. 81, 86, 
10 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 269, 274 (1994) (dictum).
94 BBO Policies and Practices ¶ 12, Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers, https://bbopublic
.blob.core.windows.net/web/f/bbopolicy.pdf (last visited May 8, 2018):
In any disciplinary hearing in which the hearing committee determines that the attorney’s 
compliance with the degree of learning and skill required to be possessed by attorneys 
practicing in a particular area or areas of the law is relevant to the decision of the commit-
tee, expert testimony concerning the standard of care applicable to the attorney’s conduct 
may, in the discretion of the committee, be admitted into evidence, subject to the caveat 
that an expert’s opinion to the eﬀect either (1) that there has or has not been a violation 
of law or (2) that there has or has not been an ethical violation, is not admissible and must 
be rejected.
95 See Crossen, 450 Mass. at 570, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. at 168; Matter of Buckley, 2 Mass. Att’y 
Disc. R. 24, 25 (1980).
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chapter eight
Confidentiality
(Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c))
I. INTRODUCTION
A lawyer must protect the information received while representing clients. The 
instructions in Rule 1.6 of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct to a law-
yer are simple and clear: “A lawyer shall not reveal conﬁdential information relat-
ing to client representation unless the client gives informed consent”1 or one of 
seven exceptions applies.2 That obligation continues after the representation ends. 
According to the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct Rule 1.9(c), a lawyer shall not use conﬁdential information to the disadvantage 
of a former client, or reveal such information unless otherwise permitted or required 
by other rules.3 A lawyer who reveals or uses information in violation of these 
rules is subject to discipline. At times, the sanctions against a lawyer who breaches 
this central ﬁduciary duty of conﬁdentiality are severe, as discussed below.
II. THE NATURE OF THE CONFIDENTIALITY DUTY
AND SANCTIONS FOR VIOLATING THE DUTY
RULE 1.6: CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal confidential information relating to 
the representation of a client unless the client gives informed con-
sent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out 
the representation or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b).
1 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.6(a).
2 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.6(a), (b), discussed in Section IV.
3 The Massachusetts version of the ABA Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.9(c)(1), barring 
the use of former client information, omits a qualifying phrase from the Model Rules counterpart. 
The latter declares an exception for information “generally known.” The absence of that phrase in 
the Massachusetts rule probably results from the state’s limitation of the restriction to “conﬁden-
tial” information. Information that is generally known is unlikely to qualify as conﬁdential. How-
ever, as comment [5B] to Rule 1.6 says, publicly available information, including information that 
is a matter of public record, but that is not generally known, is protected as a client conﬁdence.
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RULE 1.6: CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION (cont’d.)
(b) A lawyer may reveal confidential information relating to the 
representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably 
believes necessary, and to the extent required by Rules 3.3, 4.1(b), 
8.1 or Rule 8.3 must reveal, such information:
(1)  to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily 
harm, or to prevent the wrongful execution or incarcera-
tion of another;
(2)  to prevent the commission of a criminal or fraudulent act 
that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in 
substantial injury to property, financial, or other signifi-
cant interests of another;
(3)  to prevent, mitigate, or rectify substantial injury to prop-
erty, financial, or other significant interests of another 
that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the 
client’s commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of 
which the client has used the lawyer’s services;
(4)  to secure legal advice about the lawyer’s compliance with 
these Rules;
(5)  to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a 
controversy between the lawyer and the client, to estab-
lish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against 
the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was 
involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding 
concerning the lawyer’s representation of the client;
(6)  to the extent permitted or required under these Rules or 
to comply with other law or a court order; or
(7)  to detect and resolve conflicts of interest arising from the 
lawyer’s potential change of employment or from changes 
in the composition or ownership of a firm, but only if the 
revealed information would not compromise the attorney-
client privilege or otherwise prejudice the client.
(c) A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadver-
tent or unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, con-
fidential information relating to the representation of a client.
(d) A lawyer participating in a lawyer assistance program, as here-
inafter defined, shall treat the person so assisted as a client for the 
purposes of this Rule. Lawyer assistance means assistance provided 
to a lawyer, judge, other legal professional, or law student by a 
lawyer participating in an organized nonprofit effort to provide 
135
Confidentiality
RULE 1.6 (cont’d.)
assistance in the form of (a) counseling as to practice matters 
(which shall not include counseling a law student in a law school 
clinical program) or (b) education as to personal health matters, 
such as the treatment and rehabilitation from a mental, emotional, 
or psychological disorder, alcoholism, substance abuse, or other 
addiction, or both. A lawyer named in an order of the Supreme 
Judicial Court or the Board of Bar Overseers concerning the 
monitoring or terms of probation of another attorney shall treat 
that other attorney as a client for the purposes of this Rule. Any 
lawyer participating in a lawyer assistance program may require a 
person acting under the lawyer’s supervision or control to sign a 
nondisclosure form approved by the Supreme Judicial Court. 
Nothing in this paragraph (d) shall require a bar association-
sponsored ethics advisory committee, the Office of Bar Counsel, 
or any other governmental agency advising on questions of pro-
fessional responsibility to treat persons so assisted as clients for 
the purpose of this Rule. 
A. The Scope of Rule 1.6
While the scope of the Massachusetts version of Rule 1.6 is narrower than 
in most other jurisdictions, and less strict than that described in ABA Rule 1.6, 
the duty remains a powerful and extensive one. Massachusetts’s Rule 1.6 pro-
tects “conﬁdential information related to the representation.” (The ABA Rule 1.6 
omits the qualiﬁer “conﬁdential,” and so literally covers more information than 
the Massachusetts rule.4)
According to Massachusetts Rule 1.6, “ ‘Conﬁdential information’ consists of 
information gained during or relating to the representation of a cli ent, whatever 
4 ABA Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6(a). Most jurisdictions have adopted the language 
of the Model Rules without the Massachusetts qualiﬁer. In practice, however, the ABA rule is very 
likely treated the same as the Massachusetts rule. As the American Law Institute states in its Restate-
ment volume on the law governing lawyers:
[U]se or disclosure of conﬁdential client information is generally prohibited if there is a 
reasonable prospect that doing so will adversely aﬀect a material interest of the client or 
prospective client. Although the lawyer codes do not express this limitation, such is the 
accepted interpretation. For example, under a literal reading of ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(a) (1983), a lawyer would commit a disciplinary violation 
by telling an unassociated lawyer in casual conversation the identity of a ﬁrm client, even 
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its source, that is (a) protected by the attorney-client privilege, (b) likely to be 
embarrassing or detrimental to the client if disclosed, or (c) information that 
the lawyer has agreed to keep conﬁdential,”5 but “does not ordinarily include 
(i) a lawyer’s legal knowledge or legal research or (ii) information that is gen-
erally known in the local community or in the trade, ﬁeld or profession to 
which the information relates.”6 The fact that information is available in a pub-
lic record or was disclosed in a public proceeding does not deprive that infor-
mation of its conﬁdential character if it ﬁts the above deﬁnition.
A lawyer must not only avoid revealing protected information related to the 
representation but must also take precautions to avoid inadvertently disclosing 
information. Any lawyer who employs e-mail communication or cloud comput-
ing to perform legal services for clients—in other words, just about every work-
ing lawyer—must ensure that the communication devices are safe and secure.7
Comment [18] to Massachusetts Rule 1.6 emphasizes that a lawyer must take 
into account the sensitivity of a client’s information, the cost and complexity of 
extra security, and the client’s preferences in choosing how to communicate tech-
nologically about a matter (including sharing sensitive documents).8 Under ordi-
nary circumstances, the use of unencrypted e-mail and cloud computing, each 
commonly used by lawyers in their daily practices, is adequate,9 but a lawyer must 
oﬀer more secure avenues when appropriate and necessary.10
For the purposes of a lawyer’s duties under Rule 1.6, the Massachusetts rule 
makes clear that “[a] lawyer participating in a lawyer assistance program . . . shall 
if mention of the client’s identity creates no possible risk of harm. Such a strict interpre-
tation goes beyond the proper interpretation of the rule.
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 60 comment [c(i)] (Am. Law 
Inst. 2000).
5 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.6 comment [3A].
6 Id.
7 See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof ’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 17-477-R (revised May 22, 2017).
8 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.6 comment [8]. Note that the Massachusetts version of comment [8], which 
also includes comment [8A], is more developed than the ABA’s version, interpreting the identi-
cal language of Rule 1.6(c). 
9 See, e.g., Massachusetts Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics, Opinion 12-03 (2012):
A lawyer generally may store and synchronize electronic work ﬁles containing conﬁdential 
client information across diﬀerent platforms and devices using an Internet-based storage 
solution, such as “Google docs,” so long as the lawyer undertakes reasonable eﬀorts to ensure 
that the provider’s terms of use and data privacy policies, practices and procedures are 
compatible with the lawyer’s professional obligations, including the obligation to protect 
conﬁdential client information reﬂected in Rule 1.6(a).
10 ABA Op. 17-477-R, supra note 7.
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treat the person so assisted as a client for the purposes of this Rule.”11 Partici-
pants must keep the conﬁdences of assisted persons, even if those persons are not 
technically their “clients.” Section IV discusses the exceptions to this ethical duty.
B. Confidentiality and the Attorney-Client Privilege Distinguished
The ethical duty of conﬁdentiality is much broader in scope than the attorney-
client privilege, and the two are sometimes confused. Rule 1.6 describes a law-
yer’s ethical responsibilities; it does not describe or address privileged matters. 
The attorney-client privilege bars any compelled use of client communications, 
in court and elsewhere, if those communications ﬁt the narrow deﬁnition devel-
oped by Massachusetts common law. The Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) describes 
the attorney-client privilege as follows:
A party asserting the privilege must show that (1) the communications 
were received from the client in furtherance of the rendition of legal 
services; (2) the communications were made in conﬁdence; and (3) the 
privilege has not been waived.12
A communication between a lawyer and a client concerning the legal mat-
ter for which the lawyer has been retained is not privileged if that conversation 
takes place in the presence of an unnecessary third party.13 The privilege may be 
waived if proper precautions are not taken to protect against inadvertent dis-
closure.14 Information that an attorney obtains during the course of represen-
tation other than through a conﬁdential client communication is not privileged, 
although it may be covered by Rule 1.6.
The doctrine surrounding the attorney-client privilege is extensive and in-
tricate, and is not a central component of this book, especially since the eviden-
tiary doctrine has little direct relevance to disciplinary matters.15 One notable SJC 
decision does deserve mention, however, because it demonstrates the relation-
ship between the two separate bodies of conﬁdentiality law. In Purcell v. Dis-
trict Attorney for Suffolk Dist.,16 a lawyer revealed otherwise conﬁdential client 
11 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.6(d). The ABA Model Rules do not include such a provision.
12 In re Grand Jury Investigation, 453 Mass. 453, 456 (2009).
13 Comm’r of Revenue v. Comcast Corp., 453 Mass. 293, 306 (2009).
14 Hoy v. Morris, 79 Mass. (13 Gray) 519 (1859).
15 For a more in-depth discussion of the privilege, see Paul J. Liacos, Mark S. Brodin &
Michael Avery, Handbook of Massachusetts Evidence § 13.4 (8th ed. 2006).
16 424 Mass. 109 (1997).
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information to the police in order to prevent his client from committing a crim-
inal act (arson). That disclosure was permissible according to DR 4–101(C)(3), in 
place at the time.17 His disclosure worked; it prevented the crime. However, it 
also led to his client’s arrest on a charge of attempted arson, for which the cli-
ent was indicted. When the district attorney subpoenaed the lawyer to testify at 
trial about the matters that the lawyer had reported to the police, the lawyer 
claimed that his testimony was inadmissible because of privilege. While recog-
nizing the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege, the SJC con-
cluded that the exception did not apply to this case.
The SJC wrote, “A statement of an intention to commit a crime made in the 
course of seeking legal advice is protected by the privilege, unless the crime-fraud 
exception applies. That exception applies only if the client or prospective client 
seeks advice or assistance in furtherance of criminal conduct.”18 In this case, the 
lawyer’s client did express his intention to commit a crime, but did not seek his 
lawyer’s assistance in that crime or advice about it. Therefore, the lawyer was per-
mitted to reveal the threat to the authorities but could decline to testify about the 
content of the conversation when subpoenaed to testify.19
C. Discipline for Revealing Confidences Under Rule 1.6
1. Disbarment
While no Massachusetts lawyer has been disbarred solely for revealing cli-
ent conﬁdences, lawyers have been disbarred for misconduct involving Rule 1.6 
or its predecessor, DR 4–101, in a signiﬁcant way. In Matter of Pool,20 a young 
lawyer disclosed conﬁdential information of a criminal defendant client—the 
17 That exception continues to exist under the Rules of Professional Conduct in a greatly expanded 
form. Section IV discusses the exceptions to the basic duties established by Rule 1.6.
18 424 Mass. at 115.
19 In Purcell, the Court implied that the client’s threats qualiﬁed as “communications . . . in fur-
therance of the rendition of legal services.” In re Grand Jury Investigation, supra note 12. In the latter 
matter, involving a client’s threats against a judge that the lawyer disclosed, the Court made that 
ﬁnding explicit. 453 Mass. at 458–59.
20 4 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 112 (1984). For a discussion of the facts leading to disbarment and the re-
spondent’s subsequent reinstatement, see Matter of Pool, 401 Mass. 460, 5 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 290 
(1988). Pool was disbarred under an earlier version of SJC Rule 4:01, and the Court noted the 
importance of his being disbarred, rather than being suspended. 4 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. at 115. 
Despite being disbarred, Pool was allowed to apply for reinstatement after one year, in part because 
the misconduct had occurred eleven years before he was disbarred, perhaps in part because the disci-
plinary hearing “did not commence until 1981, due to the unwillingness of the United States gov-
ernment to permit interviews of the Federal agents and attorney involved in the case.” 401 Mass. at 
463 n.1.
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location of a safety deposit box—to prosecutors in order to reach funds in the 
box to pay for investigative expenses and counsel fees. The lawyer also misrep-
resented these actions to the client, but the primary misdeed was revealing his 
client’s secrets in order to obtain money. He was disbarred.
In Matter of Johnson,21 an experienced lawyer was disbarred after posting 
conﬁdential client information on her website, in an eﬀort to publicize what 
she believed were false claims of sexual abuse. Much of the material posted was 
impounded by a court order, which the respondent ignored. The respondent 
also refused to remove website material about a client until the client withdrew 
a complaint made to the Oﬃce of the Bar Counsel (OBC). This combination 
of misconduct led to her disbarment.
Another lawyer, in what the single justice described as “an unfortunate case,” 
was disbarred after misusing client funds, neglecting the client’s Interest on Law-
yers Trust Account (IOLTA), mismanaging client aﬀairs, and, when suing the 
client for fees allegedly due, disclosing more conﬁdential facts than necessary to 
establish the claim or defense under Rule 1.6(b)(5).22 That unwarranted disclo-
sure of conﬁdential client information contributed to the disbarment, but appar-
ently played a relatively minor role.
2. Suspension
No Massachusetts lawyer has been suspended solely for violating Rule 1.6, 
but several lawyers have been suspended from practice for a combination of 
misconduct, some of which included serious disregard for client conﬁdential-
ity. In one vivid example of misconduct, a lawyer abandoned his law practice 
and, in the words of the single justice:
When the respondent abandoned his law oﬃce, he left a large number 
of open and closed ﬁles and documents in ﬁle drawers and cabinets and 
on desks and tables. The respondent did not make any of these ﬁles 
available to the clients and former clients, did not inform them that he 
was abandoning his oﬃce and his practice and did not maintain the 
conﬁdentiality of information in these ﬁles and documents from his 
landlord or others who might take possession of the premises. The 
respondent also abandoned a check book, check register and statements 
on an IOLTA account in his name.23
21 450 Mass. 165, 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 403 (2006).
22 Matter of O’Malley, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 462 (2010).
23 Matter of Delaney, 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 166 (2005).
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The lawyer also diverted escrow funds for his personal use and neglected many 
client matters when he abandoned his law practice. The SJC imposed an indef-
inite suspension.
In Matter of Lagana,24 a lawyer was suspended for three months for multi-
ple instances of misconduct, including a violation of Rule 1.6 under circumstances 
that may interest many lawyers who ﬁnd themselves in a similar situation. In his 
immigration practice, the respondent represented a client who proved to be non-
responsive. The respondent ﬁled a motion to withdraw his appearance, disclos-
ing in the motion more client information than was necessary to support the 
motion.25 That breach of client conﬁdentiality, along with considerable additional 
misconduct,26 led to the suspension. Similarly, in Matter of Hilson,27 a lawyer was 
suspended indeﬁnitely for multiple instances of misconduct involving the han-
dling of a real estate escrow account. One count against the respondent accused 
him of violating DR 4–101(B), the predecessor to Rule 1.6, by disclosing more 
client facts than necessary during his deposition after the dispute led to litigation. 
The lawyer claimed that his disclosures were “appropriate” given his need to defend 
himself, but the SJC agreed with the Board of Bar Overseers (BBO) that “the 
standard is more than ‘appropriate’; disclosures must be ‘necessary.’ ”28
A lawyer was also suspended for his failure to reveal client conﬁdences pur-
suant to Rule 1.6(b)(3). As noted previously, Rule 1.6(b)(3) gives lawyers discre-
tion to reveal client information when necessary to prevent or rectify client fraud. 
Such a disclosure becomes mandatory under Rule 4.1(b) when necessary to avoid 
assisting in a client’s fraud. In Matter of Harlow,29 the lawyer represented a cli-
ent in an administrative proceeding, and the single justice concluded that the 
client’s course of action constituted health care fraud. By seeking to serve as a 
zealous advocate and therefore failing to disclose the client’s fraud (misleading 
the administrative body at the same time by the evidence and arguments), the 
respondent violated both Rule 1.6 and Rule 4.1 and was suspended for six 
months and a day.
24 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 295 (2010).
25 Id.
26 The respondent asked an inexperienced associate to prepare the motion to withdraw with its ex-
cessive disclosures and did not review the motion before its ﬁling, and therefore violated Rule 5.1. 
More troubling still, the lawyer failed to notify an immigration court about a change of his oﬃce 
address and, as a result, missed critical notices in the client’s case, leading the client to lose Tempo-
rary Protected Status and, eventually, to be arrested by the immigration authorities.
27 448 Mass. 603, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 265 (2007).
28 448 Mass. at 610, n.5 (citing Canon 4, DR 4–101(C)(4)).
29 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 212 (2004).
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Practice Tip
Lawyers must tread a ﬁne line when communicating 
with the court about problems with a client relationship, 
such as when seeking leave of the court to withdraw 
from representation. Lawyers may properly disclose 
some limited client information to support the request, 
but revealing more than necessary could lead to disci-
pline. As discussed in Section II(C)(4), most such errors 
result in an admonition. One suggested strategy is for 
counsel to ﬁle a motion disclosing minimal facts and 
then to prepare a separate supporting in camera afﬁda-
vit for the court to review, without disclosing it to oppos-
ing counsel or making it part of the record.30
3. Public Reprimand
Lawyers have received a public reprimand for revealing clients’ conﬁden-
tial information. In Matter of Bulger,31 the attorney was employed as counsel to 
the Oﬃce of the Commissioner of Probation. When the administrator who 
appointed him was placed on administrative leave pending an investigation 
into politically motivated hiring at the department, the attorney continued to 
communicate with the administrator without permission, providing updates 
on the investigation. The BBO adopted the hearing committee’s recommenda-
tion of a public reprimand. The BBO noted that a Rule 1.6 violation alone 
typically warrants an admonition, but in this instance a reprimand was war-
ranted. “[T]he respondent was improperly motivated by concern for the person 
responsible for his own rise in the probation department; the impropriety of 
his disclosures was fairly obvious; the disclosures occurred repeatedly over an 
extended course of conversations with [the administrator]; and the respondent 
seemed to the committee still to be wholly unaware of the impropriety of his 
30 See Massachusetts Bar Association Ethics Op. 96-3 (1996). The ethics committee cautioned 
that disclosure should be limited to the bare minimum necessary and that, if the court wants to 
delve more deeply, the lawyer might request that the motion to withdraw be heard in camera by 
a judge other than the one expected to try the client’s case.
31 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 65 (2013).
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misconduct.” The BBO dismissed the respondent’s argument that he was unsure 
who his client was during this time as “willful blindness.”32
Several lawyers have received public reprimands for misusing client infor-
mation belonging to a former client. Section III discusses the cases and sanctions 
reported under Rule 1.9(c), the rule governing safekeeping of former client 
conﬁdences.
4. Admonition
The typical sanction for violating Rule 1.6 without other misconduct or aggra-
vating circumstances is an admonition.33 The disciplinary reports show how a law-
yer with a disagreement with a client might improperly reveal conﬁdential client 
information. The lawyers who have done so, and whose complaints did not in-
clude separate misconduct, have typically received admonitions. (Lawyers who 
reveal information about a former client under such circumstances also receive 
admonitions, as described in Section III.) Lawyers seeking to withdraw from rep-
resentation in a court matter often struggle with the question of how much in-
formation to reveal in support of the motion. At least two admonitions show 
lawyers who made the wrong judgments. In Ad. 11-21,34 the lawyer, in his motion 
to withdraw from representation in a family court matter, attached e-mails be-
tween the lawyer and the client to establish the breakdown of the relationship. 
The lawyer also disclosed the speciﬁc fees the client owed, which the BBO deemed 
not necessary and a breach of the lawyer’s conﬁdentiality duty. In an earlier deci-
sion, PR 92-34,35 the OBC recommended a public reprimand for a lawyer who 
made a similarly poor decision, but the BBO imposed what was then called a 
private reprimand, the equivalent to an admonition today. In that case, the client 
sent letters to the Geraldo Rivera television show and to the respondent, each com-
plaining about the lawyer’s representation of the client in a criminal matter. In 
his motion to withdraw as defense counsel, the lawyer attached both letters to 
bolster his claim. Because both letters revealed conﬁdential and sensitive infor-
mation, including the client’s allegations that the judge was corrupt, the BBO 
32 Id. See also Matter of DuPont, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 213 (2013) (in a motion to withdraw, 
“the respondent ﬁled an aﬃdavit that was critical of his client and revealed conﬁdential infor-
mation that went beyond what was necessary to support his withdrawal”; public reprimand 
imposed).
33 Bulger, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. at 66.
34 27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 972 (2011).
35 8 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 328 (1992).
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concluded that the lawyer had violated his duties under the disciplinary rule in 
place at the time.36
Other examples exist where the lawyer and the client had some disagree-
ment, and the lawyer revealed more than necessary in response to the client’s 
claims. For instance, in Ad. 09-18,37 a client posted comments on an Internet 
bulletin board criticizing the tax assistance the lawyer had provided and the law-
yer’s fee. The lawyer responded with a post denying the client’s claims and disclos-
ing the client’s substance abuse issues along with other conﬁdential information. 
And, in Ad. 07-35,38 a client authorized the lawyer to charge the lawyer’s fee to 
a credit card but later disputed the claim with the credit card provider. The law-
yer sent letters to the bank in an attempt to explain the charge and request that 
it be reinstated. The lawyer revealed highly conﬁdential information about the 
client that was unnecessary to establishing the claim for legal fees. The BBO 
concluded that such disclosure violated Rule 1.6(a).
In another admonition matter, Ad. 06-24,39 the lawyer was disciplined after 
disclosing information from a prospective client to her estranged husband. The 
facts learned from the prospective client were relevant to a dispute the lawyer had 
with her husband, leading her to confront him with the information. Because 
information from a prospective client has the same protection as that from a 
current client, the lawyer’s actions violated Rule 1.6.40
A disciplinary matter arising under the predecessor to Rule 1.6 involved 
lawyers using information from one client’s case to substantially assist another 
client’s aﬀairs, at little (but some) harm to the client whose information the law-
yers exploited. In Matter of Discipline of Two Attorneys,41 the lawyers represent-
ing the buyers of a parcel of real estate learned by happenstance that a diﬀerent 
client of the lawyers was a judgment-creditor of the sellers. The lawyers arranged 
to intercept the proceeds of the sale after the closing but before the funds reached 
36 Id. (referring to DR 4-101(B)(1)). Note that while the letter sent to the television show was 
not privileged, given that it was hardly conﬁdential, for purposes of the ethics rules it remained 
protected, and disclosing it breached the lawyer’s ethical duties. Under the current Massachusetts 
rule, the lawyer’s disclosure of the letters might contravene Rule 1.6 because they were embar-
rassing to the client.
37 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 685 (2009).
38 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 1015 (2007).
39 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 901 (2006).
40 That same misconduct would violate Rule 1.18 of the ABA Model Rules, which Massachusetts 
had not adopted at the time. Rule 1.18 protects information from prospective clients in a fashion 
diﬀerent from that of existing clients.
41 421 Mass. 619, 12 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 580 (1996).
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the seller, to pay oﬀ their judgment-creditor client. In addition to the conﬂict 
of interest, the SJC agreed with the BBO that the potential risk of harm to the 
buyer clients (that the scheme would unravel and the sale would be canceled 
once the sellers learned of it) was suﬃcient to warrant an informal admonition, 
given the language of DR 4-101(B) barring disclosure of information that 
“would be likely to be detrimental to the client.”42
In one reported matter, a single justice, after concluding that a lawyer had 
violated the predecessor to Rule 1.6, declined to impose discipline. In Matter of 
an Attorney,43 the client discharged the attorney representing his personal injury 
claim after they disagreed about the relevance to his claim of the client’s attend-
ing a police academy. After the client returned with his father, a police oﬃcer, and 
used police resources to photocopy parts of the ﬁle, the attorney wrote to the 
police chief detailing the encounter and revealing the client’s plans to use the 
police lab for his personal business. The OBC sought an admonition for this dis-
closure. The single justice concluded that the lawyer’s actions violated DR 4-101, 
but exercised his discretion and imposed no discipline. Noting the client’s “out-
rageous conduct,” the single justice wrote that “an isolated lapse in judgment 
does not necessarily constitute sanctionable conduct.” 
Practice Tip
Lawyers who engage in public disputes with clients 
through social media not only risk sanctions for violating 
Rule 1.6, they also risk damage to their reputations, as 
such social media interactions often have high search- 
engine value. Prospective clients or others searching for 
the lawyer on the Internet may see that dispute appear-
ing prominently in search-engine results.
42 421 Mass. at 622–23, 12 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. at 586.
43 18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 588 (2002).
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III. THE NATURE OF THE CONFIDENTIALITY DUTY TO FORMER
CLIENTS AND SANCTIONS FOR VIOLATING THE DUTY
RULE 1.9(c): DUTIES TO FORMER CLIENTS
(c) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or 
whose present or former firm has formerly represented a client in 
a matter shall not thereafter:
(1)  use confidential information relating to the representa-
tion to the disadvantage of the former client, or for the 
lawyer’s advantage, or the advantage of a third person, 
except as Rule 1.6, Rule 3.3, or Rule 4.1 would permit or 
require with respect to a client; or
(2)  reveal confidential information relating to the representa-
tion, except as Rule 1.6, Rule 3.3, or Rule 4.1 would per-
mit or require with respect to a client.
A.  Discipline for Revealing or Using Former Client Confidences 
Under Rule 1.9(c)
Practice Tip
A lawyer may properly oppose a former client in a later 
matter that is not substantially related to the earlier 
representation. Even if permitted to oppose a former 
client, the lawyer may not reveal or use information that 
was learned from the client in the ﬁrst matter, unless 
that information is generally known.44
Lawyers on occasion have been disciplined for using or disclosing client 
information after representation has ended. Some of these disciplinary matters 
are discussed in Chapter 10, Section III(A) concerning successive conﬂicts of 
interest. No lawyer has been disbarred or suspended solely for misusing former 
44 The ABA Model Rules includes the exception noted in the Practice Tip for “generally known” 
matters. That same exception appears in comment [8] in the Massachusetts version of Rule 1.9(c), 
presumably because if a fact is “generally known,” it is not “conﬁdential.”
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client conﬁdences in violation of Rule 1.9(c), although several lawyers have 
received admonitions or public reprimands.
1.  Public Reprimand
Lawyers have been publicly reprimanded on occasion for disclosing for-
mer clients’ information. In Matter of Hochberg,45 a lawyer represented new cli-
ents in a dispute against a former client in a matter unrelated to the former 
representation. Therefore, under Rule 1.9(a), the new representation seems to 
have been proper. In response to a consumer protection demand letter the 
former client’s new lawyer sent, the respondent sought to attack the former 
client’s credibility by disclosing that the former client had not paid the respon-
dent’s legal bill and that the former client had attempted to fabricate evidence 
in the previous matter. The BBO imposed a public reprimand for misusing the 
former client’s conﬁdences against him.
In Matter of Horrigan,46 a case discussed in Chapter 10, the lawyer vio-
lated Rule 1.9(a) and then more seriously violated Rule 1.9(c), receiving a pub-
lic reprimand for that misconduct. After representing a man in a personal 
injury and worker’s compensation matter, the lawyer agreed to represent the 
man’s wife in a divorce action. The lawyer then realized the conﬂict of interest 
and withdrew the same day. The respondent later gave to the wife the hus-
band’s medical records that had been obtained during the previous represen-
tation. Although neither the wife nor her lawyer reviewed the records (they 
returned them to the husband’s divorce lawyer), and despite the absence of 
prior discipline or any other misconduct in the present proceeding, the law-
yer’s actions warranted a public reprimand.
In Matter of Acharya,47 a lawyer whose former client sought relief from an 
order by claiming that the respondent provided ineﬀective assistance of counsel 
defended herself by revealing more conﬁdential information about her former 
client than was necessary. That misconduct, along with the less-than-competent 
legal services oﬀered originally, led to the lawyer receiving a public reprimand.
2.  Admonition
A few lawyers have been admonished for disclosing conﬁdential informa-
tion belonging to a former client. The distinction between public reprimands 
and admonitions appears to be based on the harm, or risk of harm, caused to 
45 17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 304 (2001).
46 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 250 (2010).
47 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 4 (2010).
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the former client. In Ad. 09-08,48 the lawyer’s misconduct was based solely on 
Rule 1.9(c). The respondent, while working as a lawyer for a company, learned 
valuable information there. After she left the company and established a busi-
ness competing with her former client, she used the information about the for-
mer client to its disadvantage. Similarly, in Ad. 09-13,49 a lawyer assisted a former 
client’s wife in a divorce action against the former client by submitting an aﬃ-
davit listing some of the former client’s faults, revealing conﬁdential informa-
tion. And in Ad. 08-09,50 the lawyer oﬀered his client, as examples for their use 
in their own cases, copies of previous clients’ divorce pleadings, thereby reveal-
ing those former clients’ conﬁdential information.51
IV. EXCEPTIONS TO THE DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY
A lawyer who reveals a client’s conﬁdential information is subject to dis-
cipline (and many examples exist of lawyers doing so), unless the lawyer has 
permission to make the disclosure, either from the client or from one of the 
exceptions identiﬁed in Rule 1.6 or 1.9. Almost all, but not all, of the exceptions 
to conﬁdentiality are discretionary, not mandatory—that is, the lawyer may, but 
need not, disclose if the exception applies. In certain instances, a lawyer is re-
quired to reveal some information that otherwise qualiﬁes as conﬁdential under 
Rule 1.6. A lawyer has permission, or a duty, to disclose otherwise-conﬁdential 
information in the following circumstances:
1. With client permission: Of course, if a client agrees to disclosure, 
Rule 1.6(a) permits the lawyer to reveal information related to the 
representation. The rule requires that the lawyer obtain “informed 
consent” from the client, which the rules deﬁne as “the agreement by 
a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has com-
municated adequate information and explanation about the material 
risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of 
conduct.”52
48 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 667 (2009).
49 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 676 (2009).
50 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 856 (2008).
51 The discipline in Ad. 08-09 demonstrates that client information available in a court ﬁle open to 
the public does not refute that the material is protected as “conﬁdential” under Rules 1.6(a) and 1.9(c).
52 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.0(f ).
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2. In some instances, to prevent death, substantial bodily harm, or substantial 
financial injury to another: Rule 1.6(b)(1) allows a lawyer the discretion 
(but not the obligation) to reveal client conﬁdences, even over the 
client’s express objection, if necessary, “to prevent reasonably certain 
death or substantial bodily harm, or to prevent the wrongful execution 
or incarceration of another.” Rule 1.6(b)(2) provides the same discre-
tion “to prevent the commission of a criminal or fraudulent act that 
the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in substantial injury to 
property, ﬁnancial, or other signiﬁcant interests of another.” And Rule 
1.6(b)(3) allows a lawyer to disclose information, when necessary, “to 
prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to property, the ﬁnancial, 
or other signiﬁcant interests of another that is reasonably certain to 
result or has resulted from the client’s commission of a crime or fraud 
in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer’s services.”
    The ABA’s Model Rules are diﬀerent from the above provisions in 
some minor ways. The Model Rules contract the discretion under
Rule 1.6(b)(2) for fraudulent acts leading to substantial ﬁnancial 
injury by requiring that the fraud be related to the lawyer’s services.53
The Massachusetts rule adds “other signiﬁcant interests” to the 
property and ﬁnancial interests that the Model Rules’ exceptions cover. 
The ABA rule also does not mention “wrongful execution or incarcer-
ation.” A wrongful execution would surely be covered by the 
“death”-prevention authority in the Model Rules, but a wrongful 
incarceration would require a factual determination that the conﬁne-
ment in question amounts to “substantial bodily harm.” In Massachu-
setts, no such factual determination would be necessary.
    A lawyer’s discretion to disclose information to prevent a fraudu-
lent act that would result in substantial ﬁnancial harm, as just 
described, becomes a mandatory obligation if disclosure is necessary 
for the lawyer to avoid assisting in a crime or fraud. This requirement 
is addressed in the discussion of Rule 4.1 in Chapter 12.
3. To establish a claim or defense in a dispute with a client: In what is 
known colloquially as the “self-defense” exception, Rule 1.6(b)(5) 
allows a lawyer to disclose enough, but only enough, conﬁdential 
53 Cf. ABA Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6(b)(1), (2).
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client information needed to defend against a claim, or to establish a 
claim, in a dispute with a client or former client. It also permits the 
lawyer to disclose conﬁdential information in order “to respond to 
allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer’s representation 
of the client.” A lawyer who relies upon this exception to reveal 
unnecessary information in a dispute with a client faces discipline, so 
lawyers must employ this discretionary exception with prudence and 
good judgment.
    Questions of protecting client conﬁdences and complying with 
Rule 1.6 also arise when a lawyer receives notice from the OBC that 
it has received a “request for investigation” (a “complaint”) about the 
lawyer’s conduct. As described in Chapter 5, the OBC, upon receiving 
a complaint about a lawyer, in most instances assigns the matter for 
investigation. The lawyer is typically asked to produce documents and 
otherwise communicate with the OBC about the facts alleged in the 
complaint. In the response to the OBC, the lawyer must consider the 
ramiﬁcations of communicating conﬁdential or privileged informa-
tion to the agency. Similarly, if the disciplinary matter proceeds to a 
formal charge being ﬁled, the lawyer must consider the scope of 
permissible disclosures in the course of responses to the complaint 
and during the resulting hearing and settlement processes.
    The general rule in Massachusetts (and elsewhere) is that an 
attorney may disclose otherwise-privileged communications in order 
to respond to allegations of misconduct. The client’s complaint eﬀects 
a waiver of the client’s privilege.54 If a person other than the attorney’s 
client makes the complaint, the common law doctrine across the 
country also permits the lawyer to reveal otherwise privileged infor-
mation in order to establish a defense.55 The same exception appears 
explicitly in the Massachusetts version of Rule 1.6(b)(5). The lawyer 
54 See, e.g., SEC v. Forma, 117 F.R.D. 516, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (“The self-defense doctrine per-
mits an attorney to disclose attorney-client communication in order to defend himself against accu-
sations of wrongful conduct.”); Commonwealth v. Silva, 455 Mass. 503, 529 (2009).
55 See, e.g., Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 1190 (2d Cir. 1974) (lawyer 
may reveal conﬁdences or secrets necessary to defend himself against accusation of wrongful 
conduct alleged by nonclient shareholder); Apex Mun. Fund v. N-Group Secs., 841 F. Supp. 
1423, 1430 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (lawyer can use privileged information in defending against noncli-
ent’s accusations even though client does not agree to waiver); Stirum v. Whalen, 811 F. Supp. 
78 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (protective order permitting disclosure by codefendant lawyer to defend 
against charge of assisting defendants in perpetrating fraud).
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may reveal only such otherwise-privileged or otherwise-conﬁdential 
information as is reasonably necessary to address the accusation. 
Revealing more than necessary may itself lead to discipline.56
4. To comply with other law: Rule 1.6(b)(6) states a principle that should 
be obvious: If an outstanding legal obligation or court order requires 
that a lawyer disclose matters that qualify as conﬁdential client infor-
mation, the lawyer has permission to comply with the other law. Note 
that this provision is discretionary. It implies that a lawyer may choose 
not to comply with the other law, but the lawyer would then be violat-
ing that other law, which itself may create problems for lawyers under 
the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct.
Practice Tip
If the lawyer has a good-faith question about the duty 
to comply with a subpoena or other court order that 
would involve disclosing conﬁdential client information, 
the attorney should consider seeking a protective order 
to test the validity of the demand for disclosure.
5. To perform certain conflict checks: Rule 1.6(b)(7) allows a lawyer to 
disclose limited information about a client’s representation in order 
“to detect and resolve conﬂicts of interest arising from the lawyer’s 
potential change of employment or from changes in the composition 
or ownership of a ﬁrm, but only if the revealed information would not 
compromise the attorney-client privilege or otherwise prejudice the 
client.”
The next three exceptions—each mandatory—require that lawyers reveal 
some client information and face discipline if they fail to do so.
56 See, e.g., Ad. 99-52, 15 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 746 (1999); Ad. 99-42, 15 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 726 
(1999); Ad. 04-47, 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 671 (2004); Matter of Harris, 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 
220 (2004); Matter of Markley, 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 372 (2004); Ad. 06-16, 22 Mass. Att’y 
Disc. R. 884 (2006); Ad. 07-06, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 909 (2007); Ad. 07-35, 23 Mass. Att’y 
Disc. R. 1013 (2007); Matter of Acharya, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 4 (2010).
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6. To prevent or rectify fraud on a tribunal: Under Rule 3.3(a)(3) and 
3.3(b), a Massachusetts lawyer is required to take aﬃrmative steps, 
including possibly informing others, if a client intends to engage in, 
or has engaged in, perjury or similar fraud on a tribunal, even if those 
steps involve revealing conﬁdential information otherwise protected 
by Rule 1.6.57 Section II discusses the perjury questions in its consid-
eration of Rule 3.3.
7. To avoid assisting in a fraud: As noted in Sections II and III, Rule 4.1 
imposes upon lawyers in Massachusetts an aﬃrmative duty to disclose 
material facts when necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudu-
lent act by a client, but only if that disclosure is not barred by Rule 1.6. 
Because Rule 1.6 permits disclosure of information necessary to pre-
vent a criminal or fraudulent act by a client in certain circumstances, 
Rule 4.1 therefore mandates such disclosure when those conditions 
are met.
8. To avoid obstructing justice: Rule 3.4(a) states that a Massachusetts 
lawyer must not “unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evi-
dence or unlawfully alter, destroy, or conceal a document or other 
material having potential evidentiary value” (emphasis added).58 Much 
common law from other states,59 as well as the Restatement of the Law 
Governing Lawyers,60 interprets the lawyer’s duty, when obtaining evi-
dence of a crime regarding a pending proceeding, to deliver such evi-
dence to a public oﬃcial, even if doing so reveals information related 
to the representation. A lawyer who fails to do so violates Rule 3.4 by 
violating the duties under applicable obstruction of justice statutes.
57 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 438 Mass. 535 (2003). Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3 does oﬀer 
special procedures for responding to intended perjury of a criminal defendant. See Rule 3.3(e).
58 Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.4(a).
59 See State v. Olwell, 394 P.2d 681 (Wash. 1964) (a knife); In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360 (E.D. 
Va. 1967) (gun and stolen money); Morrell v. State, 575 P.2d 1200 (Alaska 1978) (handwritten 
kidnapping plan); People v. Meredith, 631 P.2d 46 (Cal. 1981) (murder victim’s wallet). The SJC 
has indicated its acceptance of that line of authority. See Matter of a Grand Jury Investigation, 
470 Mass. 399, 400, 403–07 (2015).
60 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §119 (Am. Law Inst. 2000).
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chapter nine
Allocation of Roles and Authority
in the Attorney-Client Relationship
(Rules 1.2, 1.4, 1.13, and 1.14)
I. INTRODUCTION
In the course of representing a client, a lawyer is confronted with countless 
decisions, from what to work on at any moment and choosing the most eﬀective 
legal strategy to recommending to a client whether to accept a settlement oﬀer 
or proceed to trial. Some of those decisions are at the lawyer’s discretion and based 
on good judgment, others are the client’s responsibility, and some the lawyer and 
client make jointly. Typically, questions regarding allocation of responsibility do 
not lead to the kind of misconduct that results in discipline, or even a discipli-
nary complaint. Sometimes, however, a lawyer misreads or misunderstands the 
applicable laws governing the proper sharing of decision-making and, as a result, 
may engage in misconduct.
This chapter reviews the relevant law and describes four rules of the Massa-
chusetts Rules of Professional Conduct—Rules 1.2, 1.4, 1.13, and 1.14—that address 
the lawyer’s and client’s responsibilities. It identiﬁes the basic purpose of each 
rule and describes, respectively, the kinds of sanctions lawyers have faced for mis-
conduct involving those rules.
II. THE RULES GOVERNING A LAWYER’S RESPONSIBILITIES
IN DECISION-MAKING FOR A CLIENT AND
SANCTIONS FOR RELATED MISCONDUCT
RULE 1.2: SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION AND ALLOCATION
OF AUTHORITY BETWEEN CLIENT AND LAWYER
(a) A lawyer shall seek the lawful objectives of his or her client 
through reasonably available means permitted by law and these 
Rules. A lawyer does not violate this Rule, however, by acced-
ing to reasonable requests of opposing counsel which do not
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RULE 1.2 (cont’d.)
prejudice the rights of his or her client, by being punctual in ful-
filling all professional commitments, by avoiding offensive tac-
tics, or by treating with courtesy and consideration all persons 
involved in the legal process. A lawyer shall abide by a client’s 
decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter. In a 
criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client’s decision, after 
consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to 
waive jury trial, and whether the client will testify.
(b) A lawyer’s representation of a client, including representation 
by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the cli-
ent’s political, economic, social, or moral views or activities.
(c) A lawyer may limit the scope of the representation if the lim-
itation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives 
informed consent. 
(d) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, 
in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a 
lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course 
of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make 
a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning, or 
application of the law.
RULE 1.4: COMMUNICATION
(a) A lawyer shall:
(1)  promptly inform the client of any decision or circum-
stance with respect to which the client’s informed con-
sent, as defined in Rule 1.0(f ), is required by these Rules;
(2)  reasonably consult with the client about the means by 
which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished;
(3)  keep the client reasonably informed about the status of 
the matter;
(4)  promptly comply with reasonable requests for informa-
tion; and
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RULE 1.4: COMMUNICATION (cont’d.)
(5)  consult with the client about any relevant limitation on 
the lawyer’s conduct when the lawyer knows that the cli-
ent expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct or other law.
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably neces-
sary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding 
the representation.
Rules 1.2 and 1.4 together establish a lawyer’s duties regarding shared re-
sponsibility with clients for the lawyer’s legal work and decisions about it.
A. The Lessons of Rules 1.2 and 1.4
Lawyers are agents of and ﬁduciaries to their clients and possess authority 
to act only from the client. But “there is much more involved [in this relation-
ship] than mere agency. The relationship of attorney and client is paramount and 
is subject to established professional standards.”1 The “established professional 
standards” allocate some decisions to clients and some to lawyers, with the cli-
ent possessing the ultimate authority about the objectives and goals of the 
representation.2 At the same time, a lawyer may not assist a client in activity that 
is criminal or fraudulent, even if that is how the client chooses to proceed.3
Placing the primary authority in the client does not, and as a practical mat-
ter cannot, mean that lawyers must look to clients to make every decision that 
arises in the course of representation. The Massachusetts Rules of Professional Con-
duct oﬀer some guidance about the proper sharing of responsibility. Rule 1.2(a) 
conﬁrms that the lawyer must seek the lawful objectives of the client through “rea-
sonably available means permitted by law . . . .”4 The rule speciﬁes certain deci-
sions that the client must make and that the lawyer may not make unilaterally: 
whether to accept a settlement oﬀer in a matter and, in criminal proceedings, 
1 Burt v. Gahan, 351 Mass. 340, 342 (1966).
2 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §§ 20–22 (Am. Law Inst. )
[hereinafter Restatement).
3 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2(d) (1998); Mass. Code of Prof. Resp. DR 7-102(A)(6), (7) (1969); 
Restatement § 23(1). The limitations on assisting in criminal or fraudulent conduct are dis-
cussed in Chapter 13.
4 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2(a).
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whether to enter a plea; whether to waive a jury trial; and whether the client will 
testify.5 By listing those discrete decisions as belonging to the client, Rule 1.2(a) 
implies that a lawyer may exercise discretion regarding other decisions in the course 
of the representation, although some that are not mentioned (such as whether to 
appeal an adverse judgment) remain with the client.6 The comments to Rule 1.2 
emphasize that “lawyers usually defer to the client regarding such questions as 
the expense to be incurred and concern for third persons who might be adversely 
aﬀected.”7 Rule 1.4, however, establishes that a lawyer must keep a client informed 
about developments in a matter, implying that a lawyer may not make critical 
choices for a client without ensuring that the client understands and accepts the 
implications of those choices.8
The lesson of Rules 1.2 and 1.4, therefore, is that lawyers must collaborate 
with clients in all substantial decision-making as a case progresses, even if the 
decisions are not those listed in Rule 1.2. While some common law malpractice 
cases hold that a lawyer should confer with clients on important decisions,9 the 
Board of Bar Overseers (BBO) has never disciplined a lawyer where the sole 
misconduct was failing to confer with a client. By contrast, a lawyer’s failure to 
keep a client informed has frequently led to formal discipline, particularly where, 
along with other misconduct, the lawyer failed to communicate about signiﬁcant 
developments in the case such as dismissal for noncompliance with discovery.10
A lawyer must refuse, however, to help a client if the objective constitutes 
a crime or a fraud. Rule 1.2(d) states the following:
A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in con-
duct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may 
discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a 
client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith eﬀort to 
determine the validity, scope, meaning, or application of the law.
Rule 1.2(d) forbids lawyers from counseling clients in a way that assists or 
encourages the clients to engage in criminal or fraudulent actions. Lawyers are 
5 Id.
6 Restatement § 22(1).
7 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2, comment [2].
8 See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4(a), (b); see also Restatement § 20. 
9 See Williams v. Ely, 423 Mass. 467 (1996) (law ﬁrm was negligent for failing to advise clients 
of the unsettled state of law and adverse consequences); Moores v. Greenberg, 834 F.2d 1105, 
1107–08 (1st Cir. 1987) (ﬁnding of legal malpractice when attorney failed to advise client of set-
tlement opportunities); Fishman v. Brooks, 396 Mass. 643 (1985) (enunciating standard of care).
10 See Matter of Galica, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 213 (2010); Matter of Gately, 23 Mass. Att’y 
Disc. R. 179 (2007); Matter of Lipton, 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 336 (2004).
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not forbidden, though, from advising clients about the limits of the law and 
explaining the consequences of violating the law. Understandably, the dividing line 
between counseling a client to commit a crime and explaining the implications of 
engaging in that criminal action (which may include the likelihood of detection 
and the punishment should detection occur) is a slippery one. But the line exists.11
Lawyers have permission to perform the latter kind of counseling; they do not 
have permission to perform the former, and they risk discipline if they do so.
The Rule 1.2(d) prohibition does not apply to conduct that is not criminal or 
fraudulent. A lawyer may properly advise a client about the legal consequences 
of breaching a valid contract, and in doing so may encourage the client to com-
mit such a breach. The lawyer may counsel a client about other noncriminal and 
nonfraudulent actions that may be inconsistent with a law or legal obligation, 
including violating regulatory mandates (e.g., copyright infringement) or tor-
tious conduct, even if doing so encourages that activity.12 Of course, a lawyer may 
(and most often should) properly engage the client in moral conversation about 
the wisdom of such activity.13
A lawyer may also limit the scope of the client’s representation in some cir-
cumstances, with the client’s informed consent. According to Rule 1.2(c), “A law-
yer may limit the scope of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under 
the circumstances and the client gives informed consent.” Rule 1.2(c), properly 
invoked, permits a lawyer not to perform certain tasks that would normally be 
part of the typical representation. A lawyer and a client may agree, subject to the 
lawyer’s duties of competence as expressed in Rule 1.1 and to a vigorous informed 
consent process, to limit the scope of the representation to selected activities, 
usually to save the client money (or, in public interest settings, to allocate a 
lawyer’s limited time and resources in the most eﬃcient fashion).14 The most 
common example of this kind of limited representation is “unbundled” legal 
services, discussed in Chapter 7 on competence.15
11 See Geoﬀrey C. Hazard, How Far May a Lawyer Go in Assisting a Client in Legally Wrongful 
Conduct?, 35 U. Miami L. Rev. 669, 672, 678, 682 (1981); Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the 
Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the Jurisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 Yale L.J. 1545, 
1554–58 (1995).
12 See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2 comment [9].
13 See Mass. R. Prof. C. 2.1.
14 The SJC allows attorneys to provide limited assistance representation in the trial courts under 
certain conditions. See Supreme Judicial Court Order Regarding Limited Assistance Representation,
Mass.Gov, https://www.mass.gov/supreme-judicial-court-rules/supreme-judicial-court-order-
regarding-limited-assistance (last visited May 10, 2018).
15 “Unbundled” legal services refers to an arrangement by which a lawyer agrees to perform certain 
discrete tasks for a client but not to represent the client fully on a matter.
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B. Discipline for Violating Rule 1.2(a) and (c)
1. Disbarment
The Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) has disbarred lawyers for misconduct re-
lated to making signiﬁcant legal decisions without client authority and then mis-
representing the status of matters to clients or others. Each case, however, included 
multiple instances of misconduct. No lawyer has been disbarred in Massachu-
setts solely for violating Rule 1.2. For instance, in Matter of Cobb,16 a lawyer was 
disbarred for serious misconduct involving three separate clients, one instance 
of which involved accepting a settlement oﬀer after the client had repeatedly 
refused to authorize the settlement ﬁgure. The lawyer later falsely claimed to have 
proof of authority to settle the case. And, in Matter of McBride,17 a lawyer was 
disbarred for multiple instances of misconduct, including settling a lawsuit with-
out client permission and then mishandling the resulting proceeds.18
Matter of Marani19 oﬀers an instructive basis for understanding the appro-
priate level of discipline in cases where a lawyer settles a client’s matter without 
authority. In Marani, the attorney represented the client in recovering damages 
for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. The attorney settled the claim 
without informing the client by entering an amount of money in a release the 
client had previously signed and then sending the release to the insurer. Once 
the attorney received the settlement check, he failed to notify the client that he 
had settled or had received the check and instead deposited the check into a 
commingled client funds account. The attorney continued to misrepresent to 
the client that he needed to sign a new release form to settle and that the funds 
could not be disbursed due to additional paperwork. Those actions led the board 
to recommend a two-year suspension. The board then discovered that the law-
yer had misappropriated close to $190,000 in client funds in other matters and, 
with that new information, the board recommended, and the SJC entered, a judg-
ment of disbarment.20
16 445 Mass. 452, 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 93 (2005).
17 449 Mass. 154, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 443 (2007).
18 See also Matter of Siciliano, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 654 (2007) (lawyer resigned, and Court 
imposed order of disbarment, after lawyer settled civil matter without client permission, includ-
ing forging client signatures and, in separate matters, misappropriated more than $200,000 in real 
estate funds he held in escrow).
19 14 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 464 (1998).
20 See also Matter of Corben, 11 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 47 (1995) (lawyers settled client matters 
without consent and forged client signatures but also, on several occasions, misappropriated client 
funds; aﬃdavit of resignation accepted and order of disbarment entered).
158
Misconduct and Typical Sanctions
Other lawyers have been disbarred for misconduct involving an apparent vio-
lation of Rule 1.2 when the lawyers mishandled or misappropriated client funds, 
and the SJC cited that rule as one basis for discipline (given that the lawyers, by 
taking client funds without permission, had violated Rule 1.2(a)).21 Other lawyers 
have been disbarred for misconduct involving Rule 1.2 when they egregiously 
neglected client matters and caused the clients signiﬁcant harm.22 Those types of 
misconduct are discussed in Chapter 7.
2. Suspension
Settling a client’s case without authority frequently results in the lawyer’s 
suspension. An apt example is Matter of Traficonte.23 There, the respondent set-
tled a class action without client consent and proceeded to mislead the named 
plaintiﬀs about the settlement status, including the lawyer’s substantial attor-
ney fee award. The hearing report, which the single justice adopted in aﬃrming 
a one-year suspension for the respondent, noted that “[d]uring the negotiations 
with [the defendant], the Respondent was motivated by the best of intentions 
on behalf of his clients, and sincerely and reasonably believed that he was 
obtaining the best result possible for his clients. He believed that his chances 
for successfully prosecuting the class action were dim.” Nevertheless, he had no 
authority to settle and misled the client after doing so. The single justice rejected 
a public reprimand because the lawyer’s actions harmed the clients and because 
the misconduct involved a conﬂict of interest (due to the fees available) and 
misrepresentation.24
You Should Know
Lawyers who settle litigation matters without client 
permission—particularly to ensure the lawyer’s contin-
gent fee—will likely receive term suspensions, with 
longer terms imposed when the lawyer misrepresents 
the nature of the misconduct.
21 See, e.g., Matter of LiBassi, 449 Mass. 1014, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 396 (2007); Matter of Dahl, 
14 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 187 (1998); Matter of Okai, 13 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 595 (1997).
22 See, e.g., Matter of O’Desky, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 512 (2008); Matter of Cohen, 27 Mass. 
Att’y Disc. R. 143 (2011); Matter of Espinosa, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 307 (2012).
23 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 747 (2006).
24 While Traﬁconte clearly violated DR 5-106(A) by settling a matter without client consent, it 
is important to note that in the context of class actions, the authority of the named plaintiﬀs to 
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Other lawyers have been suspended for settling matters without client 
authority. In Matter of Buck,25 a lawyer was suspended for one year for conduct 
similar to that in Traficonte. In Buck, the lawyer settled a personal injury case 
without client authority and without suﬃcient medical evidence to warrant a 
settlement. He then instructed his secretary to forge his clients’ signatures on 
the settlement check. The single justice rejected the parties’ stipulated agree-
ment for a three-month suspension and imposed a one-year suspension.26
In Matter of Chancellor,27 the lawyer was suspended indeﬁnitely after set-
tling a client’s matter without client permission in order to receive a contingent 
fee. The attorney settled the client’s claim without consulting the client about the 
settlement amount or obtaining the client’s consent, and then used the client’s 
share of the settlement and continually misrepresented matters to the client. The 
lawyer also mishandled his Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts (IOLTA) and lied 
to the Oﬃce of the Bar Counsel investigation, factors that contributed to his more 
serious discipline.
In Matter of King,28 an attorney was suspended for two months, by stipula-
tion, for violating Rule 1.2(a) in two matters. In the ﬁrst matter, after a dissat-
isﬁed client sought new counsel, the new counsel repeatedly informed the former 
attorney of the discharge and requested the client’s ﬁle. Instead of sending the 
client’s ﬁle to the new counsel, the former attorney ﬁled suit on behalf of the cli-
ent without informing the client or obtaining consent. In the second matter, the 
attorney was discharged after the client retained new counsel but the former attor-
ney failed to withdraw. He then settled the client’s claim without the client’s 
knowledge and consent and took his fee from the settlement.
Another example of a lawyer settling a case without authority, but this time 
on the defense side, is Matter of Leone.29 The respondent was suspended for one year 
for misrepresenting to the court and to opposing counsel that she had authority 
control the litigation is considerably less than in ordinary civil or criminal litigation. The lawyer’s 
duty is to the class, not to the named plaintiﬀ individually. For examples of disputes about this 
principle, see Bartle v. Berry, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 372 (2011); Ehrlich v. Stern, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 
531 (2009) (both concerning class action disputes involving claims against the distributor of 
Poland Springs bottled water).
25 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 121 (2006).
26 The lawyer oﬀered evidence of several mitigating factors, which may account for the three-month 
suspension stipulation.
27 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 150 (2012); see also Matter of Thalheimer, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 684 
(2008) (indeﬁnite suspension); Matter of Barrese, 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 30 (2005) (indeﬁnite 
suspension).
28 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 352 (2007).
29 19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 236 (2003).
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to settle a case, violating DR 7-102(A)(5). The respondent shared oﬃce space with 
a lawyer (the “referring lawyer”) who asked the respondent for assistance repre-
senting a defendant in a civil action and gave her the authority to settle for not 
more than $1,500. Contrary to this instruction, the respondent settled the case 
for $3,000 after misrepresenting to opposing counsel that she had the authority 
to do so. The attorney then signed the referring lawyer’s name to court documents 
and misrepresented facts to the bar counsel during its investigation. Those lat-
ter elements likely accounted for the serious suspension.
A lawyer can also be suspended for violations of Rule 1.2 that do not involve 
failing to obtain client authorization of a settlement. In Matter of Bozzotto,30 the 
respondent engaged in multiple violations of Rule 1.2(a) (along with Rules 1.1, 
1.3, and 1.4) by not keeping an organizational client (a labor union) informed 
about three diﬀerent matters he was handling for that client. He engaged in sim-
ilar misconduct on a fourth matter for an individual client. The respondent was 
suspended indeﬁnitely after failing to cooperate with the bar counsel’s investiga-
tion (leading to an administrative suspension), then practiced law unauthorized 
while on suspension, and failed to participate in the disciplinary proceedings. 
3. Public Reprimand
Whether lawyers receive a public reprimand or a term suspension may 
depend on whether they were acting in their own interests when proceeding 
without client permission and the extent of the resulting harm. For instance, in 
Matter of Malaguti,31 an attorney handled real estate closings for a company that 
itself served as an agent for lenders. The lawyer failed to attend two closings 
and to advise the clients that he was not attending. The board treated the lim-
ited representation as one that required client consent, which the lawyer did 
not obtain. The lawyer also paid insuﬃcient attention to the documents, caus-
ing some harm to at least one client.
You Should Know
Lawyers who act without proper client authority but 
without selﬁsh or evil intentions, and whose clients do 
not suffer substantial harm, may receive a public repri-
mand rather than a suspension.
30 27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 58 (2011).
31 27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 566 (2011).
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In Matter of Blake,32 an attorney violated Rule 1.2 by continuing to prose-
cute an action over the client’s objection. The client was administratrix of her 
sister and brother’s estate; the attorney and client disagreed whether three bank 
accounts left in the siblings’ names were joint accounts. The client opposed ﬁling 
an action in the Probate and Family Court to determine how the court should 
treat the accounts; instead, the client instructed her lawyer to ﬁle tax returns, 
which the attorney did not do. This violation of Rule 1.2 also led to violating 
Rule 1.5, as the lawyer charged substantial, and unnecessary, fees for the result-
ing years of litigation.
In Matter of Weiss,33 an attorney received a public reprimand for violating 
Rule 1.2(a) by settling a case for $500 without the client’s permission. The small-
claims court complaint had sought $750 in damages, in addition to multiple dam-
ages and attorneys’ fees. The attorney did not discuss the possibility of settlement, 
nor did he obtain the client’s consent to settle the claim. The client ultimately was 
not harmed, as he challenged the settlement agreement and received $750. But, 
in aggravation, the lawyer had been previously disciplined. The order imposing 
a public reprimand included a condition that the lawyer pass the Multi-State 
Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE) within a year; if not, the sanc-
tion would instead be a one-month suspension.
In Matter of Mason34 an attorney received a public reprimand for withdraw-
ing an objection in Bankruptcy Court without consulting the client, violating 
DR 7-101(A)(1), (2), and (3).35 The bankruptcy trustee had submitted a ﬁnal 
report that excluded a negotiated homestead exemption. In response, the attor-
ney ﬁled an objection but decided to withdraw the objection without discussing 
that strategy with the client. The attorney also failed to advise the client that the 
objection had been withdrawn. As a result, the case closed with the trustee’s inac-
curate ﬁnal report.36
32 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 52 (2010).
33 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 787 (2006).
34 17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 408 (2001).
35 Under the previous Massachusetts Code, DR 7-101(A)(1), (2), and (3) served as the equiva-
lent of Rule 1.2. The provisions addressed the following duties: “(A) A lawyer shall not inten-
tionally: (1) Fail to seek the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably available means 
permitted by law . . . ; (2) Fail to carry out a contract of employment entered into with a client 
for professional services . . . ; (3) Prejudice or damage his client during the course of the profes-
sional relationship . . . ,” each subject to some exceptions not included here.
36 See also Matter of Bixby, 17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 81 (2001) (dismissal of case without client’s 
authorization resulted in a public reprimand).
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4. Admonition
Lawyers who act without client consent with little or no harm to the client
frequently receive admonitions. For example, in Ad. 99-22,37 an attorney added 
unauthorized language to a mortgage, violating Rule 1.2(a). In an eﬀort to 
protect some property after the client lost a lawsuit, the lawyer inserted lan-
guage he thought would be useful into a mortgage, but about which he did not 
counsel his client. The client complained after circumstances later changed and 
the added language came to light. The attorney acknowledged that he was not 
authorized to insert the language, although the board concluded that his assump-
tions about the client’s intentions were logical. The attorney took steps to rectify 
the mistake. Similarly, in Private Reprimand 92-30,38 an attorney printed his cli-
ent’s name on the back of two checks payable to the client and negotiated them. 
Although the attorney believed that the client intended him to use the funds as 
payment toward legal fees, the attorney violated DR 1-102(A)(4) because he never 
had the client’s express authority to do so.
You Should Know
If a lawyer acts without client authority, and no serious 
harm occurs, the lawyer will likely receive an admonition, 
unless the lawyer makes misrepresentations to a court.
In one case where the facts were seemingly even more egregious, the board 
also imposed an admonition. In Ad. 06-37,39 an attorney violated Rule 1.2 while 
representing an incarcerated client. The attorney ﬁled a tort complaint on behalf 
of his client but expected the client to pursue the matter himself, even though 
the client was in jail. The lawyer did not discuss the limits of his representation 
with the client; as a result, the client did not respond to discovery requests in 
that lawsuit, and the court ultimately dismissed the matter. The respondent, a 
relatively new lawyer, made adequate restitution to the client, factors which 
may have inﬂuenced the board to admonish the lawyer privately rather than 
reprimand him publicly.
In these admonitions, the lawyers did not misrepresent their authority to 
others, and that factor seemed relevant to the sanction imposed.
37 15 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 687 (1999).
38 8 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 321 (1992). Private reprimands were the predecessor to what is now 
known as an admonition. Both are private disciplinary sanctions.
39 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 897 (2006).
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C. Discipline for Violating Rule 1.4
1. Disbarment
The SJC has disbarred lawyers for misconduct involving Rule 1.4 (Commu-
nication) but typically in connection with other, related, serious rule violations. 
Because lawyers who misappropriate client funds or engage in conﬂicts of inter-
est usually do not keep their clients suﬃciently apprised of developments in the 
matters, virtually every such disciplinary opinion includes a reference to Rule 1.4.40
Also, several Rule 1.4 disbarments relate to the respondents’ serious neglect of 
client matters, which almost inevitably includes a failure to apprise clients of 
developments.41 Chapter 7 discusses Rule 1.4 violations in that context. 
Some lawyers, however, have been disbarred for serious misconduct that 
mainly included failing to keep a client informed about a matter’s status or fail-
ing to explain a matter adequately to the client. Matter of Espinosa42 is one such 
case. In Espinosa, the attorney represented a mother and her two minor sons, who 
retained the lawyer to adjust their immigration status. The attorney failed to 
pursue adjustment for all three clients without adequately explaining to the cli-
ents the reason for his actions, violating Rule 1.4(a) and (b); the lawyer violated 
Rule 1.4 by failing to advise the mother about the status of the sons’ petitions, 
which had been denied; he also failed to inform a diﬀerent client about an immi-
gration court hearing or to explain adequately that the lawyer’s strategy to gain 
legal residency would present signiﬁcant risks. The attorney advised the latter cli-
ent not to appear at the hearing, and the court ordered that the client be deported 
in absentia. This misconduct, combined with the signiﬁcant harm to the clients, 
warranted disbarment.
40 See, e.g., Matter of Arnowitz, 27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 10 (2011) (failure to inform client of settle-
ment, approval of release without client consent, and signing stipulation of dismissal without noti-
fying the client); Matter of Campanella, 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 122 (2006) (settled matter without 
client consent, misappropriated the proceeds); Matter of Pinson, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 496 (2009) 
(settlement of several personal injury matters without informed consent); Matter of Reynolds, 28 
Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 723 (2012) (misappropriating client funds); Matter of Steele, 24 Mass. Att’y 
Disc. R. 662 (2008) (mismanagement of liens on personal injury award).
41 See, e.g., Matter of Cohen, 27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 143 (2011) (neglect of divorce and trade-
mark matters); Matter of Daniels, 27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 159 (2011) (misrepresentation to 
clients about neglected matters); Matter of O’Desky, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 512 (2008) (neglect 
of divorce client matters; misappropriating funds).
42 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 307 (2012). The respondent had previously resigned and been dis-
barred, 7 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 95 (1991) and reinstated, 13 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 197 (1997). This 
was therefore his second disbarment.
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In Matter of Mangano,43 an attorney violated Rule 1.4(a) and (b) by failing 
to inform several bankruptcy clients that he was not authorized to practice law in 
the Bankruptcy Court. He later abandoned his solo practice without notifying 
clients and without taking adequate steps to protect his clients’ interests, leav-
ing his clients’ conﬁdential records and ﬁles unsecured at his law oﬃce. The attor-
ney then withdrew from representation without notice to his clients, who had 
relied on him to ﬁle bankruptcy petitions. The SJC ordered that him disbarred.44
2. Suspension
The disciplinary reports from 1999 through 2017 contain more than 150 
suspension decisions involving Rule 1.4 violations, usually along with other 
rules. As discussed in Section II(C)(1) regarding disbarment, most of those 
suspensions resulted from serious misconduct accompanied by the lawyer’s 
failure to inform the client of matters (which most often were going terribly 
wrong). On occasion, however, a suspension results from misconduct in which 
Rule 1.4 played a more signiﬁcant role. For instance, in Matter of Grayer,45 the 
SJC imposed a one-year suspension on a lawyer who, in three separate in-
stances, used the services of a lawyer who was not a member of his law ﬁrm 
without notifying the client of that referral and collaboration. The second law-
yer’s fees were signiﬁcantly higher than those of the respondent, leading to 
higher bills than the client expected. While other misconduct occurred as well, 
the lawyer’s primary failure was not keeping his clients apprised of how he was 
managing their cases.
Practice Tip
Lawyers sometimes act on their own without keeping 
their clients informed about their actions or obtaining 
client consent to the legal strategy. That mistake can 
lead to a term suspension if a client is harmed as a 
result. Lawyers who repeatedly keep clients in the dark 
receive lengthy suspensions.
43 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 600 (2012).
44 See also Matter of Sachar, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 539 (2009); Matter of Conley, 25 Mass. 
Att’y Disc. R. 138 (2009); Matter of Osagiede, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 523 (2008), aff ’d 453 
Mass. 1001, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 478 (2009).
45 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 215 (2007).
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In Matter of Donovan,46 while representing a husband in a divorce proceed-
ing, the attorney was unreachable and failed to respond to the client’s calls. In 
another divorce matter, she failed to advise her client of a pretrial hearing and 
abandoned the matter without notice. In a personal injury case, she did not inform 
her client that her telephone service had been disconnected and that she was no 
longer working on the case. Lastly, in another personal injury matter in which 
she represented a juvenile, the attorney failed to advise the child’s mother that a 
guardian ad litem needed to be appointed. The attorney further violated Rule 1.4 
by failing to respond to the client’s requests for information and by abandoning 
the case without notice. She was suspended for eighteen months.
In Matter of Nealon,47 an attorney failed to communicate the fee basis or 
rate to his clients, a husband and wife who had a dispute with a builder. When 
the attorney received settlement funds from the builder, he failed to notify his 
clients within a reasonable time (but did remove funds to pay himself, also with-
out notice to the client). In another case, the attorney represented an elderly 
couple involved in an automobile accident who also wanted him to help them 
with estate planning. The husband died shortly after the clients hired the attor-
ney, leaving the wife as the sole beneﬁciary of her husband’s estate. The attorney 
decided that neither of the two automobile accident claims was worth litigat-
ing and thus did not ﬁle suit within the statute of limitations, without inform-
ing the wife. He was suspended for six months, with four months stayed.
3. Public Reprimand
The disciplinary reports between 1999 and 2017 contain more than a hun-
dred public reprimands involving violations of Rule 1.4, most of which included 
other wrongdoing. One public reprimand where Rule 1.4 played a more signif-
icant role was Matter of Atwood.48 In Atwood, several diﬀerent clients ﬁled com-
plaints with the bar counsel against an attorney after he charged fees that he never 
adequately explained to the clients. While his conduct violated Rule 1.5 (Fees), 
it also violated his duties under Rule 1.4. Matter of Mancuso49 resulted in a pub-
lic reprimand from essentially breaching communication duties. In Mancuso,
the attorney knowingly gave his client an unreliable phone number (a cell phone 
46 27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 229 (2011).
47 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 427 (2010).
48 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 12 (2010).
49 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 465 (2008).
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whose service was frequently cut oﬀ because of billing problems) and failed to 
reply to several letters from a client who was in prison.50
You Should Know
Most public reprimands involving a failure to maintain 
adequate communication with a client, as required by 
Rule 1.4, also include other misconduct.
Several other public reprimand matters also involved a signiﬁcant breach of 
the duties required by Rule 1.4. In Matter of McGuirk,51 a lawyer received a pub-
lic reprimand after failing to respond to repeated inquiries by two separate clients 
as well as failing to advise a client about the eﬀects of a guardianship proceed-
ing. In Matter of Pepe,52 an attorney received a public reprimand for misconduct 
that included serious violations of Rule 1.4(a) and (b). The lawyer, representing 
a tenant in an eviction summary process proceeding, failed to respond to discov-
ery and did not inform his client about the court hearings resulting from his non-
response. Even after the client discharged the attorney, he did not tell her about 
the next court hearing scheduled in her case. In Matter of Doyle,53 an attorney 
received a public reprimand for violating Rule 1.4, among other instances of mis-
conduct. The attorney failed to back up his data and lost all of it when his com-
puter crashed; as a result, he stopped working on the case. The attorney neither 
disclosed to the client the loss of information nor informed her that he was no 
longer working on her case, violating Rule 1.4. While the client suﬀered no harm 
(warranting perhaps an admonition, as discussed in the following section), the mis-
handling of the client’s retainer contributed to the lawyer’s public discipline.
4. Admonition
Lawyers have received admonitions for failing to maintain adequate com-
munication with a client, absent serious harm to the clients. For instance, in 
50 For a similar set of facts, where a lawyer received a public reprimand for his persistent failure 
to respond to client inquiries, see Matter of Kwiat, 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 434 (2006).
51 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 355 (2010).
52 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 497 (2010); see also Matter of Berkland, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 40 (2010) 
(attorney received public reprimand for repeatedly failing to respond to interrogatories and fail-
ing to inform his client).
53 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 143 (2010).
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Ad. 07-18,54 an attorney violated Rule 1.4(a) and Rule 8.4(c). He was unable 
to immediately ﬁle his client’s complaint but falsely told the client that he had 
done so. He made additional false statements concerning the progress of the 
case. The client discharged the respondent and suﬀered no harm in the end. In 
Ad. 06-39,55 an attorney failed to promptly notify his client that her wrongful 
termination lawsuit had been dismissed, to respond in a timely fashion to his 
client’s inquiries, and to reﬁle the suit. And in Ad. 99-74,56 an attorney violated 
Rule 1.4(a) and (b) when he was appointed to represent a client in an appeal of 
his criminal convictions. The attorney neither met the client nor spoke with him 
before ﬁling the appellate brief. Even after ﬁling the brief, the attorney made 
no attempt to meet the client.
You Should Know
The disciplinary reports show that a lawyer’s failure to 
keep a client informed, without other misconduct and 
without any serious prejudice to the client, most often 
results in an admonition.
III. ALLOCATION OF DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY
WITH ORGANIZATIONAL CLIENTS
Rules 1.2 and 1.4 apply to all lawyers, whether representing individual cli-
ents or organizations. Lawyers representing organizations have distinct duties, 
however, as described in Rule 1.13.
RULE 1.13: ORGANIZATION AS CLIENT
(a) A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents 
the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents.
(b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee, 
or other person associated with the organization is engaged in
54 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 968 (2007).
55 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 935 (2006).
56 15 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 789 (1999).
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RULE 1.13: ORGANIZATION AS CLIENT (cont’d.)
action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to the 
representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the orga-
nization, or a violation of law that reasonably might be imputed 
to the organization, and that is likely to result in substantial 
injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall proceed as is rea-
sonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. Unless 
the lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best 
interest of the organization to do so, the lawyer shall refer the 
matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if war-
ranted by the circumstances, to the highest authority that can act 
on behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law.
(c) Except as provided in paragraph (d), if
(1)  despite the lawyer’s efforts in accordance with paragraph (b) 
the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organi-
zation insists upon or fails to address in a timely and 
appropriate manner an action, or a refusal to act, that is 
clearly a violation of law, and
(2)  the lawyer reasonably believes that the violation is reason-
ably certain to result in substantial injury to the organiza-
tion, then the lawyer may reveal information relating to 
the representation whether or not Rule 1.6 permits such 
disclosure, but only if and to the extent the lawyer reason-
ably believes necessary to prevent substantial injury to the 
organization. 
(d) Paragraph (c) shall not apply with respect to information 
relating to a lawyer’s representation of an organization to investi-
gate an alleged violation of law, or to defend the organization or 
an officer, employee or other constituent associated with the orga-
nization against a claim arising out of an alleged violation of law.
(e) A lawyer who reasonably believes that he or she has been dis-
charged because of the lawyer’s actions taken pursuant to para-
graphs (b) or (c), or who withdraws under circumstances that 
require or permit the lawyer to take action under either of those 
paragraphs, shall proceed as the lawyer reasonably believes neces-
sary to assure that the organization’s highest authority is informed 
of the lawyer’s discharge or withdrawal.
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RULE 1.13 (cont’d.)
(f ) In dealing with an organization’s directors, officers, employ-
ees, members, shareholders, or other constituents, a lawyer shall 
explain the identity of the client when the lawyer knows or rea-
sonably should know that the organization’s interests are adverse 
to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing. 
 (g) A lawyer representing an organization may also represent 
any of its directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders, 
or other constituents, subject to the provisions of Rule 1.7. If 
the organization’s consent to the dual representation is required 
by Rule 1.7, the consent shall be given by an appropriate official 
of the organization other than the individual who is to be repre-
sented, or by the shareholders.
A.  The Allocation of Decision-Making Principles Applied
to Organizational Clients
1. Rule 1.13 Guidance on Representing Organizations
Rule 1.13 oﬀers guidance on how to properly counsel organizational clients, 
such as corporations or limited liability companies (LLCs), and some lawyers 
have been disciplined for failing to conform to the dictates of Rule 1.13.57
Rule 1.13(a) provides that “[a] lawyer employed or retained by an organi-
zation represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constitu-
ents.”  The individual person in the organization with whom a lawyer interacts 
is not the lawyer’s client, even if that person acts like the client and the lawyer 
treats that person as the client. The client is the organization.58 In allocating 
decision-making authority in the organizational setting, the lawyer must rely for 
guidance on the “duly authorized constituents” of the organization. Ordinarily, 
the constituent authorized to provide guidance to the lawyer is clear (e.g., the 
organization’s CEO, vice president, or general counsel). In some less common 
instances, though, it is unclear who lawfully speaks for the client, especially, 
57 See, e.g., Matter of Wise, 433 Mass. 80, 16 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 416 (2000).
58 The same principle generally applies under the common law. See Robertson v. Gaston Snow & 
Ely Bartlett, 404 Mass. 515 (1989).
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for instance, when an organization encounters internal disputes. Rule 1.13 does 
not resolve those questions for the lawyer, except to require the lawyer to follow 
the direction of the “duly authorized” constituents. The lawyer must instead 
rely on applicable corporate law and agency principles to discern whose direc-
tions to honor.59
The other signiﬁcant implication of Rule 1.13(a) is that a lawyer may not 
always and automatically rely on a purportedly authorized constituent if the 
lawyer has reason to believe that a superior constituent would disapprove of the 
proposed course of action, or if the lawyer concludes that the proposed course 
of action is not in the best interests of the organizational client. Lawyers have 
the right to approach a higher authority within the organization to conﬁrm or 
determine that a proposed course of action is, in fact, what the organization 
wishes. If the client’s constituent breaches an obligation to the organization and 
creates a likelihood of substantial harm to the client, the lawyer must approach 
the higher authority.60 A lawyer who fails to determine what the organization 
itself chooses to do—where a reasonable lawyer would understand the need to 
seek some further conﬁrmation—has violated the responsibility to the organiza-
tional client and Rules 1.2, 1.4, and 1.13. As of April 2018, no reported disci-
plinary decision has sanctioned a lawyer for making the wrong decision in such 
a setting.61
Nothing in Rule 1.13 relieves a lawyer of the responsibility to honor Rule 
1.2(d) to refrain from assisting in conduct that is criminal or fraudulent. Rule 
1.13(b) adds a further obligation to a lawyer representing an organization, in 
stating:
If a lawyer for an organization knows that an oﬃcer, employee, or other 
person associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to 
act or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation that is a 
violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law 
that reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and that is likely 
59 For one widely cited discussion of this tension, see William H. Simon, Whom (Or What) Does the 
Organization’s Lawyer Represent: An Anatomy of Intraclient Conflict, 91 Cal. L. Rev. 57 (2003).
60 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.13(b). Sometimes substantive law, apart from the rules of professional con-
duct, imposes additional duties to report potential wrongdoing. See, e.g., SEC Rule 205, 17 C.F.R., 
Ch. II, Pt. 205 (2003) (implementing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 
116 Stat. 745).
61 In other jurisdictions, lawyers have occasionally received discipline for mishandling their duties 
under Rule 1.13. See, e.g., Ky. B. Ass’n v. Hines, 399 S.W.3d 750 (Ky. 2013) (120-day suspension 
after lawyer acted in the best interests of the organization and challenged majority shareholders 
and board members).
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to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall 
proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization.
Under this standard, a Massachusetts lawyer must do something upon discov-
ering that the organizational constituents are engaging in conduct that either 
violates a legal obligation to the organization (e.g., embezzlement) or violates
law applicable to the organization (e.g., pollution), if either of those actions is 
likely to cause substantial harm to the organization and is related to the repre-
sentation. Typically, the lawyer must counsel the constituent about ceasing or 
rectifying the improper action and (if that does not solve the problem) then report 
the improper action to a higher authority within the organization. In some in-
stances, a lawyer may report the misconduct outside the organization, even if 
Rule 1.6 would not otherwise permit such reporting.62
2. The Constituent/Client Distinction
The most common ethical challenge for the lawyer representing an orga-
nization (and especially a close corporation) is maintaining the distinction 
between the organization’s constituents—the managers, employees, and others 
with whom the lawyer works daily—and the client itself, which is the entity. 
Constituents frequently make the common mistake of believing that the com-
pany lawyer serves as their lawyer.63 While the lawyer may look to the constit-
uents to act as “the client,” they are not the lawyer’s client in any personal or 
individual capacity (absent a separate agreement). Rule 1.13(f ) addresses this 
concern as follows:
In dealing with an organization’s directors, oﬃcers, employees, members, 
shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of 
the client when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the 
organization’s interests are adverse to those of the constituents with 
whom the lawyer is dealing.
Lawyers representing an organization, therefore, must be vigilant in assess-
ing whether the employee or agent with whom they are speaking understands 
62 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.13(c). That provision permits the lawyer to reveal information outside of 
the client, even if not permitted by Rule 1.6, if the highest authority in the organization fails or 
refuses to address misconduct related to the representation, “but only if and to the extent the law-
yer reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial injury to the organization.”
63 See, e.g., Robertson v. Gaston Snow & Ely Bartlett, 404 Mass. 515, 521 (1989) (“An attorney 
for a corporation does not simply by virtue of that capacity become the attorney for . . . its oﬃ-
cers, directors or shareholders.”).
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that they are not that person’s individual lawyer, and the lawyer must advise the 
constituent about the lawyer’s role if there appears to be any uncertainty. Some 
refer to this kind of Rule 1.13(f ) advice (which is also consistent with Rule 4.3 
obligations) as a “corporate Miranda warning,” given its importance in prevent-
ing an inadvertent attorney-client relationship.64 This is particularly important 
in situations involving close corporations. Under the common law, even though 
there may not be an attorney-client relationship between the lawyer and the indi-
vidual shareholders, the lawyer still owes a ﬁduciary duty to minority sharehold-
ers (derivative of the ﬁduciary duty that shareholders in close corporations owe 
to each other). Thus, in Baker v. Wilmer, Cutler, Pickering, Hale & Dorr,65 the 
appeals court reversed the dismissal of a case against a law ﬁrm where the alle-
gations in the complaint set out suﬃcient facts to assert a claim that the law-
yers had aided majority shareholders in freezing out minority shareholders.
Practice Tip
Lawyers who represent organizations, including public 
agencies, frequently come to consider their supervisors 
in the organization as their “client.” That reaction is 
understandable, but it is wrong and can be risky to the 
lawyer and the organization, as discussed in the Bulger 
matter in the following subsection.
B.  Discipline for Violating Rule 1.13
While Rule 1.13 presents subtle and complicated issues for lawyers repre-
senting organizations, few lawyers have been disciplined for violating that rule. 
In one reported disciplinary case, Matter of Wise,66 the attorney was suspended 
for six months for misconduct arising from representing a nonproﬁt organiza-
tion engaged in an internal struggle for control. The lawyer took actions at the 
direction of former members of the corporation’s board of directors, who claimed 
64 See Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Corporate Miranda Warnings, 25 A.B.A. Crim. Just.
47 (Summer 2010); United States v. Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600, 604 n.3 (9th Cir. 2009).
65 91 Mass. App. Ct. 835 (2017).
66 433 Mass. 80, 16 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 416 (2000).
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that their removal from the board was unlawful and, therefore, they still spoke 
for the nonproﬁt. Because the lawyer’s action occurred before the Massachusetts 
Rules of Professional Conduct was adopted, the SJC concluded that Rule 1.13 did 
not apply, but it implied that the lawyer’s actions may have breached duties under 
that rule if it had been in eﬀect.67 By favoring and cooperating with the dissi-
dent faction within an internal organizational dispute, and at a time when the 
opposing faction was questioning his bill for attorney’s fees, the lawyer violated 
the rules governing conﬂicts of interest, revealing client conﬁdences, and con-
tact with a party represented by counsel.68 Wise serves as an important warning 
to lawyers who represent organizations about the need for care in determining 
who speaks for the client.
In Matter of Bulger,69 the respondent received a public reprimand after he 
continued to communicate conﬁdential client information to a former constit-
uent of the government agency for which the respondent worked as general 
counsel. The former constituent was the head of the agency and had been 
placed on administrative leave after allegations of wrongdoing. The respon-
dent sought to lessen his sanction by claiming that the circumstances created 
confusion about his client’s identity, but the board rejected that claim as “will-
ful blindness.”
IV. ALLOCATION OF DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY
FOR CLIENTS WITH DIMINISHED CAPACITY
Rules 1.2 and 1.4 assume a client who is capable of shared decision-making 
about the client’s matters. Sometimes, however, clients suﬀer from impairments 
that hamper their ability to participate meaningfully in their legal matters. 
Rule 1.14 addresses the lawyer’s responsibilities in such settings, and few law-
yers have been disciplined in Massachusetts for misconduct related to violating 
Rule 1.14.
67 Id. 433 Mass. at 85–86.
68 The Court said that the duty of a lawyer facing such a dispute about control of an organization 
is to “remain neutral.” Wise, 433 Mass. at 88. It rejected the claims that the lawyer acted in the 
best interests of the organization and that he had permission to reveal information to prevent 
the commission of a crime, as permitted under the applicable Code of Professional Responsibility
at the time. Id.
69 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 65 (2013).
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RULE 1.14: CLIENT WITH DIMINISHED CAPACITY
(a) When a client’s capacity to make adequately considered deci-
sions in connection with a representation is diminished, whether 
because of minority, mental impairment or for some other reason, 
the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal 
client-lawyer relationship with the client.
(b) When the lawyer reasonably believes that the client has 
diminished capacity that prevents the client from making an ade-
quately considered decision regarding a specific issue that is part 
of the representation, is at risk of substantial physical, financial or 
other harm unless action is taken, and cannot adequately act in 
the client’s own interest, the lawyer may take reasonably necessary 
protective action in connection with the representation, includ-
ing consulting with individuals or entities that have the ability to 
take action to protect the client and, in appropriate cases, seeking 
the appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator, or guardian.
(c) Confidential information relating to the representation of a 
client with diminished capacity is protected by Rule 1.6. When 
taking protective action pursuant to paragraph (b), the lawyer is 
impliedly authorized under Rule 1.6(a) to reveal confidential 
information about the client, but only to the extent reasonably 
necessary to protect the client’s interests.
A. Allocation of Authority for Clients with Diminished Capacity
The standard rules regarding the allocation of decision-making authority 
between a lawyer and the client, as discussed thus far, presume that the client has 
the capacity to make reasoned choices within the attorney-client relationship. 
When the client suﬀers from some diminished capacity, this rule requires the 
attorney to maintain the normal attorney-client relationship “as far as reasonably 
possible.” The commitment to client autonomy that Rules 1.2 and 1.4 establish 
remain operative. But if the client is unable to participate meaningfully in the 
legal matter because of a disability or limitation, or if that ability is substantially 
compromised, the lawyer’s responsibilities change. The lawyer must remain com-
mitted to respecting the client’s autonomy while at the same time compensating 
for the client’s decision-making limitations and protecting the client’s interests 
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from substantial harm.70 Therefore, Rules 1.2 and 1.4 apply diﬀerently when 
the client has some form of diminished capacity.
Rule 1.14 oﬀers lawyers some guidance about how to proceed with a client 
with diminished capacity. That limited capacity may result from developmental 
disability, mental illness, or young age, as when a lawyer is appointed to repre-
sent a child client. Rule 1.14(b) articulates the trigger for a lawyer’s extra 
responsibility and describes how the lawyer might exercise the discretion the 
rule grants:
When the lawyer reasonably believes that the client has diminished 
capacity that prevents the client from making an adequately considered 
decision regarding a speciﬁc issue that is part of the representation, is at 
risk of substantial physical, ﬁnancial or other harm unless action is 
taken, and cannot adequately act in the client’s own interest, the lawyer 
may take reasonably necessary protective action in connection with the 
representation . . . .71
Before a lawyer may lawfully take “reasonably necessary protective action” on 
behalf of a client, the lawyer must reasonably believe that (1) the client has 
diminished capacity; (2) the diminished capacity is suﬃciently severe to prevent 
the client from deciding capably about some speciﬁed representational issue; 
(3) the client, as a result, cannot adequately act in his own interest; and (4) the 
client faces a palpable risk of some substantial harm, whether ﬁnancial, physi-
cal, or emotional. Only if the lawyer concludes that all four factors are present 
may the lawyer treat the client with diminished capacity any diﬀerently than 
another client.
The text of Rule 1.14 does not help a lawyer determine when it is appropri-
ate to take some protective action, but its comments refer to such factors as:
[T]he client’s ability to articulate reasoning leading to a decision, 
variability of state of mind and ability to appreciate consequences of a 
decision; the substantive fairness of a decision; and the consistency of 
a decision with the known long-term commitments and values of the 
client.72
70 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.14 comment [1].
71 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.14(b).
72 Id. at comment [6].
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Lawyers must rely upon their own discretionary judgments, usually without the 
aid of a professional, to conclude that a client’s actions are not merely idiosyn-
cratic but manifest some impaired reasoning capacity.73 Once a lawyer concludes, 
or reasonably believes, that the above factors have been met, the lawyer may con-
sult with others who may be helpful in conﬁrming or correcting the lawyer’s assess-
ment, notwithstanding the usual prohibition on speaking with others about a 
client’s aﬀairs. The rule does not require an attorney to consult with an expert 
before taking action under the rule. Indeed, the decision to take action, includ-
ing consulting an expert, is one of the things that would otherwise violate the 
lawyer’s duties with unimpaired clients, but which the rule permits after the attor-
ney has formed a reasonable belief about the need for it.
If the lawyer, either through consulting others or relying on personal judg-
ment, determines that the client does indeed have diminished capacity and faces 
the risks of harm described in the rule, the lawyer may seek or recommend that 
a surrogate decision-maker be appointed, such as a guardian or conservator, or 
take other measures aimed at protecting the client’s interests. Comment [7] to 
Rule 1.14 oﬀers the following choices, each available at the lawyer’s discretion:
The attorney may:
(i) advocate the client’s expressed preferences regarding the issue;
(ii)  advocate the client’s expressed preferences and request the appoint-
ment of a guardian ad litem or investigator to make an independent 
recommendation to the court;
(iii)  request the appointment of a guardian ad litem or next friend to 
direct counsel in the representation; or
(iv)  determine what the client’s preferences would be if he or she were 
able to make an adequately considered decision regarding the issue 
and represent the client in accordance with that determination.74
The role of a lawyer acting in a protective capacity for a client with dimin-
ished capacity with no appointed surrogate is clear: The lawyer must exercise 
discretion using the “substituted judgment” standard and not a “best interests” 
73 The criteria upon which a lawyer may act pursuant to Rule 1.14 resemble those applicable to 
appointing a conservator for an impaired person. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 190B § 5-101(9) (“an 
individual who[,] for reasons other than advanced age or minority, has a clinically diagnosed con-
dition that results in an inability to receive and evaluate information or make or communicate 
decisions to such an extent that the individual lacks the ability to meet essential requirements for 
physical health, safety, or self-care, even with appropriate technological assistance”).
74 Id. at comment [7].
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standard.75 In other words, the lawyer must act in such a way as to fulﬁll the 
desires and respect the values of the client, to the extent those may be dis-
cerned, instead of acting in some objective, best interests fashion. The lawyer’s 
actions ought to represent the least restrictive alternative available.76
Many lawyers have been disciplined for mistreating clients with diminished 
capacity,77 but few decisions, described in the following section, have sanctioned 
a lawyer for misapplying or misunderstanding the duties under Rule 1.14. That 
Rule 1.14 operates primarily in a defensive manner might explain the scarcity 
of such discipline. It serves to justify lawyer actions that would normally be 
improper, such as discussing private matters with third parties or making deci-
sions contrary to the client’s instructions.78
B.  Discipline for Violating Rule 1.14
As noted, few lawyers have been disciplined for misconduct in which Rule 
1.14 played an important role. In Matter of Eskenas,79 the respondent represented 
a frail nursing home resident in a divorce against her husband. While the law-
yer properly recognized his need for a substitute decision-maker when his client’s 
capacity to make informed decisions failed, he misjudged his responsibilities when 
he sought and obtained a general guardianship, rather than a limited guardian-
ship, for his client. He then neglected his responsibilities after ﬁling for the guard-
ianship by failing to keep either his client or the proposed guardian apprised of 
developments. He received a public reprimand. In Matter of Weiss,80 the respon-
dent was suspended for a year and a day for misconduct involving failure to respect 
75 See, e.g., Care & Protection of Georgette, 439 Mass. 28, 36 (2003); Brophy v. New England 
Sinai Hospital, Inc., 398 Mass. 417 (1986); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. 
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 729–32, 746–47, 752–54 (1977).
76 While Rule 1.14 does not reference the “least restrictive alternative” principle expressly, that 
sentiment is well accepted in other protective services contexts. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 
190B § 5-407(b)(8) (conservator statute).
77 See, e.g., Matter of Clooney, 403 Mass. 654 (1988) (disbarment after misuse of funds belong-
ing to “elderly, impaired” clients); Matter of Muse, 12 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 335 (1996) (three-
year suspension for misconduct involving an elderly, impaired client); Matter of Hurley, 8 Mass. 
Att’y Disc. 102 (1992) (disbarment for scheming to become guardian for an elderly disabled
woman and misappropriating funds).
78 Discipline under Rule 1.14 is rare nationwide as well, no doubt for that same reason. For one 
such example, see In re Flack, 33 P.3d 1281 (Kan. 2001) (lawyer’s failure to abide by client’s estate 
planning objectives, as far as reasonably possible, after being informed of client’s medical and men-
tal disability violated Rule 1.14; two-year probation).
79 30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 130 (2014).
80 460 Mass. 1012, 27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 895 (2011).
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his disabled elderly client’s wishes. The reported decisions on his discipline and 
his unsuccessful reinstatement eﬀorts do not describe the facts of his miscon-
duct or the rules he violated, but unpublished (and public) BBO documents show 
that he failed to comply with Rule 1.14.
In Matter of Zinni,81 the respondent received a public reprimand after fol-
lowing the instructions of one daughter to revise the estate plan of an impaired 
mother to favor that daughter and to disinherit the remaining siblings. Disci-
pline was charged based on his lack of competence and diligence on behalf of 
the mother as well as his conﬂict of interest in representing the daughter along 
with the mother. He was not charged with violating Rule 1.14, and his reliance 
on that rule in his defense did not help. In Matter of Robin82 and Matter of 
Ward,83 the respondents together represented a woman with diminished capac-
ity and, following her wishes and instructions, assisted her in pursuing several 
frivolous court ﬁlings. The attorneys’ reliance on Rule 1.14 as a defense was 
unsuccessful.84
In Ad. 17-06,85 counsel for an elderly woman viewed his client retaining a 
new lawyer and transferring funds to a family member as evidence of that fam-
ily member exercising undue inﬂuence over the client. The lawyer, conferring 
with the client’s daughter (who objected to the funds transfer) instead of the client, 
advised the daughter to move all remaining client funds into his trust account. 
He also refused to cooperate with successor counsel. After the respondent learned 
that his client had indeed authorized the initial actions, he immediately returned 
all client funds and provided successor counsel with his papers. He received an 
admonition for inappropriately applying the guidance of Rule 1.14.
81 31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 722 (2015).
82 SJC No. BD-2016-120 (Nov. 23, 2016), 32 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2016) (three-month sus-
pension, stayed).
83 P.R. No. 2016-16 (Nov. 3, 2016), 32 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2016) (public reprimand).
84 In neither Robin nor Ward did the discipline report cite Rule 1.14.
85 33 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2017).
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chapter ten
Problems of Conflicts of Interest: Concurrent 
Conflicts, Successive Conflicts, and Business 
Transactions (Rules 1.7, 1.8, 1.9(a) and (b), and 1.10)
I. INTRODUCTION
A lawyer must avoid conﬂicts of interest that might impair client represen-
tation. A lawyer is a ﬁduciary who must put the client’s interests ﬁrst and must 
not accept or continue representation if the work for one client interferes with 
the lawyer’s duties on behalf of another client. A lawyer may not represent a 
client whose interests are adverse to another current client unless both clients 
consent. Sometimes even the clients’ consent is not suﬃcient to permit such 
opposition.
A lawyer’s conﬂict-of-interest responsibilities are among the most common, 
and complex, ethical issues that arise in a lawyer’s work. Most large law ﬁrms 
appoint one lawyer or a committee to monitor client work to avoid, remedy, or 
negotiate about possible conﬂicts of interest. Small-ﬁrm lawyers, legal-services 
lawyers, in-house counsel, and government lawyers all encounter possible con-
ﬂicts in their work. Despite the frequency, conﬂicts of interest are not the most 
common example of lawyer misconduct the Massachusetts disciplinary system 
addresses.1 Perhaps because other remedies often exist for a lawyer engaging in 
conduct amounting to a conﬂict of interest—including, in litigation matters, 
motions to disqualify or other court-generated sanctions and, in all matters, the 
prospect of a malpractice claim—parties or counsel who discover a conﬂict do not 
always treat that misconduct as a disciplinary matter. But engaging in a conﬂict 
without informed consent is misconduct that subjects a lawyer to discipline.
Conﬂicts of interest appear in two quite diﬀerent forms. First, a lawyer may 
not proceed in the face of a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict means 
1 According to the annual reports of the Oﬃce of the Bar Counsel, the most common disciplinary 
matters involve neglect and mishandling of trust accounts. See Massachusetts Office of the 
Bar Counsel of the Supreme Judicial Court, Annual Report to the Supreme Judicial 
Court, Fiscal Year  () at 7 (Table 3); Massachusetts Office of the Bar Coun-
sel of the Supreme Judicial Court, Annual Report to the Supreme Judicial Court, Fis-
cal Year  () at 7 (Table 3).
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that the lawyer either opposes an ongoing client through some other represen-
tation or suﬀers from some impairment that limits the lawyer’s ability to oﬀer 
unfettered, zealous representation to a client. Second, a lawyer may not proceed 
in the face of a successive conflict of interest. A successive conflict arises when the 
work for an existing client opposes and relates to the work the lawyer or the law 
ﬁrm did for a former client. The following sections discuss these more fully.
This chapter discusses concurrent conﬂicts, successive conﬂicts, and the prin-
ciples governing charges of conﬂicts among lawyers, as set out in the Massachu-
setts Rules of Professional Conduct, Rules 1.7, 1.8, 1.9(a) and (b), and 1.10. The 
discussion provides examples using decisions and reports from the Board of Bar 
Overseers (BBO) and the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) and describes the typ-
ical or expected sanctions that accompany various manifestations of conﬂicts 
of interest.
II. THE RULES GOVERNING CONCURRENT
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
A. Concurrent Conflicts Under Rule 1.7
Massachusetts regulates concurrent conﬂicts through Rules 1.7 and 1.8 of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 1.7 addresses the general concurrent conﬂict-
of-interest principles, while Rule 1.8 governs speciﬁc instances of that conﬂict, 
primarily but not only concerning conﬂicts between attorney and client.
RULE 1.7: CONFLICT OF INTEREST: CURRENT CLIENTS
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not repre-
sent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of 
interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if:
(1)  the representation of one client will be directly adverse to 
another client; or
(2)  there is significant risk that the representation of one or 
more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s 
responsibilities to another client, a former client or a 
third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.
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RULE 1.7 (cont’d.)
(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of 
interest under paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if:
(1)  the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able 
to provide competent and diligent representation to each 
affected client;
(2)  the representation is not prohibited by law;
(3)  the representation does not involve the assertion of a 
claim by one client against another client represented by 
the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding 
before a tribunal; and
(4)  each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in 
writing.
1. The Types of Concurrent Conflicts Lawyers Encounter
Rule 1.7 proscribes a lawyer’s representation in two types of concurrent 
conﬂict settings.2 A concurrent conﬂict of interest exists if “the representation 
of one client will be directly adverse to another client,”3 or if “there is signiﬁcant 
risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by 
the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person 
or by a personal interest of the lawyer”(emphasis added).4 Both of the 1.7(a) 
prohibitions may be waived, however, in certain circumstances with client con-
sent. The process for obtaining such consent is discussed in Section II(A)(2).
Rule 1.7 covers two prototypical, improper conﬂict scenarios: (1) where a 
lawyer sues (or otherwise opposes) an existing client (whether or not the action 
is related to the lawyer’s work for that existing client); and (2) where a lawyer rep-
resents a client when some interest of the lawyer, whether related to another cli-
ent or to a personal or ﬁnancial interest, might distort or interfere with the lawyer’s 
ability to advocate for the ﬁrst client. Not surprisingly, both of these conﬂicts can 
arise in innumerable ways. Lawyers have many resources available to help them 
understand the intricate and sometimes confusing nuances involved in concurrent 
2 The language of Rule 1.7 in the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct is diﬀerent from the 
language of Rule 1.7 in the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, but its message is exactly 
the same.
3 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.7(a)(1).
4 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.7(a)(2).
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conﬂicts.5 However, Section II(B) provides examples of misconduct leading to 
lawyer discipline under Rule 1.7.
Concurrent Conﬂicts Summary
Generally speaking, lawyers encounter concurrent con-
ﬂicts when:
•  They accept joint representation of multiple clients in 
circumstances when the clients’ interests are not fully 
aligned;
•  They accept representation of a new client whose 
claim is directly adverse to the lawyer’s or the law 
ﬁrm’s existing client;
•  The new client’s claims affect a personal or family 
interest, leading the lawyer to possibly downplay 
advocating for the client; or
•  They offer advice, even with the best intentions, to two 
disputing parties in an effort to mediate the dispute.
2. Obtaining Consent to Concurrent Conflicts
If a lawyer discovers that representing one client triggers a conﬂict of inter-
est, the lawyer may have to end that representation, although the lawyer can explore 
the possibility of obtaining consent from the aﬀected client or clients. Rule 1.7(b) 
permits a lawyer to continue representing a client notwithstanding a concurrent 
conﬂict under the following four conditions: 
1. The lawyer “reasonably believes” the representation will not be 
adversely aﬀected, notwithstanding the conﬂict. 
2. The representation is not prohibited by law. 
3. The representation does not involve the lawyer representing opposing 
parties in the same litigation or matter. 
4. Each aﬀected client gives consent, conﬁrmed in writing, after being 
informed of the material risks of and alternatives to continued 
representation.6
5 See Gilda Tuoni Russell, Massachusetts Professional Responsibility, Chapters 7, 8, 
and 10 (2003) (addressing Rules 1.7, 1.8, and 1.10); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., W. William 
Hodes & Peter R. Jarvis, The Law of Lawyering, Chapters 10, 11, and 12 (3rd ed. Supp. 
2004, 2008).
6 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.7(b)(1)–(4); see also Rules 1.0(c) and 1.0(f ).
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This means that if, in the lawyer’s professional judgment, the conﬂict will not 
impair the legal work for the client, and the lawyer’s judgment is objectively reason-
able, the lawyer may explain the nature of the conﬂict to the client, including the 
risks and beneﬁts the client faces in continuing the representation. In order to pro-
ceed notwithstanding a conﬂict, the lawyer must obtain fully informed consent from 
the client, conﬁrmed in writing, which typically means explaining the nature of the 
conﬂict in such a way that the client can appreciate the tensions arising from the 
conﬂict.7 If the lawyer cannot reveal facts related to a diﬀerent client necessary to 
have an informed discussion, the lawyer may not seek consent to the conﬂict.
Practice Tip
The affected client or clients may consent to many con-
current conﬂicts of interest, but the lawyer must docu-
ment carefully both the fact of the consent and the risks 
involved in case a disagreement later arises. The informed 
consent discussion must be conﬁrmed in a writ ing to the 
client and indicate all the considerations the lawyer 
addressed. Also, in order to seek consent when the rep-
resentation of one client conﬂicts with that of another, 
the lawyer must be able to explain the conﬂict to each 
affected client without disclosing protected information 
about the other affected client. Sometimes that is 
impossible and the conﬂict cannot be consented to.
B. Discipline for Concurrent Conflicts Under Rule 1.7
In 2002, the BBO articulated general standards for imposing discipline for 
conﬂicts of interest. In Ad. 02-13, the board described those standards as follows:
In conﬂicts cases, suspension has been reserved for conduct involving 
self-dealing, or egregious conﬂicts causing substantial injury to clients or 
innocent third parties. Otherwise, public [reprimand] will be imposed if 
harm results from an obvious conﬂict . . . . In the absence of proof of any 
actual harm to the estates, an admonition is the appropriate sanction for 
engaging in these conﬂicts.8
7 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.0(c) requires such a writing, and Rule 1.0(f ) describes the nature of the 
informed consent discussion that the writing must memorialize.
8 18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 640, 655–56 (2002) (citations omitted).
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That description corresponds, generally, to the actual discipline imposed in both 
BBO and SJC decisions.
1. Disbarment
While some lawyers have been disbarred for egregious misconduct that in-
cluded engaging in a conﬂict of interest, such as in Matter of Conley9 and Matter 
of McDonald,10 no lawyer has ever been disbarred solely for engaging in a con-
ﬂict of interest.11
2. Suspension
While disbarment has not been a common sanction for serious conﬂicts of 
interest, suspensions for that misconduct are not rare. Matter of Pike is perhaps 
the most notable serious conﬂict-of-interest disciplinary matter in Massachu-
setts.12 In Pike, the lawyer was suspended for six months for representing both 
a tenant and landlord in the lease of a commercial rental unit. The attorney rec-
ommended the unit to the tenant client with the intention of earning a com-
mission from the landlord client, and then encouraged the landlord to increase 
the rent to cover his brokerage fee. The attorney never disclosed to the tenant 
client his ﬁduciary duty to the landlord or that he had a personal ﬁnancial inter-
est in the transaction terms. The SJC concluded that more than a token suspen-
sion was appropriate, given that the lawyer “acted deliberately for his own beneﬁt 
9 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. at 139 (2009). Among six counts of misconduct, including serious mishan-
dling of client funds, “Conley ﬁled a wrongful death suit against the administratrix of an estate of 
which Conley was a named co-administrator, thereby creating an impermissible and unwaivable 
conﬂict with the interests of his clients in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.7 (a) and (b).”
10 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 381 (2004). Among several counts of misconduct, including serious 
mishandling of client funds, McDonald represented his son at a loan closing while also serving 
as the agent for the title insurance company, in violation of 1.7(b). See also Matter of Roberts, 22 
Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 656 (2006) (disbarment after converting client funds and conﬂict of interest); 
Matter of Clark, 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 87 (2005) (disbarment after converting client funds and 
improper business transaction with client).
11 This result diﬀers from the standards for presumptive discipline articulated by the American 
Bar Association (ABA). The ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions state, among other 
bases for disbarment, that “[d]isbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer, without the 
informed consent of client(s) . . . engages in representation of a client knowing that the lawyer’s 
interests are adverse to the client’s with intent to beneﬁt the lawyer or another, and causes serious 
or potentially serious injury to the client . . . . ” ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanc-
tions § 4.31(a) (1986, 1992) (hereinafter ABA Standards).
12 Matter of Pike, 408 Mass. 740, 6 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 256 (1990). Pike is a matter arising under 
the former Massachusetts Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Court found that the lawyer 
had violated Canon 1, DR 1-102 (A)(4) and (6).
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and in disregard of his client’s interests,” and that the client had suﬀered prej-
udice as a result.13
You Should Know
Term suspensions have been imposed for conﬂicts of 
interest where the lawyer’s breach of duty was egregious 
or self-interested, and caused harm to the clients. Rela-
tive to other kinds of misconduct, the term suspensions 
for conﬂicts of interest tend to be shorter in duration.
The other suspension examples include ﬁndings that the lawyers acted self-
ishly or with complete disregard to the interests of their clients. For instance, in
Matter of Wise,14 a lawyer representing a nonproﬁt corporation colluded with 
members of the board of directors against other members of the board (and, in 
fact, against the wishes of the controlling members of the board), in part to 
ensure payment of his legal fees. The SJC rejected the BBO’s recommendation 
for a public reprimand and concluded that the lawyer’s actions warranted a six-
month suspension from practice, partly because the attorney displayed a “venge-
ful attitude” and the multiple violations were “motivated by selﬁshness and anger.” 
Similarly, in Matter of Lupo,15 the Court imposed an indeﬁnite suspension for 
the lawyer’s multiple conﬂicts of interest with clients through which he enriched 
himself at their expense. The Court imposed this substantial discipline because 
the lawyer’s misconduct was “characterized less by a divided loyalty and more 
by a motivation to subjugate the interests of his clients to his own.”16
A lawyer may receive a suspension for a conﬂict of interest not involving 
fraud, deceit, or predatory intent if other accompanying misconduct or a discipli-
nary history warrants such greater discipline.17 The sanctions in Massachusetts 
13 Pike, 408 Mass. at 745, 6 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. at 261.
14 433 Mass. 80, 16 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 416 (2000). The Wise matter appears in the discussion 
of representing organizational clients in Chapter 9, Section III(B)(2).
15 447 Mass. 345, 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 513 (2006).
16 Id. 447 Mass. at 359–60, 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. at 531.
17 See, e.g., Matter of Lansky, 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 446 (2006) (six-month suspension for 
combination of neglect, conﬂict of interest, and substantial harm); Matter of Doherty, 20 Mass. 
Att’y Disc. R. 130 (2004) (two-year suspension for representing both driver and estate of 
deceased passenger in auto accident, plus commingling client funds); Matter of Owens, 19 
Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 348 (2003) (six-month suspension for allowing the buyer of lots to direct 
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for conﬂicts of interest without those other factors may be less severe than in 
other jurisdictions.18
3. Public Reprimand
As noted earlier, in Massachusetts “public discipline will be imposed if harm 
results from an obvious conflict” (emphasis added).19 While BBO decisions and 
SJC opinions do not expressly deﬁne “obvious,” several examples of such conﬂicts 
leading to public reprimands provide an understanding of that term. In Matter 
of Carnahan, for instance, where the SJC full-bench decision employed the “obvi-
ous” characterization, the lawyer agreed on behalf of one client to accept repre-
sentation of an elderly, disabled man whose interests conﬂicted with those of 
the ﬁrst client. The lawyer’s work for the second client beneﬁted the ﬁrst client, 
and neither client gave informed consent to the representation.20
You Should Know
A lawyer will typically receive a public reprimand for caus-
ing harm to a client while engaged in an “obvious” conﬂict 
and not acting with a predatory or selﬁsh motive.21
The Carnahan court cited the following examples of conﬂicts of interest war-
ranting a public reprimand: Matter of Manelis22 (attorney drafted new will for 
his judgment in defending adverse possession suit, while simultaneously purporting to represent 
the deceased client’s estate and executrix as seller of the lots; lawyer also engaged in neglect and 
caused substantial harm).
18 The reported suspension cases in Massachusetts show sanctions that are less than the ABA Stan-
dards recommend. The ABA Standards describe the criterion for imposing a suspension for an imper-
missible conﬂict of interest as follows:
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows of a conﬂict of interest and does 
not fully disclose to a client the possible eﬀect of that conﬂict, and causes injury or 
potential injury to a client.
ABA Standards, supra note 11, at § 4.32.
19 Matter of Carnahan, 449 Mass. 1003, 1004–05, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 56 (2007) (quoting 
Ad. 02-13, 18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 640 (2002)).
20 Carnahan, 449 Mass. at 1004–05. The bar counsel sought a six-month suspension for Carnahan, 
but the SJC concluded that his misconduct warranted a public reprimand.
21 See Matter of Martinian, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 342 (2010) (discussed later in this section in 
the text accompanying note 25).
22 18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 375 (2002).
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father at request of beneﬁciary son without discussing matter separately with 
father and without conducting reasonable investigation into father’s competency);
Matter of Reynolds23 (attorney drafted estate planning documents beneﬁting live-
in caregivers of elderly woman without inquiring about the parties’ relationship 
and knowing that documents represented fundamental change in estate plan 
detrimental to family members); and Matter of Epstein24 (attorney prepared will 
for father-in-law’s seventy-two-year-old sister beneﬁting father-in-law where 
attorney knew or should have known that sister was not competent to execute 
will). Each of the preceding conﬂicts was in fact “obvious” in that an attentive 
lawyer would recognize that the lawyer’s interests on behalf of one client were not 
aligned with those of another client or constituent.
Attorneys should be diligent about not engaging in an unwaivable con-
ﬂict, even at the request of the parties, for instance, a divorcing couple who 
divide their assets and ask the lawyer to represent both of them in their divorce, 
or the “amicable lease” where the lawyer is asked to advise both the landlord 
and the tenant. A recent example of this pitfall is Matter of Martinian,25 where 
the lawyer prepared the separation agreement on behalf of both spouses and pre-
pared and signed both of their ﬁnancial statements. After the respondent sub-
mitted the various pleadings, the Probate and Family Court rejected the lawyer’s 
attempt to appear on behalf of both divorcing spouses. The respondent received a 
public reprimand for violating Rule 1.7, and her attempt to do so demonstrated 
a lack of competence, in violation of Rule 1.1.26
4. Admonition
Any ﬁnding of an impermissible conﬂict of interest that does not cause 
harm and is not unwaivable will lead to an admonition. As the BBO has noted, 
23 15 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 497 (1999).
24 7 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 93 (1991).
25 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 342 (2010).
26 The ABA standard for conﬂicts of interest imposes a public reprimand more readily than the 
reported decisions in Massachusetts demonstrate. For public reprimands, the ABA Standards say 
the following:
Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent in determining whether 
the representation of a client may be materially aﬀected by the lawyer’s own interests, or 
whether the representation will adversely aﬀect another client, and causes injury or potential 
injury to a client.
ABA Standards, supra note 11, at § 4.33. The ABA employs the term negligent, while the Massa-
chusetts authorities use the term obvious, in advising when to impose a public reprimand. The for-
mer term implies the presence of conﬂicts that are less than obvious but still recognizable with 
due care and attention.)
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“In the absence of proof of any actual harm to the estates [or, presumably, the 
client], an admonition is the appropriate sanction for engaging in these con-
ﬂicts.”27 The reported decisions correspond to the BBO’s description.
You Should Know
A lawyer who engages in a conﬂict of interest without 
causing actual harm to a client will typically receive an 
admonition.
For example, in Ad. 05-11,28 the BBO admonished a lawyer for authorizing a 
lawsuit against an active client to collect his unpaid fee, in violation of Rule 1.7(a)(1) 
as it read in 2005. In Ad. 08-11,29 the BBO admonished two lawyers employed by 
a large law ﬁrm after the ﬁrm’s conﬂict-checking system failed to detect a conﬂict 
because a partner had not recorded a client name properly in the ﬁrm’s conﬂict-
detection database. The BBO noted that the lawyers “apparently acted in good faith 
reliance on their ﬁrm’s detection system and on the advice of the ﬁrm’s ethics 
committee,” but without having any authority to discipline the ﬁrm,30 the BBO 
admonished the individual lawyers. The BBO also noted that, once the conﬂict 
was disclosed, the lawyers refused one of the clients’ demand that they withdraw 
from litigation in which she had an adverse interest. Despite that added factor 
beyond the original conﬂict, the BBO still imposed only an admonition.
In Ad. 11-04,31 a lawyer violated Rule 1.7(b) as it read in 2011, along with 
Rules 1.16(a)(1) and 1.4(b), when she represented a client in the probate of his 
uncle’s estate, knowing that her former law ﬁrm, in which her father was a prin-
cipal, had helped the uncle establish his estate plan but had neglected to fund an 
important trust as part of that plan. The lawyer did not explain to the nephew 
27 Ad. 02-13, 18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 640 (2002).
28 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 694 (2005). See also Ad. 06-08, 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 858 (2006), in 
which a lawyer violated Rules 1.7(b) and 1.16(a) by suing a client for unpaid fees without ﬁrst 
formally withdrawing his representation of the client.
29 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 861 (2008).
30 In some states, the disciplinary authorities may impose sanctions on law ﬁrms. See, e.g., N.J.
Rules of Prof’l Conduct Rule 5.1(a); N.Y. Rules of Prof’l Conduct Rule 5.1. For a discus-
sion of this topic, see Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1 
(1991) (advocating discipline for law ﬁrms); Julie R. O’Sullivan, Professional Discipline for Law 
Firm? A Response to Professor Schneyer’s Proposal, 16 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1 (Fall 2002) (dis-
agreeing with the need for law ﬁrm discipline). In 2015, the SJC rejected the proposal of its 
Standing Advisory Committee to permit discipline against a law ﬁrm.
31 27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 930 (2011).
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the implications of her father’s mistake. The BBO found that the attorney’s rep-
resentation was “materially limited by her responsibilities to her father and her 
former and present law ﬁrm when she did not seek the consent of the client 
after consultation.” The earlier error cost the nephew-client substantially more 
in legal fees during the estate’s probate, but the lawyer ultimately forgave her 
fees, so the client suﬀered little ﬁnancial damage.
In Ad. 07-14,32 a partner and associate violated Rule 1.7(a)(2), as it read in 
2007, and Rule 1.8(a) when the two lawyers represented a wife in the sale of 
her marital home. The lawyers included a 5% commission for their ﬁrm in the 
purchase and sale agreement, without explaining the commission clause to the 
client, obtaining her informed consent, or advising her that she should consult 
with independent counsel. In Ad. 10-18,33 a lawyer violated Rule 1.7(a) while 
she and her partner were representing cotrustees and beneﬁciaries in a trust ref-
ormation dispute with adverse trustees, and she undertook simultaneous repre-
sentation of the adverse trustees. She advised the adverse trustees that there was 
no conﬂict of interest because all of the trustees and beneﬁciaries “shared a com-
mon interest in seeking reformation.” (The lawyer’s partner was also admonished 
for violating Rule 1.10(a) by representing the trustees and beneﬁciaries when 
the original lawyer was disqualiﬁed from doing so.)
C. Concurrent Conflicts Under Rule 1.8
Rule 1.8 eﬀectively covers a subset of the Rule 1.7 concerns and oﬀers more 
speciﬁc guidance to a lawyer facing certain types of concurrent conﬂicts of inter-
est, primarily as between lawyer and client.
RULE 1.8: CONFLICT OF INTEREST: CURRENT CLIENTS:
SPECIFIC RULES
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a cli-
ent or knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security, or 
other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless:
(1)  the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires 
the interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are 
fully disclosed and transmitted in writing in a manner 
that can be reasonably understood by the client;
32 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 959 (2007).
33 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 794 (2010).
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RULE 1.8: CONFLICT OF INTEREST: CURRENT CLIENTS:
SPECIFIC RULES (cont’d.)
(2)  the client is advised in writing of the desirability of seek-
ing and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the 
advice of independent counsel in the transaction; and
(3)  the client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by 
the client, to the essential terms of the transaction and 
the lawyer’s role in the transaction, including whether the 
lawyer is representing the client in the transaction.
(b) A lawyer shall not use confidential information relating to 
representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client or for 
the lawyer’s advantage or the advantage of a third person, unless 
the client gives informed consent, except as permitted or required 
by these Rules.
(c) A lawyer shall not, for his own personal benefit or the benefit 
of any person closely related to the lawyer, solicit any substantial 
gift from a client, including a testamentary gift, or prepare for a 
client an instrument giving the lawyer or a person closely related 
to the lawyer any substantial gift, including a testamentary gift, 
unless the lawyer or other recipient of the gift is closely related to 
the client. For purposes of this Rule, a person is “closely related” 
to another person if related to such other person as sibling, 
spouse, child, grandchild, parent, or grandparent, or as the spouse 
of any such person.
(d) Prior to the conclusion of representation of a client, a lawyer 
shall not make or negotiate an agreement giving the lawyer liter-
ary or media rights to a portrayal or account based in substantial 
part on information relating to the representation.
(e) A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in 
connection with pending or contemplated litigation, except that:
(1)  a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of 
litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on 
the outcome of the matter; and
(2)  a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court 
costs and expenses of litigation on behalf of the client.
(f ) A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a cli-
ent from one other than the client unless:
(1)  the client gives informed consent;
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RULE 1.8 (cont’d.)
(2)  there is no interference with the lawyer’s independence of 
professional judgment or with the client-lawyer 
relationship; and
(3)  information relating to representation of a client is 
protected as required by Rule 1.6.
(g) A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not partici-
pate in making an aggregate settlement of the claims of or against 
the clients, or in a criminal case an aggregated agreement as to 
guilty or nolo contendere pleas, unless each client gives informed 
consent, in a writing signed by the client. The lawyer’s disclosure 
shall include the existence and nature of all the claims or pleas 
involved and of the participation of each person in the settlement.
(h) A lawyer shall not:
(1)  make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer’s 
liability to a client for malpractice unless the client is 
independently represented in making the agreement; or
(2)  settle a claim or potential claim for such liability with an 
unrepresented client or former client unless that person is 
advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is 
given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of 
independent legal counsel in connection therewith.
(i) A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of 
action or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for 
a client, except that the lawyer may:
(1)  acquire a lien authorized by law to secure the lawyer’s fee 
or expenses; and
(2)  contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a 
civil case.
( j) Reserved.
(k) While lawyers are associated in a firm, a prohibition in the 
foregoing paragraphs (a) through (i) that applies to any one of 
them shall apply to all of them.
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Rule 1.8 oﬀers guidance to lawyers: 
• Who wish to engage in a business transaction with a client (which is 
not prohibited, even if it is perilous)34
• With potentially famous clients who wish to pay the lawyer by oﬀer-
ing some intellectual property rights to the client’s story35
• Writing wills or similar estate planning documents where the lawyer 
or a family member will be a beneﬁciary 36
• Who wish to advance living expenses or similar aid to a litigation client37
• Whose work for one client is paid for by a third party 38
• Representing several clients who wish to engage in an aggregate 
settlement of their claims39
• Who wish to limit liability by an agreement with the client waiving 
prospectively any malpractice claims against the lawyer40
In many of these instances, Rule 1.8 expressly prohibits the identiﬁed conduct.
Rule 1.8 formerly addressed the “Adam’s Rib” conﬂict of interest for law-
yers who are closely related to one another and represent clients whose interests 
are directly adverse.41 That issue is now covered in Comment [11] of Rule 1.7. 
The principle remains the same: A lawyer may not oppose in a matter a party that 
the lawyer’s parent, child, sibling, or spouse represents, subject to the informed 
consent provisions previously discussed.
One may see how each of these Rule 1.8 examples generates a potential 
conﬂict covered by Rule 1.7(a)(2). Each setting ﬁnds the lawyer having some 
interests or incentives that are not entirely congruent with the client’s. The ben-
eﬁt of Rule 1.8 over the generic Rule 1.7(a)(2) is that each respective subsection 
of Rule 1.8 oﬀers more guidance to a lawyer than the general pronouncement 
of the latter rule. Most of the Rule 1.8 provisions cannot be waived by a client’s 
informed consent.42
34 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.8(a).
35 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.8(d).
36 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.8(c).
37 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.8(e).
38 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.8(f ).
39 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.8(g).
40 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.8(h).
41 See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.8(i) (2014 version, since removed). See Adam’s Rib (Metro-Goldwin-
Mayer 1949) (comedy involving husband and wife lawyers played by Spencer Tracy and Katharine 
Hepburn).
42 Only the provisions of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.8(b), (f ), and (g) permit conduct requiring client 
informed consent, and always with other conditions.
193
Problems of Conflicts of Interest
D. Discipline for Concurrent Conflicts Under Rule 1.8
1. Disbarment
The BBO has not recommended, nor has the SJC imposed, disbarment for 
violating Rule 1.8, except when combined with other rules violations. For in-
stance, in Matter of Azzam,43 the SJC disbarred an attorney after his felony con-
viction for sharing client’s personal ﬁnancial data with service providers. His 
use of conﬁdential client information for his own beneﬁt violated Rule 1.8(b).44
Practice Tip
The two most common troubles that lawyers encounter 
with Rule 1.8 are engaging in improper business transac-
tions with a client45 and providing improper ﬁnancial 
assistance to a client.46
2. Suspension
The SJC has imposed term suspensions on lawyers whose conduct violated 
Rule 1.8. In Matter of Duggan,47 the lawyer was suspended for six months for 
engaging in several self-interested transactions involving his clients’ property. The 
lawyer entered into multiple business arrangements with his clients, including 
purchasing their home at a foreclosure sale, without complying with Rule 1.8 
notice or fairness requirements. The clients later sued the lawyer and obtained 
an order undoing the transactions.48 In Matter of Glynn,49 the lawyer engaged in 
conduct prohibited by Rule 1.8(c) by drafting a will for a client in which he was 
the primary beneﬁciary. He also lost the will because of poor oﬃce manage-
ment. The SJC accepted a stipulation for a suspension of six months and a day. 
In Matter of Balliro,50 the SJC accepted a stipulation for a suspension of a year 
and a day after the respondent arranged and prepared mortgage documents to 
43 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 18 (2010).
44 See also Matter of Conley, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 138 (2009); Matter of Cruz, 20 Mass. Att’y 
Disc. R. 111 (2004); Matter of Fuller, 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 152 (2004).
45 Since 1999, at least thirty-ﬁve lawyers have been disciplined for violating Rule 1.8(a).
46 Since 1999, at least ﬁfteen lawyers have been disciplined for violating Rule 1.8(e).
47 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 305 (2006).
48 Duggan v. Gonsalves, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 250 (2005).
49 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 282 (2005).
50 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 11 (2013).
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secure his and his partner’s attorney’s fees, without obtaining his client’s con-
sent or otherwise complying with Rule 1.8(a). The respondent also represented 
multiple parties to the transaction, in violation of Rule 1.7.
You Should Know
Lawyers who engage in a series of improper business 
transactions with clients, especially those intended to 
secure or ensure payment of the lawyer’s fees or with 
other aggravating factors, have been disciplined with 
term suspensions. “Sanctions for Rule 1.8 violations 
include substantial term suspensions that can range well 
over one year.”51
In Matter of Lupo,52 discussed in Section II(B)(2) in the context of Rule 1.7, 
the lawyer was suspended indeﬁnitely for engaging in “a transaction . . . when the 
terms were not fair to [the client] or fully disclosed,” in violation of Rule 1.8(a). 
In an earlier case similarly involving a predatory business transaction with clients, 
Matter of Ferris,53 the lawyer was suspended for three years for inducing trustee 
clients to loan him $50,000 on terms unfavorable to the trust.54
3. Public Reprimand
A lawyer violating Rule 1.8(c), by including the lawyer or a member of the 
lawyer’s family as a beneﬁciary of a client’s estate plan, typically results in a pub-
lic reprimand. For example, in Matter of Viegas,55 the BBO imposed, by stipula-
tion, a public reprimand of a lawyer who, seemingly with some reluctance, wrote 
a will for a nonrelative client in which he received a large bequest. In Matter of 
51 Matter of Weisman, 30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 440 (2014). Without multiple violations or other 
aggravating factors, lawyers have received public reprimands or even admonitions, as discussed in 
Sections II(D)(3) and (4). See, e.g., Matter of Lathrop, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 420 (2008) (public 
reprimand for a Rule 1.8 violation related to the attorney’s fee); Ad. 10-12, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 
782 (2010) (admonition for creating a lien to secure fees).
52 447 Mass. 345, 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 513 (2006).
53 9 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 110 (1993).
54 See also Matter of Moran, 27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 612 (2011) (two-month suspension for vio-
lating Rule 1.8(c) (the lawyer drafted a will naming himself as a beneﬁciary) and 1.8(a) (the law-
yer solicited a loan from the same client that was not fair and reasonable and was preceded by 
none of the notice requirements)).
55 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 3 (2004).
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Field (bequest to the respondent’s spouse),56 Matter of Toner (bequest to respon-
dent, his wife, and his children),57 and Matter of Filosa (bequest to lawyer as 
remainder-person of a will),58 the BBO imposed the public reprimand sanction 
for similar conduct.
Practice Tip
A lawyer who includes himself or a relative in an estate 
plan created for a client will typically receive a public 
reprimand, absent other misconduct. The reprimand 
typically results regardless of how long the lawyer or the 
family has known the client or how much past work the 
lawyer has done for the client; it remains true even if the 
client expressly instructed the lawyer to do so, if no one 
challenges the legitimacy of the document, and even if 
the lawyer has rejected or returned the gift.59
In Matter of Lathrop,60 the attorney borrowed $2,000 from a client and 
did not repay it, but instead sought to “credit” the debt against the attorney’s 
fees that the client owed him. By entering into a business transaction without 
reducing the terms to writing, discussing how the loan would be repaid, giving 
the client reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel, or 
obtaining the client’s informed consent, and by purporting to repay the loan 
through a credit without the client’s consent, the attorney violated Rule 1.8(a). 
The BBO imposed a public reprimand. Similarly, a single justice imposed a pub-
lic censure (the previous equivalent of a public reprimand) against the lawyer in
Matter of Dionisi, who represented a client in a transaction in which the attorney’s 
56 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 140 (2004).
57 16 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 394 (2000).
58 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 273 (2008).
59 See, e.g., Matter of Filosa, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 273 (2008) (public reprimand after lawyer 
drafted estate plan provisions favoring him at the client’s direct insistence after lawyer counseled 
otherwise; no party objected to the provision); Matter of Viegas, 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 526 
(2004) (attorney disclaimed what client bequeathed to him, and objection by an heir had no basis, 
but public reprimand still resulted); Matter of Field, 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 140 (2004) (public 
reprimand still resulted despite the attorney and his wife knowing the testatrix for many decades, 
maintaining a close relationship with her, and frequently socializing and spending all major hol-
idays together).
60 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 420 (2008).
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immediate family had a substantial personal ﬁnancial interest without full dis-
closure and consent from the client.61
A lawyer received a public reprimand for compromising a potential mal-
practice claim against him without providing the client the protections required 
by Rule 1.8(h). In Matter of Brown,62 the lawyer neglected a matter. When his 
client discovered that neglect and complained, the lawyer settled with the cli-
ent by agreeing to pay money to the client and to a third party. The lawyer did 
not advise the client to seek independent counsel before settling her claim with 
him. The BBO also considered that the attorney had neglected the matter and 
had failed to act with competence. The BBO found mitigating circumstances 
(the respondent’s stressful divorce) and implied that but for that mitigation the 
respondent would have been suspended.63
4. Admonitions
Admonitions are common in Massachusetts for violating Rule 1.8 where 
the client has not suﬀered signiﬁcant harm. In most of the reported decisions 
resulting in an admonition, the lawyer failed to make the necessary disclosures 
to the client when engaging in a transaction in which the lawyer, or a member 
of the lawyer’s family, might beneﬁt.
For example, in Ad. 08-19,64 a lawyer purchased a condominium belong-
ing to his client, without informing the client that he was not representing her 
as a lawyer in the matter. Although the terms of the agreement were fair and 
reasonable to the client, the attorney did not disclose all of the terms of the 
transaction to the client in writing and did not give the client adequate oppor-
tunity to seek the advice of independent counsel. Similarly, in Ad. 09-09,65 the 
lawyer borrowed $5,000 from a client for a personal matter without obtaining 
the client’s consent in writing, disclosing all of the terms of the agreement in 
writing, or giving the client opportunity to consult independent counsel. The 
client was satisﬁed with the terms, however. In each instance, the BBO deemed 
admonition an adequate sanction for the lawyer’s misconduct.
61 9 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 99 (1993).
62 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 60 (2004).
63 See also Matter of Humphries, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 369 (2008) (public reprimand for 
respondent who, in an eﬀort to assist his client, obtained title to her home).
64 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 897 (2008).
65 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 668 (2009).
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In Ad. 01-51,66 a lawyer misused a client’s conﬁdences to the client’s det-
riment and to the beneﬁt of a second client, in violation of Rule 1.8(b). The 
respondent lawyer, the trustee of two trusts, withheld distribution to one trust’s 
beneﬁciary to compel that beneﬁciary to make payments allegedly due to the 
second trust. In so acting, the respondent used the conﬁdential information he 
acquired in his role as trustee of both trusts to the detriment of one of the ben-
eﬁciaries (and for his own beneﬁt). The lawyer made full restitution.
Lawyers have received admonitions for assisting clients with living expenses, 
in violation of Rule 1.8(e). In Ad. 09-16,67 the lawyer violated Rule 1.8(e) when 
he loaned a client $7,500 for living expenses while he was representing the cli-
ent’s personal injury suit in which the claims were pending. After settlement of 
the claims, the lawyer repaid himself from the client’s settlement proceeds. Sim-
ilarly, in Ad. 06-12,68 a lawyer violated the same rule by cosigning a loan for the 
client’s beneﬁt while the client’s personal injury case was pending. The lawyer 
had no prior history of discipline.
In Ad. 04-44,69 the respondent violated Rule 1.8(f ), which prohibits a law-
yer from accepting payment from a third party under circumstances that might 
aﬀect the lawyer’s independent professional judgment. An insurer regularly re-
ferred its insureds with potential Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) claims 
to the lawyer for representation on those claims, then paid the lawyer for han-
dling the client’s SSDI claim. The lawyer assisted the insurance company in re-
couping retroactive beneﬁts from the SSDI claimants, funds to which the insurer 
was entitled. The BBO imposed an admonition, ﬁnding that the one client whose 
matter was before the BBO suﬀered no harm.
In Ad. 10-12,70 a lawyer received an admonition for violating Rule 1.8( j) 
(now Rule 1.8(i)) after negotiating with his client for a lien on the client’s prop-
erty to secure the respondent’s attorney’s fees. The lien attached real estate be-
longing to the client (the subject of one of the matters for which the respondent 
represented the client), and the respondent recorded the lien with the Registry 
of Deeds. The BBO concluded that the lawyer violated then Rule 1.8(j) by 
acquiring an interest in the litigation’s subject matter. The reported admonition 
summary does not indicate that the client suﬀered harm.
66 17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 757 (2001).
67 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 682 (2009).
68 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 877 (2006).
69 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 743 (2004).
70 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 782 (2010).
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E. Concurrent Conflicts Triggered by Lawyers in the Same Firm
or Sharing Office Space
Lawyers who share oﬃce space must take special care to avoid triggering 
inadvertent concurrent conﬂicts of interest. Rule 1.10 establishes the general 
principle that lawyers in a law ﬁrm are treated as one lawyer for purposes of 
conﬂicts of interest; the conﬂicts of one attorney are imputed to all others in 
the ﬁrm.71
RULE 1.10: IMPUTED DISQUALIFICATION: GENERAL RULE
(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall 
knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing 
alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7 or 1.9, 
unless the prohibition is based on a personal interest of the pro-
hibited lawyer and does not present a significant risk of materially 
limiting the representation of the client by the remaining lawyers 
in the firm. A lawyer employed by the Public Counsel Division of 
the Committee for Public Counsel Services and a lawyer assigned 
to represent clients by the Private Counsel Division of that Com-
mittee are not considered to be associated. Lawyers are not consid-
ered to be associated merely because they have each individually 
been assigned to represent clients by the Committee for Public 
Counsel Services through its Private Counsel Division.
(b) When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm 
(“former firm”), the former firm is not prohibited from thereafter 
representing a person with interests materially adverse to those of 
a client represented by the formerly associated lawyer and not 
currently represented by the former firm, unless:
(1)  the matter is the same or substantially related to that in 
which the formerly associated lawyer represented the 
client; and
(2)  any lawyer remaining in the former firm has information 
protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c) that is material to the 
matter.
(c) A disqualification prescribed by this Rule may be waived by 
the affected client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7.
71 One exception not attributed to other ﬁrm members was triggered by the lawyer’s relative rep-
resenting the adverse party, per Rule 1.7 comment [11].
199
Problems of Conflicts of Interest
RULE 1.10 (cont’d.)
(d) When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm (“new firm”), 
the new firm may not undertake to or continue to represent a per-
son in a matter that the firm knows or reasonably should know is 
the same or substantially related to a matter in which the newly 
associated lawyer (the “personally disqualified lawyer”), or the 
former firm had previously represented a client whose interests 
are materially adverse to the new firm’s client unless:
(1)  the personally disqualified lawyer has no information 
protected by Rule 1.6 or Rule 1.9 that is material to the 
matter (“material information”); or
(2)  the personally disqualified lawyer (i) had neither 
involvement nor information relating to the matter 
sufficient to provide a substantial benefit to the new firm’s 
client and (ii) is screened from any participation in the 
matter in accordance with paragraph (e) of this Rule and 
is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom.
(e) For the purposes of paragraph (d) of this Rule and of Rules 
1.11 and 1.12, a personally disqualified lawyer in a firm will be 
deemed to have been screened from any participation in a matter if:
(1)  all material information possessed by the personally 
disqualified lawyer has been isolated from the firm;
(2)  the personally disqualified lawyer has been isolated from 
all contact with the new firm’s client relating to the matter, 
and any witness for or against the new firm’s client;
(3)  the personally disqualified lawyer and the new firm have 
been precluded from discussing the matter with each other;
(4)  the former client of the personally disqualified lawyer or 
of the former firm receives notice of the conflict and an 
affidavit of the personally disqualified lawyer and the new 
firm describing the procedures being used effectively to 
screen the personally disqualified lawyer, and attesting 
that (i) the personally disqualified lawyer will not participate 
in the matter and will not discuss the matter or the 
representation with any other lawyer or employee of the 
new firm, (ii) no material information was transmitted by 
the personally disqualified lawyer before implementation 
of the screening procedures and notice to the former 
client; and (iii) during the period of the lawyer’s personal 
disqualification those lawyers or employees who do
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RULE 1.10: IMPUTED DISQUALIFICATION: GENERAL RULE
(cont’d.)
    participate in the matter will be apprised that the 
personally disqualified lawyer is screened from 
participating in or discussing the matter; and
(5)  the personally disqualified lawyer and the new firm 
reasonably believe that the steps taken to accomplish the 
screening of material information are likely to be effective 
in preventing material information from being disclosed 
to the new firm and its client.
   In any matter in which the former client and the new firm’s 
client are not before a tribunal, the firm, the personally disquali-
fied lawyer, or the former client may seek judicial review in a court 
of general jurisdiction of the screening procedures used, or may 
seek court supervision to ensure that implementation of the 
screening procedures has occurred and that effective actual com-
pliance has been achieved.
(f ) The disqualification of lawyers associated in a firm with for-
mer or current government lawyers is governed by Rule 1.11.
In conventional law ﬁrms, partnerships with partners and employee associ-
ates, or professional corporations with shareholders and employee associates, the 
rule of imputation is easy to apply. In other settings, though, whether lawyers 
constitute a “ﬁrm” for conﬂicts purposes may not be so clear. Rule 1.10 addresses 
one such possible ambiguity: Private lawyers assigned by the Committee of Pub-
lic Counsel Services (CPCS, the Massachusetts version of the public defender) 
through its Private Counsel Division to represent indigent criminal defendants 
are not deemed CPCS members.72 The comments to the rule also advise that 
“[l]awyers employed in the same unit of a legal service organization constitute 
a ﬁrm, but not necessarily those employed in separate units.”73
For the many lawyers who share oﬃce space, the critical question is whether 
those lawyers constitute a law ﬁrm, resulting in imputed conﬂicts. The general 
understanding is that, absent an agreement to operate as one law ﬁrm, or actual 
operations that treat the lawyers as if they practice as one ﬁrm, lawyers simply 
sharing oﬃce space do not need to be treated as one ﬁrm. Lawyers who share 
72 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.10(a).
73 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.10 comment [3].
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an oﬃce suite and operate distinct law practices do not need to check with 
each other for the conﬂicts discussed in this chapter. At the same time, those 
lawyers must ensure that they do not inadvertently operate as one ﬁrm. Accord-
ing to one authority, “Lawyers sharing oﬃce space may be deemed ‘associated 
in a ﬁrm’ if they share information and staﬀ or if they hold themselves out as 
a ﬁrm.”74 Employing a common receptionist who has access to client informa-
tion, therefore, presents, at a minimum, a complication for lawyers who share 
oﬃce space.
One SJC decision concluded that, for purposes of a claim of ineﬀective assis-
tance of counsel after a criminal conviction, the mere sharing of an oﬃce suite 
is not suﬃcient to conclude that the lawyers should be treated as one ﬁrm for 
conﬂict-of-interest purposes, especially where the ﬁrm had taken precautions 
to separate the two practices. In Commonwealth v. Alison, the Court wrote, “Each 
attorney must have his or her own telephone number. If a shared receptionist 
is employed, the receptionist should be instructed to answer the telephone as if 
it were the individual law oﬃce of the particular attorney. These safeguards, 
although defeating some cost-saving beneﬁts of a shared-oﬃce relationship, are 
necessary to ensure that the public is not [misled] into believing that the law-
yers are associated as a ﬁrm.”75
The risk of being treated as one ﬁrm for conﬂicts purposes is worrisome.76
Space-sharing is one of the most common “traps for the unwary” about which 
ethics advisors warn practicing attorneys to be particularly vigilant.77
74 ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct, 199 (8th ed. 2015) (citing Monroe v. 
City of Topeka, 988 P.2d 228 (Kan. 1999) (indicia of lawyers presenting themselves to public as 
a ﬁrm for purposes of imputed disqualiﬁcation included sharing oﬃce space, telephone, facsim-
ile number, and mailing address); D.C. Ethics Op. 303 (2001) (whether sharing oﬃce space 
leads to imputation of disqualiﬁcation depends upon speciﬁc arrangements); Or. Ethics Op. 2005-
50 (2005) (disqualiﬁcation imputed if lawyers share common employee with access to protected 
information)).
75 Commonwealth v. Alison, 434 Mass. 670, 691 (2001). The Restatement of the Law Governing 
Lawyers concurs: “The key inquiry is whether the physical organization and actual operation of the 
oﬃce space is such that the conﬁdential client information of each lawyer is secure from the others. 
Where such security is provided and where no other plausible risks to conﬁdentiality and loyalty 
are presented, the conﬂicts of the lawyers are not imputed to each other by reason of their oﬃce-
sharing arrangement.” Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 123 com-
ment [e] (Am. Law Inst. 2000), hereinafter Restatement.
76 For a discussion of the concern when a lawyer has “of counsel” status with more than one ﬁrm, 
see Nancy Kaufman, The Of Counsel Relationship (2000), Massachusetts Board of Bar Over-
seers, https://bbopublic.blob.core.windows.net/web/f/ofcounsel.pdf (last visited May 1, 2018).
77 See, e.g., Susan R. Martyn & Lawrence J. Fox, Who Is Your Client?, in Developments in Legal 
Ethics: Attorney-Client Relations and the Attorney-Client Privilege (2005). The bar 
counsel has advised Massachusetts lawyers about the risks of sharing oﬃce space. See Daniel C. 
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III. THE RULES GOVERNING SUCCESSIVE
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
A. Successive Conflicts Under Rules 1.9 and 1.10
Massachusetts regulates successive, or former client, conﬂicts through Rules 
1.9 and 1.10. Unlike with current clients, a lawyer may, without that former cli-
ent’s informed consent, oppose a former client, even directly, except when the 
new matter relates to the work the lawyer performed for the former client in 
the past.78
RULE 1.9: DUTIES TO FORMER CLIENTS
(a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter 
shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a sub-
stantially related matter in which that person’s interests are mate-
rially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the 
former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.
(b) A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or 
a substantially related matter in which a firm with which the law-
yer formerly was associated had previously represented a client
(1)  whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and
(2)  about whom the lawyer had acquired information pro-
tected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c) that is material to the matter, 
unless the former client gives informed consent, con-
firmed in writing.
Crane & John W. Marshall, Space-Sharers Beware! (2000), Massachusetts Board of Bar Over-
seers, https://bbopublic.blob.core.windows.net/web/f/space.pdf (last visited May 1, 2018). The 
authors wrote:
Section 16 of MGL Chapter 108A, the Uniform Partnership Act, essentially says that a 
person can be held vicariously liable as a partner if he or she consents to being held out as 
a partner and a third party relies on the partnership to his or her detriment. What the 
comment to Rule 7.5(d) says is that space-sharers practicing under a joint name without a 
disclaimer of joint liability are holding themselves out as partners. The case of Atlas Tack 
Corp. v. DiMasi, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 66 (1994) is to the same eﬀect. The new comment to 
[Massachusetts] Rule [of Professional Conduct] 7.5(d) [addressing law ﬁrm names] 
probably will make it easier to prove a partnership by estoppel claim against space-sharers 
who do not use eﬀective disclaimers of joint liability.
78 The Massachusetts version of Rule 1.9(a) is identical to the ABA’s Model Rules version.
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RULE 1.9 (cont’d.)
(c) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or 
whose present or former firm has formerly represented a client in 
a matter shall not thereafter:
(1)  use confidential information relating to the representa-
tion to the disadvantage of the former client or for the 
lawyer’s advantage, or the advantage of a third person, 
except as Rule 1.6, Rule 3.3, or Rule 4.1 would permit or 
require with respect to a client; or
(2)  reveal confidential information relating to the representa-
tion except as Rule 1.6, Rule 3.3, or Rule 4.1 would permit 
or require with respect to a client.
The full text of Rule 1.10 appears in Section II(E), in connection with the 
discussion of concurrent conﬂicts.
Rule 1.9 is consistent with Massachusetts common law developed before the 
adoption of the rule.79 In order to protect the prior client’s conﬁdences, Rule 1.9 
bars representation (absent a waiver) when two elements are present: a substan-
tial relationship to the prior representation and adversity to the former client. 
Unlike the concurrent conﬂicts rules, which protect the loyalty commitment and 
the lawyer’s independent professional judgment, the successive conﬂict rule pro-
tects conﬁdential information.80 The substantial relationship test serves as a sub-
stitute for determining when a lawyer would have learned information from a 
client in the ﬁrst representation that could be used against that client in the sec-
ond representation. If the two matters are substantially related, the doctrine pre-
sumes conclusively that the lawyer acquired information that could be used against 
the client in the second matter.81
Rule 1.9 covers three aspects of former client representation. First, Rule 1.9(a) 
prohibits a lawyer from later opposing the former client on substantially related 
matters—the essence of this rule. Then, Rule 1.9(b) states that a lawyer who 
worked at a ﬁrm that represented a client may not later, at a diﬀerent ﬁrm, 
oppose that client without consent on a substantially related matter, if the 
79 See Adoption of Erica, 426 Mass. 55, 61 (1997) (after noting that “[w]e have often discussed 
the substantial relationship test, but have never adopted it,” the SJC applied the test in this case).
80 Id.
81 Bays v. Theran, 418 Mass. 685, 691 (1994) (quoting from Note, Developments in the Law: Con-
flicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1244, 1315 (1981)).
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migrating lawyer learned information at the ﬁrst ﬁrm that would be covered by 
Rule 1.6 and would be material to the new representation. Finally, Rule 1.9(c) 
generally prohibits a lawyer who once represented a client from using informa-
tion learned in the earlier representation to the disadvantage of the former 
client or to the lawyer’s advantage (except in certain speciﬁed situations), 
whether or not some later adverse representation is permitted.
Practice Tip
The rules governing successive conﬂicts of interest and 
imputation of those conﬂicts among ﬁrm members who 
formerly practiced elsewhere are somewhat different in 
Massachusetts compared to the ABA’s Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct. Take special care to understand 
the Massachusetts versions, especially if you were trained 
in law school using the Model Rules.
Rule 1.9 concerns are far more likely to arise in the context of motions to 
disqualify in litigation matters than in a BBO disciplinary process. A typical 
example of the successive conﬂicts worry Rule 1.9 addresses is the case of 
O’Donnell v. Robert Half International, Inc.82 In this action against an employ-
ment-placement ﬁrm in which several employees alleged violations of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act, the defendant was represented by a large national law 
ﬁrm and the plaintiﬀ by a smaller local law ﬁrm. The large ﬁrm representing 
the defendant assigned a new associate to assist in preparing small parts of the 
defendant’s case. When the recession of 2008 reduced the national law ﬁrm’s 
business, the ﬁrm dismissed that associate. The associate, in turn, applied for an 
opening at the plaintiﬀ ’s law ﬁrm. After unsuccessfully seeking a waiver from 
the defendant’s ﬁrm of any possible conﬂict, the plaintiﬀ ’s ﬁrm hired the asso-
ciate. The associate did not work on any legal matters at the new ﬁrm connected 
to the O’Donnell litigation.
Upon learning of the hire, the defendant ﬁled an emergency motion to dis-
qualify the plaintiﬀ ’s ﬁrm. Its argument was based directly on Rule 1.9 (along 
with Rule 1.10, discussed later in this section). The federal district court judge 
held that because the associate formerly represented the defendant but now 
82 641 F. Supp. 2d 84, 87 (D. Mass. 2009).
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represents the plaintiﬀ (by virtue of working for the plaintiﬀ ’s ﬁrm), the plaintiﬀ ’s 
ﬁrm had created an impermissible conﬂict of interest. Whether applying Rule 
1.9(a), under which the associate would qualify as a lawyer who formerly rep-
resented a client in the same matter, or Rule 1.9(b), under which the associate 
would qualify as a lawyer who left a ﬁrm at which a lawyer had formerly repre-
sented the client, she was disqualiﬁed. Under Rule 1.9(b), the court found, after 
a careful assessment of the disputed facts, that the plaintiﬀ ’s ﬁrm could not rebut 
the presumption that the associate learned material information about the for-
mer client while at the defendant’s ﬁrm.83 Also, because of the nature of the 
information that the associate either had or was deemed to have, she was not 
eligible to be screened at her new ﬁrm under Rule 1.10.84 Therefore, despite the 
length of the litigation and the fact that the matter was a few weeks from a ﬁrm 
trial date, the district court disqualiﬁed the plaintiﬀ ’s ﬁrm, requiring the plain-
tiﬀ to retain new counsel.85
As noted previously, successive conﬂicts matters do not appear often in the 
disciplinary reports, most likely because they are addressed through motions to 
disqualify. While it is not uncommon for former clients, not understanding the 
implications of Rule 1.9, to complain to the BBO that the former lawyers are 
now opposing them and therefore betraying a duty to them, most of those 
complaints arise from proper actions by the respondent lawyer, and the bar 
counsel typically dismisses the charges or otherwise deals with the complain-
ants on an informal basis. Only a handful of reported disciplinary decisions 
have arisen from successive conﬂicts matters, as discussed in Section III(B).
As with concurrent conﬂicts covered by Rule 1.7, and as seen in the discus-
sion of the O’Donnell disqualiﬁcation, successive conﬂicts of one ﬁrm lawyer 
are imputed to the remainder of that lawyer’s ﬁrm, absent informed consent of 
the former client,86 per Rule 1.10(a). The previous discussion about imputed 
83 Id. at 89. Mass. Rule 1.9 comment [6] establishes a rebuttable presumption that a lawyer 
learned relevant information during a prior representation.
84 Id. at 88. Mass. Rule 1.10(d) permits screening of a migrating lawyer who does not have “substan-
tial material information” about the previous client matter. See the discussion in Section III(B) 
below.
85 Id. at 91. A diﬀerent federal court judge later concluded that, after the “tainted attorney” had 
left the second ﬁrm, the ﬁrm was not precluded from representing another plaintiﬀ against the 
same defendant in a similar claim because the “risk of recalling the substantial material informa-
tion to which she was exposed and . . . the subsequent intolerably strong temptation to divulge 
such information . . . dissolved when . . . the [tainted attorney] moved on.” O’Donnell v. Robert 
Half Int’l, Inc., 724 F. Supp. 2d 217, 223 (D. Mass. 2010).
86 Note that if a lawyer did obtain informed consent from a previous client to oppose that client in 
a new, substantially related matter (an unlikely scenario), the new representation would likely trig-
ger a Rule 1.7 concurrent conflicts issue for the new client. The lawyer may need to obtain informed 
206
Misconduct and Typical Sanctions
disqualiﬁcation applies with equal force here, with an important exception—
the availability of screening in some circumstances in successive representation 
conﬂicts. Screening for concurrent conﬂicts is not permitted under the Massa-
chusetts rules.
Rule 1.10 addresses the imputed disqualiﬁcation implications of a lawyer’s 
moving to a new law ﬁrm that represents a client adverse to a client of the law-
yer’s former ﬁrm. If the lateral hire possesses no information material to the 
adverse matter, the new ﬁrm may proceed without screening the lawyer. The 
rule appears to allow that lateral lawyer to participate in the matter against the 
prior ﬁrm. If that lawyer possesses some information, but “had neither involve-
ment nor information relating to [the prior] matter suﬃcient to provide a sub-
stantial beneﬁt to the ﬁrm’s client,” the new ﬁrm may proceed only if it screens 
the “personally disqualiﬁed” lawyer who moved. That screening opportunity is 
narrower than that permitted under the ABA Model Rules.87 Finally, if the lat-
eral lawyer possesses information that would provide a beneﬁt to the new ﬁrm’s 
client, the new ﬁrm may not proceed, even if it screens the lateral lawyer. Rule 
1.10(e) details the requirements necessary for an eﬀective screen.
B. Typical Discipline for Former Client Conflicts
Under Rules 1.9(a) and 1.9(b)
Discipline under Rule 1.9, where a lawyer has improperly represented a cli-
ent in a substantially related matter adverse to a former client without the lat-
ter’s consent, is rare in Massachusetts. Rule 1.9 protection essentially focuses 
on former client conﬁdences; the reported disciplinary decisions regarding mis-
use of conﬁdences, in violation of Rule 1.6, are less uncommon (see Chapter 8). 
But few of those decisions or opinions rely on Rule 1.9.88 In some cases, though, 
lawyers have been disciplined for conﬂicts of interest involving former clients.
consent from the new client to oppose a party with whom the lawyer used to have a relationship, 
given the possibility that the lawyer’s current representation might be limited by the lawyer’s 
relationship with the former client, or by the lawyer’s inability, under Rule 1.9(c), to use infor-
mation obtained in the previous representation. For a discussion of that posture, see Restate-
ment § 132.
87 Under ABA Model Rule 1.10(a), a migrating lawyer who otherwise would be disqualiﬁed 
under Rule 1.9(a) or (b) may be screened, and the new ﬁrm may represent the new client, 
regardless of how much information the lawyer possesses about the former client, if certain 
procedures are followed, including notice to the aﬀected former client and other disclosures.
88 The 2002 treatise on Massachusetts ethics and discipline, Tuoni, supra note 5, cites no disci-
pline examples in its discussion of Rule 1.9, except a series of disciplinary actions taken against 
lawyers for violating Rule 1.6 or its predecessor in the Code of Professional Responsibility. See id. 
at 9-30 to 9-33.)
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You Should Know
The SJC has stated that violating the successive conﬂict 
rules, without a ﬁnding that the lawyer was motivated by 
self-interest, should result in an admonition.89
 
1. Disbarment
Massachusetts has never disbarred a lawyer for a Rule 1.9 violation arising 
from a former client conﬂict of interest. On occasion, the SJC has disbarred a 
lawyer for misconduct that included improper use of former client conﬁdences 
in violation of Rule 1.9(c). For example, in Matter of McDonald,90 the respon-
dent lawyer violated thirteen separate rules in an extensive series of misconduct, 
including using the conﬁdences of former clients to enrich himself. The single 
justice accepted the respondent’s resignation and entered an order of disbarment.
2. Suspension
Only a few reported decisions involving a former client conﬂict have re-
sulted in the lawyer being suspended from practice. The examples involve mul-
tiple instances of misconduct, so no reported disciplinary decision resulting in 
suspension involved simply a Rule 1.9(a) or (b) violation. In Matter of Airewele,91
the respondent, practicing in Georgia without being admitted to the Georgia bar 
(a Rule 5.5 violation), represented a man in a divorce after having represented 
the man’s wife in an immigration proceeding, and without the wife’s consent. 
In the course of the later representation, the respondent “forwarded to his local 
Georgia counsel damaging information about the man’s wife relevant to the wife’s 
immigration proceedings the respondent had handled.”92 The respondent was 
suspended for six months and a day for this and other misconduct.
In Matter of Wise,93 the respondent lawyer received a six-month suspension 
for actions regarding a client, a nonproﬁt corporation, which the lawyer had rep-
resented for some time and within which an internal power struggle arose. The 
lawyer acted in concert with former board members of the nonproﬁt against the 
interests of the current (and allegedly unfaithful) board members, after he had 
89 Matter of Discipline of an Attorney, 449 Mass. 1001, 1002 (2007) (rescript).
90 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 381 (2004).
91 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 3 (2012).
92 Id. at 6.
93 433 Mass. 80, 16 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 416 (2000).
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been dismissed as counsel by the latter managers. The actions in Wise occurred 
before the adoption of Rule 1.9, and neither the BBO nor the SJC refers to the 
lawyer’s conﬂicts as “former client” conﬂicts, but they were precisely that. The 
lawyer was also suspended for violating the rules against contact with a repre-
sented party and for disclosing conﬁdential information without adequate cli-
ent consent.
3. Public Reprimand
At least one serious violation of Rule 1.9 involved betraying a former cli-
ent, resulting in a public reprimand for the lawyer, although that decision also 
included a separate instance of misconduct on a diﬀerent matter and a history 
of prior discipline. In Matter of Lederman,94 the respondent lawyer represented 
four siblings in a litigated dispute with a ﬁfth sibling over the proceeds of a 
trust established under their mother’s will. After the lawyer’s initial strategy 
failed to produce the hoped-for results, he proceeded to represent one of the 
four siblings in a new strategy against the interests of the remaining siblings, 
three of whom were the respondent’s former clients. Combined with a separate 
matter in which the lawyer used deceptive tactics in an eﬀort to obtain docu-
ments belonging to the other spouse in a divorce matter, and a history of one 
prior admonition, the lawyer’s misconduct resulted in the public reprimand.
In Matter of Horrigan,95 the lawyer violated Rule 1.9(a), and then more seri-
ously violated Rule 1.9(c). He received a public reprimand for his misconduct. 
After having represented a man in a personal injury and worker’s compensation 
matter, the lawyer agreed to represent the man’s wife in a divorce action. The law-
yer recognized the conﬂict and withdrew the same day. He later shared with the 
wife the husband’s medical records, obtained during the previous representation, 
although neither the wife nor her lawyer reviewed the records. With no prior dis-
cipline and no other misconduct in the present proceeding, the lawyer’s actions 
warranted a public reprimand.
Finally, in Matter of Schwartz,96 a lawyer agreed to represent two passen-
gers in a motor vehicle accident, until he learned that his law ﬁrm represented 
the driver of the second car involved in the accident. He withdrew from the 
passenger representation but authorized his ﬁrm to remain as counsel for the 
driver of the second car. Later, the respondent represented one of the original 
94 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 462 (2006).
95 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 250 (2010) (also discussed in Chapter 8, Section III(A)(1).
96 18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 455 (2002).
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two clients in a new matter adverse to the other original client and to the driver 
of the second car, without permission from either. Those violations of Rules 1.9(a) 
and 1.10 led to a stipulated public reprimand. In addition to the multiple con-
ﬂicts, an aggravating factor was the respondent’s previous admonition for mis-
handling client funds.
In Matter of Glassman,97 the respondent initially represented the driver and 
two passengers in the same vehicle, all of whom were injured in a motor vehicle 
accident. Under the circumstances (including insuﬃcient liability insurance), 
the interests of all three clients were adverse to one another. When one passen-
ger discharged the respondent, he continued to represent the driver and the other 
passenger, thus maintaining an ongoing conﬂict of interest. Thereafter, the in-
surer oﬀered an aggregate settlement, which the respondent did not handle prop-
erly under Rule 1.8(g). He received a public reprimand for this misconduct as 
well as failing to withdraw from representing the remaining clients after being 
discharged by one passenger.
4. Admonition
In a 2007 SJC opinion, a lawyer who violated Rule 1.9(a) or (b) received an 
admonition, even though the aﬀected former client suﬀered some harm. In Mat-
ter of Discipline of an Attorney,98 the respondent lawyer represented a former cli-
ent’s son, as mortgagor, and recorded a discharge of the client’s mortgage, even 
though the lawyer had represented the father, as mortgagee, in drafting the orig-
inal mortgage. The hearing committee found that the lawyer’s betrayal of his for-
mer client’s interests “caused ﬁnancial and physical harm to the father.”99 The SJC 
agreed with the BBO that the proper sanction was an admonition and not, as the 
bar counsel requested, a suspension or, at minimum, a public reprimand. Because 
“[the respondent’s] actions were not motivated by self-interest and the rule vio-
lations were isolated incidents,” the breach did not compare to other examples 
cited in the opinion warranting a public reprimand.100 This opinion may seem 
inconsistent with Matter of Lederman, previously discussed in Section III(B)(3) 
and decided after Matter of the Discipline of an Attorney, as Lederman did not in-
volve harm and did result in a public reprimand. But Lederman involved two vio-
lations and prior discipline as an aggravating factor.
97 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 224 (2009).
98 449 Mass. 1001, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 786 (2007).
99 449 Mass. at 1001, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. at 786.
100 449 Mass. at 1002 (distinguishing Matter of Dionisi, 9 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 99, 100 (1993); 
Matter of Warren, 8 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 260, 261 (1992)). None of the cited examples involved 
Rule 1.9(a) or (b).
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In Ad. 05-38,101 two lawyers (a principal and an associate) initially repre-
sented a driver and two passengers injured in a motor vehicle accident. In con-
trast with Glassman, it initially appeared that the passengers had no claim against 
the driver. Several months later, the respondents obtained a police report that 
indicated the driver may have been at fault and, therefore, a direct conﬂict of 
interest existed. The principal attorney attempted to resolve the conﬂict by dis-
charging the driver as a client. He also transferred representation of the pas-
sengers to his associate. By continuing to represent the two passengers after 
withdrawing as counsel for the driver without the driver’s consent, the respon-
dents violated Rule 1.9(a). In mitigation, the respondents later withdrew from 
all representation in the matter and waived any fee claims.
C. The “Hot Potato” Doctrine
As noted in Section II, Rule 1.7 bars any representation adverse to a cur-
rent client, regardless of whether it is substantially related to the work for the 
current client, unless the current client gives informed consent in writing. By 
contrast, Rule 1.9 only bars representation adverse to a former client if the new 
work is substantially related to the work for the former client. Rule 1.9 is, there-
fore, much less strict than Rule 1.7. Law ﬁrms have sought to take advantage 
of that diﬀerence by withdrawing from ongoing representation of an existing cli-
ent in order to accept unrelated, and presumably more lucrative, work from a 
new client against the now-former client. Most states have adopted what has 
come to be known as the “hot potato” doctrine,102 forbidding a lawyer from aban-
doning a client prior to accepting a new client in order to exploit the less restric-
tive former client conﬂicts rule.103
In Massachusetts, the SJC has never expressly adopted the “hot potato” doc-
trine.104 A 2016 Court decision did not resolve whether Massachusetts would 
follow the rest of the country in forbidding such a maneuver. In Bryan Corp. v. 
101 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 756 (2005).
102 The phrase was coined in Picker Int’l v. Varian Assocs., 670 F. Supp. 1363, 1365–66 (N.D. 
Ohio 1987).
103 See Keith Swisher, The Practice and Theory of Lawyer Disqualification, 27 Geo. J. Legal Eth-
ics 71, 78 n.17 (2014) (“Typically, courts . . . preclude the lawyer or ﬁrm from dropping (i.e., 
ﬁring) a current client like a ‘hot potato’ in order to sue that client.”); Restatement § 132 
comment [c] and Reporter’s Note to comment [c] (2000).
104 See Paul Lannon & Jeﬀrey D. Woolf, When Clients Clash: Abrano, Hot Potato and the Duty of 
Loyalty, 60 Boston Bar J. 4 (2016).
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Abrano,105 the SJC disqualiﬁed a law ﬁrm for violating Rule 1.7 in representing 
a company in a litigation matter. After a dispute among the family members 
making up the management, the formerly controlling constituents asked the law 
ﬁrm to sue the company. The ﬁrm sought to terminate its work on behalf of the 
company in order to accept the new matter. The SJC concluded that the ﬁrm 
had not withdrawn from its representation of the company before commenc-
ing adverse representation, thus violating Rule 1.7. Because a current conﬂict 
existed, the Court declared that it need not reach the “hot potato” question.106
The Court, however, strongly emphasized a lawyer’s duty of loyalty to an exist-
ing client when considering representing another client that would create, or is 
likely to create, a conﬂict with the existing client, stating that “rule 1.7 encom-
passes a lawyer’s duty to anticipate potential conﬂicts and, where appropriate, 
decline representation.”107
D. Discipline for Conflicts Under Rule 1.10
Because Rule 1.10 operates to attribute conﬂicts of interest originating under 
another rule, including Rules 1.7, 1.8, and 1.9(a) and (b), any disciplinary deci-
sion relying on Rule 1.10 would be derived from the direct misconduct under 
those rules. For example, in Matter of Schwartz,108 discussed in Section III(B)(3), 
under Rule 1.9, the lawyer’s misconduct involved a conﬂict of interest of his ﬁrm. 
Likewise, the associate in Ad. 05-38, discussed in Section III(B)(4), who took 
over representing the passengers after discharging the driver as a client, violated 
Rule 1.10(a).
In Ad. 08-11,109 however, multiple respondents received an admonition for 
the principal violation of Rule 1.10(a). A large international law ﬁrm failed to 
enter properly into its database the names of some clients and, as a result, the 
ﬁrm accepted representation directly adverse to one of its clients. While that 
misconduct included a Rule 1.7 violation, the only basis cited for the admoni-
tion was Rule 1.10.
105 474 Mass. 504 (2016).
106 475 Mass. at 510. In its solicitation of amicus briefs on this case, the SJC had asked “whether, 
and if so in what circumstances, Massachusetts recognizes the so-called ‘hot potato’ doctrine, 
which precludes an attorney from resolving a disqualifying conﬂict by dropping one client in 
favor of the other.”
107 475 Mass. at 512.
108 18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 455 (2002).
109 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 860 (2008).
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chapter eleven
Other People’s Money
(Rules 1.5 and 1.15)
I. INTRODUCTION
Among the reasons for which lawyers get in trouble and end up before the 
Board of Bar Overseers (BBO), misconduct involving money is one of the most 
common and often the most serious. A review of BBO and Supreme Judicial 
Court (SJC) disciplinary decisions from the past quarter century reveals close to 
a thousand reported cases involving misconduct related to client funds or lawyer’s 
fees. This chapter provides a general discussion of the obligations lawyers assume 
regarding money and property as well as the kinds of sanctions that accompany 
this kind of misconduct.
This topic contains two related but separate areas, each governed by its own 
rule of professional conduct. The ﬁrst is the issue of lawyer’s fees and related pay-
ment for legal services, and the second is the lawyer’s responsibility to hold funds 
and property belonging to clients, and sometimes to third parties, in trust and sep-
arate from the lawyer’s own funds. Lawyers sometimes err by charging clients fees 
that are clearly excessive or illegal. Much more often, lawyers err because they 
fail to handle safely enough, or they engage intentionally in misuse of, funds or 
property held in trust. Both represent a serious breach of the lawyer’s ﬁduciary 
duties to clients or third parties.
II. THE RULES GOVERNING LAWYER’S FEES
Rule 1.5 of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct governs, along 
with some state statutes and common law, the area of lawyer’s fees and payment 
for legal services.
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RULE 1.5: FEES
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or 
collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee or collect an unreasonable 
amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in determining 
whether a fee is clearly excessive include the following:
(1)  the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the 
questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the 
legal service properly;
(2)  the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the accep-
tance of the particular employment will preclude other 
employment by the lawyer;
(3)  the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal 
services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5)  the time limitations imposed by the client or by the 
circumstances;
(6)  the nature and length of the professional relationship with 
the client;
(7)  the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or 
lawyers performing the services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
(b) (1)  Except as provided in paragraph (b)(2), the scope of the 
representation and the basis or rate of the fee and 
expenses for which the client will be responsible shall be 
communicated to the client in writing before or within a 
reasonable time after commencing the representation, 
except when the lawyer will charge a regularly represented 
client on the same basis or rate. Any changes in the basis 
or rate of the fee or expenses shall also be communicated 
in writing to the client.
(2)  The requirement of a writing shall not apply to a single-
session legal consultation or where the lawyer reasonably 
expects the total fee to be charged to the client to be less 
than $500. Where an indigent representation fee is imposed 
by a court, no fee agreement has been entered into between 
the lawyer and client, and a writing is not required.
(c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which 
the service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent
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RULE 1.5: FEES (cont’d.)
fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law. Except for contin-
gent fee arrangements concerning the collection of commercial 
accounts and of insurance company subrogation claims, a contin-
gent fee agreement shall be in writing and signed in duplicate by 
the lawyer and the client within a reasonable time after the mak-
ing of the agreement. One such copy (and proof that the duplicate 
copy has been delivered or mailed to the client) shall be retained 
by the lawyer for a period of seven years after the conclusion of 
the contingent fee matter. The writing shall state the following:
(1)  the name and address of each client;
(2)  the name and address of the lawyer or lawyers to be 
retained;
(3)  the nature of the claim, controversy, and other matters 
with reference to which the services are to be performed;
(4)  the contingency upon which compensation will be paid, 
whether and to what extent the client is to be liable to
pay compensation otherwise than from amounts collected 
for him or her by the lawyer, and if the lawyer is to be paid 
any fee for the representation that will not be determined 
on a contingency, the method by which this fee will be 
determined;
(5)  the method by which the fee is to be determined, includ-
ing the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the 
lawyer out of amounts collected, and unless the parties 
otherwise agree in writing, that the lawyer shall be enti-
tled to the greater of (i) the amount of any attorney’s fees 
awarded by the court or included in the settlement or (ii) 
the amount determined by application of the percentage 
or other formula to the recovery amount not including 
such attorney’s fees;
(6)  the method by which litigation and other expenses are to 
be calculated and paid or reimbursed, whether expenses 
are to be paid or reimbursed only from the recovery, and 
whether such expenses are to be deducted from the recov-
ery before or after the contingent fee is calculated;
(7)  if the lawyer intends to pursue such a claim, the client’s 
potential liability for expenses and reasonable attorney’s 
fees if the attorney-client relationship is terminated 
before the conclusion of the case for any reason, including
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RULE 1.5 (cont’d.)
a statement of the basis on which such expenses and fees 
will be claimed, and, if applicable, the method by which 
such expenses and fees will be calculated; and
(8)  if the lawyer is the successor to a lawyer whose representa-
tion has terminated before the conclusion of the case, 
whether the client or the successor lawyer is to be respon-
sible for payment of former counsel’s attorney’s fees and if 
any such payment is due.
   Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter for which a writ-
ing is required under this paragraph, the lawyer shall provide the 
client with a written statement explaining the outcome of the 
matter and, if there is a recovery, showing the remittance to the 
client and the method of its determination. At any time prior to 
the occurrence of the contingency, the lawyer shall, within twenty 
days after either (1) the termination of the attorney-client rela-
tionship or (2) receipt of a written request from the client when 
the relationship has not terminated, provide the client with a 
written itemized statement of services rendered and expenses 
incurred; except, however, that the lawyer shall not be required to 
provide the statement if the lawyer informs the client in writing 
that he or she does not intend to claim entitlement to a fee or 
expenses in the event the relationship is terminated before the 
conclusion of the contingent fee matter.
(d) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or 
collect:
(1)  any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or 
amount of which is contingent upon the securing of a 
divorce or upon the amount of alimony or support, or 
property settlement in lieu thereof; or
(2)  a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a crimi-
nal case.
(e) A division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same 
firm may be made only if the client is notified before or at the time 
the client enters into a fee agreement for the matter that a divi-
sion of fees will be made and consents to the joint participation in 
writing and the total fee is reasonable. This limitation does not
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RULE 1.5: FEES (cont’d.)
prohibit payment to a former partner or associate pursuant to a 
separation or retirement agreement.
(f ) (1)  The following forms of contingent fee agreement may be 
used to satisfy the requirements of paragraphs (c) and (e) 
if they accurately and fully reflect the terms of the engage-
ment.
(2)  A lawyer who uses Form A does not need to provide any 
additional explanation to a client beyond that otherwise 
required by this rule. The form contingent fee agreement 
identified as Form B includes two alternative provisions 
in paragraphs (3) and (7). A lawyer who uses Form B shall 
show and explain these options to the client, and obtain 
the client’s informed consent confirmed in writing to each 
selected option. A client’s initialing next to the selected 
option meets the “confirmed in writing” requirement.
(3)  The authorization of Forms A and B shall not prevent the 
use of other forms consistent with this Rule. A lawyer 
who uses a form of contingent fee agreement that con-
tains provisions that materially differ from or add to those 
contained in Forms A or B shall explain those different or 
added provisions or options to the client and obtain the 
client’s informed consent confirmed in writing. For 
purposes of this Rule, a fee agreement that omits option 
(i) in paragraph (3), and, where applicable, option (i) in 
paragraph (7) of Form B is an agreement that materially 
differs from the model forms. A fee agreement containing 
a statement in which the client specifically confirms with 
his or her signature that the lawyer has explained that 
there are provisions of the fee agreement, clearly identi-
fied by the lawyer, that materially differ from, or add to, 
those contained in Forms A or B meets the “confirmed in 
writing” requirement.
(4)  The requirements of paragraphs (f )(1)–(3) shall not apply 
when the client is an organization, including a non-profit 
or governmental entity.
[Contingent Fee Agreement Form A and Form B omitted.]
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A. The Basics of Rule 1.5
Rule 1.5 expresses a straightforward obligation whose practical application 
can be remarkably ambiguous. The rule provides that a lawyer’s fees must not be 
clearly excessive or illegal, and it lists eight nonexclusive factors that help deter-
mine this. Those factors primarily require that a lawyer’s fees must not exceed the 
prevailing market for the kind of work the lawyer provides but also take into con-
sideration the lawyer’s skill level, the nature of the tasks the lawyer must perform 
(including how long the work takes), the client’s demands and particular needs 
(including the matter’s urgency), and, signiﬁcantly, whether the fee is ﬁxed or con-
tingent.1 Because those factors are not exclusive, other considerations may aﬀect 
whether any given fee is permitted under the rule. Rule 1.5 also regulates contin-
gent fees with great speciﬁcity, as described in Section II(C)(2). The rule also pro-
hibits a lawyer from “collect[ing] an unreasonable amount for expenses.”2
Massachusetts requires that all fee arrangements and the scope of the repre-
sentation be communicated to the client in writing, “except when the lawyer will 
charge a regularly represented client on the same basis or rate,”3 or in a single-
meeting consultation, or when the engagement is for a total fee not exceeding 
$500.4 The writing requirement, deﬁned in 2012, is diﬀerent from the practice 
in most jurisdictions,5 and the client’s signature is not required unless the arrange-
ment is for a contingent fee. Including the scope of the representation is not only 
required by the rule but is essential for both parties’ understanding of what the 
lawyer will and will not address during the representation. Recall that Rule 1.2(c) 
requires the client’s informed consent if the representation objectives are to be 
limited. The exception to the writing requirement for regular, repeated represen-
tation “on the same basis” most likely refers to arrangements where the lawyer 
oﬀers services for a ﬂat fee, discussed in Section III(A).
One further aspect of Rule 1.5 deserves mention because it is quintessen-
tially a Massachusetts practice and tradition. Unlike almost every other juris-
diction in the nation, Massachusetts permits an attorney’s fee to be divided with 
1 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5(a)(1)–(8).
2 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5(a).
3 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5(b)(1).
4 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5(b)(2) (“The requirement of a writing shall not apply to a single-session 
legal consultation or where the lawyer reasonably expects the total fee to be charged to the client 
to be less than $500.”).
5 The American Bar Association’s Model Rules, which most jurisdictions follow, states that the fee 
basis shall be communicated “preferably in writing.” See American Bar Association Model 
Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.5(b).
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a lawyer who does not practice in the primary lawyer’s ﬁrm (i.e., a referral fee), 
even if the referring lawyer does nothing more than refer the matter.6 The rules 
in most jurisdictions, however, state that a lawyer may not pay a referring law-
yer a fee unless the latter lawyer works on the matter or accepts responsibility 
for the representation, and even then the fee must be divided proportionately.7
The Massachusetts rule permits a pure referral fee, as long as the client knows 
in advance that the fee will be divided with the referring lawyer, the client con-
sents to the joint participation in writing, and the total fee charged to the client 
is reasonable.
While a discussion of Rule 1.5 as it pertains to contingent-fee agreements is 
beyond the scope of this book, the Oﬃce of the Bar Counsel (the bar counsel) 
has written several articles on fee agreements in general and contingent-fee agree-
ments in particular, which are available on the Bar Counsel website.8
Other topics of interest to lawyers arising from Rule 1.5 concern payments 
in kind and measures lawyers take to secure future payments. These issues are dis-
cussed in Section II(C)(4), along with a more in-depth discussion of the require-
ments of a reasonable fee and a proper contingent fee.
B. Discipline for Violating Rule 1.5
1. Disbarment
A lawyer’s intentionally charging or collecting fees for work not actually per-
formed may be viewed as equivalent to misappropriation, or theft, of a client’s 
funds. The presumptive, or accepted, sanction for misappropriating client money 
is disbarment or indeﬁnite suspension.9 Ordinarily, however, the disciplinary re-
ports do not treat charging a client a clearly excessive fee in the same way as mis-
appropriating client funds or property.
6 Mass R. Prof. C. 1.5(e).
7 See ABA Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.5(e).
8 See, e.g., Nancy E. Kaufman & Constance V. Vecchione, The Ethics of Charging and Collecting 
Fees, Board of Bar Overseers (Nov. 2015), https://bbopublic.blob.core.windows.net/web/f/
ethicsfees.pdf; Constance V. Vecchione, FAQs: Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5(b) and Written Fee Arrange-
ments, Board of Bar Overseers (April 2013), https://bbopublic.blob.core.windows.net/web/f/
FAQs%201.5(b).pdf; Constance V. Vecchione, Write It Up, Write It Down: Amendments to Mass. R. 
Prof. C. 1.5 Require Fee Arrangements to Be in Writing, Board of Bar Overseers (Nov. 2012), 
https://bbopublic.blob.core.windows.net/web/f/WriteItUp.pdf; Constance V. Vecchione, Fees and 
Feasibility: Amendments to Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5 on Fees, Board of Bar Overseers (March 2011), 
https://bbopublic.blob.core.windows.net/web/f/Fees2011.pdf.
9 Matter of Schoepfer, 426 Mass. 183, 185–88 & n.2, 13 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 679 (1997).
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You Should Know
In Matter of Schoepfer, the SJC established the follow-
ing presumptive sanctions for misappropriating client 
funds, which an excessive fee might represent:
If . . . an attorney intended to deprive the client of 
funds, permanently or temporarily, or if the client was 
deprived of funds (no matter what the attorney 
intended), the standard discipline is disbarment or 
indeﬁnite suspension.10
In Matter of Goldstone,11 the attorney charged and collected an excessive fee 
from his client, a national retailer, by intentionally and in bad faith charging fees 
he was not entitled to. The corporation sued the lawyer for breach of contract 
and won a judgment against him.12 Relying on the facts established conclusively 
in the civil action, the SJC disbarred the lawyer. The Court wrote, “[The respon-
dent] intentionally overbilled and collected from his client hundreds of thou-
sands of dollars in fees and costs to which he was not entitled, on both closed 
and active cases. Where an attorney lacks a good-faith belief that he has earned 
and is entitled to the monies, such conduct constitutes conversion and misap-
propriation of client funds.”13 In Matter of Smith,14 decided soon after Goldstone,
an attorney ﬁled an aﬃdavit of resignation after the bar counsel accused him of 
charging his client excessive fees. The attorney billed an elderly widowed client 
$60,000 for services that had a maximum value of $7,500. The single justice 
accepted his resignation. While many lawyers have been disbarred for inten-
tionally misappropriating client funds the lawyers held, Goldstone and Smith rep-
resent disciplinary matters where the bad-faith charging of an excessive fee led 
to disbarment.15
10 426 Mass. at 185–88 & n.2 (citing Matter of the Discipline of an Attorney, 392 Mass. 827, 
836–37 (1984)).
11 445 Mass. 551, 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 288 (2005).
12 See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Goldstone & Sudalter, P.C., 128 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 1997) (conﬁrming 
that the attorney bears the burden of proof in a controversy with a client to establish that the fees 
were reasonable).
13 455 Mass. at 566.
14 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 609 (2005).
15 In Matter of Pomeroy, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 515 (2010), an elderly client retained the respon-
dent to liquidate several bank accounts and turn the proceeds over to him. The lawyer converted 
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You Should Know
A lawyer who charges a client a clearly excessive fee 
typically receives a public reprimand. The discipline for a 
lawyer who charges a clearly excessive fee while mislead-
ing the client is a term suspension. On occasion, when a 
lawyer refunds the excess fees and the client suffers lit-
tle harm, the lawyer may receive an admonition. Disbar-
ment has not been imposed for solely violating Rule 1.5.
On other occasions, lawyers have been disbarred for charging excessive 
fees, although always with other serious misconduct. In Matter of Pepyne,16 the 
single justice accepted the respondent’s resignation after reviewing six separate 
instances of misconduct, several of which involved the lawyer imposing liens or 
accepting fees he was not entitled to. He also neglected matters, was held in con-
tempt of court, and was convicted of an unrelated crime. In Matter of O’Connor,17 
the single justice disbarred a lawyer for collecting a higher fee in a worker’s com-
pensation matter than the settlement provided for and misleading his client about 
You Should Know
There is a difference between a clearly excessive fee and 
an illegal fee. An illegal fee is one that is not allowed 
under the contractual or regulatory terms by which the 
lawyer is to be paid, even if the actual amounts charged 
would not be deemed clearly excessive. Lawyers have 
been disciplined under Rule 1.5 for charging an illegal 
fee in a workers’ compensation matter18 and a criminal 
defense matter,19 among others.
over $812,000. When her conduct was discovered, she initially claimed this represented a contin-
gent fee she was owed for these services. She later fabricated documents to conceal her activities. 
Ultimately, the respondent submitted an aﬃdavit of resignation and was disbarred. See Matter of 
Pomeroy, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 515 (2010).
16 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 502 (2010).
17 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 458 (2010).
18 Id.
19 Matter of Serpa, 30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 358 (2014).
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the true fee. He also engaged in separate misconduct where he neglected a mat-
ter and lied to his client about his carelessness.
2. Suspension
Lawyers suspended for violating Rule 1.5 have typically overcharged a client 
intentionally, with some misrepresentation about the fee. For instance, in Matter 
of Beaulieu,20 an attorney was suspended for four years and had to make restitu-
tion before applying for reinstatement. The attorney billed the Committee for 
Public Counsel Services for his legal services and violated Rule 1.5(a) by submit-
ting inaccurate and grossly inﬂated reports of his hours. In Matter of Murphy,21
a report that may interest private ﬁrm lawyers, an attorney was suspended for a 
year and a day for knowingly spending more time on client matters than neces-
sary in order to increase his billable hours. The attorney, an associate in a law ﬁrm, 
earned an annual salary with a bonus tied to his billings. The attorney billed his 
clients extra hours for tasks that should have been delegated to less senior law-
yers and for tasks that were duplicated and billed by others in his ﬁrm.22
In Matter of Rafferty,23 the single justice gave the lawyer a four-month sus-
pension, with reinstatement conditioned on passing the Multi-State Profes-
sional Responsibility Examination (MPRE) and making restitution, after he 
intentionally complied with his wealthy and overzealous client’s questionable 
instructions, excessively litigated her matter, and collected $700,000 in fees from 
her. The fees were far in excess of any amount she could reasonably hope to win 
in the lawsuit. Because the lawyer collected an excessive fee through his failure 
to restrain his client’s unreasonable litigation requests, the single justice deter-
mined that his sanction should be higher than the presumptive sanction (a public 
reprimand) for charging excessive fees.
20 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 33 (2013).
21 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 643 (2012).
22 The misconduct present in Matter of Murphy has been, by many accounts, a common phenome-
non within competitive ﬁrm law practice, where associates experience intense pressure to meet 
billable hour quotas and partners encounter similar incentives to report high hours. For a discus-
sion of this problem, see, e.g., Susan Saab Fortney, Soul for Sale: An Empirical Study of Associate 
Satisfaction, Law Firm Culture, and the Effects of Billable Hour Requirements, 69 UMKC L. Rev. 
239 (2000); Lisa G. Lerman, Blue-Chip Bilking: Regulation of Billing and Expense Fraud by Law-
yers, 12 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 205 (1999); Christine Parker & David Ruschena, The Pressures of 
Billable Hours: Lessons from a Survey of Billing Practices Inside Law Firms, 9 U. St. Thomas L.J. 
619 (2011); William G. Ross, Kicking the Unethical Billing Habit, 50 Rutgers L. Rev. 2199 
(1998).
23 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 538 (2010).
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In Matter of Beatrice,24 the respondent was suspended for two years for sev-
eral instances of misconduct, including entering into and collecting a contingent 
fee in a criminal case. And in Matter of Landry,25 the respondent was suspended 
for nine months after charging, and suing to collect, an excessive contingent fee 
for representation regarding the sale of corporate stock. The respondent also mis-
led his client about the propriety of a contingent-fee arrangement in that type of 
representation.26
3. Public Reprimand
“[T]he typical sanction for charging an excessive fee is a public reprimand.”27
Many lawyers have received public reprimands for violating Rule 1.5, either 
after charging an hourly fee or involving a contingent-fee arrangement. The most 
prominent SJC treatment for an excessive fee has been Matter of Fordham,28 dis-
cussed in more detail in Section II(C)(1). In Fordham, the SJC imposed a public 
reprimand on the lawyer for charging his unsophisticated client a clearly exces-
sive fee (despite providing high-quality, successful legal services and the fact that 
the excessive fee was not actually collected).
Other recent matters in which the lawyer received a public reprimand for 
violating Rule 1.5 include Matter of Henry,29 where an attorney was reprimanded 
after representing a husband and wife in their petition to partition a two-family 
duplex. The attorney charged the clients more than $91,000, while the total rea-
sonable amount, according to the Fee Arbitration Board, was $35,000. In Matter 
of Tierney,30 an attorney received a public reprimand because the fees she charged 
24 14 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 56 (1998).
25 31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 374 (2015).
26 See also Matter of Gibson, 27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 396 (2011) (single justice order suspending 
the respondent indeﬁnitely, without reference to Rule 1.5, after the respondent entered into a 
grossly unfair contingent-fee agreement and misappropriated the funds held).
27 Matter of Raﬀerty, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 538, 541 (2010). The ABA discipline standards 
apply a more ﬂexible approach. Those standards recommend varying sanctions for “unreasonable 
or improper fees,” depending on the lawyer’s mental state and the harm caused to the client. See 
ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions §§ 7.0–7.4 (2012).
28 423 Mass. 481, 12 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 161 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1149 (1997). Fordham 
charged, but did not actually collect, a clearly excessive fee. However, since then the bar counsel has 
stipulated to public reprimands in cases where lawyers both charged and actually collected clearly 
excessive fees, when the lawyer has made restitution. See, e.g., Matter of Chignola, 25 Mass. Att’y 
Disc. R. 112 (2009) (restitution and other factors in mitigation); Matter of Olchowski, 24 Mass. 
Att’y Disc. R. 520 (2009) (restitution).
29 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 450 (2012).
30 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 850 (2012).
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and collected were disproportionate to the size and value of the estate she worked 
on. The attorney charged $22,500 for work on an estate that had net real estate 
proceeds of less than $98,000, something the BBO concluded was clearly exces-
sive under the circumstances.
Lawyers who failed to document a contingent fee in writing usually received 
admonitions, as discussed in Section II(B)(4). In some instances, the lawyers 
received public reprimands, but in each case the lawyer also committed other 
misconduct. (Indeed, in each case, the bar counsel seemingly discovered the 
absence of a written agreement because of the separate misconduct.) For exam-
ple, in Matter of Carroll,31 the respondent neglected a contingent-fee matter for 
which there was no written fee agreement and caused the client’s case to be time-
barred through his lack of diligence, among other things. He received a public 
reprimand. In Matter of Kelleher,32 the attorney ignored a previous lawyer’s claim 
to a share of the contingent-fee proceeds and also failed to prepare a written 
contingent-fee agreement. In Matter of Faria,33 the lawyer received a public rep-
rimand after entering into an oral contingent-fee agreement, neglecting the mat-
ter, and causing the client’s case to be dismissed. He had previously received an 
admonition for neglect, including missing a statute of limitations.34
4. Admonition
Occasionally, lawyers who charged excessive fees or otherwise violated 
Rule 1.5 received only an admonition. The admonitions tend to appear where 
the misconduct was unintentional and the client suﬀered little or no harm. For 
example, in Ad. 00-78,35 the respondent charged his client, an elderly woman 
for whom he was trustee, legal services rates for assistance that did not require 
legal skills. Because the lawyer “ha[d] also taken very good care of the client 
over the years that he has been her trustee” and made restitution to the trust, 
he received only an admonition. In Ad. 09-02,36 an attorney failed to execute a 
31 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 130 (2012). See also Matter of Kelleher, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 281 (2010) 
(attorney also faced public reprimand for misconduct including not having a written contingent-
fee agreement); Matter of Foley, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 207 (2009) (attorney faced three-month 
suspension, stayed for one year under probationary conditions, for entering into a contingent-fee 
agreement without a written fee agreement, among other violations).
32 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 281 (2010).
33 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 201 (2009).
34 See also Matter of Neal, 19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 330 (2003) (public reprimand for misconduct, 
including failing to maintain a copy of the contingent-fee agreement).
35 16 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 563 (2000).
36 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 655 (2009).
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written contingent-fee agreement with the client, leading to disagreement about 
its terms. The lawyer also oﬀered less-than-competent services to the client but 
made full amends to remedy any potential harm.37 In Ad. 06-02,38 the attorney 
charged his client for unnecessary and redundant services, and he made resti-
tution for the fees he was not entitled to. In Ad. 04-05,39 the attorney received 
an admonition after calculating his contingent fee on personal injury protection 
beneﬁts that were not contingent. The attorney refunded that portion of his fee 
after his client ﬁled a complaint with the Oﬃce of the Bar Counsel. Other exam-
ples of a similar nature exist in the disciplinary reports.40
In Ad. 99-58,41 a lawyer received an admonition for failing to disclose to a 
client that he had received a referral fee, in violation of DR 2-107(A)(1), the 
predecessor to Rule 1.5(e). The lawyer had referred a matter and received a 
contingent fee, but both he and the lawyer to whom he referred the matter 
failed to inform the client.
In Matter of the Discipline of an Attorney,42 the SJC declined to admonish a 
lawyer for including in his contingent-fee agreement a provision stating that if 
the attorney were discharged prior to concluding the representation, the attor-
ney would be compensated for the fair value of his services or one-third of any 
settlement oﬀer made at the time of discharge, whichever was greater. Because 
this speciﬁc provision could result in fees that exceeded the fair value of the work 
and could discourage the client from discharging the lawyer, the Court doubted 
whether a contingent-fee agreement should contain any such provision. But be-
cause the respondent had neither charged nor collected an unreasonable fee based 
upon that contract, the Court concluded that discipline was not warranted. (Be-
cause the respondent’s conduct was not expressly prohibited by Rule 1.5, after 
that opinion the Court amended Rule 1.5 and included clause (6) of both ver-
37 For a similar, if perhaps more surprising, example, see Ad. 08-18, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 895 
(2008) (no written contingent-fee agreement, plus neglect leading to dismissal of client’s case; 
successor counsel obtained reversal of the dismissal, so ultimately no substantial harm to the 
client). Cf. Ad. 00-12, 16 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 467 (2000) (admonition solely for failure to have 
contingent-fee agreement in writing).
38 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 848 (2006).
39 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 668 (2004).
40 See Ad. 06-06, 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 855 (2006); Ad. 05-17, 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 706 (2005); 
Ad. 03-32, 19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 577 (2003); Ad. 02-55, 18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 745 (2002); 
Ad. 02-50, 18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 732 (2002); Ad. 00-34, 16 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 501 (2000).
41 Ad. 99-58, 15 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 759 (1999).
42 451 Mass. 131, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 824 (2008).
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sions of the Model Fee Agreement to limit such fees.) However, the SJC did 
admonish the lawyer for knowingly misrepresenting to insurers on several occa-
sions the existence of a statutory lien in his favor and for failing to promptly 
notify his client about receiving funds payable to the client. 
C. Other Fee Issues
1. Determining Whether a Fee Is Clearly Excessive
No formula exists for determining whether a lawyer’s fee is “clearly exces-
sive.” That determination calls for careful and nuanced judgment based on the 
many factors set forth in Rule 1.5(a). Most discussions use Matter of Fordham,43
described earlier in Section II(B)(3), as a benchmark for that assessment. In
Fordham, an experienced and well-respected member of the Massachusetts bar 
with no history of previous discipline received a public reprimand for charging 
an excessive fee to his client, a young man he defended against a criminal 
charge of driving under the inﬂuence (DUI). The lawyer attained the client’s 
acquittal, and the parties stipulated that the lawyer had worked diligently every 
hour he billed and had billed the client an acceptable hourly rate. However, the 
fee the lawyer charged (close to $50,000) was so far beyond what a typical DUI 
defense lawyer charged similar clients (almost never more than $10,000, ac-
cording to even respondent’s own experts) that it qualiﬁed as “clearly exces-
sive.” The Court also criticized the lawyer for charging his client for time spent 
learning an area of law he did not previously know. The Court wrote, “A client 
‘should not be expected to pay for the education of a lawyer when he spends 
excessive amounts of time on tasks which, with reasonable experience, become 
matters of routine.’ ”44
Fordham emphasizes the importance of the prevailing practices among law-
yers in similar settings oﬀering comparable services. Fordham also makes clear 
that a lawyer may not charge a client for the lawyer’s own legal education if that 
extra eﬀort results in an excessive fee. In fact, however, most discipline for vio-
lating Rule 1.5, aside from contingent-fee matters, stems from lawyers charging 
fees for work they never performed or performed poorly.
43 423 Mass. 481, 12 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 161 (1996) (public reprimand), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 
1149 (1997).
44 423 Mass. at 490 (quoting Matter of the Estate of Larson, 103 Wash. 2d 517, 531, 694 P.2d 
1051 (1985)).
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2. Contingent Fees
Rule 1.5(c) addresses the speciﬁcs of contingent fees. Details about the 
logistics of charging and collecting a reasonable contingent fee are beyond the 
scope of this book, but useful resources exist for Massachusetts lawyers who 
charge contingent fees.45 Rules 1.5(c) and (f ), and comments [3] and [3A]–[3D], 
set forth the requirements for continent-fee agreements in Massachusetts. With 
few exceptions, a lawyer who charges a contingent fee in Massachusetts must 
sign a written agreement with the client. The agreement must contain several 
mandated provisions:
• The contingency on which the fee award will be based
• The rate used
• Whether the rate is based on the gross proceeds or the net proceeds 
after litigation expenses are deducted
• Whether the lawyer or the client is responsible for litigation expenses 
In addition, in a relatively new provision, the agreement must address the ques-
tion of how the lawyer will be paid, if at all, should the representation end be-
fore the matter resolves. If the lawyer is a successor lawyer to a previous lawyer 
with a contingent-fee agreement who performed some work on the matter, the 
agreement must address who will pay the previous lawyer.46 If the agreement is 
silent, the successor lawyer is responsible for the previous lawyer’s fees.
The revised Massachusetts rule oﬀers lawyers two templates for a contingent-
fee agreement: Form A, which has standard default provisions, and Form B, which 
oﬀers various provisions from which the lawyer may choose. Lawyers are not 
required to use those template forms, but if they choose to proceed with a dif-
ferent agreement, the lawyers “shall explain those diﬀerent or added provisions 
or options to the client and obtain the client’s informed consent conﬁrmed in 
writing.”47 In Matter of Diviacchi,48 the lawyer was suspended for twenty-seven 
months for using a nonconforming contingent-fee agreement and not explain-
ing its terms to the client, among other misconduct.
45 See, e.g., Timothy Dacey III, Fee Agreements, in Ethical Lawyering in Massachusetts,
Chapter 5 ( James Boland ed. 2009 and 2015 Supp.); Kaufman & Vecchione, supra note 8.
46 In 2009, the SJC sought comments on how to allocate the responsibility for paying the dis-
charged lawyer in a successful contingent-fee matter, responding to an issue the SJC decided a 
few years before. See Malonis v. Harrington, 442 Mass. 692 (2004).
47 Mass R. Prof. C. 1.5(f )(3).
48 475 Mass. 1013 (2016).
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Several SJC decisions articulated the principles to apply when a client dis-
charges a contingent-fee lawyer before the matter’s ﬁnal resolution. In Salem 
Realty Co. v. Matera,49 the SJC aﬃrmed the appeals court determination that a 
discharged lawyer may not rely on the contingent-fee agreement for his fees 
but should be compensated on a quantum meruit basis for the reasonable value 
of the work produced. In Malonis v. Harrington,50 the SJC decided that the 
successor lawyer was responsible for paying the discharged lawyer’s fees. That 
decision triggered the revision to Rule 1.5 addressing the question of who pays 
the discharged lawyer. In Liss v. Studeny,51 the Court rejected a lawyer’s eﬀort to 
collect a quantum meruit fee in a contingent-fee matter after he withdrew from 
the case before it was concluded, and after the former client had lost at trial. In 
so doing, the Court announced the general rule that there is no quantum meruit
recovery under contingent-fee agreements when the contingency has not oc-
curred, i.e., when the client has not obtained a recovery.52
3. Changing the Fee Agreement with a Client
A lawyer may alter an existing fee agreement with a client by giving the 
client notice of such changes in writing.53 Most authorities agree that a lawyer 
may increase an hourly fee prospectively or make comparable adjustments to the 
fee agreement as time passes, as long as the client receives adequate notice of 
the change, the changes are reasonable, and the fee agreement provides for rate 
increases.54 In some circumstances, a material change to an existing contract 
49 10 Mass. App. Ct. 571 (1980), aff ’d 384 Mass. 803 (1981).
50 442 Mass. 692 (2004).
51 450 Mass. 473 (2008).
52 450 Mass. at 480–81. The Court noted, however, that it was not categorically prohibiting quan-
tum meruit recovery where the contingency does not occur; particularly compelling circumstances 
might permit recovery. The Court provided some indication of what such circumstances might be: 
“[T]here is no evidence that Studeny used Liss’s services without intending that the contingency 
occur. That is, Studeny did not defeat Liss’s reasonable expectation that he was using Liss’s services 
to bring about the contingency on which Liss might be compensated.” Id. at 481.
53 Mass R. Prof. C. 1.5(b)(1) (“Any changes in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses shall also 
be communicated in writing to the client.”).
54 See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 18(1)(a) (Am. Law Inst. 
2000) (if a fee agreement or modiﬁcation “is made beyond a reasonable time after the lawyer has 
begun to represent the client in the matter . . . the client may avoid it unless the lawyer shows that 
the contract and the circumstances of its formation were fair and reasonable to the client”). See also
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 89(a) (Am. Law Inst. 1981) (modiﬁcation of an ex-
isting contract is enforceable without additional consideration only upon an unanticipated change 
of circumstances making a contractual task more onerous or more valuable, and the modiﬁcation 
is fair and equitable).
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might qualify as a business transaction between a lawyer and a client, triggering 
the requirements of Rule 1.8(a).55 For example, in Matter of Weisman,56 an attor-
ney renegotiated the fee agreement with his organizational client in the middle 
of the representation in a manner that the hearing committee found was nei-
ther fair nor preceded by suﬃcient informed consent of the client. That modi-
ﬁcation represented a business transaction with the client, and the respondent 
did not comply with Rule 1.8. For that misconduct, and for mishandling the 
fees received, he was suspended for one year.
4. Payment in Kind and Liens for Fees
Lawyers typically receive compensation in the form of money, by cash, 
check, or credit card payment. However, a lawyer may receive payment in kind, 
subject to some restrictions. As the bar counsel has advised, “A lawyer may 
accept property instead of money as a fee, so long as the lawyer is not acquiring 
a proprietary interest in the subject matter of the litigation in violation of 
Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.8(j). A fee paid in property may constitute a business trans-
action with a client and be subject to Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.8(a).”57 The ban on 
acquiring a “proprietary interest” in litigation means that a lawyer cannot accept 
ownership, aside from a contingent-fee interest, in the property or matter that 
is the subject matter of the litigation for which the lawyer represents the client. 
In the words of one authority, “the lawyer’s interest in the case cannot be that 
of a co-plaintiﬀ.”58
55 Note that while Rule 1.8(a), concerning business transactions between attorney and client, gen-
erally does not apply to the original fee agreement (see Matter of an Attorney, 451 Mass. 131, 139–
40, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 824, 832–35 (2008)), amendments to the fee agreement might fall 
within that rule. See Kaufman & Vecchione, supra note 8, at 7 (“If an attorney . . . changes the 
fee agreement, this is a business transaction with a client and the lawyer must comply with the 
requirements of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.8(a), including that the transaction must be fair and reason-
able and understood by the client, the client must be given an opportunity to consult independent 
counsel, and the client must give informed consent in writing.”). While this advice from the bar 
counsel seems to indicate that all changes in a fee agreement require the protections of Rule 1.8(a), 
it seems very unlikely that a regular adjustment of an hourly fee rate made after a signiﬁcant 
period of time would qualify as a business transaction between a lawyer and a client, or that the 
bar counsel would consider it as such. See also Matter of Murray, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 483 
(2008) (respondent charged with violating Rule 1.8(a) after demanding changes to a contingent-
fee agreement; the hearing committee and the BBO rejected that count).
56 30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 440 (2014).
57 Kaufman & Vecchione, supra note 8, at 7.
58 Ronald D. Rotunda & John S. Dzienkowski, Legal Ethics: The Lawyer’s Deskbook 
on Professional Responsibility § 1.8–10 (2012–2013 ed.) (“In other words, the client may 
not assign to the attorney part of his cause of action in a way that would allow the lawyer to pre-
vent settlement. The client cannot waive his right to decide when to settle litigation.”).
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In some settings, accepting property as a fee qualiﬁes as a business trans-
action between the lawyer and the client, triggering the strict requirements of 
Rule 1.8(a).59 One common example of an attorney’s fee being subject to Rule 
1.8(a) is when a lawyer accepts as the fee stock in a corporate client.60 Lawyers 
may accept such an equity interest in the client as the fee,61 but, in addition to 
com plying with Rule 1.8(a), the lawyer must ensure that the resulting fee is rea-
sonable. In making that determination, the focus must be on the value of the 
stock at the time of transfer, not later when the stock’s value may be diﬀerent 
from what the parties had earlier predicted.62 Chapter 10, Section (II)(D) dis-
cusses the sanctions for violating Rule 1.8.
If a client fails to pay the legal fees owed for the work performed in a matter 
that goes to litigation, the lawyer is entitled to a lien on the claim or the pro-
ceeds of the claim, pursuant to the General Laws of Massachusetts,63 a device some-
times known as an “attorney’s lien”64 or a “charging lien.”65 If the relationship ends 
with the lawyer withdrawing as counsel before ﬁnal judgment, “[w]hether with-
drawal works a waiver of the attorney’s lien depends on whether the attorney had 
good cause to withdraw.”66 A lawyer may not withhold a client’s papers and other 
materials in order to collect a fee,67 but in a matter that is not a contingent-fee 
case, the lawyer may properly withhold work product for which the client has 
not yet paid the lawyer,68 except when doing so “would prejudice the client 
unfairly.”69
59 According to Rule 1.8(a), a business transaction between an attorney and a client must be objec-
tively fair, with all terms disclosed in writing, and the client must have the opportunity to consult 
with separate counsel and must consent in writing to the transaction.
60 See, e.g., Rubin v. Murray, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 64 (2011). For commentary about that practice, 
see John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, The Decline in Lawyer Independence: Lawyer Equity 
Investments in Clients, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 405 (2002); Jason M. Klein, No Fool for a Client: The Finance 
and Incentives Behind Stock-Based Compensation for Corporate Attorneys, 1999 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 
330; Donald C. Langevoort, When Lawyers and Law Firms Invest in Their Corporate Clients’ Stock,
80 Wash. U.L.Q. 569 (2010); Therese Maynard, Ethics for Business Lawyers Representing Start-Up 
Companies, 11 Wake Forest J. Bus. & Intell. Prop. L. 401 (2011).
61 Rubin v. Murray, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 64 (2011).
62 Id. at 75.
63 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 221, § 50 (2018).
64 See, e.g., Matter of King, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 352 (2007).
65 See, e.g., Boswell v. Zephyr Lines, Inc., 414 Mass. 241, 244 (1993).
66 Phelps Steel, Inc. v. Von Deak, 24 Mass. App. Ct. 592, 594 (1987). “A withdrawal occasioned 
by a breakdown in the lawyer-client relationship is suﬃcient reason for an attorney to remove him-
self from the case, and will leave the attorney’s lien intact.” Bartermax, Inc. v. Discover Boston 
Multi-Lingual Trolley Tours, Inc., 71 Mass. App. Ct. 1107 (2008) (unpublished opinion).
67 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.16(e).
68 Kaufman & Vecchione, supra note 8, at 7; see Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.16(e)(4) and (6).
69 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.16(e)(7).
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Practice Tip
The Ofﬁce of Bar Counsel hears often from clients whose 
former lawyers refuse to return or transfer the client’s ﬁle. 
Most often, the bar counsel’s Attorney and Consumer 
Assistance Program resolves these matters without for-
mal proceedings, with the attorney inevitably returning 
the ﬁle to the former client.
In 2018, the SJC added Rule 1.15A to the Rules of Professional Conduct.70
It contains detailed instructions regarding the handling of ﬁles on closed mat-
ters. Rule 1.15A articulates a lawyer’s responsibility to maintain client ﬁles, to 
return ﬁles to clients when requested or required, and to maintain ﬁles for at least 
six years after terminating representation. Lawyers may maintain ﬁles electroni-
cally. Rule 1.15A(b) oﬀers the following guidance to attorneys: “[A] lawyer may 
not refuse, on grounds of nonpayment, to make available materials in the client’s 
ﬁle when retention would prejudice the client unfairly.” The reader is advised to 
consult the rule and its commentary.
III. THE RULES GOVERNING HOLDING
AND SAFEKEEPING PROPERTY
Rule 1.15 of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct govern how law-
yers manage the funds they receive from clients or other persons as part of their 
legal representation.
RULE 1.15: SAFEKEEPING PROPERTY
(a) Definitions:
(1)  “Trust property” means property of clients or third per-
sons that is in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a 
representation and includes property held in any fiduciary 
capacity in connection with a representation, whether as
70 Mass. R. Prof. C. r. 1.15A (2018).
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RULE 1.15 (cont’d.)
   trustee, agent, escrow agent, guardian, executor, or other-
wise. Trust property does not include documents or other 
property received by a lawyer as investigatory material or 
potential evidence. Trust property in the form of funds is 
referred to as “trust funds.”
(2)  “Trust account” means an account in a financial institu-
tion in which trust funds are deposited. Trust accounts 
must conform to the requirements of this Rule.
(b) Segregation of trust property: A lawyer shall hold trust prop-
erty separate from the lawyer’s own property.
(1)  Trust funds shall be held in a trust account.
(2)  No funds belonging to the lawyer shall be deposited or 
retained in a trust account except that:
  (i)  Funds reasonably sufficient to pay bank charges may 
be deposited therein, and
  (ii)  Trust funds belonging in part to a client or third per-
son and in part currently or potentially to the lawyer 
shall be deposited in a trust account, but the portion 
belonging to the lawyer must be withdrawn at the 
earliest reasonable time after the lawyer’s interest in 
that portion becomes fixed. A lawyer who knows that 
the right of the lawyer or law firm to receive such 
portion is disputed shall not withdraw the funds 
until the dispute is resolved. If the right of the lawyer 
or law firm to receive such portion is disputed within 
a reasonable time after notice is given that the funds 
have been withdrawn, the disputed portion must be 
restored to a trust account until the dispute is 
resolved.
(3)  A lawyer shall deposit into a trust account legal fees and 
expenses that have been paid in advance, to be withdrawn 
by the lawyer only as fees are earned or as expenses 
incurred.
(4)  All trust property shall be appropriately safeguarded. 
Trust property other than funds shall be identified as 
such.
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RULE 1.15: SAFEKEEPING PROPERTY (cont’d.)
(c) Prompt notice and delivery of trust property to client or third 
person: Upon receiving trust funds or other trust property in 
which a client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall 
promptly notify the client or third person. Except as stated in this 
Rule or as otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the 
client or third person on whose behalf a lawyer holds trust 
property, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third 
person any funds or other property that the client or third person 
is entitled to receive.
(d) Accounting:
(1)  Upon final distribution of any trust property or upon 
request by the client or third person on whose behalf a law-
yer holds trust property, the lawyer shall promptly render 
a full written accounting regarding such property.
(2)  On or before the date on which a withdrawal from a trust 
account is made for the purpose of paying fees due to a 
lawyer, the lawyer shall deliver to the client in writing (i) 
an itemized bill or other accounting showing the services 
rendered, (ii) written notice of amount and date of the 
withdrawal, and (iii) a statement of the balance of the cli-
ent’s funds in the trust account after the withdrawal.
(e) Operational requirements for trust accounts:
(1)  All trust accounts shall be maintained in the state where 
the lawyer’s office is situated, or elsewhere with the con-
sent of the client or third person on whose behalf the trust 
property is held, except that all funds required by this 
Rule to be deposited in an IOLTA account shall be main-
tained in this Commonwealth.
(2)  Each trust account title shall include the words “trust 
account,” “escrow account,” “client funds account,” “con-
veyancing account,” “IOLTA account,” or words of simi-
lar import indicating the fiduciary nature of the account.
(3)  For each trust account opened, the lawyer shall submit 
written notice to the bank or other depository in which the 
trust account is maintained confirming to the depository 
that the account will hold trust funds within the meaning 
of this Rule. The lawyer shall retain a copy executed by the
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    bank and the lawyer for the lawyer’s own records. The 
notice shall identify the bank, account, and type of 
account, whether pooled, with interest paid to the IOLTA 
Committee (IOLTA account), or individual account with 
interest paid to the client or third person on whose behalf 
the trust property is held. For purposes of this Rule, one 
notice is sufficient for a master or umbrella account with 
individual subaccounts.
(4)  No withdrawal from a trust account shall be made by a 
check which is not prenumbered. No withdrawal shall be 
made in cash or by automatic teller machine or any simi-
lar method. No withdrawal shall be made by a check pay-
able to “cash” or “bearer” or by any other method which 
does not identify the recipient of the funds.
(5)  Every withdrawal from a trust account for the purpose of 
paying fees to a lawyer or reimbursing a lawyer for costs 
and expenses shall be payable to the lawyer or the lawyer’s 
law firm.
(6)  Each lawyer who has a law office in this Commonwealth 
and who holds trust funds shall deposit such funds, as 
appropriate, in one of two types of interest-bearing 
accounts: either (i) a pooled account (“IOLTA account”) 
for all trust funds which in the judgment of the lawyer are 
nominal in amount, or are to be held for a short period of 
time, or (ii) for all other trust funds, an individual account 
with the interest payable as directed by the client or third 
person on whose behalf the trust property is held. The 
foregoing deposit requirements apply to funds received by 
lawyers in connection with real estate transactions and 
loan closings, provided, however, that a trust account in a 
lending bank in the name of a lawyer representing the 
lending bank and used exclusively for depositing and dis-
bursing funds in connection with that particular bank’s 
loan transactions, shall not be required but is permitted to 
be established as an IOLTA account. All IOLTA accounts 
shall be established in compliance with the provisions of 
paragraph (g) of this Rule.
(7)  Property held for no compensation as a custodian for a 
minor family member is not subject to the Operational
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RULE 1.15: SAFEKEEPING PROPERTY (cont’d.)
    Requirements for Trust Accounts set out in this para-
graph (e) or to the Required Accounts and Records in 
paragraph (f ) of this Rule. As used in this paragraph, 
“family member” refers to those individuals specified in 
Rule 7.3(a)(3).
(f ) Required accounts and records: Every lawyer who is engaged in 
the practice of law in this Commonwealth and who holds trust 
property in connection with a representation shall maintain com-
plete records of the receipt, maintenance, and disposition of that 
trust property, including all records required by this paragraph. 
Records shall be preserved for a period of six years after termina-
tion of the representation and after distribution of the property. 
Records may be maintained by computer subject to the require-
ments of subparagraph (1)G of this paragraph (f ) or they may be 
prepared manually.
(1) Trust account records: The following books and records 
must be maintained for each trust account:
   A. Account documentation: A record of the name and address 
of the bank or other depository; account number; 
account title; opening and closing dates; and the type 
of account, whether pooled, with net interest paid to 
the IOLTA Committee (IOLTA account), or account 
with interest paid to the client or third person on 
whose behalf the trust property is held (including mas-
ter or umbrella accounts with individual subaccounts).
   B. Check register: A check register recording in chrono-
logical order the date and amount of all deposits; the 
date, check or transaction number, amount, and payee 
of all disbursements, whether by check, electronic 
transfer, or other means; the date and amount of every 
other credit or debit of whatever nature; the identity of 
the client matter for which funds were deposited or 
disbursed; and the current balance in the account.
   C. Individual client records: A record for each client or third 
person for whom the lawyer received trust funds docu-
menting each receipt and disbursement of the funds of 
the client or third person, the identity of the client matter 
for which funds were deposited or disbursed, and the
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     balance held for the client or third person, including a 
subsidiary ledger or ledger for each client matter for 
which the lawyer receives trust funds documenting 
each receipt and disbursement of the funds of the cli-
ent or third person with respect to such matter. A law-
yer shall not disburse funds from the trust account that 
would create a negative balance with respect to any 
individual client.
   D. Bank fees and charges: A ledger or other record for funds 
of the lawyer deposited in the trust account pursuant 
to paragraph (b)(2)(i) of this Rule to accommodate 
reasonably expected bank charges. This ledger shall 
document each deposit and expenditure of the lawyer’s 
funds in the account and the balance remaining.
   E. Reconciliation reports: For each trust account, the law-
yer shall prepare and retain a reconciliation report on a 
regular and periodic basis but in any event no less fre-
quently than every sixty days. Each reconciliation 
report shall show the following balances and verify 
that they are identical:
  (i)  The balance which appears in the check register as 
of the reporting date.
  (ii)  The adjusted bank statement balance, determined 
by adding outstanding deposits and other credits 
to the bank statement balance and subtracting 
outstanding checks and other debits from the 
bank statement balance.
  (iii)  For any account in which funds are held for more 
than one client matter, the total of all client matter 
balances, determined by listing each of the indi-
vidual client matter records and the balance which 
appears in each record as of the reporting date, 
and calculating the total. For the purpose of the 
calculation required by this paragraph, bank fees 
and charges shall be considered an individual cli-
ent record. No balance for an individual client 
may be negative at any time.
   F. Account documentation: For each trust account, the law-
yer shall retain contemporaneous records of transactions
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    as necessary to document the transactions. The lawyer 
must retain:
  (i)  bank statements.
  (ii)  all transaction records returned by the bank,
including canceled checks and records of elec-
tronic transactions.
  (iii)  records of deposits separately listing each depos-
ited item and the client or third person for whom 
the deposit is being made.
   G. Electronic record retention: A lawyer who maintains a 
trust account record by computer must maintain the 
check register, client ledgers, and reconciliation 
reports in a form that can be reproduced in printed 
hard copy. Electronic records must be regularly backed 
up by an appropriate storage device.
(2) Business accounts: Each lawyer who receives trust funds 
must maintain at least one bank account, other than the 
trust account, for funds received and disbursed other than 
in the lawyer’s fiduciary capacity.
(3) Trust property other than funds: A lawyer who receives 
trust property other than funds must maintain a record 
showing the identity, location, and disposition of all such 
property.
(4) Dissolution of a law firm: Upon dissolution of a law firm, 
the partners shall make reasonable efforts to ensure the 
maintenance of client trust account records specified in 
this Rule.
(g) Interest on lawyers’ trust accounts:
(1)  The IOLTA account shall be established with any bank, 
savings and loan association, or credit union authorized 
by Federal or State law to do business in Massachusetts 
and insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion or similar State insurance programs for State char-
tered institutions. At the direction of the lawyer, funds in 
the IOLTA account in excess of $100,000 may be tempo-
rarily reinvested in repurchase agreements fully collater-
alized by U.S. Government obligations. Funds in the
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    IOLTA account shall be subject to withdrawal upon 
request and without delay.
(2)  Lawyers creating and maintaining an IOLTA account 
shall direct the depository institution:
  (i)  to remit interest or dividends, net of any service 
charges or fees, on the average monthly balance in 
the account, or as otherwise computed in accordance 
with an institution’s standard accounting practice, at 
least quarterly, to the IOLTA Committee;
  (ii)  to transmit with each remittance to the IOLTA 
Committee a statement showing the name of the 
lawyer who or law firm which deposited the funds; 
and
  (iii)  at the same time to transmit to the depositing lawyer 
a report showing the amount paid, the rate of inter-
est applied, and the method by which the interest 
was computed.
(3)  Lawyers shall certify their compliance with this Rule as 
required by S.J.C. Rule 4:02, § (2).
(4)  This court shall appoint members of a permanent IOLTA 
Committee to fixed terms on a staggered basis. The repre-
sentatives appointed to the committee shall oversee the 
operation of a comprehensive IOLTA program, including:
  (i)  the receipt of all IOLTA funds and their disburse-
ment, net of actual expenses, to the designated chari-
table entities, as follows: sixty-seven percent (67%) 
to the Massachusetts Legal Assistance Corporation 
and the remaining thirty-three percent (33%) to 
other designated charitable entities in such propor-
tions as the Supreme Judicial Court may order;
  (ii)  the education of lawyers as to their obligation to 
create and maintain IOLTA accounts under this 
Rule;
  (iii)  the encouragement of the banking community and 
the public to support the IOLTA program;
  (iv)  the obtaining of tax rulings and other administrative 
approval for a comprehensive IOLTA program as 
appropriate;
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  (v)  the preparation of such guidelines and Rules, subject 
to court approval, as may be deemed necessary or 
advisable for the operation of a comprehensive 
IOLTA program;
  (vi)  establishment of standards for reserve accounts by 
the recipient charitable entities for the deposit of 
IOLTA funds which the charitable entity intends to 
preserve for future use; and
  (vii)  reporting to the court in such manner as the court 
may direct.
(5)  The Massachusetts Legal Assistance Corporation and 
other designated charitable entities shall receive IOLTA 
funds from the IOLTA Committee and distribute such 
funds for approved purposes. The Massachusetts Legal 
Assistance Corporation may use IOLTA funds to further 
its corporate purpose and other designated charitable 
entities may use IOLTA funds either for (a) improving 
the administration of justice or (b) delivering civil legal 
services to those who cannot afford them.
(6)  The Massachusetts Legal Assistance Corporation and 
other designated charitable entities shall submit an annual 
report to the court describing their IOLTA activities for 
the year and providing a statement of the application of 
IOLTA funds received pursuant to this Rule.
(h) Dishonored check notification: All trust accounts shall be estab-
lished in compliance with the following provisions on dishonored 
check notification:
(1)  A lawyer shall maintain trust accounts only in financial 
institutions which have filed with the Board of Bar Over-
seers an agreement, in a form provided by the Board, to 
report to the Board in the event any properly payable 
instrument is presented against any trust account that 
contains insufficient funds, and the financial institution 
dishonors the instrument for that reason.
(2)  Any such agreement shall apply to all branches of the 
financial institution and shall not be cancelled except 
upon thirty days notice in writing to the Board.
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(3)  The Board shall publish annually a list of financial insti-
tutions which have signed agreements to comply with this 
Rule, and shall establish Rules and procedures governing 
amendments to the list.
(4)  The dishonored check notification agreement shall pro-
vide that all reports made by the financial institution shall 
be identical to the notice of dishonor customarily for-
warded to the depositor, and should include a copy of the 
dishonored instrument, if such a copy is normally pro-
vided to depositors. Such reports shall be made simulta-
neously with the notice of dishonor and within the time 
provided by law for such notice, if any.
(5)  Every lawyer practicing or admitted to practice in this 
Commonwealth shall, as a condition thereof, be conclu-
sively deemed to have consented to the reporting and pro-
duction requirements mandated by this Rule.
(6)  The following definitions shall be applicable to this sub-
paragraph:
  (i)  “Financial institution” includes (a) any bank, savings 
and loan association, credit union, or savings bank, 
and (b) with the written consent of the client or third 
person on whose behalf the trust property is held, any 
other business or person which accepts for deposit 
funds held in trust by lawyers.
  (ii)  “Notice of dishonor” refers to the notice which a 
financial institution is required to give, under the 
laws of this Commonwealth, upon presentation of an 
instrument which the institution dishonors.
  (iii)  “Properly payable” refers to an instrument which, 
if presented in the normal course of business, is in 
a form requiring payment under the laws of this 
Commonwealth.
A. The Lessons of Rule 1.15
Related to the fees a lawyer may charge a client is how the lawyer manages 
the funds received from clients or other persons as part of the representation. The 
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lawyer often holds funds that are prepayment for the attorney’s fees; sometimes 
the funds are proceeds from the representation, such as real estate payments held 
pending a closing event, or payment of a settlement or judgment. At other 
times, lawyers hold funds and properties in express ﬁduciary capacities, such as 
a trustee, guardian, or escrow agent. In general, the nature of the lawyer’s role 
in accept ing funds does not matter—the same principles apply in safeguarding 
those funds.71 In Massachusetts, the regulation of handling other people’s money 
or property is extensive, as Rule 1.15 includes layers of detailed requirements. 
Lawyers frequently make mistakes in the Rule 1.15 record-keeping require-
ments or simply fail to comply with some of the provisions. A disturbingly high 
incidence of both intentional and negligent misuse of funds held for others also 
exists. These kinds of misconduct are common and typically result in serious dis-
cipline, as discussed in Section III(B).
Before addressing the requirements of Rule 1.15 generally, this section will 
highlight one important distinction relating to the previous discussion of attor-
ney’s fees. When a client pays a sum to a lawyer at the start of representation, 
that money is usually called a “retainer,” but that term covers two diﬀerent con-
cepts, and lawyers and clients must understand the distinctions between the two. 
Most often, the retainer a client pays represents an advance for attorney’s fees 
that have not yet been earned but likely will be in the future. That deposit, the 
typical understanding of the term retainer,72 remains the client’s money until 
the lawyer earns the fees and, therefore, is covered by this general topic and, in 
particular, by Rule 1.15. Because the funds belong to the client, the lawyer must 
return them to the client if not earned. Nonrefundable advance fee payments 
are not permitted in Massachusetts.73
On occasion, a client pays a lawyer money not as a deposit toward future fees 
but as compensation for the lawyer’s availability and willingness to forgo other 
lucrative work. That payment, known in Massachusetts as a classic retainer,74
belongs to the lawyer when paid and need not (and in fact may not) be held as 
71 It is true, however, as discussed in Section III(B)(2), suspensions under Rule 1.15, that a law-
yer who misappropriates third-party funds may receive lesser discipline than a lawyer who mis-
appropriates client funds.
72 Matter of Sharif, 459 Mass. 558, 27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 809 (2011) (citing Matter of Garabedian, 
415 Mass. 77, 80–81, 9 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 132, (1993)). Some scholars refer to this as a “special 
retainer.” See Dacey, supra note 45, at § 5.10.5; Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics 
§ 9.2.2, 505–06 (1986).
73 Matter of Zak, 476 Mass. 1034, 1040 (2017).
74 Sharif, 459 Mass. at 568.
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property of another or placed in the lawyer’s trust account.75 Lawyers some-
times confuse the two retainer versions, at considerable peril. Any lawyer charg-
ing a classic retainer must show that the arrangement is not simply a version of 
a nonrefundable advance fee, which a lawyer may not charge a client. For pur-
poses of the discussion in this chapter, the term retainer refers to the advance 
fee that must be held in trust and not the classic retainer, unless the context indi-
cates otherwise.
Rule 1.15 provides detailed guidance regarding funds a lawyer holds for 
another, with two essential and unwavering messages—the lawyer must always 
separate the funds held for another from the lawyer’s personal or business funds, 
and the lawyer must account scrupulously for the funds held in trust. The pro-
cedural and documentary requirements of Rule 1.15 aim to achieve those two 
ends. As with the discussion of contingent fees in Section II(C)(2), this section 
does not provide the detailed mechanisms for how a lawyer manages funds, 
which other resources cover well.76 This section addresses the following issues 
that practicing lawyers must understand in order to avoid mistakes:
Withdrawing earned fees from trust accounts: A lawyer who earns fees that will 
be paid out of trust account funds (whether a retainer or funds received as payment 
on a litigated claim) faces an important judgment call.77 The “no-commingling” 
rule prohibits a lawyer from keeping the earned fees in the client trust account. 
But if the lawyer withdraws the fee from the trust account immediately after 
earning it, or after the check clears, a client may later claim, and perhaps cor-
rectly, that some of the money withdrawn was not earned and, therefore, the law-
yer misappropriated client funds. Rule 1.15 recognizes this dilemma and provides 
guidance in Rule 1.15(b)(2)(ii), which states that “the portion belonging to the 
lawyer must be withdrawn at the earliest reasonable time after the lawyer’s inter-
est in that portion becomes ﬁxed.” If a lawyer has no reason to believe that the 
75 Id. (“While the funds in an advance fee retainer belong to the client and must be held in a 
trust account on a client’s behalf until the fees are earned, . . . classic retainers are considered 
earned by the attorney when paid because the attorney ‘gives up the possibility of being employed 
by [other parties] in the very matter to which the retainer relates.’”) (quoting Blair v. Columbian 
Fireprooﬁng Co., 191 Mass. 333, 336 (1906)).
76 See, e.g., Jayne B. Tyrrell & Stephen M. Casey, Managing Clients’ Funds and 
Avoiding Ethical Problems (Mass. IOLTA Committee 2018); Daniel C. Crane, Records 
for Other People’s Money, Board of Bar Overseers (Oct. 2003), http://www.mass.gov
/obcbbo/money.htm.
77 For a discussion of this topic in Massachusetts, see Dorothy Anderson, At What Cost, Pay-
ment? Or Possession Is Not Nine-Tenths of Your Ethical Obligations, Board of Bar Overseers
(Jan. 2005), https://bbopublic.blob.core.windows.net/web/f/cost.pdf.
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client will dispute the lawyer’s withdrawal, then the lawyer must promptly with-
draw the funds.
On or before withdrawing such funds, however, “the lawyer shall deliver to 
the client in writing (i) an itemized bill or other accounting showing the ser-
vices rendered, (ii) written notice of amount and date of the withdrawal, and 
(iii) a statement of the balance of the client’s funds in the trust account after the 
withdrawal.”78 Moreover, the “lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third 
person any funds or other property that the client or third persons is entitled
to receive.”79 The lawyer will be hard-pressed to explain withdrawing funds due 
while not concurrently making a distribution to the client, as this rule requires. 
Accordingly, the lawyer ought to render a full accounting under Rule 1.15(d)(1) 
and distribute the funds due to the client and the lawyer at the same time. 
The lawyer should be aware, however, that Rule 1.15 provides that if the 
client receives notice of the withdrawal and objects to it, the lawyer must re-
store the disputed portion of the funds to the trust account until the dispute is 
resolved.80 The funds must remain in the trust account as long as the lawyer 
knows that a dispute regarding ownership of the funds exists. The SJC has made 
clear that a lawyer must pay funds to a client from such a trust account, even if 
a third party claims a right to those funds, unless the lawyer is certain that the 
funds the third party claims “belonged to and were earmarked for” that third 
party.81 “ ‘[A]n attorney is not required to serve as a collection agent for [a third 
party],’ ”82 but a lawyer holding funds in a trust account to which a third party 
has a legitimate claim possesses a ﬁduciary duty to that third party not to dis-
tribute the funds until the claim is resolved.83
Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts (IOLTA): Massachusetts lawyers hold-
ing funds for clients or other persons must hold those funds in one of two dif-
ferent accounts: 
• For funds that are either small amounts or to be held for a short time, 
the lawyer must establish an IOLTA account.84 This is because the 
78 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(d).
79 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c).
80 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(2)(ii).
81 Frontier Enterprises, Inc. v. Anchor Company of Marblehead, Inc., 404 Mass. 506, 513 (1989).
82 Id. (quoting Blue Cross of Mass., Inc. v. Travaline, 398 Mass. 582, 590 (1986)).
83 See Matter of Hilson, 448 Mass. 603, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 265 (2007) (indeﬁnite suspen-
sion after respondent distributed funds held in escrow despite outstanding claims to the funds).
84 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(6)(i) refers to this as a “pooled account (‘IOLTA account’).”
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transaction costs of creating a separate interest-bearing account for 
those funds outweigh any beneﬁt of doing so. 
• For funds that are large or to be held for a longer period of time, Rule 
1.15(e)(6)(ii) requires that the lawyer establish a separate interest-
bearing account so that the funds held in trust earn interest for the client. 
IOLTA accounts pool all of the short-term or small deposits so that the 
aggregated funds earn interest. That interest, according to the IOLTA guide-
lines, is used for legal services and other access-to-justice purposes.85 It is a 
breach of a lawyer’s duty to the client to deposit non-nominal amounts of cli-
ent funds for more than a short period of time if the funds can generate inter-
est for the client, unless the client consents to that strategy.86
Client trust account management: For both IOLTA and conventional interest-
bearing accounts, a Massachusetts lawyer must follow strict protocols to metic-
ulously account for the funds held in trust and to reconcile the bank statements 
on a regular basis. Rule 1.15(f ) describes the steps a lawyer must take to ensure 
the safety and security of the funds held in trust. In addition to those require-
ments, Massachusetts has adopted a “dishonored check notiﬁcation” policy, 
described in Rule 1.15(h). If a bank where a lawyer’s trust account is held dis-
honors a check drawn on the account, the bank notiﬁes the BBO and the 
lawyer at the same time. 
Flat fees: The only exception to the requirement that a lawyer hold in a trust 
account payments from clients that have not yet been earned is for ﬂat fees, 
according to language the SJC added in 2015. A ﬂat fee is deﬁned in the com-
ment to Rule 1.15 as “a ﬁxed fee that an attorney charges for all legal services 
in a particular matter, or for a particular discrete component of legal services, 
whether relatively simple and of short duration, or complex and protracted.”87
85 IOLTA Guidelines, Massachusetts IOLTA, https://www.maiolta.org/for-attorneys (last vis-
ited Feb. 23, 2018). The IOLTA program in Massachusetts has funded a signiﬁcant amount of 
legal services and supported other important initiatives. At its peak, the Massachusetts IOLTA 
program generated $31,000,000 in funds for those purposes. In ﬁscal year 2015, the program 
generated $6,442,000.
86 See Matter of Montague, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 367 (2010) (“By retaining a non-nominal 
amount of client funds for a more than a short amount of time in her IOLTA, the respondent 
violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(5) [now (e)(6)]”). Rule 1.15(e)(6) creates an exception for 
conveyancing accounts, and Rule 1.15(e)(7) creates an exception for “property held for no com-
pensation for a minor family member.”
87 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 comment [2A].
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An attorney may deposit a ﬂat fee directly into the operating account. If the law-
yer chooses to deposit a ﬂat fee into the trust account instead, all trust account 
provisions apply. Also, if the client ends the representation before the lawyer has 
performed all the work for which the ﬂat fee was paid, the lawyer must return to 
the client any unearned portion of that fee.88
Mishandling of other people’s funds has been a persistent source of trouble 
for lawyers and has caused many to face BBO disciplinary proceedings. More 
than 750 reported disciplinary decisions between 1999 and 2017 refer to Rule 1.15. 
More than 120 such reports refer to Rule 1.5. The bar counsel reports receiving 
more than 300 complaints a year involving fee disputes.89 The following section 
provides typical examples of violations leading to discipline and how the bar coun-
sel, the BBO, and the SJC imposed sanctions for this type of misconduct.
B. Discipline for Violating Rule 1.15
Rule 1.15 has been the basis for hundreds of disciplinary matters in Massa-
chusetts in recent years. The SJC, along with the BBO, has oﬀered reliable guid-
ance about the appropriate sanction for mishandling funds held for another. In 
1997, in Matter of Schoepfer,90 the SJC conﬁrmed the standards expressed in its 
1984 decision, Matter of Discipline of an Attorney91 (known as the “Three Attor-
neys” case). The Schoepfer Court described the presumptive disciplinary standard 
for this type of misconduct as follows: 
The intentional use of clients’ funds normally calls for “a term suspension 
of appropriate length.” . . . If additionally an attorney intended to deprive 
the client of funds, permanently or temporarily, or if the client was 
deprived of funds (no matter what the attorney intended), the standard 
discipline is disbarment or indeﬁnite suspension.92
An inadvertent misuse of funds held for others with some deprivation to the owner 
of the funds warrants a term suspension,93 as does intentional misuse without
88 Id. Comment 2A addresses everything described in the paragraph in the text.
89 Kaufman & Vecchione, supra note 8, at 1.
90 426 Mass. 183, 13 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 679 (1997).
91 392 Mass. 827, 4 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 155 (1984).
92 426 Mass. at 187 (quoting Three Attorneys, 392 Mass. at 836).
93 Matter of Jackman, 444 Mass. 1013, 1014, 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 349 (2005) (rescript) (“where, 
as here, the unintentional misconduct has resulted in even temporary deprivation, a term suspen-
sion is typical”).
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deprivation or intent to deprive.94 An unintentional misappropriation of funds 
without any deprivation to the funds’ owners typically leads to a public reprimand.95
Commingling alone, without deprivation, results in an admonition.96 For purposes 
of this discipline, “Deprivation arises when an attorney’s intentional use of a client’s 
funds results in the unavailability of the client’s funds after they have become due, 
and may expose the client to a risk of harm, even if no harm actually occurs.”97
1. Disbarment
The several disbarments on record for violating a lawyer’s duties under 
Rule 1.15 typically include some factor beyond intention to deprive and actual 
deprivation, such as prior discipline, failure to make restitution, or accompany-
ing misconduct. Because the Schoepfer standard requires either “disbarment or 
indeﬁnite suspension” for this type of misconduct, the more serious disciplinary 
sanction tends to be imposed when other misconduct is present or where res-
titution has not been made. Disbarments also typically include a violation of 
Rule 8.4(c), prohibiting “conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrep-
resentation.”98 An apt example is Matter of Pasterczyk,99 in which the single jus-
tice disbarred the respondent for intentionally misusing a client’s funds. After 
the lawyer settled a personal injury matter for $4,500 without his client’s per-
mission (and forged the client’s signature on the release), the attorney deposited 
the settlement check into his IOLTA account, again forging the client’s signa-
ture. He then withdrew all but $395 from the account for his own use. The single 
justice opted for disbarment over an indeﬁnite suspension because of the lawyer’s 
prior disciplinary record and his failure to make restitution until the bar coun-
sel’s involvement. In Matter of Dasent,100 the SJC disbarred a lawyer who com-
mingled and misappropriated the client’s funds. The respondent had not made 
restitution, failed to cooperate with bar counsel, made misrepresentations 
during the disciplinary proceeding, and furnished fabricated evidence.
94 Matter of Guerrero, 31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 31 MADR 242 (2015) (six-month suspension, 
with conditions).
95 Matter of Murray, 455 Mass. 872, 879, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 402 (2010) (citing Matter of 
Abromovitz, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 6 (2007); Matter of McCarthy, 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 471 
(2005)).
96 See, e.g., Ad. 07-44, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 1036 (2007).
97 Matter of Watt, 430 Mass. 232, 236 (1999).
98 Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c). Between 1999 and 2017, at least seventy-ﬁve disbarment judgments 
based upon misuse and deprivation of funds have referred to Rule 8.4(c).
99 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 507 (2013).
100 446 Mass. 1010, 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 173 (2006).
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“ ‘If . . . an attorney intended to deprive the client of 
funds, permanently or temporarily, or if the client was 
deprived of funds (no matter what the attorney 
intended), the standard discipline is disbarment or indef-
inite suspension.’ ”101 “Whether a respondent has made 
restitution is a factor in choosing between disbarment 
and indeﬁnite suspension.”102
Several comparable examples exist in the disciplinary reports. In Matter of 
McBride,103 an attorney representing a criminal defendant misappropriated the 
client’s forfeiture funds by transferring much of the money from his IOLTA account 
to his business operating account, without justiﬁcation or the client’s knowledge. 
The respondent argued for an indeﬁnite suspension under the Schoepfer standard, 
but the SJC concluded not only that the lawyer’s intentional deprivation of funds 
on its own could support disbarment under the Court’s standard, but also that 
the lawyer’s prior history of discipline and lack of honesty during the discipli-
nary process justiﬁed the more serious sanction. In Matter of Donaldson,104  the 
respondent paid himself $17,000 from an IOLTA account without the client’s 
permission or other justiﬁcation and misled the client about the terms of his rep-
resentation. The misappropriation of the client’s money alone, according to the 
single justice, merited disbarment, and his other misconduct only conﬁrmed the 
appropriateness of that sanction.105
101 Schoepfer, 426 Mass. at 187 (quoting Three Attorneys, 392 Mass. at 836). Note that intentional mis-
use of trust funds typically leads to a charge based on both Rule 1.15 and Rule 8.4(c), covering dis-
honesty and deceit. See, e.g., Matter of Morad, 31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 31 (2015).
102 Matter of Nwogu, 32 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___, BD 2016-060 (Nov. 16, 2016).
103 449 Mass. 154, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 443 (2007).
104 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 221 (2012).
105 For other instances of disbarment primarily based on misuse of client funds, but with other 
misconduct or aggravating factors, see, e.g., Matter of Bailey, 439 Mass. 134, 19 Mass. Att’y Disc. 
R. 12 (2003) (included false testimony under oath concerning the misappropriated assets); Mat-
ter of Paczkowski, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 483 (2010) (included failure to cooperate with the bar 
counsel); Matter of Sardeson, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 635 (2007) (same); Matter of Dragon, 440 
Mass. 1023, 1023–24, 19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 121 (2003) (included lack of candor to the bar 
counsel and vulnerability of clients, who were harmed); Matter of Bryan, 411 Mass. 288, 7 Mass. 
Att’y Disc. R. 24 (1991) (failure to make restitution and included noncompliance with terms of 
temporary suspension).
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A single justice concluded that a lawyer’s addiction does not necessarily serve 
as the basis for a lesser sanction than disbarment. In Matter of Clifford,106 the attor-
ney used his client trust account to satisfy his drug addiction. He later success-
fully overcame that addiction but did not make any signiﬁcant eﬀorts to repay 
his clients. The single justice agreed that even if the lawyer’s addiction could serve 
as a mitigating factor, his failure to attempt to repay the funds owed to his client, 
along with other misconduct, warranted disbarment.107 In Matter of Collins,108
the Court reserved the question of whether addiction to illegal drugs (as opposed 
to, say, alcoholism) could ever mitigate the sanction for intentional misuse.
The disciplinary reports also contain scores of examples of disbarments or 
resignations after a recommendation for disbarment where the respondent attor-
ney did not contest the charges of mishandling client funds.109
2. Suspension
Most often, based on the Schoepfer standard, a lawyer who intentionally mis-
appropriates client funds with deprivation to the client will receive an indeﬁnite 
suspension and not disbarment, if restitution is voluntarily made. As previously 
noted, the more serious sanction of disbarment results when restitution is not 
made or some additional factor is present.110
106 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 74 (2010).
107 See also Matter of Gustafson, 6 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 140 (1990) (attorney obtained treatment 
for alcoholism and made substantial restitution to client but was still disbarred, as alcoholism 
was found not to be “but for” cause of wrongdoing). Cf. Matter of Collins, 455 Mass. 1020, 26 
Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 102 (2010) (attorney completed rehabilitation program, self-reported mis-
appropriation of client funds to the bar counsel, and paid back more than half of what he owed; 
indeﬁnite suspension on the condition that attorney complete restitution); Matter of Hull, 6 
Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 152 (1990) (lawyer’s rehabilitation eﬀorts regarding addiction served as 
mitigation after misappropriation of client funds; indeﬁnite suspension ordered).
108 455 Mass. 1020, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 102 (2010) (on its speciﬁc facts, indeﬁnite suspension).
109 For a sample of such matters, see, e.g., Matter of Catala, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 136 (2012); 
Matter of Reynolds, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 723 (2012); Matter of Daniels, 27 Mass. Att’y Disc. 
R. 159 (2011); Matter of O’Malley, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 462 (2010); Matter of Lamond, 26 
Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 299 (2010); Matter of Connor, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 107 (2010); Matter of 
Hodgdon, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 349 (2008); Matter of Yonce, 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 552 (2004).
110 Usually, the restitution must be voluntary to work to the lawyer’s credit. As the SJC has stated, 
“Recovery obtained through court action ‘is not “restitution” for purposes of choosing an appropri-
ate sanction.’” Matter of LiBassi, 449 Mass. 1014, 1017, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 396 (2007) (quot-
ing Matter of Hollingsworth, 16 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 227, 236 (2000)). On occasion, an order of 
indeﬁnite suspension might include restitution of amounts lost, including interest calculated 
according to the “prudent investor” rule, at a schedule based upon the lawyer’s ability to repay. See
Matter of Collins, 455 Mass. 1020, 1022, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 102 (2010) (citing, as a source 
of authority for the “prudent investor” rule as a calculation of the rate of interest, Piemonte v. New 
Boston Garden Corp., 377 Mass. 719, 735 (1979)).
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You Should Know
The typical sanction for intentionally misappropriating 
client funds with deprivation to the client is disbarment 
or an indeﬁnite suspension, absent other misconduct. If 
the attorney voluntarily makes restitution, the sanction 
is typically an indeﬁnite suspension. By contrast, a law-
yer who misappropriates funds while not engaged in 
practicing law typically receives a term suspension. 
Unintentional misuse of client funds that leads to depri-
vation typically warrants a term suspension.
Many examples of indeﬁnite suspensions for intentional misuse of client 
funds with deprivation exist. For example, in Matter of Schoepfer,111 the Court 
imposed an indeﬁnite suspension for a lawyer intentionally misappropriating 
client funds. In Matter of Thalheimer,112 an attorney intentionally misappropri-
ated IOLTA funds to pay oﬀ personal debts and previous client obligations, which 
resulted in constant shortages in the account. She also commingled her own funds 
with client funds. The single justice accepted the BBO’s recommendation of an 
indeﬁnite suspension instead of disbarment, based upon the principle that “it is 
important to encourage lawyers to make restitution of misappropriated funds.” 
In Matter of Abelson,113 the lawyer mismanaged his IOLTA account, leading to 
commingling his money with his clients’ and some loss of his clients’ funds. In 
choosing between disbarment and indeﬁnite suspension, the single justice de-
ferred to the BBO’s recommendation of suspension, even though the lawyer 
had not made full restitution. The justice concluded that the respondent had 
made good-faith eﬀorts to do so and had accomplished as much as his ﬁnances 
allowed.
In Matter of Johnson,114 the attorney commingled funds and misappropri-
ated his clients’ funds, along with other misconduct. The SJC vacated an order 
of a single justice imposing a thirty-month suspension and ordered an indeﬁ-
nite suspension, concluding that nothing in the record “warrant[ed] a lesser 
111 426 Mass. 183, 13 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 679 (1997).
112 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 684 (2008).
113 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 1 (2008).
114 444 Mass 1002, 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 355 (2005).
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sanction than is usual and presumptive.”115 In Matter of Haese,116 the respon-
dent was disbarred, despite making restitution, because of the seriousness of 
his misconduct.
Departures from the Schoepfer presumptive discipline are rare. As Schoepfer
itself noted, the recognized standards may not apply where the lawyer’s disabil-
ity, or similar mitigating circumstance, warrants a lesser sanction.117 One such 
example is Matter of Guidry,118 where a single justice imposed a thirty-month 
suspension, which the parties proposed in their stipulation, after the respondent 
intentionally converted client trust funds. The single justice accepted the depar-
ture from the Schoepfer standard because the lawyer’s misconduct was a result of 
“extreme ﬁnancial and emotional stress arising from grave and acute family prob-
lems.” Respondents have relied on Guidry on occasion to justify a lesser sanction 
than an indeﬁnite suspension.119 For instance, in Matter of Dodd,120 the lawyer 
neglected and mismanaged his IOLTA account for several years, including fail-
ing to keep adequate records and intentionally appropriating client funds to cover 
obligations to other clients. The respondent made restitution, and the single jus-
tice ordered a one-year suspension, with conditions. The single justice concluded 
that the respondent’s “debilitating and worsening medical condition during the 
relevant period was a signiﬁcant contributing cause of his misconduct,” along 
with the fact that his practice had already been restricted for six years, justify-
ing a departure from the standard sanction. 
The Court has distinguished between misappropriating client funds while 
in the role of counsel and misappropriation of third-party funds outside the 
115 444 Mass. at 1003. For a sampling of other indeﬁnite suspension matters similar to those 
described in the text, see, e.g., Matter of Eleey, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 275 (2012); Matter of 
Montague, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 367 (2010); Matter of Tolins, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 691 
(2008); Matter of Moriarty, 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 494 (2005); Matter of Gonick, 15 Mass. 
Att’y Disc. R. 230 (1999); Matter of Milgroom, 14 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 506, 518 (1998).
116 468 Mass 1002, 30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 196 (2014).
117 Schoepfer, 426 Mass. at 188 (“If a disability caused a lawyer’s conduct, the discipline should be 
moderated.”).
118 15 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 255 (1999).
119 For those that succeeded, see Matter of Sweeney, 32 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___, 2016 WL 
695826 (2016) (eighteen-month suspension); Matter of Greenidge, 30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 174 
(2014) (one-year suspension); Matter of Jebb, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 374 (2008) (thirty-month 
suspension). For those that did not succeed, see Matter of ( John) Johnson, 444 Mass. 1002 
(2005) (indeﬁnite suspension); Matter of (Gayle) Johnson, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 326 (2007),
aff ’d, 452 Mass. 1010, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 380 (2008) (indeﬁnite suspension).
120 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 196 (2005).
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practice of law, imposing a greater disciplinary sanction for the former. As the 
SJC has written:
Although we presently discern a basis to treat diﬀerently the attorney 
who acts dishonestly by misappropriating the funds of another while 
acting outside the practice of law from the attorney who does so while 
acting within the practice of law, we see no reason to treat diﬀerently an 
attorney who misappropriates third-party funds from the attorney who 
misappropriates client funds when the misconduct occurs within the 
practice of law.121
In Matter of Barrett,122 the respondent, acting as CEO of a company in 
which he was the majority stockholder but not its counsel, converted company 
funds for his own use. The SJC imposed a two-year suspension. In Matter of 
Hilson,123 the respondent was indeﬁnitely suspended for converting third-party 
funds held while representing a real estate broker. The Court wrote, “Had the 
respondent simply converted third-party funds while acting outside the prac-
tice of law, a two-year suspension might be in order.”124
Misuse of funds the client paid in advance for fees is diﬀerent from misuse 
of purely client-owned funds, as the lawyer has a reasonable expectation of 
earning the retainer.125 In Matter of Sharif,126 the SJC explained the diﬀerence:
[W]here an attorney intentionally uses funds advanced to pay legal fees 
with intent to deprive the client of those funds, either permanently or 
temporarily, or where the client was actually deprived of those funds, 
121 Matter of Hilson, 448 Mass. 603, 619, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 269, 288 (2007).
122 447 Mass. 453, 464–65, 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 58 (2006).
123 448 Mass. 603, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 265 (2007).
124 448 Mass. at 618. See also Matter of Cortiella, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 84 (2007) (as CEO of 
corporation, respondent misdirected money to himself; full restitution paid; two-year suspen-
sion); Matter of Carreiro, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 91 (2009) (two-year suspension for converting 
check payable to employer ﬁrm, aggravated by fabricated check in eﬀort to conceal the misuse); 
Matter of Chum, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 125 (2013) (eighteen-month suspension for two inci-
dents of stealing cash from employer; restitution paid).
125 See, e.g., Matter of Hopwood, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 354 (2008) (one-year suspension) (“Nei-
ther the Court nor the board has held or even opined that misuse of a retainer is to be treated with 
the same severity as the classic conversion of client funds addressed in Three Attorneys and clariﬁed 
in Matter of Schoepfer . . . .”); Matter of Pudlo, 460 Mass. 400, 27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 736 (2011) 
(one-year suspension, six months stayed with conditions); Matter of Sharif, 459 Mass. 558, 27 
Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 809 (2011) (three-year term suspension, third year stayed).
126 459 Mass. 558, 27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 809 (2011).
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regardless of the attorney’s intent, the attorney’s misconduct is serious 
and merits a severe sanction. But we do not agree that the sanctions of 
disbarment or indeﬁnite suspension should presumptively apply to all 
such cases . . . . The presumptive sanction of disbarment or indeﬁnite 
suspension that we established in cases involving the intentional misuse 
of traditional client funds is not mandatory, but “[a]n oﬀending lawyer 
has a heavy burden to demonstrate” that the sanction should not be 
applied, and we will not depart from the presumed sanction without 
providing “clear and convincing reasons for doing so.”127
Misuse of client funds that is not intentional but that leads to deprivation 
warrants a term suspension. As the SJC stated in Matter of Jackman, “While the 
negligent, unintentional misuse of client funds might warrant a public reprimand 
in the absence of actual deprivation, where . . . the unintentional misconduct has 
resulted in even temporary deprivation, a term suspension is typical.”128 In Jackman, 
the lawyer kept shoddy records of his client trust account, leading to commin-
gling with his own funds and some misuse of client funds. The lawyer made full 
restitution, so no client suﬀered any lasting harm. The lawyer’s mishandling of 
the account was unintentional but resulted in some deprivation. He also assisted 
in the unauthorized practice of law by permitting his paralegal to settle matters 
without supervision. The Court imposed a two-year suspension, with the con-
dition that upon reinstatement, should he be reinstated, his practice could not 
include any representation in civil matters. The SJC or single justices have imposed 
term, rather than indeﬁnite, suspensions in other situations comparable to those 
in Jackman.129
The burden of proof to establish facts in disciplinary proceedings typically 
rests with the bar counsel. But a respondent bears the burden of proof to estab-
lish lack of intentional misconduct when funds received in cash are unaccounted 
127 459 Mass. at 566–67 (quoting Schoepfer).
128 Matter of Jackman, 444 Mass. 1013, 1014 (2005), 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 349 (2005) (citing 
Matter of Newton, 12 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 351 (1996)) (two years); Matter of Zelman, 10 Mass. 
Att’y Disc. R. 302 (1994) (two years); Matter of Barnes, 8 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 8 (1992) (three 
years, with third year suspended and attorney placed on probation).
129 See, e.g., Matter of Murray, 455 Mass. 872, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 402 (2010) (six-month 
suspension); Matter of Wilsker, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 625 (2009) (nine-month suspension); 
Matter of Ryan, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 621 (2008) (nine-month suspension); Matter of Sylvia, 
24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 673 (2008) (three-month suspension).
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for. According to the SJC, “Once a showing has been made by Bar Counsel that 
client cash has been received, has not been deposited in a bank account, and has 
not been accounted for, . . . it will be the burden of the attorney to demonstrate 
whether the funds are indeed missing, whether his actions were intentional or 
negligent, and whether there has been deprivation. Should an attorney fail to con-
vince that funds are missing by virtue of negligence rather than purpose, depri-
vation will be presumed, and a sanction of disbarment or indeﬁnite suspension 
will be imposed.”130
Practice Tip
A quick response to, and repair of, an inadvertent depri-
vation of client funds can make an important difference 
in the ultimate sanction an attorney receives. Some law-
yers have received public reprimands after demonstrat-
ing immediate good-faith efforts to correct any mistake 
involving deprivation of client funds.131
3. Public Reprimand
Lawyers presumptively receive public reprimands for mishandling funds 
held in trust when the misconduct results from negligence and the client suf-
fers no deprivation.132 The disciplinary reports are ﬁlled with such examples. 
For instance, in Matter of Molle,133 an attorney received a public reprimand after 
commingling his own funds with clients’ funds, negligently misusing client 
funds, and failing to maintain adequate trust account records. The BBO deter-
mined that his actions were negligent and his clients suﬀered no deprivation. 
Similarly, in Matter of Barnes,134 the attorney, who through poor bookkeeping, 
negligently withdrew client funds to pay his fees but caused no deprivation to 
the client, received a public reprimand. In Matter of Hitchcock,135 the attorney, 
again as a result of careless bookkeeping, commingled personal funds with 
130 Murray, 455 Mass. at 887–88.
131 See, e.g., Matter of Manoﬀ, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 421 (2013); Matter of LaPre, 26 Mass. 
Att’y Disc. R. 302 (2010).
132 Matter of Jackman, 444 Mass. 1013, 1014, 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 349 (2005).
133 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 390 (2009).
134 18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 64 (2002).
135 17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 299 (2001).
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client funds over an extended period of time, resulting in negligent misuse of 
client funds but without deprivation to client. The attorney made full restitu-
tion and received a public reprimand.136
You Should Know
The typical sanction for a lawyer who negligently misap-
propriates client funds with no deprivation to the client, 
or for a lawyer who mismanages a trust account, is a 
public reprimand.
In Matter of Franchitto,137 the SJC concluded that a public reprimand was 
the proper sanction, notwithstanding some intentional misuse of trust account 
funds, after the respondent mismanaged his real estate trust account, leading to 
shortfalls. Although certain parties, but not his clients, were temporarily de-
prived of funds, the lawyer was a victim of duplicity by his client, which justi-
ﬁed a departure from the presumptive sanction.
4. Admonition
Admonitions are common for lawyers who commingle client funds with 
their own funds. Between 1999 and 2017, the bar counsel has issued at least 150 
admonitions citing Rule 1.15 as a basis for the discipline.138 The most common 
reports document commingling of personal and client funds.139 Other lawyers vio-
lated the rule by failing to promptly notify clients when they received settlement 
funds.140 For example, in Ad. 04-34,141 the attorney received an admonition 
136 For other examples of mishandled client accounts, without intention and without deprivation 
leading to a public reprimand, see, e.g., Matter of Cabana, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 77 (2013); 
Matter of Fallon, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 237 (2013); Matter of Powers, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 
540 (2013); Matter of Kantrovitz, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 507 (2012); Matter of Dialessi-Laﬂey, 
26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 133 (2010).
137 448 Mass. 1007, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 162 (2007).
138 Westlaw search, July 27, 2013 (153 admonition reports citing Rule 1.15).
139 The Westlaw search shows eighty-nine reports between 1999 and 2017 referring both to Rule 
1.15 and commingling.
140 See, e.g., Ad. 04-34, 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 723 (2004).
141 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 723 (2004). See also Ad. 05-34, 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 746 (2005). 
Of the ﬁfty-three lawyers admonished for failing to notify a client about receipt of funds, none 
has received an admonition under Rule 1.15 since 2007.
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after he processed a settlement check through a personal account, rather than 
a trust account, with no harm to the client. Several lawyers received admoni-
tions after a bank dishonored a client trust account check for insuﬃcient funds. 
For example, in Ad. 10-01,142 the lawyer’s commingling of funds led to the 
bounced check, but with no harm to a client. In Ad. 07-44,143 the lawyer, who 
seldom held client funds in trust, mistakenly used her IOLTA account for 
ordinary expenses, instead of her business checking account, leading to a dis-
honored check.
In general, most of the admonitions in this area result from the lawyer’s 
record-keeping mistake but without misuse of client funds. For example, in 
Ad. 01-66,144 the attorney failed to promptly withdraw his fee on contingent 
cases as well as to keep careful track of the fees he had withdrawn, which caused 
an IOLTA check to be returned for insuﬃcient funds. In Ad. 10-12,145 the law-
yer, who represented lenders on real estate closing matters, on several occasions 
recorded the closing documents in the Registry of Deeds before verifying that 
the funds for the closing were in his IOLTA account. As noted, the disciplinary 
reports contain many similar examples.
You Should Know
Under the Schoepfer/Three Attorneys standards, com-
mingling of client funds without misuse or deprivation 
warrants an admonition. As noted previously, if that 
commingling resulted from faulty record-keeping prac-
tices, the recent trend is to impose a public reprimand.
The disciplinary reports show that, between 2010 and 2017, every instance 
of a trust account check returned for insuﬃcient funds has led to a public rep-
rimand or worse, but those numbers are misleading. Many of those insuﬃcient-
fund matters result in “diversion agreements,” where the bar counsel defers 
disciplinary charges if the respondent cooperates by rectifying any trust account 
142 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 761 (2010).
143 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 1036 (2007).
144 17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 787 (2001).
145 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 782 (2010).
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errors.146 Those without diversion agreements, or those who fail to honor such 
agreements, face more serious charges. As a result, historically, most Rule 1.15 
violations have led to public reprimands, showing a trend away from admoni-
tions in this area.147
146 For a discussion of diversion agreements, see Chapter 4. 
147 Of the 355 reported cases citing Rule 1.15 between 2007 and July 2017, only 15 were
admonitions.)
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Candor to the Court and Third Parties
(Rules 3.3, 4.1(a), 8.4(c))
I. INTRODUCTION
In Massachusetts, lawyers who ﬁnd themselves in the disciplinary process 
often end up there because they have lied, deceived, or were otherwise not fully 
honest when representing clients (and, on occasion, outside of representation). 
The disciplinary reports are ﬁlled with examples of such misconduct, with law-
yers often suﬀering grave consequences. Most lawyers resist whatever tempta-
tions arise to bend the facts to obtain a good result, but some do not. Some 
dissemble to further their own ends. This chapter discusses the rules that gov-
ern candor and honesty, reviews the discipline imposed for violating those 
rules, and then describes some of the more challenging issues lawyers confront 
in this area.
II. THE NATURE OF THE LAWYER’S RESPONSIBILITIES
REGARDING CANDOR BEFORE A TRIBUNAL
A lawyer’s obligation of candor emerges from three rules in the Massachu-
setts Rules of Professional Conduct: Rule 3.3, which prohibits dishonesty directed to 
a tribunal and similar misconduct; Rule 4.1(a), which prohibits a lawyer from 
making a material misstatement of fact or law to a third person when represent-
ing a client; and Rule 8.4(c), which broadly prohibits deception and dishonesty by 
a lawyer. This chapter discusses these rules in that order.
RULE 3.3: CANDOR TOWARD THE TRIBUNAL
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1)  make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to 
correct a false statement of material fact or law previously 
made to the tribunal by the lawyer;
(2)  fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the con-
trolling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly
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RULE 3.3 (cont’d.)
   adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by 
opposing counsel; or
(3)  offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false, except as 
provided in Rule 3.3(e). If a lawyer, the lawyer’s client, or 
a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material 
evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the 
lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures, including 
if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. A lawyer may 
refuse to offer evidence, other than the testimony of a 
defendant in a criminal matter, that the lawyer reasonably 
believes is false.
(b) A lawyer who represents a client in an adjudicative proceed-
ing and who knows that a person intends to engage, is engaging 
or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the 
proceeding shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if 
necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.
(c) The duties stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) continue to the con-
clusion of the proceeding, including all appeals, and apply even if 
compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected 
by Rule 1.6.
(d) In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of 
all material facts known to the lawyer that will enable the tribunal 
to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse.
(e) In a criminal case, defense counsel who knows that the defen-
dant, the client, intends to testify falsely may not aid the client in 
constructing false testimony, and has a duty strongly to discourage 
the client from testifying falsely, advising that such a course is 
unlawful, will have substantial adverse consequences, and should 
not be followed.
(1)  If a lawyer discovers this intention before accepting the 
representation of the client, the lawyer shall not accept 
the representation,
(2)  If, in the course of representing a defendant prior to trial, 
the lawyer discovers this intention and is unable to persuade 
the client not to testify falsely, the lawyer shall seek to
258
Misconduct and Typical Sanctions
RULE 3.3: CANDOR TOWARD THE TRIBUNAL (cont’d.)
   withdraw from the representation, requesting any required 
permission. Disclosure of privileged or prejudicial infor-
mation shall be made only to the extent necessary to effect 
the withdrawal. If disclosure of privileged or prejudicial 
information is necessary, the lawyer shall make an appli-
cation to withdraw ex parte to a judge other than the judge 
who will preside at the trial and shall seek to be heard in 
camera and have the record of the proceeding, except for an 
order granting leave to withdraw, impounded. If the law-
yer is unable to obtain the required permission to with-
draw, the lawyer may not prevent the client from testifying.
(3)  If a criminal trial has commenced and the lawyer discov-
ers that the client intends to testify falsely at trial, the 
lawyer need not file a motion to withdraw from the case if 
the lawyer reasonably believes that seeking to withdraw 
will prejudice the client. If, during the client’s testimony 
or after the client has testified, the lawyer knows that the 
client has testified falsely, the lawyer shall call upon the 
client to rectify the false testimony and, if the client refuses 
or is unable to do so, the lawyer shall not reveal the false 
testimony to the tribunal. In no event may the lawyer 
examine the client in such a manner as to elicit any testi-
mony from the client the lawyer knows to be false, and the 
lawyer shall not argue the probative value of the false tes-
timony in closing argument or in any other proceedings, 
including appeals.
A. The Lessons of Rule 3.3
Most lawyers understand Rule 3.3 as the “no perjury” rule. While it has 
several components, that understanding serves as a nicely crystallized, if narrow, 
description of the rule. Simply stated, a lawyer cannot lie to a tribunal, know-
ingly oﬀer testimony that is false (either in court or out of court, including 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and other pleadings), or present false evi-
dence. The rule provides that a lawyer may not make a false statement of fact or 
law to a tribunal,1 oﬀer evidence that the lawyer knows is false, or fail to correct 
1 Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3(a)(1) (2015).
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false material evidence or the attorney’s own misstatement of material fact or 
law.2 If the lawyer learns that a person (either the client or another person) 
intends to oﬀer or has oﬀered false evidence, the lawyer “shall take reasonable 
remedial measures,”3 which may include disclosure of the falsehood to the tri-
bunal.4 A lawyer may refuse to oﬀer evidence that the lawyer “reasonably believes 
is false.”5 When the proposed perjury is by a defendant in a criminal proceeding, 
the rule indicates a diﬀerent process.6
Statements that are theoretically true but that are intentionally misleading 
generally violate Rule 3.3.7 Statements that are “technically accurate” or “literally 
true,” but that nevertheless are “clearly intended to mislead” or “beg[] [a] false 
inference” amount, in appropriate cases, to false statements within the meaning 
of Rule 3.3(a)(1).8 “[H]alf-truths may be as actionable as whole lies.”9
Finally, Rule 3.3 requires lawyers appearing ex parte before a tribunal to in-
form the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer needed for a fair deci-
sion (thus serving as an exception to the usual principle that lawyers need not 
disclose unfavorable facts if not asked),10 and establishes a duty of lawyers to re-
veal to a tribunal “legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the 
lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by 
opposing counsel.”11 According to a Massachusetts Bar Association ethics opin-
ion, the duty to disclose adverse authority applies even if the authority is factually 
2 Id. at 3.3(a)(3).
3 Id. at 3.3(b).
4 Id. at 3.3(a)(3), (b).
5 Id. at 3.3(a)(3).
6 Id. at 3.3(e). In essence, Rule 3.3(e) provides for special procedures on withdrawal and disclosure, 
depending on when the lawyer knows that the client proposes to commit perjury, and forbids a 
criminal defense lawyer from disclosing to the tribunal hearing the matter the fact that his client 
intends to commit perjury. The Rule oﬀers a method through which the lawyer may oﬀer a narra-
tive version of the false testimony if the lawyer “is unable to persuade the client not to testify falsely.” 
Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3(e)(2). The lawyer may not actively elicit the false testimony and may not 
refer to it in closing argument or elsewhere. Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3(e)(3).
7 Matter of Hession, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 338 (2013) (“calculatedly misleading” statement vio-
lates Rule 3.3(a)); Matter of O’Toole, 31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 511 (2015) (citing authorities). In 
Matter of Angwafo, 453 Mass. 28, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 8 (2009), the board concluded that 
the “deceitful” statements the respondent made were not suﬃciently false to violate Rule 3.3 but 
did violate Rule 8.4(c).
8 Matter of Pemstein, 16 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 339, 348 (2000).
9 Kannavos v. Annino, 356 Mass. 42, 48 (1969).
10 Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3(d) (2015).
11 Id. at 3.3(a)(2).
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distinguishable from the matter before the tribunal and continues until the tri-
bunal renders its decision.12
The requirement that a lawyer reveal intended or completed perjury to 
someone, including, if necessary, to the judge or administrative oﬃcer deciding 
the matter, is broader than the duties the previous Massachusetts disciplinary 
code imposed, which limited that obligation to revealing nonprivileged mate-
rial.13 The duties Rule 3.3 establishes apply when the attorney “knows” that the 
evidence is false. Actual knowledge is required, but it may be inferred from the 
circumstances.14
The question of what a lawyer should do when aware of a client’s, a witness’s, 
or a third party’s untruthful testimony has perplexed practitioners and commen-
tators for decades.15 For purposes of cataloging the treatment of Rule 3.3 viola-
tions in the disciplinary process, the path is much more straightforward. A lawyer 
must not use evidence known to be false and must prevent the client from using 
it. If the false evidence comes in through the lawyer’s client or witness, despite 
the lawyer’s eﬀorts, the lawyer must take steps to rectify the false evidence.
B. Discipline for Violating Rule 3.3
The usual sanction in Massachusetts for making a false statement or pre-
senting false evidence to a tribunal is now a term suspension, one year for a law-
yer presenting false evidence or making false statements, but not under oath, and 
two years for a lawyer making false statements under oath. The Supreme Judicial 
12 Massachusetts Bar Association Ethics Op. 80-3 (1980). While this opinion interpreted DR 
7-106(B)(1), the predecessor to Rule 3.3(d), the substance of the current rule is exactly the same 
as the former disciplinary rule.
13 See Mass. Code of Prof. Resp. DR 7-102(B)(1) (1969).
14 Matter of Angwafo, supra note 7, 453 Mass. at 34. See also Matter of Zimmerman, 17 Mass. 
Att’y Disc. R. 633 (2001) (“[A] lawyer cannot avoid ‘knowing’ a fact by purposefully refusing 
to look. While a lawyer ‘is not under an obligation to seek out information,’ his or her ‘studied 
ignorance of a readily accessible fact by consciously avoiding it is the functional equivalent of 
knowledge of the fact.’ ” (citations omitted)).
15 See e.g., Jay S. Silver, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: The Case Against the Client Perjury 
Rules, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 339 (1994); Susan E. Thrower, Neither Reasonable nor Remedial: The 
Hopeless Contradictions of the Legal Ethics Measures to Prevent Perjury, 58 Clev. St. L. Rev. 781, 
796–97 (2010) (describing the traditional client perjury solutions of withdrawal and disclosure 
as unworkable); Harris Weinstein, Client Confidences and the Rules of Professional Responsibility: 
Too Little Consensus and Too Much Confusion, 35 S. Tex. L. Rev. 727, 739 (1994). It is fair to say 
that the level of confusion and uncertainty is signiﬁcantly higher in the case of perjury by crim-
inal defendants, given their constitutional right to eﬀective assistance of counsel and protection 
against self-incrimination.
261
Candor to the Court and Third Parties
Court (SJC) has stated that “the presumptive sanction is a one-year suspen-
sion” for “cases involving misrepresentations to a tribunal.”16 It has also stated, 
“Where an attorney has made false statements under oath, the presumptive 
sanction is a two-year suspension from the practice of law,”17 because “an attor-
ney who lies under oath engages in ‘qualitatively diﬀerent’ misconduct from an 
attorney who makes false statements and presents false evidence.”18
Practice Tips
Lawyers who lie almost always get in serious trouble if 
caught, and they frequently get caught. The most seri-
ous sanctions come when a lawyer lies (1) before a court, 
(2) under oath, (3) on behalf of a client, and (4) to fur-
ther the lawyer’s, and not the client’s, interests. The more 
of those four factors present, the more serious the sanc-
tion. Lesser sanctions have applied when the lawyers lie 
in their private matters, such as during their own divorce 
proceedings.
* * *
Lying before a tribunal, the misconduct Rule 3.3 
covers, is more serious than lying outside of a tribunal to 
a client or a third party (such as in a negotiation), which 
Rule 4.1 covers.
In rare circumstances, a lawyer has received either a public reprimand or 
an admonition for misconduct stemming from Rule 3.3, but those dispositions 
tend to be exceptions, as explained in the Sections II(B)(3) and (4).
16 Matter of Goodman, 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 352, 365 (2006). See also Matter of Zimmerman, 
17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 633 (2001) (“one-year suspension is ‘standard’ sanction for material 
misrepresentations to tribunal,” citing Matter of McCarthy, 416 Mass. 423, 9 Mass. Att’y Disc. 
R. 225 (1993)); Matter of Neitlich, 413 Mass. 416, 8 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 167 (1992).
17 Matter of Sousa, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 557, 566 (2009) (citing Matter of O’Donnell, 23 Mass. 
Att’y Disc. R. 508, 514 n.3 (2007)). See also Matter of Shaw, 427 Mass. 764, 767–69, 14 Mass. 
Att’y Disc. R. 699 (1998) (two-year suspension for false testimony in court, ﬁling false aﬃdavits, 
and issuing misleading opinion letters signed under oath with forged notarization).
18 Matter of Shaw, 427 Mass. at 769 (quoting Matter of Budnitz, 425 Mass. 1018, 1019, 13 Mass. 
Att’y Disc. R. 62 (1997)).
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1. Disbarment
An attorney giving false testimony under oath may be disbarred, but only in 
egregious circumstances, typically those involving other misconduct or aggra-
vating factors.19 In Matter of Bailey,20 for example, the lawyer was disbarred in 
part because of his false testimony regarding the handling of a client’s property, 
but also for misappropriating that property and improper ex parte contacts with 
a judge. There, the SJC wrote that an attorney’s false testimony “under oath, by 
itself, can justify disbarment.”21 However, no reported case since then has resulted 
in disbarment for false statements to a tribunal without some other factor, such 
as a conviction, other accompanying misconduct, or aggravating factors. In Mat-
ter of Finneran,22 the respondent, a former Speaker of the Massachusetts House 
of Representatives, oﬀered misleading and false statements at a trial when he tes-
tiﬁed, as a witness, that he was unaware of gerrymandering that occurred as a 
result of legislation he oversaw. After his conviction in federal district court for 
obstructing justice, the SJC concluded that the felony conviction warranted dis-
barment, the presumptive discipline for such convictions.23
19 See Matter of Balliro, 453 Mass. 75, 86, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 35, 51 (2009) (citing Matter of 
Sleeper, 251 Mass. 6 (1925)); Matter of Budnitz, supra note 18. The ABA’s recommended stan-
dards suggest disbarment without the egregious and aggravating circumstances. See ABA Stan-
dards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (rev. 2012) § 6.11:
Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer, with the intent to deceive the court, 
makes a false statement, submits a false document, or improperly withholds information, 
and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, or causes a signiﬁcant or 
potentially signiﬁcant adverse eﬀect on the legal system.
The ABA also does not make the distinction, which the SJC uses, between false statements under 
oath and false statements not under oath.
20 439 Mass. 134 (2003) (attorney disbarred for lying to a judge under oath, misappropriating cli-
ent funds, engaging in ex parte communications with a judge in an eﬀort to inﬂuence the outcome 
of a proceeding, divulging conﬁdential client information, and violating court orders).
21 Matter of Bailey, 439 Mass. 134, 149, 151, 19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 12 (2003).
22 455 Mass. 722, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 178 (2010).
23 See also Matter of Kelly, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 282 (2010) (disbarment after felony conviction 
on twenty counts, including forging documents submitted to court); Matter of Lonardo, 25 Mass. 
Att’y Disc. R. 360 (2009) (disbarment after conviction of conspiracy to commit insurance fraud). 
In Matter of Foley, 439 Mass. 324, 19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 141 (2003) (three-year suspension), the 
respondent fabricated a defense for a criminal defense client but never presented it because the 
putative client was actually an undercover FBI agent; the case was nolle prossed when the district 
attorney learned the defendant’s true identity and that his arrest had been part of an undercover 
investigation. Id. 439 Mass. at 331. The Court went on to say that, had the respondent actually “pre-
sented the false story he had concocted and the false testimony he had developed . . . , the sanction 
respondent would be facing most assuredly would have been disbarment.” Id. at 335–36.
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2. Suspension
Most Rule 3.3 violations result in some form of suspension. As previously 
noted, the usual sanction for making false statements to a tribunal is a one-year 
suspension, unless the false statement is made under oath, and then the sanction 
is a two-year suspension. In Matter of Sousa,24 the respondent was suspended 
for two years after she testiﬁed falsely in court against her client. She had pre-
viously engaged in a romantic relationship with her former client, which later 
deteriorated, leading to claims of stalking and considerable acrimony between 
the two. The single justice concluded that her misconduct was no more or less 
culpable than that for which the typical sanction applies. Other examples of 
that disposition exist.25
You Should Know
According to the SJC, the accepted sanction for making 
a deliberate misrepresentation to a court is a one-year 
suspension.26 But “[w]here an attorney has made false 
statements under oath, the presumptive sanction is a 
two-year suspension from the practice of law.”27
* * *
Some cases involving counsel ﬁling false afﬁdavits 
without false oral testimony have resulted in a one-year 
suspension instead of a two-year suspension.28
24 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 557, 566 (2009).
25 For other instances of the presumptive sanction of a two-year suspension for false evidence made 
under oath, see, e.g., Matter of Shaw, 427 Mass. 764, 14 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 699 (1998) (two-year 
suspension for false testimony in court, ﬁling false aﬃdavits, and issuing misleading opinion let-
ters signed under oath with forged notarization); Matter of Beatrice, 14 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 56 
(1998) (two-year suspension for lying under oath about relationship with suspended attorney 
work ing in his oﬃce, mishandling bankruptcy proceedings, and charging a contingent fee in a 
criminal case, aggravated by testifying falsely to hearing committee).
26 Matter of Slavitt, 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 720 (2006), modified on appeal, 449 Mass. 25, 23 
Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 662 (2007); Matter of Macero, 27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 554 (2011) (pre-
sumptive sanction is a one-year suspension).
27 Matter of Sousa, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 557, 566 (2009) (citing Matter of O’Donnell, 23 
Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 508, 514 n.3 (2007)).
28 See Matter of Powell, 30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 319, 324 n.2 (2014) (noting that “[c]ases involving 
false aﬃdavits usually result in a one-year suspension,” but imposing a six-month suspension in 
light of lack of materiality); Matter of Livingstone, 27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 548 (2011) (one-year 
suspension by stipulation); Matter of Cross, 15 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 157 (1999) (public reprimand 
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Some lawyers who oﬀer testimony or evidence under oath have been sus-
pended for longer periods than the usual sanction. For instance, in Matter of 
O’Donnell,29 the attorney was suspended indeﬁnitely for false testimony under 
oath, combined with misuse of client funds. In Matter of Foley,30 the respon-
dent was suspended for three years for “calculated corruption” in “assisting and 
encouraging his client in the preparation of a fabricated defense to a criminal 
complaint” and also presenting the fabricated defense to the prosecutor. The 
respondent in Foley never oﬀered evidence under oath.
Some lawyers have been suspended for less than two years after presenting 
false evidence under oath to a tribunal; most of these involved statements made 
not on behalf of a client but as a witness31 or concerning the lawyer’s personal 
aﬀairs. (In 2015, the SJC added a new comment [1] to Rule 3.3, stating that the 
“Rule governs the conduct of a lawyer who is representing a client in the pro-
ceedings of a tribunal.”32) In Matter of Finnerty,33 the respondent was suspended 
for six months after he intentionally misrepresented to the Probate and Family 
Court (under penalties of perjury34) his ﬁnancial worth in connection with divorce 
proceedings. While some mitigating factors were present (including the respon-
dent’s history of public service, the emotional impact of the divorce, and his for-
mer wife’s supportive statements), the Court stated that “we are satisﬁed that this 
disposition is consistent with the sanctions imposed in other cases.”35 In Mat-
ter of Angwafo,36 the respondent was suspended for one month for misstating 
in light of lack of materiality). But see Matter of Diviacchi, 475 Mass. 1013, 32 Mass. Att’y Disc. 
R. ___ (2016) (twenty-seven-month suspension standard after the respondent ﬁled a false com-
plaint signed under oath, then relied on the false statements in arguments to the Court, and for 
other misconduct).
29 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 508 (2007).
30 439 Mass. 324, 19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 141 (2003).
31 Matter of Bartley, 30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 16 (2014) (respondent suspended for a year and a day 
for false testimony as a witness).
32 Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3 comment [1]. See also infra discussion accompanying note 93.
33 418 Mass. 821, 10 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 86 (1994).
34 The Court noted that the false ﬁnancial statement the respondent submitted was subject to 
Probate Court Rule 401, which reads, “All ﬁnancial statements shall be signed by the party ﬁling 
the same and shall be subject to the pains and penalties of perjury.” Id. 418 Mass. at 828.
35 Id. at 830. In Matter of Angwafo, 453 Mass. 28, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 8 (2009), the SJC 
observed that in Finnerty there existed “no ﬁnding that the lawyer knowingly made a false state-
ment of material fact” (453 Mass. at 38), even though the Court in Finnerty had concluded the 
following: “[The respondent] deliberately misrepresented to the court his total ﬁnancial worth, 
including the fair value of his law practice and other assets, in order to obtain an unwarranted 
judgment, favorable to him, with respect to the division of marital assets.” 418 Mass. at 828.
36 453 Mass. 28, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 8.
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ﬁnancial and other matters in a Probate and Family Court proceeding. She suf-
fered from extreme domestic violence, amounting to “terror” at the time.37 In 
Matter of Leahy,38 the single justice suspended the respondent for two months 
after he submitted false aﬃdavits in a dispute about custody and visitation with 
his children during his divorce. The single justice noted that “[a]ttorneys who 
have acted improperly in the course of their own divorce and child custody pro-
ceedings have generally been suspended for a period of three or more months.”39
The respondent’s lack of ﬁnancial motive justiﬁed a shorter suspension. In Mat-
ter of Vinci,40 the attorney, just like the respondents in Finnerty and Angwafo,
ﬁled a false ﬁnancial statement under the penalties of perjury with the Probate 
and Family Court in his own divorce case and served that statement on his oppos-
ing counsel. He also failed to honor an administrative suspension. The single 
justice accepted the parties’ stipulation to a nine-month suspension.41
In Matter of Balliro,42 an attorney was suspended for six months for mak-
ing false statements to a Tennessee prosecutor and the police as well as giving 
false testimony under oath at trial in Tennessee. The attorney was a victim of 
domestic violence by a man with whom she was in a romantic relationship, and 
her testimony occurred at his criminal trial. She understood that a conviction 
meant jail time for the defendant and loss of any possibility of his paying child 
support. After the prosecutor denied her request to have the charges dismissed, 
the respondent claimed falsely, under oath, that her injuries were caused by a 
fall. After the Board of Bar Overseers (BBO) accepted the hearing committee’s 
37 The Court concluded that because the respondent quickly corrected her false statements to the 
Court, no discipline under Rule 3.3 was warranted. She was disciplined instead under Rule 8.4(c) 
for other dishonest activity in the same proceeding. See discussion of Angwafo in the context of 
Rule 8.4(c) infra at Section IV(A).
38 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 529 (2012).
39 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. at 537 (citing Matter of Ring, 427 Mass. 186, 14 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 
651 (1998) (three months); Matter of Kersey, 432 Mass. 1020, 16 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 238 (2000) 
(three months); Matter of Finnerty, 418 Mass. 821, 10 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 86 (1994) (six months); 
Matter of Kilkenny, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 288 (2010) (ﬁve months)).
40 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 742 (2007). For a similar type of misconduct, see Matter of Wong, 21 
Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 659 (2005) (one-year suspension where lawyer failed to update her personal 
bankruptcy ﬁlings to show increased income; presumably the original ﬁling was under oath, but 
lawyer omitted facts rather than misstated facts).
41 See also Matter of Pezza, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 535 (2013) (a year-and-a-day suspension for 
submitting a false aﬃdavit to a court to help an acquaintance; only Rules 8.4(c) and (d) cited); Mat-
ter of Powell, 30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 319 (2014) (stipulation; suspension of six months and a day 
for false aﬃdavit in same proceeding as Pezza; no rules cited).
42 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 31 (2009).
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recommendation of a public reprimand, the SJC disagreed and imposed the 
six-month suspension.43
If a lawyer, in the role of counsel, makes misrepresentations to the tribunal
not under oath, the sanction that has been the norm for many years is a one-
year suspension. For instance, in 1993, in Matter of McCarthy,44 the respon-
dent’s sanction was a one-year suspension after he elicited false testimony, intro-
duced false records, and then failed to correct the erroneous record before a 
rent control board. In Matter of Neitlich,45 the attorney was also suspended for 
one year for actively misrepresenting the terms of a real estate transaction in a 
divorce proceeding to both opposing counsel and the Court. In two recent mat-
ters, the Court applied that presumptive standard but added one day to the sus-
pension, thereby triggering the additional requirement that the respondent petition 
for reinstatement.46
In 2003, the SJC suggested stiﬀer penalties for misrepresentation. In Mat-
ter of Griffith,47 after imposing a one-year suspension on a respondent who had 
assisted his client in preparing false and misleading discovery responses, the 
Court stated:
We advise for future reference that this sanction is tailored to the factors 
in this case and the novelty of the issues. Counsel who engage in similar 
misconduct in the future should not necessarily expect a maximum 
sanction of a one-year suspension. We emphasize that “[a]n eﬀective 
judicial system depends on the honesty and integrity of lawyers who 
appear in their tribunals.” Matter of Finnerty, supra. This principle 
applies not only to trials, but also to trial preparation and discovery.48
43 The Court acknowledged the following conﬂict resulting from the decision: “We recognize and 
share the board’s concern about the perceived inequity of sanctioning the respondent more severely 
than attorneys who have been convicted of domestic assault. See Matter of Grella, 438 Mass. 47, 
51, 18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 271 (2002) (attorney suspended for two months after conviction of mis-
demeanor arising from violent assault on estranged wife).” Id. See also Matter of Angwafo, 453 
Mass. 28, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 8 (2009) (one-month suspension for false statements resulting 
from severe domestic abuse).
44 416 Mass. 423, 9 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 225 (1993). At the time, a one-year suspension required 
a reinstatement hearing.
45 413 Mass. 416, 8 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 167 (1992).
46 See Matter of Corben, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 115 (2010) (attorney fabricated a story to chal-
lenge parking tickets); Matter of Cosmos, 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 157 (2006) (false statement 
on a pleading).
47 440 Mass. 500, 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 174 (2003).
48 440 Mass. at 509 (citing Matter of Finnerty, 418 Mass. 821, 10 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 86 (1994)).
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Since the Griffith decision, however, the few cases with sanctions for mis-
representation not under oath that have been longer than the standard one-year 
suspension typically included other misconduct. In Matter of Ozulumba,49 the 
order acknowledged that a one-year suspension is the presumptive sanction for 
making a misrepresentation to a court but not under oath; however, the single 
justice imposed a two-year suspension because of multiple instances of submit-
ting false evidence to courts, along with other separate misconduct. In Matter 
of Harris,50 an attorney incurred an eighteen-month suspension after he falsely 
stated to the Court, and arranged for his client to testify under oath, that the 
client and the lawyer had diﬃculty communicating, in an eﬀort to permit the 
lawyer to withdraw and the client to obtain a continuance. That lawyer had also 
engaged in an impermissible business relationship with the client. In Matter of 
Carchidi,51 the attorney was suspended for thirty months after ﬁling a false 
accounting with the Probate and Family Court and intentionally misstating 
the fees he charged the estate, but he had also mismanaged the client accounts 
and been suspended twice for similar misconduct involving mismanaging cli-
ent funds.52 In Matter of Munroe,53 an attorney was suspended for two years and 
six months for ﬁling false accountings and false pleadings plus several other sep-
arate instances of misconduct. Most recently, in Matter of Moran,54 in which 
the lawyer had ﬁled a false probate accounting under oath to mask his fees, but 
also paid himself clearly excessive fees and engaged in other misconduct, the 
full bench of the SJC increased the nine-month suspension imposed by the 
single justice to ﬁfteen months.
In matters where the misrepresentations were either less material or less 
intentionally deceitful, the Rule 3.3 violations resulted in shorter suspensions. 
For instance, in Matter of MacDonald,55 a newly admitted lawyer was suspended 
49 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 515 (2007).
50 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 220 (2004).
51 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 111 (2013). The report implies that the accounting ﬁled with the court 
was not made under oath.
52 For similar violations of Rule 3.3 where the attorney ﬁled a false account in Probate and Family 
Court, see Matter of Zadworny, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 722 (2010) (attorney’s violation of 3.3 by 
ﬁling a false account in probate court led to an indeﬁnite suspension); Matter of Steinkrauss, 26 
Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 650 (2010) (violation led to an order accepting respondent’s resignation); Mat-
ter of Nicholls, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 441 (2010) (attorney disbarred after misrepresenting his han-
dling of escrow funds in the accounting to the court); Matter of Reardon, 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 
640 (2006) (attorney was disbarred for ﬁling a false account with Probate and Family Court, saying 
that he had distributed funds to a beneﬁciary’s estate when no such distributions were made).
53 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 385 (2010).
54 479 Mass. 1016 (2018).
55 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 411 (2007).
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for six months, with probation conditions, after preparing false aﬃdavits and 
backdating documents in an eﬀort to reinstate cases dismissed because of his 
carelessness. The single justice in MacDonald deemed that conduct more egre-
gious than that at issue in Matter of Long,56 where, to receive a continuance of 
a pretrial conference, the lawyer made deliberate misrepresentations to a court 
oﬃcial that he was scheduled to appear elsewhere. Long’s suspension was for 
three months, followed by three years’ probation on certain conditions. The law-
yer in MacDonald, in contrast, altered documents and made false statements on 
more than one occasion, warranting a longer suspension than in Long.
More recently, in Matter of Macero,57 the single justice adopted the board 
memorandum, which declined to recommend a suspension greater than one year, 
citing Neitlich and McCarthy for the “presumptive sanction” of a “one-year sus-
pension.”58 In Macero, the respondent had failed to pay an appeals court dock-
eting fee on time, which resulted in the appeal being dismissed. She then 
backdated her check and misrepresented to the appeals court that the post 
oﬃce was to blame for the delay. In addition, she testiﬁed falsely about the 
backdated check at the disciplinary hearing. The board memorandum did not 
refer to the Court’s warning in Griffith regarding possible stiﬀer sanctions.
A lawyer who forges the signature of an absent individual to an otherwise 
truthful document or statement may receive a shorter suspension or, as seen in 
the following subsection, a public reprimand (the recognized minimum sanction 
for that misconduct), or even an admonition. In Matter of Molloy,59 the respon-
dent was suspended for three months for signing or directing someone else to 
sign a client’s name to an aﬃdavit and then ﬁling the paper with the Court. The 
respondent also lied to the Oﬃce of the Bar Counsel about the event, which 
increased his sanction.
3. Public Reprimand
On occasion, the sanction for signing another’s name to an otherwise truth-
ful document is a public reprimand. In Matter of Colella,60 an attorney received 
a public reprimand after he, with the client’s authorization, signed the client’s 
name to a truthful aﬃdavit under the penalties of perjury. That signing consti-
tuted a misrepresentation to the Court in violation of  Rules 3.3(a)(1) and 8.4(c).
56 16 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 250 (1999).
57 27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 554 (2011).
58 Id.
59 19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 302 (2003).
60 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 155 (2006).
269
Candor to the Court and Third Parties
You Should Know
The minimum sanction for signing another’s name, with-
out the requisite authority, to an otherwise truthful doc-
ument is a public reprimand, if it is not signed under oath 
or is not an afﬁdavit. However, if the respondent has been 
convicted under state or federal criminal laws, or if the 
document is an afﬁdavit, the misconduct may result in 
greater sanctions.
In Matter of Cross,61 the lawyer received a public reprimand by stipulation 
after she intentionally misrepresented the facts on a return of service of process 
and later on an aﬃdavit she ﬁled in response to a motion challenging the service. 
Because the respondent conceded (when challenged) that service was ineﬀec-
tive, and she did not seek to rely on it, her misrepresentation was not material.
No other public reprimands or censures appear in the disciplinary reports 
for violating Rule 3.3 or its predecessor, DR 7-102(A).
4. Admonition
Few lawyers who have violated Rule 3.3 have received admonitions. In Ad. 
No. 15-02,62 the respondent asserted a fact in a pleading that he believed to be 
true, but later learned was false. He informed his supervisor that he could not 
pursue an appeal that relied on the false statement; the supervisor relieved him 
of that task and pursued it himself. The respondent never informed the Court 
or opposing counsel of the prior false statement, contrary to his obligation under 
Rule 3.3(a)(3), and received an admonition. In Ad. No. 06-41,63 the respondent 
signed an aﬃdavit for a witness without her knowledge and ﬁled it in court in 
support of a motion for a continuance. The witness was aware of the aﬃdavit 
and had approved its generally accurate contents, but had not authorized the 
attorney to sign her name. Most likely because the attorney was inexperienced 
and was in treatment for depression, he received a less severe sanction than the 
lawyer in Colella, described in the previous subsection.
61 15 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 157 (1999).
62 31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 747 (2015). The supervisor stipulated to a term suspension. Matter of 
Newman, 31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 482 (2015).
63 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 960 (2006).
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The only other admonition related to Rule 3.3 concerns Rule 3.3(d), which 
pertains to disclosure during an ex parte proceeding. In Ad. No. 00-24,64 a law-
yer sought an ex parte real estate attachment and, in doing so, failed to disclose 
material facts that would have inﬂuenced the Court’s decision. The lawyer re-
ceived an admonition for that misconduct. No other admonitions appear in the 
disciplinary reports for violating Rule 3.3 or its predecessor.
III. THE NATURE OF THE LAWYER’S RESPONSIBILITIES
REGARDING CANDOR OUTSIDE OF THE TRIBUNAL SETTING
Rule 4.1(a) prohibits a lawyer from making a material misstatement of fact 
or law to a third person when representing a client. Lawyers understand Rule 4.1(a) 
to be the out-of-court counterpart to Rule 3.3.
RULE 4.1: TRUTHFULNESS IN STATEMENTS TO OTHERS
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person[.]
A. The Lessons of Rule 4.1(a)
Lawyers may not lie to or deceive others about material facts or legal prin-
ciples when representing a client. In very limited circumstances, Rule 4.1(a) 
allows a lawyer to make a knowingly false representation to another (but not to 
a tribunal or a client) while representing a client if the falsehood concerns a non-
material representation, or an assertion that is not factual, such as an opinion. 
Comment [2] to the rule explains that qualiﬁcation, with examples:
This Rule refers to statements of fact. Whether a particular statement 
should be regarded as one of fact can depend on the circumstances. Under 
generally accepted conventions in negotiation, certain types of state-
ments ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact. Estimates 
64 16 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 484 (2000).
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of price or value placed on the subject of a transaction and a party’s 
intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a claim are ordinarily in this 
category, and so is the existence of an undisclosed principal except 
where nondisclosure of the principal would constitute fraud. Lawyers 
should be mindful of their obligations under applicable law to avoid 
criminal and tortious misrepresentation.65
Commentators agree that this language means that a lawyer engaged in a nego-
tiation may aﬃrmatively misstate the client’s “bottom line” and limits of the nego-
tiating authority.66 (Of course, most experienced lawyers understand that, even 
if permitted by the rules, ﬂat-out misstatements to other lawyers or parties are 
almost always strategic and reputational mistakes.)
As with Rule 3.3,67 Rule 4.1 covers more than outright false statements. 
Comment [1] to Rule 4.1 states that “[m]isrepresentations can also occur by par-
tially true but misleading statements or omissions that are the equivalent of 
aﬃrmative false statements.”68 The SJC has stated that “[s]tatements that are 
‘technically accurate’ or ‘literally true,’ but that nevertheless are ‘clearly intended 
to mislead’ or ‘beg[] [a] false inference’ amount, in appropriate cases, to false 
statements within the meaning” of Rule 4.1(a).69 Also, a lawyer making false or 
deceptive statements may also be subject to sanction under Rule 8.4(c), which 
prohibits “conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”70
65 Mass. R. Prof. C. 4.1 comment [2] (2015).
66 See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Consensus Builder: Ethics for a New Practice,
70 Tenn. L. Rev. 63 (2002); Douglas R. Richmond, Lawyers’ Professional Responsibilities and 
Liabilities in Negotiations, 22 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 249 (Winter 2009); Brian C. Haussmann, 
Note, The ABA Ethical Guidelines for Settlement Negotiations: Exceeding the Limits of the Adver-
sarial Ethic, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 1218, 1220 (2004).
67 See supra discussion accompanying notes 1–14.
68 Mass. R. Prof. C. 4.1 comment [1].
69 Matter of O’Toole, 31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 511 (2015) (citing authorities). See also Matter of 
Hession, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 338 (2013) (“calculatedly misleading” statements, even if liter-
ally true, may qualify as misrepresentations; addressing Rule 3.3(a), not Rule 4.1). In Matter of 
Angwafo, 453 Mass. 28, 37, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 8 (2009), the SJC concluded that certain 
“deceitful” conduct will not qualify as “misrepresentation” for purposes of Rule 3.3(a) (and, pre-
sumably, Rule 4.1(a)), but would nevertheless violate Rule 8.4(c).
70 Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) (2015). See Matter of Lee, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 355 (2009) (attorney 
who misrepresented terms while acting as a real estate broker found to have violated Rule 8.4(c) 
term suspension, aggravated by prior misconduct). See also discussion of Rule 8.4(c) infra Sec-
tion IV.
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In some jurisdictions, Rule 4.1(a) poses a problem for lawyers involved in 
certain undercover investigations, including civil rights “testers.” Undercover inves-
tigations are addressed as part of the discussion of Rule 8.4(c) in Section IV of 
this chapter. Even if a jurisdiction permits civil rights and similar testing, a law-
yer cannot use “excessively intrusive investigative techniques” and claim doing so 
as a private tester. In Matter of Crossen,71 the SJC held that such conduct violated 
Rules 4.1(a) and 8.4(c) and, on those facts, warranted disbarment.
B. Discipline for Violating Rule 4.1
1. Disbarment
No Massachusetts lawyer has been disbarred solely for making false state-
ments to others outside of a tribunal setting, in violation of Rule 4.1(a), although 
several were disbarred for criminal convictions relating to making such false state-
ments.72 Moreover, several lawyers have been disbarred for such misconduct when 
combined with other serious misconduct. For example, in Matter of Pepyne,73 an 
attorney was disbarred after multiple instances of misconduct. One of these 
occurred after a client, a plaintiﬀ in a personal injury matter, died before the mat-
ter was resolved. The attorney failed to inform the insurer of the client’s death 
and continued to engage in settlement matters while lying to the deceased cli-
ent’s family. In Matter of Siciliano,74 the attorney agreed to settlement of a mal-
practice lawsuit after his clients refused to settle. He forged their names to a 
release, sent the release to the defendant’s counsel, and then misappropriated 
the funds after receiving them. In Matter of Hoffman,75 the lawyer misused 
mortgage loan proceeds and arranged for an employee to forge another attor-
ney’s signature on six insurance policies without that attorney’s knowledge or 
authority. He also refused to cooperate with the bar counsel.
71 450 Mass. 533, 555–68, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 122, 149–65 (2008).
72 See, e.g., Matter of Concemi, 422 Mass. 326, 12 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 64 (1996) (attorney dis-
barred after being convicted of thirty-ﬁve felony counts, including conspiracy to defraud bank, 
bank fraud, and making false statements to federally insured bank while acting in his capacity as 
a lawyer); Matter of Walsh, 13 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 829 (1997) (aﬃdavit of resignation accepted 
and disbarment ordered after conviction for making false statements to a federally insured bank). 
A third lawyer was indeﬁnitely suspended for making false statements without being convicted 
of bank fraud, but there were also substantial mitigating factors. Matter of Nickerson, 422 Mass. 
333, 12 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 367 (1996).
73 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 502 (2010).
74 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 654 (2007).
75 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 301 (2007).
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You Should Know
The presumptive sanction for out-of-court deception is 
less than for deception occurring in court. But lawyers 
who have lied about material facts while representing 
clients have received signiﬁcant discipline. Disbarment 
may be rare, but suspension is not.
Lawyers who misuse funds belonging to others and then misrepresent the 
facts in order to avoid detection or to mislead others are disbarred for those mul-
tiple rule violations, including Rule 4.1(a).76
2. Suspension
The sanction for lawyers who misrepresent facts in order to deceive others 
and cause them harm is often a term suspension. While the full bench of the 
SJC has not stated a presumptive sanction for misrepresentations under Rule 
4.1(a), a single-justice decision stated that the presumptive sanction for a false 
statement to a third person, not in connection with a tribunal, should be less 
than that occurring before a tribunal.77 Nevertheless, lawyers have incurred sus-
pensions for periods longer than one year for violating Rule 4.1(a). In Matter of 
Friery,78 an attorney was suspended for two years for misrepresenting her pro-
fessional credentials, in violation of Rule 4.1(a). The respondent falsely repre-
sented to her law ﬁrm that she had graduated from medical school, and her name 
appeared as “M.D.” or “Dr.” on the ﬁrm’s letterhead, business cards, and other 
documents. Despite no harm to clients or the law ﬁrm, and no aggravating fac-
tors, this unambiguous falsehood warranted the two-year suspension, most likely 
because of the extent of the misrepresentations, the length of time the respon-
dent repeated them or allowed them to be repeated, and the number of people 
who heard or repeated the misrepresentation.
76 For other examples of a lawyer disbarred for a combination of misconduct, including misrepre-
sentation to others, see, e.g., Matter of Connolly, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 80 (2007) (cover-up of 
neglect of probate matters); Matter of Roberts, 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 656 (2006) (misrepresenta-
tions to cover for mishandling client funds); Matter of McDonald, 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 381 (2004) 
(misrepresentations about mishandling of client funds, including in bankruptcy proceeding).
77 Matter of Goodman, 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 352 (2006) (“The respondent correctly distinguishes 
cases involving misrepresentations to a tribunal, where the presumptive sanction is a one-year sus-
pension, from cases involving misrepresentations to others.”).
78 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 337 (2012).
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You Should Know
Lawyers have received lengthy suspensions for making 
intentionally false statements outside of court settings, 
especially in real estate transactions.
Several lawyers have been suspended for longer than one year for misrep-
resentations during real estate closings, typically to obtain mortgages where 
the borrower would not otherwise qualify for the loan. For example, in Matter 
of Alberino,79 an attorney was suspended for eighteen months after he prepared, 
signed, and made the buyers and sellers sign false HUD-1 Disclosure State-
ments as part of a scheme to rescue homeowners in foreclosure. In Matter of 
Hanserd,80 the respondent participated in the same schemes as the lawyer in 
Alberino. She was suspended for one year and a day, the lighter discipline likely 
the result of her having less responsibility for orchestrating the scheme.81 Other 
lawyers involved in fraudulent real estate transactions have received similar sus-
pensions, with the length of the suspension seemingly determined by the respon-
dent lawyer’s level of responsibility and the number of transactions aﬀected by 
misrepresentations.82
In Matter of Goodman,83 the single justice imposed a one-year suspension, 
with a reinstatement petition and hearing required,84 for what he termed the 
respondent’s “brazen” misrepresentations while representing clients in personal 
79 27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 1 (2011).
80 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 229 (2010).
81 See also Matter of Sementelli, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 584 (2013). In Sementelli, the single jus-
tice imposed an eighteen-month suspension for making false statements to obtain three mort-
gage loans for properties she was buying as well as a fourth loan for the beneﬁt of another lawyer. 
The respondent was charged under Rule 8.4, however, not Rule 4.1.
82 See, e.g., Matter of Palmer, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 486 (2009) (twenty-one-month suspension 
for executing false HUD-1 Settlement Statements); Matter of Robbins, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 
533 (2009) (nine-month suspension for participation in real estate closing fraud; lawyer acted at 
employer’s direction).
83 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 352 (2006).
84 The single justice permitted the lawyer to ﬁle a reinstatement petition after nine months of sus-
pension. This is now the current rule. See Massachusetts Rules and Orders of the Supreme 
Judicial Court r. 4:01, § 18(2) [hereinafter SJC Rule] (eﬀective Sept. 1, 2009). The reason for 
allowing a suspended lawyer to apply early for reinstatement is so the time required to process 
the reinstatement petition and conduct a hearing does not eﬀectively add three months to the 
length of the suspension. For a discussion of the diﬀerence between a suspension of one year, and 
that of a year and a day, see Chapter 4.
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injury cases. In one matter, the attorney made false statements to a health insurer 
in order to release its lien against the proceeds of a client’s recovery. In another 
case, that attorney failed to disclose his client’s death to the insurer and implied 
that the plaintiﬀ was alive. By comparison, in Matter of Mulvey,85 an attorney 
received a six-month suspension for knowingly providing misleading, decep-
tive, and false information to a third party in order to obtain funding for his cli-
ent—funding that would not have been advanced had the lawyer communicated 
accurate information. The relatively short suspension is likely due to the fact there 
was only one transaction and the lawyer made full restitution to the third party.
In Matter of Ghitelman,86 the lawyer was suspended for a year and a day after 
she fabricated immigration documents that she had failed to ﬁle, and which 
she then provided to successor counsel to cover her neglect. Her misconduct 
was aggravated by prior discipline, implying that this increased her sanction. In
Matter of Robbins,87 the respondent was suspended for one year after he drafted 
documents for and presided over a fraudulent transaction based on a sham pur-
chase and sale agreement. The single justice, in comparing this misconduct to 
previous disciplinary matters, concluded that a one-year suspension was appro-
priate.88 The attorney’s total suspension was increased to eighteen months for also 
commingling client funds.
The shortest suspension for misconduct related to Rule 4.1(a) or its prede-
cessor occurred in Matter of Connolly.89 In Connolly, the single justice agreed to 
a stipulated three-month suspension after the lawyer prepared, but did not sign, 
a false HUD-1 Settlement Statement for his client. The statement misrepre-
sented that his client had paid $5,700 in points to the bank so that the client 
could fraudulently be reimbursed that sum from his employer.
3. Public Reprimand
Aside from instances of lying to clients (misconduct not covered by Rule 4.1(a), 
which only applies to third persons), no lawyer has received a public reprimand 
in Massachusetts for making misrepresentations outside of court in violation 
of this rule. In one instance, Matter of Farber,90 the respondent received a public 
85 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 398 (2009).
86 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 162 (2004).
87 17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 480 (2001).
88 The single justice used as a relevant benchmark Matter of Eastwood, 10 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 70 
(1994) (one-year suspension for participation in fraudulent real estate transaction).
89 11 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 43 (1995).
90 27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 249 (2011).
276
Misconduct and Typical Sanctions
reprimand for making false statements to another during a negotiation. Because 
the board found that the respondent was acting as a broker, and not a lawyer, in 
that negotiation, the sanction was based upon violating Rule 8.4(c), not Rule 4.1(a).
4. Admonition
The board has concluded that some misrepresentations to third parties in vio-
lation of Rule 4.1 may warrant an admonition, especially if the recipient has not 
been harmed and mitigating factors exist. In Matter of an Attorney,91 the lawyer 
wrote a letter to opposing counsel in a divorce case seeking an advance on mar-
ital assets to purchase a house, without mentioning that the lawyer’s client was 
engaged in a related transaction with her new paramour. While the individual 
statements in the attorney’s letter could be read as literally true, and while she 
believed the statements to be true, the attorney violated Rule 4.1(a) because the 
letter was “deliberately misleading”—through half-truths and omissions, it was 
calculated to create false impressions in the mind of the recipient. Ultimately, 
the lawyer disclosed the falsehood, and the other party suﬀered no harm from 
the deception. After concluding that the conduct constituted a misrepresenta-
tion in violation of Rule 4.1(a), despite the document’s literal truth, the board 
decided against imposing a public reprimand and instead admonished the law-
yer. A single justice approved that order.
In Matter of an Attorney,92 the SJC imposed an admonition against a lawyer 
who wrongfully asserted statutory liens in communications to insurers, without 
any authority to assert the liens. The Court cited Rule 8.4(c), but not Rule 4.1(a), 
for this misconduct.
IV. THE NATURE OF THE LAWYER’S RESPONSIBILITIES
REGARDING DECEPTION GENERALLY
Rule 8.4(c) broadly prohibits deception by lawyers and must be read in tan-
dem with the treatment of deception under Rules 3.3(e) and 4.1(a), each of which, 
as noted in previous sections, permits some attorney deception in identiﬁed lim-
ited circumstances.93 Rule 8.4(c) applies to lawyers acting within or outside the role 
91 Ad. No. 07-33, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 1012 (2007).
92 Ad. No. 08-02, 451 Mass. 131, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 824 (2008).
93 Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3(e) permits a lawyer to participate, in limited circumstances, in present-
ing false evidence by a criminal defendant. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. Rule 4.1(a) 
and its comments permit a lawyer to misstate authority and other nonmaterial facts in negotiation.
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of attorney, unlike Rules 3.3 and 4.1, which apply to a lawyer acting on behalf 
of a client.94 Section IV(C) addresses speciﬁc areas in which Massachusetts law-
yers should consider Rule 8.4(c).
RULE 8.4: MISCONDUCT
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
* * *
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation[.]
A. The Lessons of Rule 8.4(c)
Rule 8.4(c) prohibits four separate types of misconduct: dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit, and misrepresentation. The disciplinary reports often reference these four 
items collectively, but the type of wrongdoing may aﬀect the sanction given. For 
example, in Matter of Angwafo,95 the Court stated: “Although we have concluded 
the evidence does not support a ﬁnding that the respondent knowingly made a 
false statement of material fact as to her assets, the special hearing oﬃcer prop-
erly could conclude on this record that the respondent’s conduct was deceitful, 
and adversely reﬂected on her ﬁtness to practice law in violation of Rule 8.4(c), 
(d), and (h).”96 To qualify as fraud or misrepresentation, the misconduct must be 
intentional,97 but reliance is not necessary.98 No disciplinary report or SJC opinion 
See supra note 66 and accompanying text. Neither of those authorities is undermined by the blan-
ket prohibitions in Rule 8.4 against lawyer deception or dishonesty.
94 Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3 comment [1] states: “This Rule governs the conduct of a lawyer who is 
representing a client in the proceedings of a tribunal.” That language was added in 2015. Pre-
viously, some lawyers received discipline for violating Rule 3.3 in matters not involving client 
representation. See, e.g., Matter of Balliro, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 31 (2009) (criminal trial in-
volving the father of her child); Matter of Szostkiewicz, 31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 609 (2015) 
(personal child support matter); Matter of Leahy, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 529 (2012) (respon-
dent’s divorce). Rule 4.1 applies to lawyers “in the course of representing a client.” Rule 4.1.
95 453 Mass. 28, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. (2009).
96 453 Mass. at 37–38.
97 See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.0(e) (“ ‘Fraud’ or ‘fraudulent’ denotes conduct that is fraudulent 
under substantive or procedural law and has a purpose to deceive.”) In Matter of O’Connor, 21 
Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 525 (2005), the single justice found that the respondent’s negligent mis-
representations to the client violated Rules 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4, but not Rules 8.4 or 4.1; his in-
tentional misrepresentations violated Rule 8.4(c).
98 See Matter of Hutton, 31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 313 (2015) (“Our cases have not construed rule 
8.4(c) to require a showing of detrimental reliance.”).
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has used the term dishonesty as a direct basis for discipline,99 but other jurisdic-
tions have disciplined attorneys for dishonesty that did not amount to fraud, 
deceit, or misrepresentation.100
B. Discipline for Violating Rule 8.4(c)
The Massachusetts disciplinary reports include more than ﬁve hundred dis-
ciplinary matters since 1999 where Rule 8.4(c) played a role in the disposition.
You Should Know
Rule 8.4(c) is cited in a wide variety of settings and cir-
cumstances. Often the rule serves as the basis for disci-
pline for misconduct that also violates Rule 3.3 or Rule 
4.1. But at times Rule 8.4(c) serves more independently 
as the basis for discipline, given its broader coverage 
than those two rules.101 Also, cases involving intentional 
misuse of funds are often charged under both Rule 1.15 
and Rule 8.4(c).102
1. Disbarment
Several lawyers have been disbarred for major misconduct “involving dis-
honesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation,” in violation of Rule 8.4(c). These 
disbarment cases frequently involve a lawyer who engaged in a signiﬁcant crime 
involving theft or fraud, and the standard discipline for a felony conviction while 
in the course of practicing law is disbarment or, in some instances, indeﬁnite 
99 While not relying expressly on the term “dishonesty,” the disciplinary reports in Angwafo and 
O’Toole determined that the respondent’s misconduct was “deceitful.” See Angwafo, 453 Mass. at 
37–38; Matter of O’Toole, 31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 511 (2015).
100 See In re Shorter, 570 A.2d 760, 768 (D.C. 1990) (dishonesty includes “conduct evincing a lack 
of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; a lack of fairness and straightforwardness”); In re
Scanio, 919 A.2d 1137, 1142–43 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“[W]hat may not legally be characterized as 
an act of fraud, deceit or misrepresentation may still evince dishonesty” (citations omitted)); 
Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Maryland v. McDonald, 85 A.3d 117, 140 (Md. 2014).
101 For one such example, see Matter of Sementelli, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 584 (2013) (eighteen-
month suspension where Rule 8.4 served as the primary basis for three of four counts where the 
misconduct involved lawyer deception of others).
102 See, e.g., Matter of Strauss, 479 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 294, 33 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2018).
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suspension.103 For instance, in Matter of Ciapciak,104 an attorney was disbarred 
after he pleaded guilty to several counts of mail fraud and ﬁling false tax returns 
after defrauding his client, an insurance company, of substantial funds. In Mat-
ter of Castelluccio,105 an attorney was disbarred for violating 8.4(c) when he mis-
appropriated a law ﬁrm’s funds for his personal use and intentionally concealed 
his misappropriation by falsifying oﬃce records. In Matter of Ricci,106 the single 
justice disbarred an attorney for removing a check from an acquaintance’s mail-
box, forging the signature, depositing it into his own bank account, and spend-
ing the money, all without the acquaintance’s knowledge or authorization.
In Matter of Cohen,107 the single justice disbarred an attorney who had 
devised a “scheme to defraud insurers by submitting false, inﬂated, and back-
dated medical bills to demonstrate that clients’ medical expenses exceeded a $500 
threshold for bringing third-party claims on behalf of clients.” The attorney 
pleaded guilty to mail fraud. In Matter of Crossen,108 discussed in Section III(A) 
as well as other chapters in this book,109 the SJC disbarred a lawyer for oversee-
ing a “sham” job interview of a judge’s law clerk and surreptitiously recording 
the interview.
2. Suspension
Many lawyers have been suspended for misconduct involving misrepresen-
tation or deceit in violation of Rule 8.4(c), and in some cases received lengthy 
suspensions. For instance, in Matter of Lupo,110 the SJC indeﬁnitely suspended 
an attorney who engaged in conﬂicts of interest and made misrepresentations to 
elderly, unsophisticated clients for his own ﬁnancial gain. In its opinion, the Court 
noted, “While there is a distinction between the respondent’s intentional misrep-
resentations that inured to his ﬁnancial beneﬁt, and the intentional deprivation 
of client funds, for purposes of comparable sanctions the two forms of miscon-
duct bear remarkable similarities. In both cases the attorney beneﬁts ﬁnancially 
103 Matter of Patch, 466 Mass. 1016, 1018, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 522 (2013).
104 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 116 (2009).
105 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 62 (2007).
106 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 460 (2004).
107 5 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 75 (1988).
108 450 Mass. 533, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 122 (2008).
109 See also Matter of Curry, 450 Mass. 503, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 188 (2008) (companion case 
to Crossen; lawyer disbarred); Matter of Donahue, 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 193 (2006) (compan-
ion case; three-year suspension).
110 447 Mass. 345, 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 513 (2006).
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from his misdeeds at the expense of clients. We therefore conclude that an indef-
inite suspension is appropriate.”
In Matter of Voros,111 the lawyer was suspended indeﬁnitely after he fraud-
ulently persuaded his client to enter into a joint venture concerning a real estate 
purchase. The attorney intentionally misrepresented to his client the joint ven-
ture’s future proﬁtability and the lawyer’s own real estate experience, failed to note 
several outstanding obligations on the property that adversely aﬀected its value, 
and grossly overstated his net worth as a general partner. In Matter of Hallal,112
the respondent was suspended indeﬁnitely after the attorney, a partner at a law 
ﬁrm, billed $68,000 of his own personal expenses to clients, implying in his bill-
ing statements that the expenses were legitimate.
In Matter of Gleason,113 the respondent was suspended for two years for 
coordinating a real estate investment scheme in which he overstated the acqui-
sition costs to investors and lenders, retained part of the inﬂated sales price, 
forged an investor’s signature on a document, and convinced his secretary to 
notarize the false signature. The board compared this misconduct to Matter of 
Jacobson,114 where the lawyer was suspended for one year for creating fraudu-
lent documents in a real estate scheme. The single justice accepted the BBO’s 
recommendation of a two-year suspension, without an explanation for the dif-
ference between Gleason and Jacobson. In Matter of Cloonan,115 an attorney was 
suspended for six months after he retyped the last page of a severance agree-
ment with his employer, signiﬁcantly altering the document, including a pro-
vision that paid him an $850,000 bonus. The respondent later retained counsel 
in order to ﬁle suit to enforce the agreement.
Lawyers have been suspended for misrepresenting their status as lawyers 
or for deceiving the Board of Bar Examiners during their admission process. For 
example, in Matter of Betts,116 an attorney was suspended for one year after he 
failed to disclose in his petition for admission to the Massachusetts bar prior 
charges for illegally possessing a Class D substance and for operating a vehicle 
with a suspended license. In Matter of Soufflas,117 an attorney was suspended for 
six months after he inﬂated his résumé and altered his law school transcript. In
111 11 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 287 (1995).
112 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 207 (2004).
113 10 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 141 (1994).
114 7 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 123 (1991).
115 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 121 (2009).
116 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 44 (2010).
117 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 739 (2006).
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Matter of Days,118 an attorney was suspended for two months for failing to notify 
the board that her professional liability insurance had lapsed and for continu-
ing to represent indigent criminal defendants in violation of her agreement with 
the Committee for Public Counsel Services (CPCS) to maintain insurance. Dur-
ing the period she was uninsured, the attorney falsely certiﬁed in her Attorney 
Annual Registration Statement that she had insurance. In Matter of Walckner,119
a lawyer who was a former police oﬃcer was suspended for ﬁve months because 
he intentionally omitted from his bar application the fact that he had been twice 
disciplined as a police oﬃcer. The single justice rejected the respondent’s claim 
that he misunderstood the application question and also rejected the assertion 
that the lawyer’s prior reporting of misconduct by a former superior police 
oﬃcer was mitigating.
3. Public Reprimand
Usually, misconduct “involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresenta-
tion” in violation of Rule 8.4(c) leads to serious discipline for the lawyer, most 
likely a suspension. But some instances of dishonesty or deceit have resulted 
in a public reprimand, where the misrepresentation or deception involved less 
serious matters. For example, in Matter of Cross,120 the lawyer received a public 
reprimand by stipulation for making intentional, but nonmaterial, misrepre-
sentations in a return of service; she admitted her misconduct and later did not 
seek to rely upon the document, thus further mitigating its eﬀect. In Matter of 
Weitz,121 the lawyer received a public reprimand for notarizing signatures he 
had not witnessed, relying instead on the client’s representations that they were 
authentic (when they were not). And in Matter of Cowin,122 the attorney had 
his client sign a blank page, which was used as his client’s signature on a veri-
ﬁed complaint ﬁled in court.
In Matter of Baker,123 an attorney received a public reprimand, by stipulation, 
for failing to aﬃrmatively disclose to a participant in a real estate closing that 
118 30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 89 (2012); see also Matter of Powers, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 518 (2010) 
(attorney’s violation of Rule 8.4(c) by altering pages to CPCS falsely aﬃrming that he was cov-
ered by professional liability insurance led to a suspension of a year and a day).
119 34 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___, SJC No. BD-2017-081 (2018) (March 27, 2018) (collecting cases).
120 15 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 157 (1999). Cross was mentioned in the discussion of Rule 3.3 in Sec-
tion II(B)(3).
121 10 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 286 (1994).
122 2 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 48 (1981), is discussed supra at note 59 and the related text. It is prob-
ably no longer good law.
123 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 25 (2007).
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the HUD-1 statement his client signed was inaccurate and misrepresented the 
facts. In Matter of Lederman,124 an attorney received a public reprimand, again by 
stipulation, for violating Rule 8.4(c) while representing a husband in a contested 
divorce. The attorney requested information from the wife’s former mortgage 
company, knowing that the company would infer that the attorney was repre-
senting the wife in an estate-planning matter. The attorney neither had the wife’s 
permission to send the letter to the mortgage company, nor did the attorney send 
the wife a copy of the letter. Neither Baker nor Lederman relied upon Rule 4.1(a) 
in assessing the misconduct; both board opinions refer only to Rule 8.4(c). Also, 
in Matter of Farber,125 a lawyer, acting as a real estate broker, received a public 
reprimand for misrepresentations made while negotiating a sale of a home, vio-
lating Rule 8.4(c).
4. Admonition
Similar to the treatment of Rule 4.1(a) violations, a lawyer who misrepre-
sents the facts in an eﬀort to accomplish a lawful purpose may receive an admo-
nition, particularly if there is no harm to the client or others. For instance, in 
Ad. No. 12-08,126 an attorney received an admonition after she submitted an aﬃ-
davit on which she had signed her client’s signature, with her client’s permission, 
after the client had reviewed the document. In Ad. No. 07-27,127 an attorney 
received an admonition after he signed a real estate deed outside of the presence 
of a notary, expecting it to be notarized later, as it was. And in Ad. No. 08-12,128
an attorney submitted documents to the Internal Revenue Service and the Depart-
ment of Revenue that appeared to be (but were not) submitted by his ex-wife and 
former employee. He did so in order to protect the two taxpayers, but also for his 
own business reasons. A hearing committee recommended a public reprimand,
but the board reduced it to an admonition, based on the lack of harm and the 
fact that the deception occurred outside of the practice of law.
124 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 462 (2006).
125 27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 249 (2011).
126 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 925 (2012). Similarly, in Ad. No. 12-06, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 922 
(2012), an attorney violated Rule 8.4(c) by notarizing a document without witnessing his client’s 
signature. For other cases involving false signatures and false witnessing of signatures, see Ad. 
No. 08-14, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 881 (2008); Ad. No. 05-19, 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 710 
(2005); Ad. No. 04-44, 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 743 (2004); Ad. No. 03-09, 19 Mass. Att’y Disc. 
R. 534 (2003); Ad. No. 03-60, 19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 635 (2003); Ad. No. 03-62, 19 Mass. Att’y 
Disc. R. 638 (2003).
127 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 987 (2007).
128 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 876 (2008).
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Practice Tip
Busy lawyers, or lawyers with busy clients, are sometimes 
tempted to sign their clients’ names to truthful documents 
or to ask a client to sign a blank sheet of paper that the 
lawyer will later use to insert true material. Actions like 
those, even if well-intended and without any harm to any 
person, have led to discipline.
C. Some Special Considerations Involving Rule 8.4(c)
While both Rule 3.3 and Rule 4.1 refer to a lawyer’s professional activities, 
the requirements of Rule 8.4 apply also to conduct outside of the attorney’s pro-
fessional employment.129 A lawyer may be disciplined under this rule for dishon-
esty or fraud occurring while not representing a client. Several Massachusetts 
lawyers have been disciplined for conduct outside of the practice of law. For ex-
ample, in Matter of Lee,130 the lawyer was suspended for violating Rules 8.4(c) 
and 8.4(h) while acting as a real estate broker. In Matter of Barrett,131 the lawyer 
was suspended for two years for multiple instances of misconduct while acting 
as a corporate oﬃcer.
Practice Tip
Although Rules 3.3, 4.1, and 8.4(c) combine to prohibit 
deception in nearly all instances, certain instances of 
deceptive conduct are beyond the scope of those rules. 
Under Rule 3.3(e)(2), a criminal defense lawyer, in some 
limited circumstances, may not prevent the introduction 
of limited false evidence at trial. Rule 4.1(a) permits some 
limited deception of others as to nonmaterial represen-
tations. Rule 8.4(c), which prohibits all dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit, or misrepresentation, is not intended to undercut 
those other rules, but applies in all other circumstances.
129 See Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 comment [1] (2015); American Bar Association, Annotated 
Model Rules of Professsional Conduct (7th ed. 2011) [hereinafter Annotated Model Rules]
(“like the other provisions of Rule 8.4, encompasses conduct outside the realm of the practice of law”).
130 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 352 (2009). This was the respondent’s third suspension. His ﬁrst, Mat-
ter of Lee, 17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 358 (2001), was also for conduct not in the role as a lawyer.
131 447 Mass. 453, 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 58 (2006).
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Some well-intended, but deceptive, activities lawyers engage in raise per-
plexing questions about the meaning of Rule 8.4(c) for Massachusetts law 
prac tice. One concerns the use of undercover agents, or testers, to ferret out 
wrongdoing. Another is ghostwriting pleadings for pro se litigants to assist 
them without assuming a more formal representation capacity.
Testing and undercover ruses: Clients may ask lawyers to assist in investigat-
ing wrongdoing by setting up undercover schemes or similar ruses to determine 
whether the wrongdoing is occurring. District attorneys and other prosecutors 
or government lawyers cooperate with law-enforcement agencies in using infor-
mants to inﬁltrate criminal enterprises. Civil rights lawyers challenging discrimi-
nation in employment or housing employ testers who apply for jobs or apartments 
in an eﬀort to establish patterns of discriminatory conduct. In all of those set-
tings, the undercover actors engage in “dishonesty, . . . deceit, or misrepresenta-
tion,” with the active participation of lawyers.
Massachusetts state courts have not addressed the question directly yet,132
but a federal district court judge, in Leysock v. Forest Laboratories, Inc.,133 the 
district court dismissed a complaint as a sanction for violating Rules 4.1(a) and 
8.4(c) after the plaintiﬀ ’s “attorneys engaged in an elaborate scheme of decep-
tive conduct in order to obtain information from physicians about their prescrib-
ing practices, and in some instances about their patients.” The court concluded 
that cases outside of Massachusetts permitted proper investigative testing,134 but 
the action here far exceeded any such allowable, limited deception.135
132 Two prominent SJC companion decisions referred to the question in determining that the law-
yers’ extremely deceitful ruse fell well outside of any plausible understanding of a “testers” exception 
to Rule 8.4(c). See Matter of Crossen, 450 Mass. 533, 565–66, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 122 (2008); 
Matter of Curry, 450 Mass. 503, 522–25, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 188 (2008). While the language of 
the Crossen opinion is not favorable toward private ruses outside of the law-enforcement context, see
450 Mass. at 566, language from its companion case Curry is more ambiguous. See note 137, infra.
133 2017 WL 1591833 at *1 (D. Mass., May 25, 2017) (Saylor, J.).
134 Citing cases from outside of Massachusetts, the court wrote:
Although the rules on their face impose sweeping prohibitions, in fact they have been 
interpreted to contain narrowly deﬁned exceptions that permit the gathering of evidence 
under certain circumstances. . . . [an] exception permits civil attorneys to use investigators 
in certain circumstances to obtain information that would normally be available to any 
member of the public (such as a prospective renter or a consumer making a similar 
inquiry). For example, attorneys may use “testers”—individuals who pose as renters or 
purchasers with no intent to actually rent or purchase a home—in order to gather 
evidence of housing discrimination.
Id., slip op. at 11–12.
135 Id., slip op. at 15–23.
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While some courts or commentators outside of the Commonwealth have 
concluded that such activity violates Rule 8.4(c),136 some states that have addressed 
the question have condoned private testers.137 Leysock assumed that the SJC 
might accept the use of testers to uncover housing discrimination or trademark 
infringement as well as within the law-enforcement context so long as appro-
priate safeguards are in place.138
Ghostwriting: Ghostwriting is the practice by which lawyers draft documents 
for clients to use while representing themselves pro se, typically in court. Law-
yers engage in ghostwriting most often for good-faith reasons, to assist clients 
who cannot aﬀord to pay for full representation, and to narrow the “access to jus-
tice” gap. Many authorities—including a 1998 Massachusetts Bar Association 
ethics opinion—consider ghostwriting to be inherently deceptive and, depend-
ing on the facts, a possible violation of Rule 8.4(c).139 One animating concern 
is that judges tend to treat pro se litigants more leniently, and if those litigants 
in fact have a lawyer, that favorable or lenient treatment will have been received 
unfairly. Another is the worry that lawyers, and especially paid counsel, will 
participate in litigation with no accountability. The American Bar Association 
(ABA) has reversed its position on the issue. After concluding in an informal 
136 See In re Gatti, 8 P.3d 966 (Or. 2000) (concluding that lawyers, including prosecutors, in Ore-
gon violate Rule 8.4(c) by covert investigation using undercover agents). The State of Oregon 
later amended its rules to invalidate the eﬀect of that decision.
137 Apple Corps Ltd. v. Int’l Collectors Soc’y, 15 F. Supp. 2d 456 (D.N.J. 1998) (“The prevailing 
understanding in the legal profession is that a public or private lawyer’s use of an undercover 
investigator to detect ongoing violations of the law is not ethically proscribed, especially where 
it would be diﬃcult to discover the violations by other means.”). For a list of similar authorities, 
see Annotated Model Rules, supra note 129, at Rule 8.4(c).
138 Compare Crossen, 450 Mass. at 566 (“The crucial factor distinguishing government and private 
attorneys is the lack of oversight for the latter. Whatever leeway government attorneys are per-
mitted in conducting investigations, they are subject not only to ethical constraints, but also to 
supervisory oversight and constitutional limits on what they may and may not do, constraints 
that do not apply to private attorneys representing private clients.”) with Curry, 450 Mass. at 
523–24 (after citing a case outside of Massachusetts that held that the use of investigators pos-
ing as customers violates no ethical rules when seeking to “ferret out discrimination in housing” 
or “uncover . . . trademark infringement,” the Court noted, “Curry’s scheme is diﬀerent from 
such investigations not only in degree but in kind . . . . Unlike discrimination testers or investi-
gators who pose as members of the public in order to reproduce pre-existing patterns of conduct, 
Curry built an elaborate fraudulent scheme whose purpose was to elicit or potentially threaten 
the law clerk into making statements that he otherwise would not have made.”).
139 See, e.g., Duran v. Carris, 238 F.3d 1268, 1272-73 (10th Cir. 2001); Laremont-Lopez v. South-
eastern Tidewater Opportunity Ctr., 968 F. Supp. 1075, 1078 (E.D. Va. 1997); Johnson v. Bd. of 
Cnty. Comm’rs, 868 F. Supp. 1226, 1231 (D. Colo. 1994); Massachusetts Bar Association Ethics 
Op. 98-1 (1998).
286
Misconduct and Typical Sanctions
1978 ethics opinion that the practice was deceptive and troublesome,140 the ABA 
issued a formal opinion in 2007 concluding that the practice of ghostwriting 
generally presents no ethical problems at all.141
The SJC now permits limited assistance representation (LAR), including, 
in certain circumstances, ghostwriting for pro se litigants. The Court’s Stand-
ing Order, “In Re: Limited Representation,” permits limited appearances in 
any trial court that chooses to allow it.142 That order addresses ghostwriting with 
the following instructions to lawyers:
An attorney may assist a client in preparing a pleading, motion or other 
document to be signed and ﬁled in court by the client, a practice some-
times referred to as “ghostwriting.” In such cases, the attorney shall 
insert the notation “prepared with assistance of counsel” on any pleading, 
motion or other document prepared by the attorney. The attorney is not 
required to sign the pleading, motion or document, and the ﬁling of 
such pleading, motion or document shall not constitute an appearance 
by the attorney.143
All of the Massachusetts trial courts implemented some form of LAR in 
their courts.144
140 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof ’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1414 (1978).
141 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof ’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 07-446 (2007).
142 See Supreme Judicial Court Order Regarding Limited Assistance Representation, https://www.mass
.gov/supreme-judicial-court-rules/supreme-judicial-court-order-regarding-limited-assistance 
(last visited Feb. 26, 2018).
143 Id. The standing order is clear that a lawyer may not make a limited appearance in court with-
out completing a training session. The order is not clear that a lawyer must have completed that 
training session in order to ghostwrite pleadings.
144 See Limited Assistance Representation, https://www.mass.gov/service-details/limited-assistance
-representation (last visited April 3, 2018).
287
chapter thirteen
Other Limits on Zealous Advocacy
(Rules 1.2(d), 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 4.2, and 4.3)
I. INTRODUCTION
Lawyers serve as zealous advocates for their clients.1 In both litigation and 
transactional matters, a lawyer’s duty is to advance the client’s interests as best 
as possible, limited only by the bounds of the law, ethics, and the client’s in-
structions. While lawyers occasionally fail to act zealously or with adequate dil-
igence, such as when overwhelmed or experiencing a conﬂict of interest,2 most 
often lawyers pursue their clients’ matters with great dedication in an eﬀort to 
satisfy both the clients’ and the lawyers’ interests. Sometimes, though, lawyers 
go too far in an eﬀort to win or to achieve a goal. This chapter discusses the 
guidance in the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct that address a law-
yer’s zealous advocacy.
This chapter does not address misrepresentation to and fraud on a tribunal, 
actions that often arise from a lawyer’s overzealousness. It covers rules that pro-
hibit a lawyer from proceeding in ways that, while perhaps beneﬁcial to a cli-
ent, are unfair to another person, party, or lawful process. The rules discussed 
here establish boundaries for the lawyer’s zeal. At times, lawyers exceed those 
boundaries, leading to discipline. This topic is divided into three categories: (1) 
limitations on what claims a lawyer may pursue on behalf of a client, (2) limita-
tions on litigation tactics, and (3) limitations on contact with others in the course 
of representing a client. For each topic, different rules apply and diﬀerent sanc-
tions are imposed.
1 Massachusetts is one of the few states that retained the sentence in Rule 1.3 stressing the duty 
of zeal after the American Bar Association (ABA) eliminated it in its Model Rule version. Com-
pare Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3 (“The lawyer should represent a client zealously within the bounds of the 
law.”) with ABA Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.3 (omitting that sentence).
2 See discussion of “The Nature of the Lawyer’s Responsibilities Regarding Diligence,” in Chap-
ter 7, Section III, and “Problems of Conﬂicts of Interest,” in Chapter 10.
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II. RULES GOVERNING THE SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION
AND PERMISSIBLE CLAIMS
Rules 1.2(d) and 3.1 address the limits and restrictions of legal conduct in 
representing clients.
RULE 1.2: SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION
* * *
(d) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, 
in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a 
lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course 
of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make 
a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning, or 
application of the law.
RULE 3.1: MERITORIOUS CLAIMS AND CONTENTIONS
A lawyer shall not bring, continue, or defend a proceeding, or assert 
or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and 
fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith 
argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing 
law. A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the 
respondent in a proceeding that could result in incarceration, may 
nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every 
element of the case be established.
A. The Scope of Rules 1.2(d) and 3.1
There are some ways in which a lawyer simply may not help a client, no mat-
ter how insistent the client is. Two separate rules establish some outer bound-
aries—although hardly crystal-clear limits—on the services a lawyer may provide 
to a client. The ﬁrst is Rule 1.2(d), which says:
A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in con-
duct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may 
discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a 
client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith eﬀort to 
determine the validity, scope, meaning, or application of the law.
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A lawyer who oﬀers assistance to a client in a matter that the lawyer knows 
is criminal or fraudulent has committed misconduct. In some extreme cases, 
lawyers have been disbarred for doing so.
Rule 3.1 establishes a diﬀerent, but related, constraint on lawyer conduct. 
That rule says:
A lawyer shall not bring, continue, or defend a proceeding, or assert or 
controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for 
doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for 
an extension, modiﬁcation or reversal of existing law.
Even if the client has no criminal or fraudulent scheme in mind, a lawyer may 
not assist the client in a proceeding if there is no good-faith basis, in law or in 
fact, for the assertions the lawyer would make. Lawyers may not pursue friv-
olous claims for a client, even if the client might beneﬁt by the lawyer’s asser-
tions (for instance, by leveraging a settlement from another party). However, 
as the rule explains, a lawyer may assert otherwise unsupported claims if the 
lawyer has a good-faith basis to claim that the law ought to be changed or 
extended.
B. Discipline for Violating Rules 1.2(d) and 3.1
1. Disbarment
Massachusetts lawyers typically are not disbarred for pursuing frivolous 
claims or for assisting with client fraud, unless the lawyer’s actions lead to a fel-
ony conviction, for which the standard sanction is disbarment.3 For instance, in 
Matter of Kelly,4 the respondent was convicted of twenty felony counts, includ-
ing forging documents, intimidating witnesses, larceny over $250, and disrupt-
ing court proceedings. His conduct involved interfering with court proceedings 
by instructing witnesses not to appear in court, forging the names of judges and 
assistant district attorneys to court documents, and altering docket entries to mis-
lead the court. The single justice accepted his resignation and entered a judgment 
3 Matter of Patch, 466 Mass. 1016, 1018 (2013). In Matter of Foley, 439 Mass. 324, 19 Mass. 
Att’y Disc. R. 141 (2003), the respondent was suspended for three years after assisting his client 
in presenting a fabricated defense in a criminal trial. The SJC concluded that had the false story 
been presented in court “the sanction respondent would be facing most assuredly would have 
been disbarment.” 439 Mass. at 336. The absence of that Rule 3.3 violation meant that a suspen-
sion was the appropriate sanction.
4 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 282 (2010).
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of disbarment.5 Similarly, in Matter of Lonardo,6 the respondent agreed to disbar-
ment after he was convicted of conspiracy to commit automobile insurance fraud.
You Should Know
Generally, a Rule 1.2(d) violation, where the lawyer assists 
a client with a criminal or fraudulent claim, results in more 
serious discipline than a Rule 3.1 violation, where the law-
yer pursues insubstantial or frivolous claims. Suspension 
is common for the former, but not for the latter.
In Matter of Cobb,7 the respondent was disbarred for three instances of mis-
conduct, two of which included pursuing frivolous, vindictive, and defamatory 
claims against lawyers and judges, in violation of Rules 3.1 and 8.2.8 The Supreme 
Judicial Court (SJC) wrote, “The respondent has demonstrated rather convinc-
ingly by his quick and ready disparagement of judges, his disdain for his fellow 
attorneys, and his lack of concern for and betrayal of his clients, that he is utterly 
unﬁt to practice law. The only appropriate sanction is disbarment.”9
One of the more dramatic and noteworthy examples of excessive advocacy 
in violation of DR 7-102(A)(7), the predecessor to Rule 1.2(d), is Matter of 
Crossen,10 along with its companion case, Matter of Curry.11 In Crossen, the 
client believed that unjust and unwarranted decisions were entered against him 
in a signiﬁcant litigation matter, and the client’s lawyers, Curry and Crossen, 
orchestrated an elaborate ruse involving the clerk of the judge who had ruled 
against the client. The ruse included a counterfeit corporation with a false job 
oﬀer and a secret recording of conversations with the clerk. The lawyer used the 
recordings to threaten the former clerk with bar discipline proceedings. The SJC, 
5 The opinion of the single justice implies that the respondent, despite engaging in such egregious 
obstruction of justice, originally received an indeﬁnite suspension for his misconduct, and was dis-
barred only after he failed to honor his suspension. See id.
6 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 360 (2009).
7 445 Mass. 452, 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 93 (2005).
8 Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.2 reads, in part, “A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows 
to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualiﬁcations or integ-
rity of a judge . . . .”
9 445 Mass. at 480.
10 450 Mass. 533 (2008). While the decision in the two matters occurred in 2008, the respondents’ 
actions occurred before 1998, when Massachusetts adopted the Rules of Professional Conduct.
11 450 Mass. 503 (2008).
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noting “the elementary observation that ‘an attorney is not free to [do] anything 
and everything imaginable . . . under the pretext of protecting his client’s right 
to a fair trial and fair representation,’”12 concluded that the lawyer’s actions were 
so far beyond the limits of proper advocacy as to warrant disbarment. While the 
respondent pointed to other examples of excessive advocacy that had resulted in 
suspensions of various lengths, the SJC determined that the combination of mis-
representation and damage to the administration of justice justiﬁed the harsh-
est sanction.13
Practice Tip
The respondents in both Crossen and Curry were dis-
barred for their overzealous tactics. The third active par-
ticipant and respondent in the consolidated petition was 
suspended for three years, with four of the eleven Board 
of Bar Overseers (BBO) members voting for a substan-
tially shorter suspension.14 That respondent persuaded 
the board that “he participated only in the planning, and 
not the execution, of the [intolerable] venture.”15
2. Suspension
Lawyers who represent their clients’ interests by engaging in fraud are 
often suspended. Several of these suspensions involved active fraud by the lawyer 
on a tribunal (including assisting in perjury), which is discussed in Chapter 12.16
But other lawyers have been suspended for violations that primarily involved a 
breach of the duties Rule 1.2(d) imposes. For instance, the lawyer in Matter of 
Buck17 assisted his client in selling stolen videotapes, including creating a Dela-
ware corporation to use in the scheme. The single justice ordered an indeﬁnite 
12 Crossen, 450 Mass. at 563 (quoting United States v. Cooper, 872 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1989)).
13 Id. at 576. The respondent in Matter of Curry made similar arguments, and the SJC responded 
consistent with its analysis in Crossen, 450 Mass. at 530–31.
14 Matter of Donahue, 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 193 (2006).
15 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. at 276. Bar counsel and the respondent stipulated to the three-year sus-
pension before the single justice, so this matter was never argued before the single justice or the full 
court.
16 See, e.g., Matter of McCarthy, 416 Mass. 423 (1993) (one-year suspension); Matter of Neitlich, 
413 Mass. 416 (1992) (one-year suspension); Matter of Foley, 439 Mass. 324 (2003) (three-year 
suspension).
17 27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 92 (2011).
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suspension. The lawyer also made false statements to the Oﬃce of the Bar 
Counsel, which contributed to his severe sanction. By comparison, in Matter of 
Phillips,18 the lawyer was suspended for three months after counseling and assist-
ing a client to violate a Probate and Family Court order establishing a trust for 
child support and similar payments. The respondent in Phillips made full resti-
tution and returned all legal fees; the resulting lack of ﬁnancial harm to the par-
ties aﬀected the suspension length.
Several reported suspensions involved lawyers participating in real estate trans-
actions where they presented documents at the closings that were not entirely 
accurate, typically to mislead the lenders.19 The suspension term in these mat-
ters generally corresponded to the experience and responsibility of the lawyer in-
volved and whether the lawyer was convicted of a crime. In Matter of Alberino,20
an experienced practitioner was suspended for eighteen months for participat-
ing in several fraudulent real estate transactions where straw purchasers misled 
lenders about the true nature of the sale and the later occupancy of the proper-
ties. In Matter of Hanserd,21 a diﬀerent lawyer involved in the same schemes as 
those in Alberino was suspended for a year and a day. In Hanserd, the lawyer was 
inexperienced and suﬀering from medical issues, and those mitigating factors 
likely account for the diﬀerence between his sanction and the sanction in Albe-
rino. In Matter of Robbins,22 a salaried lawyer working as an associate in a ﬁrm 
handling real estate closings participated in an arrangement where, while his 
ﬁrm represented the lender, twenty-four condominium units were sold, each 
one with documents that misstated the buyer’s creditworthiness at the closing. 
The lawyer, who had acted at his employer’s direction, was suspended for nine 
months. In Matter of Palmer,23 a lawyer who prepared inaccurate HUD-1 Settle-
ment Statements for several real estate closings was suspended for twenty-three 
months. The longer suspension in Palmer compared to Robbins is likely due to 
18 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 547 (2008).
19 These cases seem to have emerged from the lawyers’ participation in what was, before the hous-
ing crash of 2008–2009, a common scheme to sell homes to and obtain mortgages for individuals 
whose creditworthiness did not support the loans. The usual term at the time for those arrange-
ments was liar loans. See, e.g., Charles W. Murdock, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act: What Caused the Financial Crisis and Will Dodd-Frank Prevent Future Crises?,
64 SMU L. Rev. 1243, 1257–58 (2011) (discussing the housing market collapse and the role of 
liar loans).
20 27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 1 (2011).
21 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 229 (2010).
22 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 605 (2008) (stipulation to nine-month suspension).
23 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 486 (2009).
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the latter’s playing a less leading role in the schemes than the former, although 
both cases arose from stipulations.24
Lawyers have been suspended for pursuing claims without suﬃcient jus -
tiﬁcation with aggravating circumstances. In Matter of Cohen,25 a lawyer was 
sus pended for one year for pursuing several claims in various federal courts after 
a class action judgment had barred those claims. His suspension resulted from 
applying issue preclusion based on several contempt judgments the various courts 
issued.
Several lawyers have been suspended for making baseless and vindictive 
accusations against judges, misconduct that also violated Rule 8.2. In Matter of 
Kurker,26 the respondent was suspended for a year and a day after he made 
repeated, baseless allegations that various state judges and opposing counsel 
were conspiring against him. The attorney ﬁled two civil actions in United States 
District Court against judges and lawyers. He did not contact any potential 
witnesses or investigate the basis for his allegations, and he had no evidence or 
personal knowledge of a reasonable basis for making any of the allegations 
against the judges or attorneys.27 In Matter of Harrington,28 the respondent was 
suspended for a year and a day for repeatedly making baseless accusations about 
a judge’s honesty, character, ﬁtness, and qualiﬁcations and for misrepresenting 
facts and case law, all while representing himself in his post-divorce proceed-
ings. And in Matter of O’Leary,29 the single justice suspended a respondent 
whom the Court had sanctioned under the General Laws of Massachusetts
24 For other real estate–based discipline where the lawyer’s level of responsibility determined the 
sanction, see, e.g., Matter of Nickerson, 422 Mass. 333 (1996) (indeﬁnite suspension of salaried, 
nonequity partner); Matter of Concemi, 422 Mass. 326 (1996) (disbarment of solo practitioner 
in same types of transactions as Nickerson, id.); Matter of Walsh, 13 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 829 (1997) 
(aﬃdavit of resignation and disbarment). Nickerson received a lesser sanction because she was a 
salaried employee and not a decision-maker who proﬁted from the fraud, but she also “cooperated 
with the authorities, providing both testimony and documentary evidence in the prosecution of 
others involved.” 422 Mass. at 336–37.
25 435 Mass. 7, 17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 129 (2001).
26 18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 353 (2002).
27 See also Matter of Van Hoozer, 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 522 (2004) (attorney suspended for three 
years for various misconduct in a divorce case, including ﬁling pleadings with no good-faith basis; 
other serious misconduct contributed to the lengthy suspension).
28 27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 432 (2011). In both Kurker and Harrington, the lawyer’s baseless accu-
sations also violated Rule 8.2, prohibiting a lawyer from making “a statement that the lawyer knows 
to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualiﬁcations or integ-
rity of a judge or a magistrate.”
29 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 461 (2009).
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(Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 6F), which authorizes awarding fees and costs 
against an attorney who pursues a claim that is “wholly insubstantial, frivolous 
and not advanced in good faith.” (The respondent pursued the claim on his own 
behalf, not on behalf of a client.) That conduct also violated Rule 3.1. The single 
justice noted that, while most sanctions for violating Rule 3.1 are public repri-
mands, the suspension in this case was warranted because of the respondent’s 
inability to accept the judgment that his lawsuit was frivolous, lack of insight 
about the nature of his misconduct, and failure to appreciate the abusive (and 
ultimately self-defeating) nature of his behavior in this matter.
Practice Tip
While “[i]t is clear . . . that a judicial imposition of a 
sanction under G. L. c. 231, § 6F, does not result auto-
matically or generally in the initiation of disciplinary pro-
ceedings, much less a sanction of suspension from the 
practice of law,”30 many court-ordered sanctions under 
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 6F also constitute a violation 
of Rule 3.1.
3. Public Reprimand
No Massachusetts lawyer has received a public reprimand for assisting a cli-
ent with fraud outside of the fraud-on-the-court context, which is addressed in 
Chapter 12.31 By contrast, a public reprimand is a common sanction for ﬁling 
groundless pleadings or pursuing frivolous claims that violate Rule 3.1. The sin-
gle justice in O’Leary, discussed in the previous paragraph, noted that, as of 2009, 
many Rule 3.1 violations had resulted in a public reprimand (formerly called a 
“public censure”), citing Matter of Landers,32 Matter of Weissman,33 and Matter of 
30 Id.
31 See Chapter 12. In Matter of Baghdady, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 26 (2009), the respon-
dent received a public reprimand for violating Rule 1.2(d), but the fraud the lawyer partici-
pated in involved court pleadings and a deposition, and so more aptly qualiﬁes as a Rule 3.3 
violation.
32 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 416 (2008) (among a number of other disciplinary violations, attorney 
made frivolous allegations in a pleading).
33 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 790 (2006) (attorney sought execution and ﬁling for lien against client 
in amount over what was due to her, without checking what was due).
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Dittami.34 The justice also noted that other such violations had resulted in admo-
nitions, discussed in the following subsection.
4. Admonition
No lawyer has received an admonition for violating Rule 1.2(d) by assist-
ing a client in a crime or fraud.35 Some lawyers have received admonitions for 
violating Rule 3.1. One such instructive admonition is Ad. 00-53,36 in which a 
husband in an unfriendly divorce matter asked the respondent to ﬁle a motion 
for relief from judgment. The respondent warned his client that he had scant 
legitimate basis to do so and that the court might order the husband to pay his 
wife’s counsel fees. On the husband’s insistence, the respondent ﬁled the motion. 
The court denied the motion and awarded attorney’s fees to the wife. Despite 
the lawyer’s warning and the client’s insistence, the lawyer violated Rule 3.1 and 
received an admonition. In related matters Ad. 02-0937 and Ad. 02-11,38 two law-
yers served an unsupported Chapter 93A demand letter on their former client 
and the former client’s new lawyer, claiming as damages the respondents’ lost 
contingent fees. Each lawyer received an admonition.
III. RULES GOVERNING LIMITS ON LITIGATION TACTICS
Rules 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, and 4.4 discuss various aspects of litigation tactics, in-
cluding expediting litigation (and not using delaying tactics for a strategic advan-
tage), and not obstructing the opposing party’s access to witnesses or to potential 
evidence, including documents or other materials. Also included in this discus-
sion is the prohibition against ex parte contacts with judges and jurors, not seek-
ing to inﬂuence them, and not engaging in disruptive behavior, whether inside 
the courtroom or outside. 
34 9 Mass. Atty. Disc. R. 102 (1993) (public censure; attorney brought suit against various parties 
for payment of debt to his client, although attorney knew at time of ﬁling that debt had been 
paid; court had awarded attorney’s fees and costs under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 6F). See also 
Matter of Dillon, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 212 (2012) (attorney received a public reprimand after 
ﬁling, with no support, a complaint for contempt in Probate and Family Court alleging that the 
ex-husband of his client had violated a court order by failing to pay for the client’s son’s tuition 
costs).
35 See Matter of Connell, 31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 84 (2015) (noting this fact).
36 16 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 530 (2000).
37 18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 619 (2002).
38 18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 629 (2002).
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RULE 3.2: EXPEDITING LITIGATION
A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation 
consistent with the interests of the client.
RULE 3.4: FAIRNESS TO OPPOSING PARTY AND COUNSEL
A lawyer shall not:
(a) unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence or 
unlawfully alter, destroy, or conceal a document or other material 
having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or 
assist another person to do any such act;
(b) falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or 
offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law;
(c) knowingly disobey an obligation under the Rules of a tribunal 
except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid 
obligation exists;
(d) in pretrial procedure, make a frivolous discovery request or 
fail to make reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally 
proper discovery request by an opposing party;
(e) in appearing before a tribunal on behalf of a client:
(1)  state or allude to any matter that the lawyer does not 
reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be sup-
ported by admissible evidence;
(2)  assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except when 
testifying as a witness; or
(3)  assert a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the 
credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or 
the guilt or innocence of an accused, but the lawyer may 
argue, upon analysis of the evidence, for any position or 
conclusion with respect to the matters stated herein;
* * *
(h) present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present crimi-
nal or disciplinary charges solely to obtain an advantage in a private 
civil matter; or
297
Other Limits on Zealous Advocacy
RULE 3.4 (cont’d.)
(i) in appearing in a professional capacity before a tribunal, engage 
in conduct manifesting bias or prejudice based on race, sex, reli-
gion, national origin, disability, age, or sexual orientation against 
a party, witness, counsel, or other person. This paragraph does not 
preclude legitimate advocacy when race, sex, religion, national 
origin, disability, age, or sexual orientation, or another similar 
fac tor is an issue in the proceeding.
RULE 3.5: IMPARTIALITY AND DECORUM OF THE TRIBUNAL
A lawyer shall not:
(a) seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror, or other 
official by means prohibited by law;
(b) communicate ex parte with such a person during the proceed-
ing unless authorized to do so by law or court order;
(c) communicate with a juror or prospective juror after discharge 
of the jury if:
(1)  the communication is prohibited by law or court order;
(2)  the juror has made known to the lawyer, either directly or 
through communications with the judge or otherwise, a 
desire not to communicate with the lawyer;
(3)  the communication involves misrepresentation, coercion, 
duress or harassment; or
(4)  the communication is initiated by the lawyer without the 
notice required by law; or
(d) engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.
RULE 4.4: RESPECT FOR RIGHTS OF THIRD PERSONS
(a) In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that 
have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or 
burden a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that 
violate the legal rights of such a person.
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RULE 4.4: RESPECT FOR RIGHTS OF THIRD PERSONS (cont’d.)
(b) A lawyer who receives a document or electronically stored 
information relating to the representation of the lawyer’s client 
and knows or reasonably should know that the document or 
electronically stored information was inadvertently sent shall 
promptly notify the sender.
A. Limits on Actions Within a Lawful Representation Context
The Rules of Professional Conduct and Massachusetts common and statu-
tory law impose other limitations on a lawyer’s eﬀorts to obtain what a client 
wants to achieve. These constraints might be divided into two categories—lim-
its on litigation tactics and limits on contact with persons whose interests are 
opposed to the lawyer’s client. This subsection addresses the limits on certain lit-
igation tactics. The following subsection discusses limits on contact with others 
and Rule 3.4 subsections (g) and (f ).
Lawyers, and especially litigators, act strategically to accomplish their goals. 
Sometimes those strategies call for tactics that the other parties would ﬁnd un-
fair and that may be prohibited in Massachusetts. Rule 3.2 requires a lawyer to 
“make reasonable eﬀorts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of 
the client.” Sometimes it is in a client’s interest to delay matters, and this rule, 
despite the ending clause, prohibits a lawyer’s bad-faith strategy to delay purely 
for the sake of delay. As comment [1] to the rule explains:
Although there will be occasions when a lawyer may properly seek a 
postponement for personal reasons, it is not proper for a lawyer to 
routinely fail to expedite litigation solely for the convenience of the 
advocates. Nor will a failure to expedite be reasonable if done for the 
purpose of frustrating an opposing party’s attempt to obtain rightful 
redress or repose. It is not a justiﬁcation that similar conduct is often 
tolerated by the bench and bar. The question is whether a competent 
lawyer acting in good faith would regard the course of action as having 
some substantial purpose other than delay. Realizing financial or other 
benefit from otherwise improper delay in litigation is not a legitimate interest 
of the client (emphasis added).39
39 Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.1 comment [1].
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Rule 3.4 lists several other ways in which a lawyer may not seek to gain an 
advantage for a client. Lawyers may not “unlawfully” obstruct another party’s 
access to evidence, alter, destroy, or falsify evidence, disobey the orders of a tri-
bunal, or make frivolous arguments or oﬀers of evidence.40 Rule 3.4 prohibits 
some lawyer contact with, or payments to, witnesses, and those restrictions are 
addressed in Section IV. Finally, Rule 3.4 includes two provisions that are not 
self-evident and that deserve some separate discussion.
First, a lawyer may not “present, participate in presenting, or threaten to pre-
sent criminal or disciplinary charges solely to obtain an advantage in a private 
civil matter.”41 The threat to ﬁle a complaint with the police or with the BBO 
might add considerably to the client’s leverage and work to the client’s beneﬁt. 
If that is the lawyer’s sole purpose in making such a threat, the rule prohibits 
the lawyer from doing so. However, as an earlier Massachusetts Bar Associa-
tion ethics opinion explained: 
[This provision], however, only prohibits presenting or threatening to 
present criminal charges where such action is taken “solely to obtain an 
advantage in a civil matter.” Thus, the attorney’s purpose in threatening 
or presenting charges is critical. Where criminal charges are pursued in 
furtherance of the public’s interest in the enforcement of criminal law 
rather than to gain leverage in a private dispute, no ethical violation 
exists . . . (emphasis added).42
Second, Rule 3.4(i) articulates one further constraint on a lawyer’s advo-
cacy eﬀorts, even if the tactic would beneﬁt a client. That rule states that a law-
yer, when acting in a professional capacity before a tribunal, may not “engage in 
conduct manifesting bias or prejudice based on race, sex, religion, national ori-
gin, disability, age, or sexual orientation against a party, witness, counsel, or other 
person.”43 Lawyers may engage in “legitimate advocacy” when the factors just 
40 Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.4(a)–(e).
41 That principle, maintained from the prior Code of Professional Responsibility at DR 7-105(A), 
did not make it into the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Massachusetts opted to keep 
the language in its rules and added the word disciplinary to ensure that reports to the BBO would 
be included in this prohibition.
42 Massachusetts Bar Association Ethics Op. 83-2 (1983) (interpreting DR 7-105(A)).
43 The ABA amended its Rule 8.4 in 2016 to include a similar prohibition. Model Rules of 
Prof’l Conduct r. 8.4(g). The Massachusetts rule conﬁnes this to prohibiting expressing or man-
ifesting bias to lawyers appearing before a tribunal, whereas the Model Rule includes lawyers in 
all representative capacities.
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listed are in issue in the proceeding.44 The BBO and the SJC have never dis-
ciplined a lawyer for violating Rule 3.4(i).
Rule 3.5 establishes boundaries on a lawyer’s actions in communicating 
with tribunals and jurors. In 2015, the SJC amended Rule 3.5(c), which covers 
contact with jurors, and expanded counsel’s contact rights after a trial has ended. 
That amendment created ambiguities in light of the Court’s long-standing, com-
mon law principles established in Commonwealth v. Fidler.45 In Commonwealth v. 
Moore,46 the Court sought to resolve any conﬂicts and adopted another revision 
to Rule 3.5(c), which went into eﬀect in 2017.47
Rule 4.4 limits attorneys’ zealous advocacy eﬀorts by forbidding them to 
“use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or 
burden a third person, or to use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the 
legal rights of such a person.”48 The second part of that clause conﬁrms a law-
yer’s duty to respect the attorney-client privilege rights of others with whom 
the lawyer interacts.49 For example, in Matter of Ebitz,50 a lawyer peeked into an 
opposing counsel’s briefcase and found useful, privileged documents. She was 
caught and was suspended for six months for violating the disciplinary rules in 
eﬀect in 1992.
Blatant misconduct like that is an easy call. What happens when an oppos-
ing lawyer mistakenly sends a lawyer documents that otherwise would be fully 
privileged? Should the lawyer read them? Should the lawyer tell the other law-
yer about the mistake? That call is much more diﬃcult, and Rule 4.4(b) 
addresses that question in a limited way. The rule requires the recipient of inad-
vertently sent material to “promptly notify the sender.”51 The rule says nothing 
more about the lawyer’s duties. In Massachusetts, an inadvertent disclosure does 
not automatically waive the attorney-client privilege; the privilege may or may 
44 Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.4(i).
45 377 Mass. 192 (1979).
46 474 Mass. 541 (2016).
47 The nuances of the Fidler and Moore issues are beyond the scope of this book. In brief, Moore 
concluded that the 2015 amendment to Rule 3.5(c) overruled Fidler in requiring court approval 
prior to counsel’s contact with jurors, but not in its ban on certain inquiries about the jurors’ 
deliberations. Moore also clariﬁed the timing of a lawyer’s duties for cases tried before and after 
July 1, 2015, the amendment’s eﬀective date. Moore, 474 Mass. at 553–54.
48 Mass. R. Prof. C. 4.4(a).
49 See Matter of Barnes, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 52 (2009).
50 8 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 77 (1992).
51 Mass. R. Prof. C. 4.4(b).
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not be waived, depending on the level of care the party or the lawyer takes,52 and 
a lawyer must proceed with caution when receiving an otherwise privileged doc-
ument apparently sent in error.53
B. Discipline for Violating Rules 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, and 4.4
By themselves, violations of any of these rules have not resulted in severe dis-
cipline in Massachusetts. This is not necessarily true, however, when a lawyer vio-
lates multiple rules.
1. Disbarment
No lawyer has been disbarred solely for violating Rule 3.2 or 3.5, although 
occasionally those rules appear within a long list of rules a lawyer who has been 
disbarred has violated.54 Some lawyers have been disbarred for engaging in mis-
conduct in violation of Rule 3.4, and many disbarred lawyers have violated Rule 
3.4(c) by continuing to practice law after an administrative suspension and by 
failing to cooperate with the bar counsel during its investigation, each of which 
reﬂects disobedience of “an obligation under the rules of a tribunal.”55
Many lawyers have been disbarred for perpetrating a fraud on the court, vio-
lating several rules, including Rule 3.4. For example, in Matter of Finnerty,56 an 
attorney represented a witness called to appear before a federal grand jury that 
was hearing claims involving James “Whitey” Bulger. On the attorney’s advice, 
52 See Matter of the Reorganization of Electric Mutual Liability Ins. Co. Ltd. (Bermuda), 425 
Mass. 419, 422 (1997) (documents sent to opposing party by an anonymous source were pre-
sumably leaked or stolen; privilege not waived since “reasonable precautionary steps were taken”).
Cf. Hoy v. Morris, 79 Mass. (13 Gray) 519 (1859) (privilege waived as reasonable steps not taken 
to prevent attorney-client conversation from being overheard).
53 Lawyers who wish to use the inadvertently disclosed document ﬁnd support from the Massa-
chusetts Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics. See MBA Ethics Op. 99-4 (1999) 
(“If Lawyer concludes that it is in his client’s best interest to do so, he should resist the opposing 
counsel’s demand for return of the letter and should urge the tribunal to reject the claim of 
attorney-client privilege.”). In matters involving civil discovery, however, the recipient of “mis-
takenly produced” material later claimed to be privileged must follow the steps described in 
Rule 26(b)(5)(B) of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure. The value of this opinion, rendered 
before Massachusetts adopted Mass. R. Prof. C. 4.4(b) in 2015, is questionable but untested.
54 See, e.g., Matter of Friedman, 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 326 (2006).
55 Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.4(c). For examples of that misconduct, see, e.g., Matter of Cliﬀord, 26 Mass. 
Att’y Disc. R. 74 (2010); Matter of Connor, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 107 (2010); Matter of Veysey, 
26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 701 (2010).
56 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 278 (2008).
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You Should Know
According to the SJC, the “standard” sanction for repeat-
edly violating court orders is “at least a suspension.”57 Dis-
barment and long-term suspensions only appear, however, 
when the lawyer resorts to fraud or misrepresentation. 
Misconduct involving a lawyer’s personal affairs tends to 
receive lesser sanctions than misconduct involving client 
representation.
a witness lied to the grand jury, and the attorney was disbarred for that miscon-
duct. In Matter of Terzian,58 an attorney was disbarred after he was convicted on 
one count of attempting to procure perjury and on another count of intimidat-
ing a witness in a court proceeding. (The presumptive sanction for a felony con-
viction is disbarment, as noted in Chapter 12.59) Similarly, in Matter of Jones,60
an attorney used false evidence in court. An attorney, representing a client in 
bankruptcy court, failed to present his client’s claim within the permissible time. 
The attorney supported his motion for an extension with a forged aﬃdavit from 
his client, not knowing that his client had died prior to the date of the pur-
ported aﬃdavit. For that fraud on the court, the lawyer was convicted of mail 
fraud and disbarred.
A lawyer has been disbarred for, among other misconduct, engaging in fraud 
within BBO proceedings. In Matter of Geller,61 an attorney falsely denied to the 
bar counsel that he had represented a certain client. The attorney also provided 
fabricated letters to the bar counsel that incorrectly documented a refund to the 
client on an earlier date, in addition to providing other fabricated documents. 
He was disbarred for this and other misconduct, including converting funds.
2. Suspension
Suspension is not a common sanction for overzealous misbehavior before 
a court, except when the lawyer’s misconduct aﬀected, or could have aﬀected if 
57 Matter of Johnson, 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 403 (2006), aff ’d, 450 Mass. 165 (2007). See also 
Matter of Ring, 427 Mass. 186, 191 (1998).
58 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 647 (2005); see also Commonwealth v. Terzian, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 739 
(2004) (the underlying criminal matter).
59 See supra Chapter 12, Section(II)(B)(1), note 23 and supra note 4.
60 16 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 282 (2000).
61 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 182 (2007).
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successful, the fairness and integrity of the proceedings. Suspensions also occur 
when the misconduct includes oﬀering false evidence, which, of course, implicates 
other rules. Misconduct involving a lawyer’s personal aﬀairs, such as a divorce, has 
been treated somewhat more leniently than that involving client representation.
Reports involving Rule 3.2 as the primary misconduct are rare. One lawyer 
was suspended for violating Rule 3.2 by not diligently pursuing his client’s cases. 
In Matter of Brooks,62 a Massachusetts lawyer practicing as an assistant United 
States attorney for the Department of Justice in Washington, DC, allowed six 
felony cases to be dismissed for want of prosecution because of his carelessness. 
That misconduct, along with the respondent’s failure to cooperate with the bar 
counsel, led to his suspension for a year and a day. No other reported Massa-
chusetts disciplinary decision involves primarily violating Rule 3.2.63
A single justice has written that “for [violation of court orders,] the stan-
dard sanction is at least a suspension.”64 The reports do not disagree with that 
description, but examples are not plentiful. Aside from instances of falsiﬁed 
evidence—misbehavior that violates Rules 3.4(c) and 3.3 and is covered else-
where in this book—only a handful of the Rule 3.4 violations for wrongdoing 
in court, including violating court orders, have led to suspensions. Two reports 
are illustrative.
In Matter of Alexander,65 an attorney was suspended for two years for with-
holding evidence in order to mislead a court. As a city solicitor in a race-
discrimination case, the attorney withheld a document from the court and the 
plaintiﬀ that supported the plaintiﬀ ’s reinstatement claim and also ﬁled a mis-
leading aﬃdavit implying facts that were untrue. The respondent’s actions were 
intended to retaliate against the employee for ﬁling the discrimination claim. 
After federal court proceedings established those facts, along with a punitive 
damage award against the respondent, the BBO recommended, and a single 
justice imposed, the suspension. 
In Matter of Goodman,66 an attorney represented a client in a claim for in-
juries sustained in a fall. The client died from unrelated causes after the attor-
ney had notiﬁed the insurer of the claim. The attorney directed his staﬀ not to 
disclose the client’s death unless speciﬁcally asked and further told his staﬀ to 
62 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 61 (2010).
63 Because Rule 3.2 requires expediting litigation, many matters involving serious neglect cite 
Rule 3.2 as well as Rule 3.1, but the primary concern is the latter misconduct.
64 Matter of Johnson, 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 403 (2006), aff ’d, 450 Mass. 165 (2007). See also 
Matter of Ring, 427 Mass. 186, 191 (1998) (same).
65 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 9 (2007).
66 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 352 (2006).
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alter a medical report to omit reference to the client’s death. The staﬀ refused 
to comply, so the respondent altered the report himself. The attorney for-
warded the altered medical report to the insurer, in violation of Rules 3.4(a) 
and 4.1(a). He was suspended for a year (but with a reinstatement hearing re-
quired) for this and two other instances of dishonesty; the single justice was 
particularly concerned about the respondent’s lack of insight about his “bra-
zen” misconduct. 
Other instances of lawyers whose excessive dishonesty in representing cli-
ents led to term suspensions include Matter of Gross,67 Matter of Foley,68 and Mat-
ter of Griffith.69 In Gross, the respondent pursued a defense of alibi and mistaken 
identiﬁcation in a criminal case by having someone impersonate the defendant 
at counsel table, hoping the victim would misidentify him. The scheme unrav-
eled after a continuance was granted, and the respondent was suspended for 
eighteen months.
In Foley, the respondent fabricated a defense for a criminal defendant cli-
ent who was arrested for driving under the inﬂuence and illegally possessing a 
handgun. Before the defense could be employed, the putative defendant-client 
was revealed to be an undercover FBI agent. The single justice imposed an 
eighteen-month suspension, but the full bench increased it to three years, not-
ing that “[h]ad the case proceeded to trial and the respondent presented the false 
story he had concocted and the false testimony he had developed . . . the sanction 
respondent would be facing most assuredly would have been disbarment.”70
In Griffith, the respondent represented the estate of a man in a lawsuit alleg-
ing misconduct by city police. The decedent and the respondent were both Cape 
Verdean, and the respondent believed the police were antagonistic toward Cape 
Verdeans. In preparing answers to interrogatories and document responses, the 
respondent omitted reference to providers whose records referred to the dece-
dent’s HIV status and did not produce medical records containing such refer-
ences, without objecting or moving for a protective order. The respondent further 
did not disclose the decedent’s HIV status to his expert witness or to the court at 
a pretrial conference. On appeal, the full bench rejected as mitigating the respon-
dent’s professed obsession with the case due to perceived mistreatment of Cape 
67 435 Mass. 455, 16 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 214 (2001).
68 439 Mass. 324, 19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 141 (2003).
69 440 Mass. 500, 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 174 (2003).
70 439 Mass. at 336. Foley served as an example of violating the rules against presenting false tes-
timony, see supra notes 3 and 16.
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Verdeans and his view that the decedent’s HIV condition was somehow privi-
leged. The Court focused on the intentional nature of the respondent’s miscon-
duct and suspended him for a year.71
Compare those reports to Matter of Diamond,72 where an attorney was sus-
pended for three months for using inappropriate and oﬀensive language in open 
court73 and for using in court a conﬁdential Criminal Oﬀender Record Infor-
mation report it appears the lawyer was not entitled to.
While many lawyers have been suspended for misconduct that included 
violating Rule 3.4(c), which covers disobeying an obligation under the rules of 
a tribunal, many of those sanctions resulted because of the lawyer’s refusal to 
comply with obligations within the BBO disciplinary process, including contin-
uing to practice after an administrative suspension.74 Other lawyers have been 
suspended for disobeying an obligation of a court or administrative tribunal other 
than the BBO, but those sanctions often followed from mishandling the under-
lying client work. For instance, in Matter of Munroe,75 an attorney was suspended 
for two and a half years for multiple Rule 3.4 violations, in addition to other rules. 
The attorney, acting as temporary executor of an estate belonging to his deceased 
client, failed to comply with court orders, in violation of Rule 3.4(c). The attor-
ney also obstructed the estate’s court-appointed special administrator from sell-
ing the business and blocked the special administrator’s access to the business 
premises and records. The attorney also fabricated stock certiﬁcates and minutes 
that he attached to court pleadings and provided to the special administrator and 
the bar counsel. In Matter of McGuirk,76 the attorney was suspended for a year 
and a day after failing to make court-ordered accountings on matters for which 
the lawyer served as a ﬁduciary. In Matter of Quinn,77 the lawyer was suspended 
71 Griffith served as an example of violating the rules against presenting false testimony. See Griffith,
440 Mass. 500.
72 16 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 100 (2000).
73 The lawyer said to the lawyer representing the other party, “If you want discovery, you’re 
going to get discovery up the ass.” Id.
74 See, e.g., Matter of Feeney, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 240 (2013) (a year-and-a-day suspen-
sion); Matter of Saletan, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 574 (2013) (six-month suspension); Matter 
of Dowell, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 244 (2012) (a year-and-a-day suspension); Matter of Days, 
30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 89 (2014) (two-month suspension); Matter of Johnson, 27 Mass. Att’y 
Disc. R. 490 (2011) (two-year suspension); Matter of Cooney, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 114 
(2008) (indeﬁnite suspension). All of these matters obviously implicated other misconduct, as 
the lawyers were in the midst of BBO disciplinary procedures.
75 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 385 (2010).
76 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 449 (2013).
77 12 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 463 (1996).
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for three months for failing to comply with orders of the Probate and Family 
Court to ﬁle an inventory and account, resulting in a contempt judgment and 
two arrests on capias warrants.
On occasion, lawyers violate Rule 3.4(c) in the context of personal litiga-
tion (often in their own divorce proceedings), not while representing a client. 
While those lawyers are, as one justice wrote, “not entitled to a free pass” because 
of the personal or private nature of the dispute,78 the sanction for personal mis-
conduct tends to be less severe than misconduct in client representation. In 
Matter of Cullen,79 for instance, a lawyer failed to comply with a probation order 
after being found guilty of assault and battery. That failure constituted a viola-
tion of Rule 3.4(c) and led to a six-month suspension (with four of the six months 
stayed). In Matter of Vinci,80 an attorney was suspended for nine months after 
ﬁling inaccurate ﬁnancial statements with the Probate and Family Court in his 
own divorce proceeding. Similarly, in Matter of Leahy,81 a lawyer was suspended 
for two months for failing to comply with court obligations in his divorce mat-
ter. After reviewing comparable examples of lawyer discipline in personal mat-
ters before a court, the single justice rejected the board’s recommendation of a 
one-year suspension, stayed for two years.82 A review of the disciplinary reports 
shows several other examples of lawyers receiving short suspensions after fail-
ing to comply with orders related to their own personal criminal conduct or domes-
tic relations dispute,83 while others have received public reprimands, as described 
in Section III(B)(3).84
Occasionally, lawyers have been suspended for violating Rule 3.5, which 
requires fair tactics and decorum before a tribunal, or its predecessor, Discipli-
nary Rules 7-106, 7-108 (D), and 7-110 (B). Two such matters involved ex parte 
communication with a judge. In Matter of Lipis,85 the respondent was suspended 
for two years for improper ex parte contact with a judge on a pending matter, 
78 Matter of Leahy, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 529 (2012).
79 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 165 (2012).
80 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 742 (2009).
81 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 529 (2012).
82 The single justice compared this respondent’s actions to the following examples: Matter of 
Kilkenny, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 288, 290 (2010) (ﬁve-month suspension); Matter of Angwafo, 
453 Mass. 28, 37, 39 (2009) (one-month suspension); Matter of Kersey, 432 Mass. 1020 (2000) 
(three-month suspension); Matter of Ring, 427 Mass. 186, 186 (1998) (three-month suspension); 
Matter of Finnerty, 418 Mass. 821, 830 (1994) (six-month suspension).
83 See sources cited supra notes 79–82.
84 See infra notes 99–100.
85 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 431 (2008).
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among other misconduct (including posing as a judge’s clerk in a telephone call 
to an insurer, in which the respondent “quoted the judge as saying the insurer 
was going to get ‘hammered’ ” if it did not settle). The misconduct also violated 
Rule 4.4(a). In aggravation, the same lawyer had received a public reprimand a few 
years earlier for a diﬀerent violation of Rule 3.5.86 Another instance of improper 
ex parte contact with a judge led to a three-month suspension, with one justice 
dissenting. In Matter of Orfanello,87 the lawyer arranged a lunch date with a judge, 
during which the lawyer discussed a matter involving a diﬀerent lawyer who had 
supported the judge’s judicial nomination. The board did not conclude that this 
conduct violated DR 7-110(B), because of the scant evidence of the lunch meet-
ing’s true purpose, but the SJC disagreed. Justice Nolan dissented on the sanction 
to apply, concluding that an isolated instance of indiscretion in an otherwise “unim-
peachable forty-year devotion to the system of justice” warranted, at most, a pub-
lic reprimand as recommended by the bar counsel and the respondent.88
A third case involves a lawyer’s disruptive tactics and disrespectful behav-
ior in the courtroom in violation of Rule 3.5(c). In Matter of Wilson,89 the law-
yer was suspended for a year and a day after multiple instances of misconduct, 
one of which netted him a ninety-day sentence for criminal contempt. As noted 
in the next subsection, he was previously reprimanded (but not suspended) for 
an ex parte communication with a judge.
3. Public Reprimand
Public reprimands are less common than suspensions for misconduct that 
aﬀects the fairness of judicial or administrative proceedings. However, some law-
yers have received public reprimands, presumably because their conduct was less 
egregious than the examples previously discussed. Two instances involved inappro-
priate contact with a judge or hearing oﬃcer. In Matter of Sydney,90 an attorney 
served as a state representative for a town that had a matter pending before a state 
agency. In violation of Rules 3.5(a) and (b), the attorney wrote a letter, encour-
aging a particular outcome, to the administrative law judge who was to rule on 
86 Matter of Lipis, 18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 369 (2002) (at a court-ordered mediation, the respon-
dent interrupted the defense counsel’s presentation by calling him a “liar” and “a piece of shit,” and 
referred to the defense counsel as “Satan” and the defense experts as “whores”).
87 411 Mass. 551, 7 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 220 (1992).
88 411 Mass. at 558. The respondent at the time served as the executive secretary to the adminis-
trative justice of the superior court.
89 32 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___, 2016 WL 6696062 (2016).
90 17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 556 (2001).
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a pending motion to dismiss. (The attorney sent this letter not on behalf of a 
client, but in his role as a public oﬃcial.) He received a public reprimand. In
Matter of Wilson,91 an attorney received a public censure for violating DR 7-110(B) 
after sending a letter to a judge, without copying counsel for the other party, com-
plaining about an opposing party and commenting on the merits of the matter 
before the judge. In Wilson, the board had recommended a term suspension for 
several instances of misconduct, but its report stated that “the ex parte commu-
nication at issue in the second count would merit public reprimand if it were the 
only misconduct found.”92 The single justice ordered a public censure. 
Similarly, in Matter of Ryan,93 a district attorney was publicly censured for 
violating DR 7-110(B) after speaking with a judge before whom a defendant (not 
prosecuted by the respondent’s oﬃce) was scheduled for sentencing on a gam-
bling conviction. A congressman had asked the attorney to talk to the judge about 
showing the client some leniency.
Some lawyers have received a public reprimand for misconduct in court other 
than misrepresentation. In Matter of Reisman,94 a lawyer advised his client that it 
was acceptable for the client to “scrub” a computer hard drive, notwithstanding 
a discovery order that required preserving the computer’s electronic ﬁles. The 
lawyer’s advice was more inept than malicious, but his conduct warranted the 
reprimand. In Matter of Nelson,95 an attorney was publicly reprimanded for vio-
lating Rule 3.4(e) (as it read in 2009) in the course of representing the Common-
wealth as an assistant district attorney against two codefendants. The attorney 
asserted his personal knowledge of the facts in issue and vouched for the cred-
ibility of witnesses. And, as noted in Section III(B)(2), in Matter of Lipis96 a law-
yer received a public reprimand for his obscenity-laden tirade in court.
In Matter of Campbell,97 the lawyer received a public reprimand after vio-
lating court orders, but the reprimand resulted from factors in mitigation. The 
lawyer failed to comply with court orders regarding his duty to ﬁle accountings 
in a ﬁduciary matter in Probate and Family Court. The lawyer’s mental health 
issues were a mitigating factor, and that mitigation led to a lesser sanction.98
91 17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 608 (2001).
92 17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. at 619.
93 6 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 275 (1990).
94 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 556 (2013).
95 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 413 (2009).
96 18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 369 (2002) (discussed supra note 86).
97 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 86 (2008).
98 Cf. Matter of Quinn, 12 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 463 (1996) (three-month suspension for similar 
misconduct, discussed supra note 77).
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Other public reprimands resulting from violating Rule 3.4 occurred in the 
lawyers’ personal matters. In both Matter of Sanchez99 and Matter of Silva,100 a 
Probate and Family Court judge held each lawyer in contempt for failure to 
abide by a child-support order issued in the lawyer’s own divorce matter. Each 
lawyer received a public reprimand as a result of the contempt order.
Lawyers have also received public reprimands for violating Rule 4.4(a). For 
example, in Matter of Melican,101 the respondent tried to exploit salacious mate-
rials he had learned about an opposing party, involving “means that had no 
substantial purpose other than to embarrass one of the plaintiﬀs into agreeing 
to a settlement of the matter involving the respondent’s client.” She received a 
public reprimand. And in Matter of Barnes,102 the respondent received a public 
reprimand for violating Rule 4.4 after obtaining information from a witness that 
impaired her rights against self-incrimination. 
4. Admonition
In at least one instance, PR 87-23,103 a lawyer received private discipline 
for failing to expedite his client’s case. In representing a client in a legal mal-
practice action against another lawyer, the attorney ﬁled suit but failed to serve 
the defendant and took no other action.
A few lawyers who have violated Rule 3.4 have received admonitions, but 
none in the mid-2010s. In Ad. 00-60,104 an attorney defended her actions to a 
court after her criminal defense client moved to withdraw a guilty plea; in 
doing so she stated her personal opinion of the merits of the defendant’s claim, 
in violation of Rule 3.4(e).105 In Ad. 06-16,106 the prosecutor in a criminal jury 
trial had cross-examined the defendant in an unnecessarily inﬂammatory way and 
asked an irrelevant question to degrade the witness. The attorney further violated 
3.4(e) by vouching for the credibility of the prosecution’s evidence, characteriz-
ing himself as the “thirteenth juror” (referring to his past experience as an altar 
boy), and asking the defendant to comment on another witness’s credibility. 
99 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 86 (2008).
100 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 710 (2006).
101 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 364 (2006).
102 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 52 (2006).
103 5 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 515 (1987).
104 Ad. No. 00-60, 16 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 540 (2000).
105 See also Ad. 05-04, 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 671 (2005) (attorney violated 3.4(e) by making 
improper closing remarks in a criminal proceeding).
106 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 884 (2006).
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In Ad. 97-106,107 an attorney sent a letter to a client’s business competitor 
stating, “If you agree with these terms, we will not seek criminal and civil action 
against you.” The attorney received an admonition for threatening to present 
criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter. Similarly, in 
Ad. 01-02,108 an attorney violated Rule 3.4(h) when he spoke with the mother 
of his former client, who had refused to repay a loan, and threatened to call the 
police and have the client arrested for larceny. 
In Ad. 14-14,109 the respondent instructed her client, involved in divorce 
litigation with her husband, to open a letter mailed to the husband but received 
at the client’s home. That violation of the husband’s rights violated Rule 4.4(a) 
and led to the admonition.
IV. RULES GOVERNING LIMITATIONS ON CONTACT WITH OTHERS
Rules 3.4(f ) and (g), and Rules 4.2 and 4.3 address fairness to opposing coun-
sel and their clients, as well as to unrepresented persons who are not parties.
RULE 3.4: FAIRNESS TO OPPOSING PARTY AND COUNSEL
A lawyer shall not:
* * *
(f ) request a person other than a client to refrain from voluntarily 
giving relevant information to another party unless:
(1)  the person is a relative or an employee or other agent of a 
client; and
(2)  the lawyer reasonably believes that the person’s interests 
will not be adversely affected by refraining from giving 
such information;
(g) pay, offer to pay, or acquiesce in the payment of compensation 
to a witness contingent upon the content of his or her testimony 
or the outcome of the case. But a lawyer may advance, guarantee, 
or acquiesce in the payment of:
(1)  expenses reasonably incurred by a witness in preparing, 
attending or testifying
107 13 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 1054 (1997).
108 17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 657 (2001).
109 30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 505 (2014).
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RULE 3.4 (cont’d.)
(2)  reasonable compensation to a witness for loss of time in 
preparing, attending or testifying; and
(3)  a reasonable fee for the professional services of an expert 
witness.
RULE 4.2: COMMUNICATION WITH PERSON REPRESENTED
BY COUNSEL
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the 
subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be 
represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has 
the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or 
a court order.
RULE 4.3: DEALING WITH UNREPRESENTED PERSON
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented 
by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is dis-
interested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that 
the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer’s role in the 
matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the mis-
understanding. The lawyer shall not give legal advice to an unrep-
resented person, other than the advice to secure counsel, if the 
lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the interests of such 
a person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with 
the interests of the client.
A. The Scope of Rules 3.4(f ) and (g), 4.2, and 4.3
The Massachusetts rules also prohibit certain kinds of contact with individ-
uals as part of a lawyer’s representation of a client. Those restrictions appear in 
three types of contexts.
First, two parts of Rule 3.4 limit a lawyer’s contact with individuals who 
have knowledge about the matter in question. Rule 3.4(f ) precludes a lawyer from 
requesting that a person not talk to one of the other parties in a matter, except 
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for a narrow set of circumstances involving a client’s relatives or agents.110 Also, 
Rule 3.4(g) forbids payments to witnesses contingent on the outcome of a case. 
Discipline under either of these sections has been rare in Massachusetts, but 
lawyers have occasionally been sanctioned for engaging in such activity.
Second, Rule 4.2 prohibits a lawyer from communicating about the subject 
matter of the representation with a person represented by counsel, unless the 
lawyer is authorized by law to do so or has the consent of that person’s attorney. 
Consent of the other person does not suﬃce. This rule is easily understood in 
the context of contact with individuals but is much more challenging to apply 
when contact is with agents or employees of organizations. Until 2002, a law-
yer could not communicate about the subject matter of a representation with any 
employee or agent of an organization that was represented by counsel.111 How-
ever, after deciding the Messing case112 in 2002, the SJC amended the comments 
to Rule 4.2. Both actions expanded considerably the kinds of corporate constit-
uents a lawyer can speak to about the representation’s subject matter. In Messing,
the SJC concluded that the interpretation of Rule 4.2 in place at that time was 
“strikingly protective of corporations regarding employee interviews.”113 The Court 
established a less restrictive standard to apply going forward. The amended com-
ment to Rule 4.2 states:
[T]his Rule prohibits communications by a lawyer for another person or 
entity concerning the matter in representation only with those agents or 
employees who exercise managerial responsibility in the matter, who are 
alleged to have committed the wrongful acts at issue in the litigation, or 
who have authority on behalf of the organization to make decisions 
about the course of the litigation.114
110 The prohibition does not apply to a “relative or an employee or other agent of a client,” but even 
then only if the lawyer reasonably believes that the person’s interests will not be adversely aﬀected 
by refraining from giving such information.” Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.4(f ).
111 Before the SJC actions in 2002 described in the text, the rule in Massachusetts prohibited con-
tact with any constituent of a represented organization “whose statement may constitute an admis-
sion on the part of the organization.” Rule 4.2, comment [4] (1998). Because the Massachusetts 
evidence rules treat any statement by an agent made within the scope of that person’s agency as 
an admission under the hearsay rule, see, e.g., Ruszcyk v. Secretary of Pub. Safety, 401 Mass. 418 
(1988), that standard eﬀectively barred all contact by a lawyer with any constituent of an orga-
nization represented by counsel.
112 Messing, Rudavsky & Weliky, P.C. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 436 Mass. 
347 (2002).
113 Messing, 436 Mass. at 354 (quoting the Superior Court judge who had imposed sanctions on 
the plaintiﬀ ﬁrm in that case).
114 Mass. R. Prof. C. 4.2 comment [7].
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The prohibition does not apply if the person the lawyer wants to contact is 
a former employee or agent, even if that person ﬁts one of the categories speci-
ﬁed in the comment.115 And even if a lawyer has a right to speak with a corporate 
employee or agent under Rule 4.2, the lawyer may not seek to learn otherwise 
privileged information.116
One other aspect of the current treatment of organizational constituents 
deserves note. If the organization in question is a governmental agency, consti-
tutional principles authorize some contact that the literal language of the rule 
or its comment might otherwise forbid. Therefore, a lawyer would not violate 
Rule 4.2 by communicating with a public oﬃcial if the lawyer’s client had a con-
stitutional right to petition that oﬃcial.117 As discussed in the following subsec-
tions, Massachusetts lawyers have occasionally faced discipline for violating 
Rule 4.2.
The third limitation regarding contact with others restricts communica-
tions with persons not represented by counsel when a lawyer is acting on behalf 
of a client. Rule 4.3 requires that the lawyer not state or imply disinterest and 
make clear to the unrepresented person that the lawyer is not disinterested if the 
person misunderstands the lawyer’s role. Rule 4.3 also prohibits a lawyer from 
giving advice to an unrepresented person whose interests may conﬂict with those 
of the lawyer’s client, other than the advice to secure counsel.
That latter part of Rule 4.3 may cause confusion in certain Massachusetts 
litigation contexts. In some high-volume courts, such as the Probate and Fam-
ily Court, the district court, and the housing court, many litigants proceed pro 
se. Lawyers representing opposing clients in those courts must communicate, 
and negotiate, with the unrepresented litigants on a regular basis.118 Lawyers rep-
resenting clients in those settings regularly employ legal arguments and cite legal 
115 See Clark v. Beverly Health & Rehabilitation Services, Inc., 440 Mass. 270 (2003).
116 Id. at 279 (“[C]ounsel must also be careful [when exercising the permission aﬀorded under 
Rule 4.2] to avoid violating applicable privileges or matters subject to appropriate conﬁdences or 
protections. Existing attorney disciplinary procedures should adequately address any less than 
scrupulous professional conduct.”).
117 Mass. R. Prof. C. 4.2 comment [5] (“Communications authorized by law may include com-
munications by a lawyer on behalf of a client who is exercising a constitutional or other legal right 
to communicate with the government.”). See also ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof ’l Responsibil-
ity, Formal Op. 97-408 n.9 (1997) (noting that Model Rule 4.2 is subject to the First Amend-
ment right to petition the government for redress of grievances); Restatement (Third) of the 
Law Governing Lawyers §101 comment [b]. (Am. Law Inst. 2000).
118 The proliferation of unrepresented litigants in community courts, litigants who typically can-
not aﬀord counsel, has emerged as a serious public policy concern. See, e.g., Massachusetts 
Access to Justice Commission, https://www.mass.gov/service-details/access-to-justice-initiative 
(last visited April 12, 2018).
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authority when speaking with unrepresented opposing parties in an eﬀort to 
settle or expedite the legal proceedings. Rule 4.3 appears to permit such nego-
tiation and does not violate the rule against oﬀering legal advice to the pro se 
individual. As comment [2] explains:
So long as the lawyer has explained that the lawyer represents an adverse 
party and is not representing the person, the lawyer may inform the 
person of the terms on which the lawyer’s client will enter into an 
agreement or settle a matter, prepare documents that require the person’s 
signature and explain the lawyer’s own view of the meaning of the 
document or the lawyer’s view of the underlying legal obligations. 
The Oﬃce of the Bar Counsel, however, interprets Rule 4.3 far more restric-
tively. Relying on slightly diﬀerent language from the comment as it read before 
2015, the bar counsel warned Massachusetts lawyers that explaining the lawyer’s 
understanding of the law to a pro se litigant within a negotiation setting may vio-
late this rule. The bar counsel wrote:
The comment should not be taken, however, as license to predict the 
outcome of court proceedings. . . . The rule does allow a lawyer to state 
the client’s position and the remedies that the lawyer will seek on behalf 
of the client, but it does not permit pressuring the unrepresented 
adversary by describing the probable legal consequences of the actions 
the lawyer plans to take.119
Because it is almost impossible to negotiate eﬀectively without “predict[ing] the 
outcome of court proceedings” or “describing the probable legal consequences of 
the actions the lawyer plans to take,” the bar counsel’s stance creates a hazard 
for Massachusetts lawyers.120 However, in the years since the article was published, 
no Massachusetts lawyer has been disciplined for predicting what a court would 
do or for describing the expected legal consequences to an unrepresented per-
son.121 Several lawyers have been disciplined for inappropriate contact with unrep-
resented persons, but few of those cases involve negotiation with a pro se litigant.
119 Nancy Kaufman, Can We Talk: Communicating with Unrepresented Persons, Massachusetts 
Lawyers Weekly, Nov. 17, 2003.
120 One of this book’s contributors has made such arguments in response to the bar counsel’s 
column. See Paul R. Tremblay, Column on 4.3 Sends “Worrisome” Message, Massachusetts Law-
yers Weekly, Dec. 15, 2003.
121 In one instance, a lawyer misstated the law during a negotiation and pressured an unrepresented 
person to pay a judgment he did not owe; the lawyer received a public reprimand. See Matter of 
Monaco, 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 571 (2006) (discussed in Section IV(B)(3)).
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B. Discipline for Violating Rules 3.4(f ) and (g), 4.2, and 4.3
1. Disbarment
On occasion, lawyers have been disbarred for ﬂagrant misconduct related to 
Rule 3.4(f ), which prohibits a lawyer from instructing a witness not to speak to 
another party. The disbarment occurred because the lawyer engaged in serious 
criminal conduct involving trial proceedings. In Matter of Hyatt,122 the lawyer was 
disbarred after he was convicted of a felony for violating a domestic relations pro-
tective order and intimidating a witness, with the single justice concluding that 
the latter constituted a violation of Rule 3.4(f ). In Matter of Reed,123 after a cli-
ent reported him to the bar counsel for settling a matter without authority and 
for misappropriating the proceeds, the lawyer urged the client not to testify in the 
BBO proceedings and oﬀered her $4,000 not to attend her deposition. Presum-
ably, the respondent’s interference with the witness’s testimony contributed to the 
disbarment, although he defaulted in the BBO proceedings, so the Court did not 
parse his violations.
You Should Know
The typical sanction for improper contact with others is 
an admonition. If a lawyer offers advice to an unrepre-
sented party in violation of Rule 4.3, however, the typical 
sanction is a public reprimand.
No lawyer has been disbarred for misconduct solely or primarily involving 
a violation of Rules 4.2 or 4.3.
2. Suspension
A remarkable violation of Rule 4.2 occurred in Matter of Bianco,124 leading 
to a suspension of a year and a day. In Bianco, a newly admitted lawyer assisted a 
more experienced attorney in defending a hospital in a sexual harassment law-
suit that a woman employee ﬁled against the hospital. The employee telephoned 
the respondent at her home, and the respondent talked to the plaintiﬀ about the 
case on at least eighty occasions without disclosing that contact to the hospital, 
122 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 309 (2007).
123 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 523 (2009).
124 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 46 (2005).
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the court, or her ﬁrm. The improper communications led to a mistrial and to the 
hospital’s seeking new counsel for that and several other cases. Because of the 
serious harm that resulted and the extent of the breach of the duty, the lawyer 
was suspended for a year and a day, by stipulation.
No other suspensions have occurred for primarily violating Rule 4.2. In Mat-
ter of Watts,125 the single justice ordered an indeﬁnite suspension for multiple acts 
of misconduct, including unauthorized contact with a represented person, but 
principally involving the lawyer’s misuse of client funds. The attorney, as the ad-
ministratrix of a client’s estate, failed to maintain a complete set of bank state-
ments and to produce records that the beneﬁciary’s attorney requested. She sent 
a letter directly to the beneﬁciary, without the beneﬁciary’s attorney’s knowledge 
or consent, asking the beneﬁciary to sign and approve a draft account. 
No lawyer has been suspended solely or principally for providing advice to 
an unrepresented person in violation of Rule 4.3. However, in Matter of Galat,126
the single justice ordered an indeﬁnite suspension for multiple counts of mis-
conduct, including violating the predecessor to Rule 4.3. A receiver overseeing an 
investment company’s assets instructed the attorney he worked with to commu-
nicate with the company’s investors and to advise them to rely on the receiver 
to protect their interests in upcoming lawsuits. Because the attorney provided 
legal advice to the investors, other than the advice to retain counsel, the attorney 
violated DR 7-104(A)(2). Her suspension, however, resulted from other, more 
serious, misconduct involving misuse of the receivership assets.
3. Public Reprimand
Two lawyers have received public reprimands for violating Rule 4.2 or its pre-
decessor, although in each instance the matter involved other violations as well. 
In Matter of Kent,127 the attorney represented a client regarding a possible pur-
chase of a house owned by an elderly woman, who had counsel. Without obtain-
ing the consent of the elderly woman’s attorney, the attorney visited the woman 
at a nursing home and discussed the management of her ﬁnancial aﬀairs and her 
interest in the property. In Matter of Allen,128 the attorney communicated with 
another party on several occasions, despite knowing that the party was repre-
sented by counsel and despite the opposing counsel’s speciﬁc request that com-
munications cease. The attorney received a public censure.
125 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 654 (2005).
126 18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 229 (2002).
127 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 366 (2005).
128 5 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 4 (1988).
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Several lawyers have received public reprimands for violating Rule 4.3 or its 
predecessor. One notable example of a pure violation of Rule 4.3 is Matter of 
Barnes.129 In Barnes, an attorney represented a man whom a woman had charged 
with domestic assault and battery, kidnapping, and threatening to commit a crime. 
The two individuals reconciled, and the attorney agreed to meet with the couple 
together before the criminal hearing. During the meeting, the attorney oﬀered 
legal and strategic advice to the woman about the proceeding, without making 
clear his role as the defendant’s lawyer and without advising her to obtain her 
own counsel. 
Similarly, in Matter of Monaco,130 an attorney received a public reprimand 
for negotiating with an individual during a supplementary process proceeding. 
The respondent attempted to enforce a judgment against a corporation by serv-
ing a capias on a corporation’s former oﬃcer. At court, the respondent incor-
rectly advised the former oﬃcer about his obligation to pay the corporation’s 
judgment and altered court papers to include the person’s name. 
Two other reported matters resulted in public reprimands for oﬀering legal 
advice to an unrepresented person. In Matter of Fischbach,131 after representing a 
married couple as their tax lawyer, an attorney decided to represent only the hus-
band after the couple separated. The attorney then oﬀered advice to the wife with-
out instructing her to secure separate counsel, revealed information from the wife to 
the husband, and later represented the husband in the divorce. In Matter of Levine,132
the attorney represented a client, a principal in a corporation, in several diﬀerent 
matters, including possible purchases of real estate and soft-drink manufacturing. 
The client drafted a contract between the corporation and a lender, and both the 
client and the lender appeared in the attorney’s oﬃce without an appointment. The 
attorney hurriedly reviewed the draft contract and let both parties sign the doc-
ument, without advising the lender to consult her own attorney before doing so. 
4. Admonition
In at least two instances, the board imposed private discipline for conduct 
violating the predecessor to Rule 3.4(g). In PR 97-38,133 an attorney received an 
admonition after he negotiated an agreement in which his client would give 20% 
of any recovery to his principal witness. In PR 88-26,134 an attor ney received a 
129 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 52 (2009).
130 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 571 (2006).
131 18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 190 (2002).
132 11 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 162 (1995).
133 13 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 929 (1997).
134 4 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 465 (1988).
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private reprimand for allowing witnesses to be compensated with a percentage 
of the settlements obtained in lawsuits. The attorney routinely employed ex-
pert witnesses on behalf of his clients and compensated the witnesses based on 
the outcome.
The board has issued many admonitions for simple violations of Rule 4.2 
without any serious harm to the represented person. For example, in Ad. 03-16,135
a pro se husband in a divorce matter obtained counsel after extensive litigation 
as an unrepresented party. After learning that the man had a lawyer, the respon-
dent, who represented the wife in the divorce, wrote two letters directly to the 
husband. In Ad. 02-32,136 a lawyer, who was a tenant, communicated with the 
trustee of the trust that owned the leased premises, not only knowing that the 
trust was represented by counsel but also having received a letter from counsel 
instructing the lawyer-tenant not to communicate directly with the trustee. The 
landlord’s interests were not harmed in any signiﬁcant way, if at all.
In Ad. 02-33,137 an attorney represented a wife in a divorce proceeding, 
which resulted in an agreement that the wife receive certain payments and that 
the husband apply for a life insurance policy to beneﬁt the wife. The husband’s 
mother was a party to a separate equity action because of a claim that she held 
some of the husband’s assets, and the mother was represented by counsel. The 
attorney met with the mother and prepared a document for her to sign, with-
out consent of the mother’s attorney. And in Ad. 01-36,138 an attorney discussed 
legal matters with a former employee whom his client had sued for breach of an 
employment noncompetition and nondisclosure agreement. The employee con-
tacted the attorney to discuss settlement, informing the lawyer that he wanted 
to resolve the case without his own counsel. Based on that request, the attorney 
discussed the matter with the employee. Many other examples exist of admoni-
tions for unauthorized contact with a represented person, without any signiﬁ-
cant harm to the represented person.139
The board has issued few admonitions for violating Rule 4.3 and instead 
imposed more serious discipline when a lawyer advised an unrepresented person 
135 19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 549 (2003).
136 18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 691 (2002).
137 18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 693 (2002).
138 17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 724 (2001).
139 See, e.g., Ad. 00-46, 16 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 519 (2000); Ad. 99-77, 15 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 795 
(1999); Ad. 96-4, 12 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 601 (1996); Ad. 96-49, 12 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 682 
(1996); Ad. 96-62, 12 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 705 (1996); PR 80-16, 2 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 223 
(1980); PR 78-2, 1 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 384 (1978).
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with interests diﬀerent from the lawyer’s client. In Ad. 10-03,140 the lawyer 
received only an admonition for misconduct that resembled that described in 
Matter of Levine that led to a public reprimand. In that matter, the lawyer rep-
resented a daughter seeking to transfer the mother’s house into the daughter’s 
name. Throughout the lawyer’s drafts of and negotiation about the agreement, 
the lawyer never explained to the mother that he was not representing her, and 
he failed to advise her to seek her own counsel.
140 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 763 (2010).
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chapter fourteen
Law Practice Management
(Rule 1.17 and Rules 5.1 Through 5.7)
I. INTRODUCTION
The legal profession is self-regulated. No individual who is not a licensed 
attorney may practice law, and those who are licensed must carefully oversee the 
work of others who assist in their practices. The Massachusetts Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct enforce these principles by limiting the role that nonlawyers may 
play in operating law ﬁrms, by prohibiting nonlawyers from owning an interest 
in law ﬁrms or directing a lawyer’s legal practice, and by prohibiting a lawyer from 
assisting in the unauthorized practice of law. The rules also limit how a lawyer may 
sell an ongoing business that includes the practice of law. Rule 1.17 addresses 
the latter topic. Rules 5.1 through 5.7 address the broader question of nonlaw-
yers’ interactions with the business of lawyers.
If lawyers do not respect the limitations these rules establish, they face pos-
sible discipline. The number of cases involving these issues is relatively small, and 
most of those involve violating Rule 5.3, which addresses a lawyer’s staﬀ super-
vision, and Rule 5.5, which forbids a lawyer from assisting in the unauthorized 
practice of law. This chapter brieﬂy describes the various rules and assesses the 
types of discipline typically associated with their violation.
II. THE NATURE OF THE LAWYER’S RESPONSIBILITIES
REGARDING THE SALE OF A LAW PRACTICE
A lawyer may, under appropriate circumstances, sell a private law practice, 
with appropriate safeguards to protect the interests of the clients. Rule 1.17 
imposes the requirements for selling a law practice.
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RULE 1.17: SALE OF LAW PRACTICE
A lawyer or law firm may sell, and a lawyer or law firm may 
purchase, with or without consideration, a law practice, including 
good will, if the following conditions are satisfied:
(a) [Reserved]
(b) [Reserved]
(c) The seller gives written notice to each of the seller’s clients 
regarding:
(1)  the proposed sale;
(2)  the client’s right to retain other counsel or to take 
possession of the file; and
(3)  the fact that the client’s consent to the transfer of that 
client’s representation will be presumed if the client does 
not take any action or does not otherwise object within 
ninety (90) days of receipt of the notice.
   If a client cannot be given notice, the representation of that 
client may be transferred to the purchaser only upon entry of an 
order so authorizing by a court having jurisdiction. The seller may 
disclose to the court in camera confidential information relating 
to the representation only to the extent necessary to obtain an 
order authorizing the transfer.
(d) The fees charged clients shall not be increased by reason of 
the sale. The purchaser may, however, refuse to include a particu-
lar representation in the purchase unless the client consents to 
pay the purchaser fees at a rate not exceeding the fees charged by 
the purchaser for rendering substantially similar services prior to 
the initiation of the purchase negotiations.
(e) Upon the sale of a law practice, the seller shall make reason-
able arrangements for the maintenance of property and records 
specified in Rule 1.15.
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A. The Lessons of Rule 1.17
In Massachusetts, lawyers may sell or transfer all or part of their law prac-
tice, but only after meeting certain conditions spelled out in Rule 1.17 and its com-
ments. The essence of this rule is that the lawyer may only transfer the practice 
to another lawyer or group of lawyers, and the transferring lawyer must notify 
each client. Clients may choose not to transfer their representation to the new 
lawyer, but their agreement is presumed if they do not object within ninety days. 
While the fees charged clients may not increase because of the sale, a purchaser 
may insist that any transferred clients pay the same fees that the purchaser typ-
ically charged its clients before the sale.
The Massachusetts rule is diﬀerent from the American Bar Association 
(ABA) Model Rule, and the two “Reserved” sections of the Massachusetts rule 
reﬂect the unwillingness of the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) to accept two cen-
tral provisions of the ABA’s standard. Unlike in Massachusetts, the ABA’s Model 
Rule 1.17(b) limits any such transfer to “the entire practice, or the entire area of 
practice” of the transferring lawyer. In other words, under the Model Rule, a law-
yer cannot sell or transfer part of a practice, but in Massachusetts that arrange-
ment is acceptable. Then Model Rule 1.17(a) requires that the transferring lawyer 
“cease to engage in the private practice of law, or in the area of practice that has 
been sold,” in the geographic or jurisdictional area where the lawyer worked. 
Massachusetts is diﬀerent. It does not forbid a lawyer from selling or transfer-
ring a practice or an area of practice while continuing to accept new clients in 
that area. Massachusetts also includes the phrase “with or without consider-
ation” in its description of the sale and purchase of a law practice, while the 
ABA rule omits that description, implying that Massachusetts permits a free 
transfer of a practice, while the ABA rule does not.
The Massachusetts version diverges from the ABA Model Rule in one other 
respect. Massachusetts Rule 1.17(d) agrees with the Model Rule that “[t]he fees 
charged clients shall not be increased by reason of the sale.” But the Massachu-
setts rule permits the purchasing lawyer to “refuse to include a particular repre-
sentation in the purchase unless the client consents to pay the purchaser fees at a 
rate not exceeding the fees charged by the purchaser for rendering substantially 
similar services prior to the initiation of the purchase negotiations.” The ABA rule 
previously included that same language, but in 2002 the ABA deleted that pro-
vision. According to one authority, “lawyers had used this statement to demand 
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higher fees or else the client would be dropped and the ABA thought this result 
was improper.”1
Practice Tip
Lawyers who lose their licenses to practice because of 
disbarment or suspension might be permitted to sell 
their portfolio. An ethics opinion from the Maine Board 
of Bar Overseers concludes that Rule 1.17 permits a sale 
in such circumstances.2 No Massachusetts report or 
opinion forbids the practice. The disbarred lawyer selling 
a practice might not be able to receive payment from 
the purchaser of the pro rata share of legal fees col-
lected later because of the rule prohibiting sharing of 
legal fees with a nonlawyer. But that lawyer may receive 
referral fees for a referral made, or hourly fees earned 
but not collected, before the disbarment was effective.3
B. Discipline for Violating Rule 1.17
Although Massachusetts treats this area of the legal business diﬀerently from 
the rest of the country, no issue has ever arisen regarding Rule 1.17, no court has 
ever addressed it, the Board of Bar Overseers (BBO) has never commented upon 
it, and no disciplinary report cites it as the basis of a lawyer’s misconduct.
III. THE NATURE OF THE LAWYER’S RESPONSIBILITIES
REGARDING SUPERVISION WITHIN A LAW PRACTICE
Massachusetts Rules 5.1 through 5.3 explain the respective responsibilities 
of supervising and subordinate lawyers working in law ﬁrms or organizations.
1 Ronald D. Rotunda & John S. Dzienkowski, Legal Ethics: The Lawyer’s Deskbook 
on Professional Responsibility 696 § 1.17 (2012–2013 ed.).
2 Me. Ethics Op. 178 (2002) (construing a predecessor to Maine Rule 1.17, with similar language). 
The South Carolina Bar has concluded the opposite, but it construed language requiring notice to 
“active” clients, a qualiﬁcation not present in the Maine or Massachusetts rules. See S.C. Ethics Op. 
2003-06 (2003).
3 In Massachusetts, a referral fee is earned when the referral is made. (This is contrary to the rule 
in most states.) If the fee was earned while the lawyer was not disbarred, the lawyer may accept 
the fee.
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RULE 5.1: RESPONSIBILITIES OF PARTNERS, MANAGERS,
AND SUPERVISORY LAWYERS
(a) A partner in a law firm, and a lawyer who individually or 
together with other lawyers possesses comparable managerial 
authority in a law firm, shall make reasonable efforts to ensure 
that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance 
that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of Professional 
Conduct.
(b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another 
lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other law-
yer conforms to the Rules of Professional Conduct.
(c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer’s violation of 
the Rules of Professional Conduct if:
(1)  the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific 
conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or
(2)  the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial 
authority in the law firm in which the other lawyer prac-
tices, or has direct supervisory authority over the other 
lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time when its con-
sequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take 
reasonable remedial action.
RULE 5.2: RESPONSIBILITIES OF A SUBORDINATE LAWYER
(a) A lawyer is bound by the Rules of Professional Conduct 
notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the direction of another 
person.
(b) A subordinate lawyer does not violate the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct if that lawyer acts in accordance with a supervi-
sory lawyer’s reasonable resolution of an arguable question of 
professional duty.
325
Law Practice Management
RULE 5.3: RESPONSIBILITIES REGARDING NONLAWYER
ASSISTANCE
With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated 
with a lawyer: 
(a) a partner, and a lawyer who individually or together with 
other lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a 
law firm, shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm 
has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the per-
son’s conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of 
the lawyer;
(b) a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlaw-
yer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person’s con-
duct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer; 
and
(c) a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person that 
would be a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if 
engaged in by a lawyer if:
(1)  the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the specific 
conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or
(2)  the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial 
authority in the law firm in which the person is employed, 
or has direct supervisory authority over the person, and 
knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can 
be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable reme-
dial action.
A. The Lessons of Rules 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3
Massachusetts Rules 5.1 through 5.3 establish lines of responsibilities and 
clarify the allocation of authority for complex ethical decisions between a senior 
lawyer and a junior lawyer as well as the duties of nonlawyers who assist law-
yers in providing legal services. 
Rule 5.1, while stating obvious principles, describes important duties of law-
yers who supervise other lawyers. Rule 5.1(a) requires that those lawyers who 
manage a law practice establish systems and policies to ensure that the lawyers 
and staﬀ comply with their ethical duties. A managing lawyer who neglects to 
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do so faces discipline.4 Rule 5.1(b) holds that a lawyer who supervises another 
lawyer shall take reasonable steps to ensure that the supervised lawyer acts eth-
ically. And, ﬁnally, Rule 5.1(c) imposes responsibility on a supervising lawyer for 
the misconduct of a supervised lawyer in two settings: (1) if the supervising law-
yer orders or ratiﬁes the misconduct; or (2) if the senior lawyer (which may in-
clude a partner or a manager who does not directly supervise the junior lawyer) 
knows of the impending misconduct and “fails to take reasonable remedial action” 
to prevent or mitigate it.5 Unless one of those two circumstances exists, a man-
ager or supervisor may not be subject to discipline for a junior or supervised 
lawyer’s misconduct.
Rule 5.1 addresses only a lawyer’s liability under the Rules of Professional Con-
duct and the lawyer’s exposure to discipline. The rule says nothing about whether 
the lawyer may be responsible in any civil action based upon a junior lawyer’s mis-
conduct, and those issues are beyond the scope of this book.6
Rule 5.2 addresses the responsibilities of the supervised, or junior, lawyer. 
It ﬁrst says that a junior lawyer may not escape discipline for misconduct the law-
yer’s supervisor directed or ordered. Sensibly, a lawyer may not defend against a 
charge of violating a rule by asserting that it was done at the request of a super-
visor. The second part of Rule 5.2 is of some passing interest to lawyers in ﬁrms 
but has never aﬀected a junior lawyer in Massachusetts.7 Rule 5.2(b) states that 
a subordinate lawyer is not subject to discipline if acting “in accordance with a 
supervisory lawyer’s reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional 
duty.” If the “reasonable resolution” ends up violating a disciplinary rule, the super-
visor, and not the subordinate, faces discipline. While some subordinate lawyers 
across the country have tried to rely on that provision to shift responsibility to a 
superior, none has ever succeeded.8 The disciplinary reports show that when a 
4 See, e.g., Matter of Foley, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 199 (2010) (suspension).
5 Mass. R. Prof. C. 5.1(c)(2).
6 As comment [7] to Rule 5.1 states, “Whether a lawyer may be liable civilly or criminally for 
another lawyer’s conduct is a question of law beyond the scope of these Rules.” For consideration 
of that topic, see, e.g., John L. Whitlock, Ethical Responsibilities in Supervising Others and Sale of a 
Law Practice, 82 Mass. L. Rev. 289 (1997); John S. Dzienkowski, Legal Malpractice and the Multi-
state Law Firm: Supervision of Multistate Offices; Firms as Limited Liability Partnerships; and Predis-
pute Agreements to Arbitrate Client Malpractice Claims, 36 S. Tex. L. Rev. 967 (1995).
7 Nor has Rule 5.2(b) led to a lawyer’s discipline elsewhere. See Andrew M. Perlman, The Silliest 
Rule of Professional Conduct: Model Rule 5.2(b), The Professional Lawyer (2009), http://papers
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1467910.
8 See, e.g., In re Okrassa, 799 P.2d 1350, 1353–54 (Ariz. 1990) (rejecting junior prosecutor’s de-
fense based on consultation with superiors); People v. Casey, 948 P.2d 1014, 1015–18 (Colo. 
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supervisor and a supervisee engage in related misconduct, the supervisor typi-
cally receives more serious discipline.9
Rule 5.3 essentially replicates the responsibilities set out for managers, part-
ners, and supervisors under Rule 5.1, but it applies them to lawyers who super-
vise paralegals, support staﬀ, and other nonlawyers who work in law oﬃces. The 
role of nonlawyer assistants becomes most interesting when we consider the ques-
tion of the unauthorized practice of law and the limits of what a nonlawyer may 
do without violating that principle. To continue the themes of Rules 5.1 through 
5.3, this chapter discusses the unauthorized practice of law in Section IV in con-
sidering Rule 5.4 alongside Rule 5.7.
B. Discipline for Violating Rules 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3
In Massachusetts, violations of the rules regarding supervisors and super-
visees has never resulted in a disbarment or a suspension unless combined with 
other rules violations.
1. Disbarment
No lawyer has been disbarred principally for violating a rule governing law 
practice management and supervising subordinate lawyers. On at least one occa-
sion, the SJC accepted a disciplinary resignation after the lawyer was charged 
with misconduct related to Rule 5.3. In Matter of Babchuck,10 the lawyer and his 
assistant mismanaged his Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts (IOLTA), lead-
ing to a lack of client funds. His failure to train and supervise the assistant vio-
lated Rule 5.3.
1997) (sanctioning associate where ethics rule clearly governed his conduct); Statewide Griev-
ance Comm. v. Glass, 1995 WL 541810, at *2 & n.1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 6, 1995) (declining 
to excuse associate’s dishonesty); In re Douglas’s Case, 809 A.2d 755, 761–62 (N.H. 2002) (reject-
ing Rule 5.2(b) defense because question of professional duty was not arguable); In re Kelley’s Case, 
627 A.2d 597, 600 (N.H. 1993) (rejecting associate’s Rule 5.2(b) defense because “there could have 
been no ‘reasonable’ resolution of an ‘arguable’ question of duty”); In re Howes, 940 P.2d 159, 164 
(N.M. 1997) (rejecting junior prosecutor’s defense based on New Mexico version of Rule 5.2(b) prin-
cipally because “there was no ‘arguable question of professional duty’ ”).
9 For example, compare Matter of Newman, 31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 482 (2015) (four-month sus-
pension for ﬁling an appellate brief relying on a statement discovered to be false, after an associate 
declined to ﬁle that brief for that reason) with Ad. 15-02, 31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 747 (2015) (ad-
monition for the associate, who, on the employer’s instructions, did not withdraw the false state-
ment, which he had believed to be true when he made it).
10 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 20 (2010) (resignation but no order of disbarment).
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Practice Tip
Lawyers hire subordinate lawyers, paralegals, and support 
staff in order to delegate work and operate a more efﬁ-
cient law practice. Delegation requires careful oversight, 
however. While lawyers obviously need not reproduce all 
of the work others perform under their supervision, law-
yers must have in place systems to ensure that the work 
is done correctly. A lawyer cannot defend against a mis-
conduct charge by saying that the lawyer being super-
vised made the mistakes.11
2. Suspension
Lawyers have been suspended after they failed to supervise support staﬀ 
who mishandled client matters. In Matter of Goldberg,12 an attorney’s failure to 
supervise his oﬃce staﬀ contributed to a suspension for a year and a day, with 
a probationary period of two years, during which a certiﬁed public accountant 
would monitor his ﬁnancial record-keeping. The attorney’s secretary, who was 
in charge of reviewing and balancing his business and IOLTA accounts, embez-
zled money from closing funds. Not only did the lawyer fail to supervise the sec-
retary’s work, but he also neglected to conduct a background check, which would 
have disclosed that she had lost her previous employment for similar miscon-
duct.13 In Matter of Heartquist,14 the respondent failed to supervise an employee 
who embezzled client funds. The board memorandum compared the embezzle-
ment cases that warranted a suspension with those that warranted a public rep-
rimand and concluded that the respondent’s lack of adequate oﬃce systems, along 
with other misconduct, justiﬁed a suspension of six months and a day.
Other lawyers have been suspended while failing to prevent, or even encour-
aging, unethical practices by support staﬀ. For instance, in Matter of Goodman,15
the respondent was suspended for one year, with a reinstatement hearing re-
quired, after instructing his staﬀ, on multiple occasions, not to reveal a client’s 
11 See, e.g., Matter of Abelson, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 1 (2008).
12 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 191 (2007).
13 See also Matter of Collins, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 132 (2009) (six-month suspension with a 
required reinstatement hearing after oﬃce manager embezzled client and ﬁduciary funds).
14 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 332 (2013).
15 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 352 (2006).
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Practice Tip
Misconduct involving failure to supervise support staff 
and paralegals, with some client harm, tends to result in 
a term suspension. If that misconduct does not cause 
client harm, a public reprimand is the typical sanction. If 
the lapse is inadvertent, and no client has been harmed, 
the respondent may receive an admonition.
death to an insurance company. He also directed his staﬀ to alter a medical report 
to omit a sentence that referred to the client’s death. The primary basis for his 
suspension was his dishonesty, but involving his staﬀ contributed to the disci-
pline imposed.
3. Public Reprimand
While term suspensions are common for failure to supervise oﬃce staﬀ with 
some harm or potential harm occurring, lesser sanctions are imposed when a law-
yer’s failure to supervise a subordinate did not result in harm or was not a pat-
tern of misconduct. For example, in Matter of Hopper,16 an attorney failed to ensure 
that his bookkeeper maintained his IOLTA and business account records in com-
pliance with Rule 1.15. As a result of the lack of oversight, one IOLTA account 
check bounced. Because the attorney did not intentionally use client funds for 
his personal use or gain, he received a public reprimand. And in Matter of Levy,17
an attorney’s failure to supervise his bookkeeper and paralegal also resulted in 
a public reprimand. The attorney had settled a client’s case and the bookkeeper 
correctly deposited the settlement check into the attorney’s IOLTA account. 
However, a ﬁrm paralegal did not pay the client her net share of the settlement 
or pay oﬀ a lien before leaving the attorney’s employ. Upon discovering the 
mistake, the attorney paid the client her net share of the settlement proceeds 
with interest.18
16 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 259 (2009). See also Matter of Kalperis, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 390 (2008) 
(attorney faced public reprimand for failure to supervise bookkeepers’ incorrect management of 
IOLTA account and funds).
17 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 355 (2009).
18 See also Matter of Perrone, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 545 (2007) (public reprimand where long-
time trusted secretary’s embezzlement was hard to discover and was undetected by respondent’s 
accountant and title insurer).
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Other reports show a public reprimand for lawyers who failed to supervise 
subordinate lawyers in their law ﬁrm. In Matter of Baron,19 the board accepted 
a stipulation for a public reprimand where a supervisory partner in a law ﬁrm 
failed to adequately supervise a managing partner in a satellite oﬃce regarding 
proper handling of client funds. In Matter of Newton,20 the board also accepted 
a stipulation for a public reprimand after the respondent failed to supervise his 
lawyer son in properly maintaining the ﬁrm’s trust account. In both matters, 
the respondents had prior discipline, but in neither instance did a client suﬀer 
deprivation. In the 1993 case Matter of Jerome,21 the lawyer received a public 
reprimand after he entrusted all responsibility for record-keeping of his busy 
ﬁrm’s trust and operating accounts to a secretary whose work he did not over-
see and who, unknown to the attorney, embezzled more than $80,000 in funds, 
mostly from the respondent but also from lienholders. The same misconduct, 
with the same level of consequences, would most likely result in a term suspen-
sion today.
4. Admonition
Admonitions are a common sanction for sloppy oﬃce procedures or super-
vision. For instance, in Ad. 10-19,22 an attorney received an admonition for fail-
ing to ensure that his ﬁrm had measures to prevent lawyers from engaging in 
conﬂicts of interest. No lawyer or staﬀ member in the ﬁrm conducted an inves-
tigation that would have revealed that the ﬁrm had previously represented one 
of its clients’ adversaries. In Ad. 07-20,23 an attorney’s inexperienced secretary 
sent a letter containing conﬁdential information to a client’s insurer, having mis-
understood the attorney’s instructions concerning the letter. In Ad. 06-18,24 an 
attorney assigned a paralegal to send a check from closing proceeds to a broker. 
Mistakenly believing that the amount was in dispute, the paralegal held the funds 
instead of sending the check to the broker as instructed. And in Ad. 05-10,25 the 
respondent did not review the ﬁnal draft of a will his secretary had prepared. 
The secretary had mistakenly inserted the attorney’s name in the will, making 
the attorney a beneﬁciary, contrary to the Rules of Professional Conduct.
19 17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 62 (2001).
20 12 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 348 (1996).
21 9 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 176 (1993).
22 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 797 (2010).
23 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 973 (2007).
24 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 887 (2006).
25 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 712 (2005).
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Other examples exist of admonitions involving violations of Rule 5.3. For 
instance, in Ad. 05-26,26 two attorneys, partners in a two-person law ﬁrm, each 
received an admonition after their paralegal made errors regarding the logistics 
of a real estate closing. The ﬁrm did not have an adequate system in place to 
supervise the paralegal. In Ad. 05-18,27 the respondent accused the judge, the 
opposing party, and that party’s counsel of collusion based on matters that the 
lawyer’s paralegal had incorrectly included in a brief the respondent submitted 
but had never read. And in Ad. 03-06,28 an attorney overseeing a closing did 
not supervise a paralegal who improperly recorded a mortgage before all of the 
proper funds had cleared.
Although not formally charged as violations of Rules 5.1 and 5.3, in Ad. 
05-3829 the supervising lawyer and an associate in his ﬁrm both received admo-
nitions for handling a motor vehicle accident case where there were conﬂicts 
in representing both the driver and the passenger of one vehicle (where the super-
vising attorney attempted to remedy the conﬂict by discharging the driver as 
a client).
IV. THE NATURE OF THE LAWYER’S RESPONSIBILITIES
REGARDING UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE
OF LAW WITHIN A LAW PRACTICE
As the practice of law becomes more nationwide—and international—the 
issues of the unauthorized practice of law are assuming increasing proportions. 
Rule 5.5 covers a number of the relevant issues.
RULE 5.5: UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW;
MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE OF LAW
(a) A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of 
the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction, or assist 
another in doing so.
26 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 726 (2005).
27 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 8 (2005).
28 19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 529 (2003).
29 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 756 (2005).
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RULE 5.5: UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW;
MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE OF LAW (cont’d.)
(b) A lawyer who is not admitted to practice in this jurisdiction 
shall not:
(1)  except as authorized by these Rules or other law, establish 
an office or other systematic and continuous presence in 
this jurisdiction for the practice of law; or
(2)  hold out to the public or otherwise represent that the 
lawyer is admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction.
(c) A lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction, and 
not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may 
provide legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction that:
(1)  are undertaken in association with a lawyer who is 
admitted to practice in this jurisdiction and who actively 
participates in the matter;
(2)  are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential pro-
ceeding before a tribunal in this or another jurisdiction, if 
the lawyer, or a person the lawyer is assisting, is autho-
rized by law or order to appear in such proceeding or 
reasonably expects to be so authorized;
(3)  are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential arbi-
tration, mediation, or other alternative dispute resolution 
proceeding in this or another jurisdiction, if the services 
arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer’s prac-
tice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to 
practice and are not services for which the forum requires 
pro hac vice admission; or
(4)  are not within paragraphs (c)(2) or (c)(3) and arise out of 
or are reasonably related to the lawyer’s practice in a juris-
diction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice.
(d) A lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction or in 
a foreign jurisdiction, and not disbarred or suspended from prac-
tice in any jurisdiction or the equivalent thereof, may provide 
legal services through an office or other systematic and continu-
ous presence in this jurisdiction that:
(1)  are provided to the lawyer’s employer or its organizational 
affiliates and are not services for which the forum requires 
pro hac vice admission; or
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RULE 5.5 (cont’d.)
(2)  are services that the lawyer is authorized to provide by 
federal law or other law or Rule of this jurisdiction.
(e) For purposes of paragraph (d), the foreign lawyer must be a 
member in good standing of a recognized legal profession in a 
foreign jurisdiction, the members of which are admitted to prac-
tice as lawyers or counselors at law or the equivalent, and are sub-
ject to effective regulation and discipline by a duly constituted 
professional body or a public authority.
A. The Lessons of Rule 5.5
In every jurisdiction, it is unlawful for a person who is not a licensed law-
yer to engage in the practice of law. In Massachusetts, practicing law without a 
license may be a crime30 and may be regulated by a court.31 Since the Massachu-
setts Rules of Professional Conduct apply to lawyers admitted to practice in the state, 
the prohibition on the unauthorized practice of law (known often as UPL) has 
little direct relevance to the topics in this book, since Massachusetts lawyers are 
typically authorized to practice law in this state.32 But the UPL topic is signiﬁ-
cant for Massachusetts lawyers in three ways, which Rule 5.5 addresses.
Assisting in the unauthorized practice of law: First, and perhaps of greatest 
interest here, Rule 5.5(a) prohibits a lawyer from assisting in UPL. Connected to 
30 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 221, § 41. Note that inactive lawyers may provide pro bono services in 
limited circumstances, as described in Chapter 24. See Chapter 24, Section II(A)(6).
31 See, e.g., Mass. Conveyancers Ass’n, Inc. v. Colonial Title & Escrow, Inc., No. Civ. 96–2746–C, 
2001 WL 669280 (Mass. Super. 2001) (ﬁnding the defendant corporation engaged in unautho-
rized practice of law and enjoining the defendant from certain activities); and The Real Estate Bar 
Ass’n for Massachusetts, Inc. v. Nat’l Real Estate Info. Servs., Inc., 459 Mass. 512 (2011) (address-
ing certain issues on what does or does not constitute the practice of law in the real estate closing 
industry).
32 According to Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.5, “A lawyer not admitted in this jurisdiction is also subject 
to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction if the lawyer provides or oﬀers to provide any legal 
services in the jurisdiction.” Massachusetts Rules and Orders of the Supreme Judicial 
Court r. 4:01 § 1 [hereinafter SJC Rule] also states that “Any lawyer . . . engaging in the practice 
of law in this Commonwealth shall be subject to this court’s exclusive disciplinary jurisdiction . . . .” 
Therefore, a lawyer admitted elsewhere (whether in good standing there or on suspension) who 
improperly practices in Massachusetts violates Rule 5.5. No non-Massachusetts lawyer has ever 
been subject to discipline in Massachusetts, however.
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the lessons of Rule 5.3 discussed earlier, a lawyer who helps or permits nonlaw-
yers to practice law violates this rule and is subject to discipline.33 The most 
common example of this misconduct is when a lawyer irresponsibly delegates 
impor tant lawyering tasks to a staﬀ member.34 This worry also arises when a 
lawyer assists a layperson in activities, such as real estate closings, when the 
activity in question qualiﬁes as the practice of law. In recent years, the activity 
of laypersons overseeing residential real estate closings has led to some signiﬁ-
cant appellate guidance about the scope of UPL,35 and the bar counsel has fol-
lowed that guidance with its own warnings to lawyers about the need to exercise 
care in participating in closings overseen by corporations not authorized to prac-
tice law.36 The following discussion brieﬂy addresses the question of what qual-
iﬁes as “the practice of law.”
The prohibition against assisting in UPL has special relevance to a lawyer 
who employs a disbarred or suspended lawyer to serve as a paralegal. One might 
think that a disbarred or suspended lawyer eﬀectively becomes a layperson and 
may be hired, as with any nonlawyer, to assist a licensed lawyer in a practice. 
That assumption is wrong, with one exception. An SJC rule limits a suspended 
or disbarred lawyer’s activity as a paralegal. The rule states:
Except as provided in [a diﬀerent section] of this rule, no lawyer who is 
disbarred or suspended, or who has resigned or been placed on disability 
inactive status under the provisions of this rule shall engage in legal or 
paralegal work, and no lawyer or law ﬁrm shall knowingly employ or 
otherwise engage, directly or indirectly, in any capacity, a person who is 
suspended or disbarred by any court or has resigned due to allegations of 
misconduct or who has been placed on disability inactive status.37
33 See, e.g., Matter of Hrones, 457 Mass. 844, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 252 (2010).
34 A lawyer may lawfully delegate out-of-court tasks to a nonlawyer, such as a paralegal, as long as 
the lawyer responsibly supervises the work of the nonlawyer. While some authorities have stated 
that a lawyer may not delegate to paralegals certain kinds of activities, such as communicating legal 
advice to clients, a recent review of the literature disputed that conclusion. See Paul R. Tremblay, 
Shadow Lawyering: Nonlawyer Practice Within Law Firms, 85 Indiana L.J. 653 (2009). The law-
yers disciplined in Massachusetts for permitting paralegals or other nonlawyers to engage in the 
practice of law inevitably failed to supervise the nonlawyers’ work.
35 See Real Estate Bar Ass’n for Massachusetts, Inc. v. Nat’l Real Estate Info. Servs., 459 Mass. 512, 
521–22 (2011); Real Estate Bar Ass’n for Massachusetts v. Nat’l Real Estate Info. Servs., 608 F.3d 
110 (1st Cir. 2010).
36 Bruce T. Eisenhut, Bearing Witness: REBA v. NREIS and Witness-Only Closings (May 2013), 
https://www.massbbo.org/Files?ﬁleName=bearingwitness.pdf (last visited April 13, 2018).
37 SJC Rule 4:01 § 17(7).
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The exception this refers to provides an opportunity for a suspended or dis-
barred lawyer to apply to the SJC for special permission to serve as a paralegal 
after a designated, and substantial, period of time set forth in the rule.38
Practice Tip
An attorney may not pay or engage a suspended or dis-
barred lawyer to perform any task, including a job 
unconnected to the practice of law, except the person 
may be employed as a paralegal if the Court has so 
allowed.39
Practice of law after suspension: Second, lawyers suspended from practice who 
continue to oﬀer legal services or to hold themselves out as lawyers also violate
Rule 5.5.40 Because those individuals remain members of the Massachusetts bar, 
even if their license to practice has been suspended, they must honor the prohibi-
tion against UPL, and Rule 5.5 applies to them.41
Multijurisdictional practice: The third aspect of Rule 5.5—“multijurisdic-
tional practice,” or MJP—is of great interest to practicing lawyers as a practical 
38 SJC Rule 4:01 § 18(3), which reads as follows:
Employment as Paralegal. At any time after the expiration of the period of suspension 
speciﬁed in an order of suspension, or after the expiration of four years in a case in which 
an indeﬁnite suspension has been ordered, or after the expiration of seven years in a case 
in which disbarment has been ordered or a resignation has been allowed under section 15 
of this rule, a lawyer may move for leave to engage in employment as a paralegal. When 
the term of suspension or disbarment or resignation has been extended pursuant to the 
provisions of section 17(8) of this rule, the lawyer may not petition to be employed as a 
paralegal until the expiration of the extended term. The court may allow such motion 
subject to whatever conditions it deems necessary to protect the public interest, the 
integrity and standing of the bar, and the administration of justice.
39 However, in Matter of Bott, 462 Mass. 430, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 54 (2012), the Court re-
manded the case to a single justice to decide whether a lawyer who resigned as a disciplinary 
sanction might be allowed to act as a mediator and, if so, under what conditions.
40 See, e.g., Matter of Linnehan, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 310 (2010) (suspension); Matter of 
Gillespie, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 223 (2010) (public reprimand); Ad. 09-03, 25 Mass. Att’y 
Disc. R. 657 (2009) (admonition).
41 See SJC Rule 4:01 §17(8) (imposing further reinstatement delays for lawyers who practice with 
a suspended license).
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matter but has less apparent relevance in the disciplinary process and, therefore, 
is only brieﬂy discussed in this book. Rule 5.5(c) addresses the proper scope of 
legal services that a lawyer admitted in another jurisdiction may oﬀer to clients 
in Massachusetts. Rule 5.5 applies primarily to Massachusetts lawyers, but it also 
describes (and limits) what activities non-Massachusetts lawyers may engage in. 
Out-of-state lawyers who engage in activity beyond what Rule 5.5(c) permits 
may face discipline in their home states for violating the limits Massachusetts 
imposes and may face discipline in Massachusetts. More likely, however, the 
lawyer who engages in practice banned by a state’s Rule 5.5 will encounter con-
sequences other than discipline, such as a loss of fees or injunctive relief.42
Brieﬂy, Rule 5.5(c) establishes that a lawyer who is not licensed in Massa-
chusetts may practice law here “on a temporary basis” only in the following cir-
cumstances: (1) when the out-of-state lawyer associates with a Massachusetts 
lawyer who accepts responsibility for the matter,43 (2) when a court permits an 
appearance under a pro hac vice arrangement,44 and, most importantly from a 
practical, operational standpoint, (3) in matters that “arise out of or are reason-
ably related to the lawyer’s practice” in the lawyer’s own jurisdiction.45 These cat-
egories, taken directly from the ABA’s Model Rule 5.5, have been the subject of 
considerable attention and commentary in the literature, and practitioners inter-
ested in the scope of this freedom to practice across state lines may ﬁnd ample 
guidance elsewhere.46
One other aspect of Rule 5.5’s coverage warrants mention. Often, a law-
yer from outside Massachusetts will move to the Commonwealth in order 
42 An authoritative piece on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct does not even list discipline in 
its review of remedies for violating Rule 5.5. See Rotunda & Dzienkowski, supra note 1, at § 5.5-5 
(listing loss of fees, disgorgement of fees, criminal prosecution, injunctive or declaratory relief, and 
contempt as the remedies for unauthorized practice).
43 Mass. R. Prof. C. 5.5(c)(1).
44 Mass. R. Prof. C. 5.5(c)(2).
45 Mass. R. Prof. C. 5.5(c)(4). We have omitted reference to the safe harbor contained in Rule 
5.5(c)(3) because that item is wholly covered by the safe harbor described in Rule 5.5(c)(4).
46 See, e.g., Stephen Gillers, A Profession, If You Can Keep It: How Information Technology and Fad-
ing Borders Are Reshaping the Law Marketplace and What We Should Do About It, 63 Hastings 
L.J. 953 (2012); Eli Wald, Federalizing Legal Ethics, Nationalizing Law Practice, and the Future of 
the American Legal Profession in a Global Age, 48 San Diego L. Rev. 489 (2011). The categories 
the ABA established in Rule 5.5(c) emerged after the disorienting decision of the California 
Supreme Court in Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1 
(Cal. 1998) (after client sued law ﬁrm for malpractice, law ﬁrm counterclaimed for its fee; with-
out deciding the malpractice claim, the court denied fees for work performed by New York 
lawyers “in” California).
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to work in-house at a national corporation or government agency, oﬀering 
advice to that organizational client while living in Massachusetts. Rule 5.5(d) 
conﬁrms that such a lawyer (including an attorney admitted in a foreign country) 
need not become licensed in this state as long as the lawyer is providing legal 
services in-house to an “employer or its organizational aﬃliates.” Rule 5.5(e) 
imposes the additional requirement that the foreign lawyer must be a member 
in good standing of a recognized legal profession in a foreign jurisdiction. The 
exception to Rule 5.5(d) is appearances in court, which remain oﬀ-limits to 
non-Massachusetts lawyers except through the usual pro hac vice application.47
This permission to practice as an in-house counsel or government lawyer does 
not permit the attorney to oﬀer legal services to clients in Massachusetts out-
side of that role.48 Additionally, any such lawyer must register with the bar as 
an in-house counsel.49
A Massachusetts lawyer considering a representation in another state must 
check that state’s version of Rule 5.5 and other applicable rules to determine whether 
the representation is permitted. Massachusetts lawyers have occasionally been dis-
ciplined for handling cases in another state in violation of the other state’s rules.50
Practice Tip
In 1998, the California Supreme Court concluded that a 
New York law ﬁrm must forfeit substantial legal fees 
incurred when working in California for a California client 
because its lawyers were not licensed to practice law in 
California.51 While Massachusetts has no such opinion, and 
while Rule 5.5 has changed since 1998, lawyers here must 
ensure that they are permitted to perform work involv-
ing out-of-state clients and out-of-state legal issues.
47 See SJC Rule 3:15 (requiring registration and payment of a fee of $301 to the BBO (except in 
pro bono matters) if appearing pro hac vice).
48 See SJC Rule 4:02 § 9 (requiring registration of out-of-state lawyers working as in-house coun-
sel and permitting certain forms of pro bono legal services outside of that setting).
49 See SJC Rule 4:02 § 9. See also Chapter 24, Part II(A)(5).
50 See, e.g., Matter of Finn, 433 Mass. 418 (2001); Matter of Shea, 7 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 269 
(1991); Matter of Weitz, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 710 (2010).
51 Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1998).
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Defining the practice of law: Whether an attorney or a non-attorney has 
engaged in UPL often depends on whether the activities the individual per-
formed qualify as “the practice of law.” If they do, the person has violated the 
state statute and the lawyer has violated Rule 5.5. If not, the activity is lawful. 
Given the signiﬁcance of that determination, one might hope for some clarity 
within reported decisions about what exactly qualiﬁes as the practice of law. 
Unfortunately, that clarity is lacking, and a deﬁnition of the practice of law 
elusive. The SJC has attempted to oﬀer some guidance in the context of lawyers 
participating with nonlawyers in real estate closings. In REBA v. NREIS,52 the 
Court oﬀered the following guidance:
“It is not easy to deﬁne the practice of law.” . . . As general observations, 
we have noted that the practice of law involves applying legal judgment 
to address a client’s individualized needs, and that custom and practice 
may play a role in determining whether a particular activity is considered 
the practice of law. More speciﬁcally, we have stated:
“[D]irecting and managing the enforcement of legal claims 
and the establishment of the legal rights of others, where it is 
necessary to form and to act upon opinions as to what those 
rights are and as to the legal methods which must be adopted 
to enforce them, the practice of giving or furnishing legal 
advice as to such rights and methods and the practice, as an 
occupation, of drafting documents by which such rights are 
created, modiﬁed, surrendered or secured are all aspects of the 
practice of law.” [And], for an activity to be considered the 
“practice of law” such that a nonlawyer cannot perform it 
without committing the unauthorized practice of law, the 
activity itself must generally fall “wholly within” the practice
of law.53
52 Real Estate Bar Ass’n for Massachusetts, Inc. v. Nat’l Real Estate Info. Servs., 459 Mass. 512 
(2011).
53 459 Mass. at 517–18 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Lowell Bar Ass’n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 
176, 180 (1943); Matter of the Shoe Mfrs. Protective Ass’n, 295 Mass. 369, 372 (1936); Matter 
of Chimko, 444 Mass. 743, 750 (2005)). In REBA, the SJC, in its response to questions the First 
Circuit posed, declined to hold that conveyancing as a whole was the practice of law and oﬀered 
a functional analysis of the component parts of a real estate transaction. For a discussion of this 
opinion and its relevance for Massachusetts practitioners, see Alexis J. Anderson, “Custom and Prac-
tice” Unmasked: The Legal History of Massachusetts’s Experience with the Unauthorized Practice of Law,
94 Mass. L. Rev. 124 (2013).
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That standard is about the best that any court could craft. Lawyers who con-
template assisting nonlawyers with activities that come close to practicing law 
must exercise careful judgment to discern whether the work ﬁts inside or out-
side of this somewhat ﬂuid deﬁnition. For purposes of discipline, few, if any, 
Massachusetts lawyers have been sanctioned for guessing incorrectly about the 
standard. In the discipline cases involving a violation of Rule 5.5(a), there has 
typically been little or no question that the activity in question was plainly the 
practice of law.
Practice Tip
Conduct that would not be viewed as UPL when per-
formed by a layperson may be deemed the practice of 
law when performed by a suspended or disbarred 
attorney.54
B. Discipline for Violating Rule 5.5
While the most common instances in Massachusetts of UPL are the for-
mer lawyer who continues to practice after being suspended or disbarred and 
the lawyer who assists a non-lawyer in the practice of law, there are other vari-
ations on this theme. The sanctions are usually very severe.
1. Disbarment
Several lawyers have been disbarred for violations involving Rule 5.5. Some 
disbarment judgments arose when a lawyer continued to practice during an admin-
istrative suspension;55 some disbarment orders followed when a lawyer assisted 
in unauthorized practice. In all disbarment matters, though, the lawyer had engaged 
in other misconduct as well. In one of those matters, Matter of Flak,56 the attor-
ney associated with a non-attorney who was a convicted felon and a “jailhouse 
54 See Matter of Bott, 462 Mass. 430, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 54 (2012) (a suspended lawyer is pro-
hibited from a broader range of activity than a nonlawyer). For further discussion of the restric-
tions on suspended or disbarred lawyers, see Chapter 22, Section III(C).
55 See, e.g., Matter of Veysey, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 701 (2010) (practicing during administra-
tive suspension); Matter of Lamond, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 299 (2010) (same); Matter of 
Cliﬀord, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 74 (2010) (same); Matter of Libassi, 449 Mass. 1014, 23 Mass. 
Att’y Disc. R. 396 (2007) (same).
56 6 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 118 (1990).
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lawyer,” and who had established a business called Federal Parole Legal Ser-
vices (FPLS) to provide legal services to federal inmates. The attorney entered 
into a partnership with the nonlawyer as the sole principals of FPLS and 
agreed to divide all income equally. The attorney also commingled client funds, 
deceived the inmates about the nature of the services, and had several other 
separate items of misconduct.
2. Suspension
The most common discipline for violating Rule 5.5 has been a term suspen-
sion. A common report involves a lawyer who continues to practice law after be-
ing administratively suspended. Several of those lawyers have been suspended 
for six months or six months and a day.57 If the lawyers committed misconduct 
while practicing law during the administrative suspension, the resulting sanction 
has been greater. For instance, in Matter of Linnehan,58 the attorney continued to 
practice law, including appearing in court multiple times, and failed to advise his 
clients, the courts, or other parties of his administrative suspension. The attorney 
was suspended for eighteen months. Other lawyers, as seen in Sections IV(B)(3) 
and IV(B)(4) that follow, have received public reprimands, or even admonitions, 
for this misconduct, so the facts and circumstances of a lawyer who practices 
while under administrative suspension play a crucial role in determining the 
level of discipline.
You Should Know
Continuing to practice law knowingly after receiving an 
administrative suspension for failure to register and pay 
bar fees constitutes a violation of Rule 5.5. The most 
common sanction for that misconduct has been a term 
suspension.
57 See, e.g., Matter of Saletan, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 574 (2013) (six months and a day); Matter 
of Gustafson, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 397 (2012), aff ’d 464 Mass. 1021, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 
292 (2013) (six months); Matter of Blessington, 19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 54 (2003) (six months 
and a day). But see Matter of Blodgett, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 71 (2009) (attorney suspended 
for two months after failure to comply with the terms of her administrative suspension); Matter 
of Johnson, 27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 490 (2011) (two-year suspension for practicing while under 
administrative suspension, but with other misconduct and aggravating factors).
58 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 310 (2010).
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The other common source of suspensions in this area is when an attorney 
permits a nonlawyer to conduct activities without supervision. Of course, in these 
situations, something usually goes wrong (hence the bar counsel’s attention to 
the problem), so the suspensions typically include some representational miscon-
duct in addition to failing to supervise the employee. A recent example is Matter 
of Hrones.59 In Hrones, an attorney was under the mistaken belief that his para-
legal was authorized to practice before the Massachusetts Commission Against 
Discrimination (MCAD) and assisted the paralegal while he eﬀectively oper-
ated an MCAD practice under the attorney’s name. The board determined that 
the attorney’s misconduct did not simply violate 5.3(b), where the attorney failed 
to supervise the paralegal, but, coupled with the paralegal’s considerable respon-
sibilities, constituted assisting in the unauthorized practice of law. The attorney 
was suspended for a year and a day.60 In Matter of Jackman,61 the attorney created 
a law partnership with a nonlawyer and shared fees with him. The nonlawyer also 
commingled and misappropriated client funds. The SJC equated that miscon-
duct to negligent misuse of client funds with deprivation and imposed a two-
year suspension (rejecting the single justice’s sanction of a three-year suspension, 
with the third year suspended for two years),62 followed by a practice limitation 
upon reinstatement (representing only criminal defendants in district court).
Practice Tip
The most common reason for a lawyer’s administrative 
suspension is the failure to register and pay annual fees. If 
the BBO does not have the lawyer’s current address, the 
chances increase that the lawyer will fail to meet those 
obligations. The BBO’s rule requiring every lawyer to pro-
vide an e-mail address should limit this kind of mistake.63
59 457 Mass. 844, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 252 (2010).
60 See also Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 4 comment [g]; Matter 
of DiCicco, 6 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 83 (1989) (attorney was found to assist in unauthorized prac-
tice of law when he formed a business with a paralegal to represent prison inmates, listed the para-
legal as “Of Counsel,” and failed to supervise the paralegal).
61 444 Mass. 1013, 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 349 (2005).
62 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 263 (2004).
63 See Chapter 4 for a discussion of administrative suspensions. A lawyer administratively suspended 
for failing to receive notice from the BBO can typically be reinstated by paying the fees due along 
with an aﬃdavit explaining the lawyer’s circumstances.
342
Misconduct and Typical Sanctions
In Matter of Burns,64 an attorney was suspended for six months after he 
hired and actively used a disbarred lawyer in his criminal defense practice. He 
treated the disbarred attorney as a paralegal but did not supervise the employee’s 
work. The report does not claim that the disbarred attorney provided substan-
dard service. By contrast, in Matter of Dash,65 the lawyer not only named his law 
ﬁrm after his paralegal, but he left her unsupervised to essentially practice law. 
The nonlawyer also commingled her funds with the ﬁrm’s IOLTA funds and 
paid her own bills from that account. The BBO and the single justice accepted 
the proposed suspension of six months and a day—merely one day more than 
in Matter of Burns (although that extra day triggered additional reinstatement 
requirements). And in Matter of Levin,66 the respondent was suspended for six 
months after assisting a lawyer who had been suspended from practicing law. 
The respondent appeared at approximately sixty residential real estate closings at 
the suspended lawyer’s request and assisted in completing deals with the sus-
pended lawyer’s clients. The respondent did not simply take over the suspended 
lawyer’s practice, which would have been proper; instead, he assisted the sus-
pended lawyer in continuing to participate in an active real estate closing busi-
ness. The suspended lawyer did all of the underlying substantive work, and the 
respondent merely appeared at the closings as the properly licensed lawyer needed 
to complete the transactions.
You Should Know
Most of the reported violations of Rule 5.5 have led to 
suspensions of six months or six months and a day, even 
when other misconduct accompanied that violation.
In Matter of Vasa,67 following Matter of O’Neill,68 the single justice suspended 
the lawyer for three months for assisting a nonlawyer with activities within the 
respondent’s law ﬁrm that qualiﬁed as practicing law.
64 16 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 35 (2000).
65 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 179 (2006).
66 18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 363 (2002).
67 32 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___, 2016 WL 7493931 (2016).
68 30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 297 (2014).
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In Matter of Ramos, a Massachusetts lawyer was suspended for six months 
for practicing law in Ohio without a license to practice in that state.69 The report 
does not indicate whether the lawyer oﬀered any substandard services to his 
Ohio clients.70
3. Public Reprimand
Since 1999, few lawyers who have violated Rule 5.5 have received public 
reprimands, except when the violation occurred while the lawyer practiced dur-
ing an administrative suspension.71 In Matter of Hutton,72 the respondent, mis-
led by his partner, allowed a suspended lawyer to return to the ﬁrm to work on 
client matters. The hearing committee found his misconduct to be less egre-
gious than other cases of assisting with UPL and recommended a public rep-
rimand, which the board imposed.73
In Matter of Gillespie,74 an attorney received a public reprimand after she con-
tinued to practice law despite her administrative suspension for nonpayment of 
bar dues, in violation of Rule 5.5(a). Unlike the lawyers who received term suspen-
sions for that misconduct (see Sections IV(B)(1) and IV(B)(2)), this respondent 
reasonably believed that her then-partner had paid her registration fees. The 
board’s report states, “Where the respondent did not in fact have actual knowl-
edge of her administrative suspension, public reprimand is the appropriate disci-
pline.”75 Despite the board’s assertion, however, some lawyers whose conduct ﬁts 
that description have received admonitions,76 as discussed in Section IV(B)(4).
69 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 554 (2013). The lawyer also failed to report a conviction to the bar 
counsel.
70 See also Matter of Airewele, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 3 (2012) (suspension of six months and a day 
for practicing in Georgia without a license, along with neglect and conﬂict of interest).
71 Cf. Matter of Nardi, 10 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 204 (1994) (public reprimand after respondent 
assisted the principal and staﬀ of a Massachusetts corporation in the unauthorized practice of law).
72 31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 313 (2015).
73 The partner who “duped” Hutton and more actively assisted the suspended lawyer to return to 
the ﬁrm was suspended for three months. See Matter of Vasa, 32 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___, 2016 
WL 7493931 (2016).
74 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 223 (2010).
75 Id. at 224. See also Matter of Cavanaugh, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 68 (2010) (public reprimand 
where attorney believed ﬁrm had paid the registration fee); Matter of Payton, 26 Mass. Att’y 
Disc. R. 495 (2010) (public reprimand where respondent’s wife, to whom he had given registra-
tion fee and materials, failed to mail them).
76 See Ad. No. 12-01, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 913 (2012); Ad. No. 12-07, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 923 
(2012); Ad. No. 09-03, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 657 (2009); Ad. No. 09-10, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 670 
(2009); Ad. No. 04-20, 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 697 (2004); Ad. No. 03-07, 19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 531 
(2003).
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In Matter of McSwiggan,77 a lawyer was publicly reprimanded for practicing 
law while administratively suspended but did not claim lack of knowledge or a 
belief that an employee was responsible for completing his registration.
4. Admonition
Several lawyers have received admonitions for continuing to practice law after 
being administratively suspended, misconduct that presumptively warrants a pub-
lic reprimand, according to a 2010 disciplinary decision.78 The admonitions appear 
both before79 and after80 that case. None of the later admonitions has addressed 
the presumptive standard, but each of the admonitions involved a lawyer’s inno-
cent mistake.
On occasion, the board has admonished a lawyer for practicing, in a limited 
way, in another jurisdiction without a license. For instance, in Ad. 99-13,81 the 
attorney received an admonition after he appeared on behalf of three defendants 
in a California court when he was not admitted to practice there. The attorney 
did not have, nor had he sought, court permission to appear pro hac vice. The 
lawyer had also engaged in other misconduct that involved making harassing 
telephone calls in the middle of the night to an attorney with whom he had a 
family-related dispute. In Ad. 99-43,82 the attorney had registered as a retired 
lawyer in Massachusetts, yet appeared in probate court on behalf of several rel-
atives in a will contest.
V. REGULATING THE LAWYER-NONLAWYER RELATIONSHIP
WHEN DELIVERING LEGAL SERVICES
Rules 5.4 and 5.7 address the relationship between lawyers and nonlawyers 
in providing legal services. They also address the form of the entity through which 
a lawyer may or may not provide legal services.
77 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 454 (2013).
78 Matter of Gillespie, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 223 (2010).
79 See, e.g., Ad. No. 09-03, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 657 (2009); Ad. No. 09-10, 25 Mass. Att’y 
Disc. R. 670 (2009); Ad. No. 04-20, 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 697 (2004); Ad. No. 03-07, 19 Mass. 
Att’y Disc. R. 531 (2003).
80 See, e.g., Ad. No. 12-01, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 913 (2012); Ad. No. 12-07, 28 Mass. Att’y 
Disc. R. 923 (2012).
81 15 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 668 (1999).
82 15 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 729 (1999).
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RULE 5.4: PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE OF A LAWYER
(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a non-
lawyer, except that:
(1)  an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer’s firm, partner, 
or associate may provide for the payment of money, over a 
reasonable period of time after the lawyer’s death, to the 
lawyer’s estate or to one or more specified persons;
(2)  a lawyer who purchases the practice of a deceased, disabled, 
or disappeared lawyer may, pursuant to the provisions of 
Rule 1.17, pay to the estate or other representative of that 
lawyer the agreed-upon purchase price;
(3)  a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a 
compensation or retirement plan, even though the plan is 
based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement; 
and
(4)  a lawyer or law firm may agree to share a statutory or
tribunal-approved fee award, or a settlement in a matter 
eligible for such an award, with a qualified legal assistance 
organization that referred the matter to the lawyer or law 
firm, if  the client consents, after being informed that a 
division of fees will be made, to the sharing of the fees and 
the total fee is reasonable.
(b) A lawyer shall not form a partnership or other business entity 
with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the entity consist of the 
practice of law.
(c) A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, 
or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or 
regulate the lawyer’s professional judgment in rendering such legal 
services.
(d) A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a limited lia-
bility entity authorized to practice law for a profit, if:
(1)  a nonlawyer owns any interest therein, except that a 
fiduciary representative of the estate of a lawyer may hold 
the stock or interest of the lawyer for a reasonable time 
during administration;
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RULE 5.4: PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE OF A LAWYER
(cont’d.)
(2)  a nonlawyer is corporate director or officer thereof or 
occupies the position of similar responsibility in any 
form of association other than a corporation 
including a limited liability company; or
(3)  a nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the 
professional judgment of a lawyer. 
RULE 5.7: RESPONSIBILITIES REGARDING LAW-RELATED
SERVICES
(a) A lawyer shall be subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct 
with respect to the provision of law-related services, as defined in 
paragraph (b), if the law-related services are provided:
(1)  by the lawyer in circumstances that are not distinct from 
the lawyer’s provision of legal services to clients; or
(2)  in other circumstances by an entity controlled by the law-
yer individually or with others if the lawyer fails to take 
reasonable measures, which shall include notice in writing, 
to assure that a person obtaining the law-related services 
knows that the services are not legal services and that the 
protections of the client-lawyer relationship do not exist.
(b) The term “law-related services” denotes services that might 
reasonably be performed in conjunction with and in substance are 
related to the provision of legal services, and that are not prohib-
ited as unauthorized practice of law when provided by a nonlawyer.
A. The Lessons of Rules 5.4 and 5.7
Rules 5.4 and 5.7 address similar topics—the proper relationship between 
lawyers and nonlawyers in delivering legal services. This is an important and 
developing issue in the legal profession but, as yet, the source of little activity 
within the disciplinary reports. As a result, this summary of the rules is brief.
Nonlawyers may not engage in the practice of law. Related to that funda-
mental tenet, Rule 5.4(b) states that lawyers may not practice law in an organiza-
tion or ﬁrm in which nonlawyers own an interest. Nonlawyers may not own law 
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ﬁrms or own equity interests in law practices. Lawyers may lawfully practice in 
nonproﬁt organizations in which nonlawyers serve as managers or directors, as 
long as the nonlawyers do not interfere with the lawyers’ independent profes-
sional judgment. Also, Rule 5.4(a) provides that lawyers may not share legal 
fees with nonlawyers, except to pay the nonlawyers for services provided, with 
some other narrow exceptions. These provisions limit most forms of multidiscipli-
nary practice (often called MDP), where lawyers and other professionals jointly own 
and operate a full-service ﬁrm oﬀering complementary products to clients with 
multiple needs. The legal profession has been debating whether to change that 
fundamental restriction on MDP, but any such eﬀorts have thus far failed.83
No lawyer in Massachusetts has been disciplined for engaging in an MDP. 
A handful of lawyers have been disciplined for sharing legal fees with nonlaw-
yers, as discussed in the following section. Those cases serve as the only reported 
Massachusetts discipline under Rule 5.4.
Rule 5.7 complements Rule 5.4 and establishes procedures to follow when a 
lawyer oﬀers clients “ancillary services” that are not legal services. Typical exam-
ples include title insurance, consulting services, or real estate appraisals. While 
a true MDP is not permitted in Massachusetts, a lawyer or law ﬁrm may oﬀer 
such nonlegal services to customers as long as the lawyer or law ﬁrm honors the 
limitations of Rule 5.4 regarding the ownership interests of and fee payments 
to the nonlawyers. If a lawyer chooses to oﬀer both legal services and ancillary 
nonlegal services, Rule 5.7 establishes protocols the lawyer must follow to 
ensure that clients and customers understand what parts of the services qualify 
for the ethical protections that legal services have and what parts do not.
The Boston Bar Association Ethics Committee has issued a formal ethics 
opinion outlining the proper steps for a lawyer to take to satisfy Rule 5.7 and the 
rules governing conﬂicts and conﬁdentiality.84
B. Discipline for Violating Rules 5.4 and 5.7
Four lawyers have been disciplined since 1999 for violating Rule 5.4, all for 
sharing legal fees with nonlawyers. In Matter of Hale,85 the attorney received a 
public reprimand for agreeing to pay his paralegal 25% of the legal fees received 
83 For one example of the ongoing eﬀorts within the ABA to permit some limited form of mul-
tidisciplinary practice, see American Bar Association, Discussion Draft for Comment: 
Alternative Law Practice Structures 6 (Dec. 2, 2011).
84 Boston Bar Association, Op. 2002-B, Bostonbar.org, http://www.bostonbar.org/sc/ethics/
Ethics2002-B.PDF.
85 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 201 (2004).
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for his immigration work. The lawyer’s prior admonition served as an aggravat-
ing factor. Two other lawyers received admonitions for sharing fees. In Ad. No. 
08-04,86 the lawyer received an admonition for agreeing to pay his oﬃce man-
ager 33% of all his legal fees as her salary. In Ad. No. 99-31,87 the lawyer paid 
a referral fee to a nonlawyer and also mismanaged his IOLTA account. In Mat-
ter of Zak,88 the lawyer was disbarred for multiple rules violations, including 
dividing legal fees with a nonlawyer business partner and paying ﬁnder’s fees 
of $1,000 and $1,500 each to several nonlawyers for referring clients to him. 
And in Matter of Shalom,89 the lawyer was suspended indeﬁnitely for multiple 
instances of misconduct, including paying a ﬁnder’s fee to a nonlawyer in return 
for a referral.90
Only two Massachusetts lawyers have been disciplined, both receiving admo-
nitions for misconduct involving Rule 5.7, when they provided ancillary services 
to customers without making clear that the activities were not legal services. In 
Ad. 03-30,91 the respondent, while operating a corporation in New York City that 
oﬀered tax preparation and tax representation services, prepared back tax returns 
and sought to resolve IRS bills for overdue taxes. The attorney did not explain to 
the client that his services were not legal services. And in Ad. 03-02,92 the attor-
ney received an admonition for failing to inform his clients that his brokerage 
services in a real estate closing were not legal services.
VI. THE NATURE OF THE LAWYER’S RESPONSIBILITIES
REGARDING RESTRICTIONS ON THE RIGHT TO PRACTICE
Rule 5.6 prohibits a lawyer from entering into any agreement that restricts 
the lawyer’s right to practice in the future. This means a law ﬁrm cannot impose 
restrictive covenants on lawyers.  It is considered to be in the best interests of 
the clients and aﬀords them the right to choose their own counsel.
86 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 848 (2008).
87 15 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 708 (1999).
88 476 Mass. 1034 (2018).
89 19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 389 (2003).
90 See also Matter of Jackman, 444 Mass. 1013, 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 349 (2005), noted in the 
discussion of Rule 5.5 in Section IV. In Jackman, the full SJC concluded that a term suspension 
was the appropriate sanction for a lawyer who practiced and shared fees with a nonlawyer.
91 19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 573 (2003).
92 19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 520 (2003).
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RULE 5.6: RESTRICTIONS ON RIGHT TO PRACTICE
A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making:
(a) a partnership, shareholders, operating, employment, or other 
similar type of agreement that restricts the right of a lawyer to 
practice after termination of the relationship, except an agree-
ment concerning benefits upon retirement; or
(b) an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer’s right to 
practice is part of the settlement of a client controversy.
A. The Lessons of Rule 5.6
Rule 5.6 prohibits restrictive covenants in employment agreements or in set-
tlement terms and restates previous Massachusetts law.93 Its purpose is to pre vent 
either law ﬁrms or opposing parties from insisting that a lawyer agree not to engage 
in certain representation activities in the future, as such terms interfere with “[t]he 
strong public interest in allowing clients to retain counsel of their choice.”94
Rule 5.6 has seldom been the source of discipline in Massachusetts.95 Its rel-
evance has been more apparent in disputes about partners’ departures from law 
ﬁrms and the ﬁrms’ eﬀorts to limit later activity by former partners. The SJC has 
decided important cases in which the Court relied upon the principles of Rule 5.6 
and its predecessor, DR 2-108, to invalidate some partnership agreement provi-
sions that limited the practices of lawyers who leave the ﬁrm.96 At the same time, 
Rule 5.6 does not prohibit the SJC or the BBO from imposing limitations on a 
lawyer’s practice as part of the lawyer’s disciplinary sanction. While not common, 
such conditions appear in the disciplinary reports.97
93 See DR 2-108.
94 Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 404 Mass. 419, 431 (1989).
95 In Matter of Traﬁconte, 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 747 (2006), the respondent “violated Canon 
Two, DR 2-108(B) (entering into an agreement in connection with a settlement that restricts the 
lawyer’s right to practice law),” among many other instances of misconduct, and received a one-
year suspension.
96 See, e.g., Meehan v. Shaughnessy, id. at 93; Pettingell v. Morrison, Mahoney & Miller, 426 
Mass. 253, 256 (1997); Eisenstein v. David G. Conlin, P.C., 444 Mass. 258, 262–63 (2005); 
Pierce v. Morrison Mahoney LLP, 452 Mass. 718 (2008).
97 See, e.g., Matter of Jackman, 444 Mass. 1013, 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 349 (2005) (ordering that 
the respondent’s “practice shall be limited to representation of criminal defendants in the District 
Court Department”).
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chapter fifteen
Advertising and Solicitation
(Rules 7.1 Through 7.5)
I. INTRODUCTION
The Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct limit the ways in which Massa-
chusetts lawyers may market their practice. Until the latter part of the twentieth 
century, lawyers were essentially forbidden from commercially advertising their 
services, but in the 1970s and 1980s U.S. Supreme Court decisions, relying on the 
First Amendment rights of lawyers and associational rights of clients, began to open 
up the commercial marketing world for attorneys. However, many restrictions still 
apply that lawyers need to understand. While Massachusetts lawyers have not 
often been disciplined for violating rules regulating advertising and solicitation, 
lawyers have occasionally run into trouble by overreaching in this area. With the 
emergence of social networking and similar creative marketing opportunities, this 
topic may lead to intriguing questions of discipline in the future.
II. THE NATURE OF THE LAWYER’S RESPONSIBILITIES
REGARDING ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION
Regulating lawyers’ eﬀorts to obtain clients appears in Rules 7.1 through 7.5. 
Those rules permit lawyers to liberally advertise, but limit, while not banning, 
more focused solicitation of individual clients. The rules also restrict the trade 
names and associational references that lawyers use to identify their practices as 
well as claims of expertise or specialization. The critical theme throughout this 
regulatory scheme is that all marketing endeavors must be honest, not mislead, 
and not pressure any prospective client. This section brieﬂy reviews the ﬁve rules, 
without extensively discussing the regulatory details.1
1 For a more extensive discussion of the advertising, solicitation, and marketing protocols appli-
cable to Massachusetts lawyers, see, e.g., Ronald F. Kehoe, Lawyer Marketing, in Ethical Law-
yering in Massachusetts, Chapter 2 ( James S. Bolan ed., 4th ed., 2015 and 2018 Supp.); 
Steven W. Kasten, Professional Ethics and Social Media, 55 Boston Bar J. 40 (Summer 2011); 
Sherri Gilmore, The Ethical Limits on Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation,Massachusetts Board 
of Bar Overseers (Sept. 2016), https://bbopublic.blob.core.windows.net/web/f/advertising.pdf 
351
Advertising and Solicitation
RULE 7.1: COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING A LAWYER’S
SERVICES
A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication 
about the lawyer or the lawyer’s services. A communication is 
false or misleading if it contains a material misrepresentation of 
fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the statement 
considered as a whole not materially misleading.
RULE 7.2: ADVERTISING
(a) Subject to the requirements of Rules 7.1 and 7.3, a lawyer may 
advertise services through written, recorded, or electronic com-
munication, including public media.
(b) A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for rec-
ommending the lawyer’s services, except that a lawyer may:
(1)  pay the reasonable costs of advertisements or communi-
cations permitted by this Rule;
(2)  pay the usual charges of a legal service plan, not-for-profit 
lawyer referral service, or qualified legal assistance orga-
nization;
(3)  pay for a law practice in accordance with Rule 1.17;
(4)  refer clients to another lawyer or a nonlawyer professional 
pursuant to an agreement not otherwise prohibited under 
these Rules that provides for the other person to refer 
clients or customers to the lawyer, if;
  (i)  the reciprocal referral agreement is not exclusive, 
and
  (ii)  the client is informed of the existence and nature of 
the agreement; and 
(5)  pay fees permitted by Rule 1.5(e) or Rule 5.4(a)(4).
(c) Any communication made pursuant to this Rule shall include 
the name of the lawyer, group of lawyers, or firm responsible for 
its content.
(last visited April 2, 2018); Sarah A. Chambers, Pick Me! Pick Me! Pick Me! (An Advertising and Solic-
itation Update),Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers (March 2005), https://bbopublic.blob
.core.windows.net/web/f/pickme.pdf (last visited April 2, 2018).
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RULE 7.3: SOLICITATION OF CLIENTS
(a) A lawyer shall not by in-person, live telephone or real-time 
electronic contact solicit professional employment for a fee, 
unless the person contacted:
(1)  is a lawyer;
(2)  has a prior professional relationship with the lawyer;
(3)  is a grandparent of the lawyer or the lawyer’s spouse, a 
descendant of the grandparents of the lawyer or the law-
yer’s spouse, or the spouse of any of the foregoing persons; 
or
(4)  is (i) a representative of an organization, including a 
non-profit or government entity, in connection with the 
activities of such organization, or (ii) a person engaged in 
trade or commerce as defined in G.L. c. 93A, §1(b), in 
connection with such person’s trade or commerce. 
(b) A lawyer shall not solicit professional employment by writ-
ten, recorded or electronic communication or by in-person, tele-
phone or real-time electronic contact even when not otherwise 
prohibited by paragraph (a), if:
(1)  the target of the solicitation has made known to the 
lawyer a desire not to be solicited by the lawyer;
(2)  the solicitation involves coercion, duress or harassment; or
(3)  the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the 
physical, mental, or emotional state of the target of the 
solicitation is such that the target cannot exercise reason-
able judgment in employing a lawyer, provided, however, 
the prohibition in this clause (3) only applies to solicita-
tions for a fee. 
(c) [Reserved] 
(d) Notwithstanding the prohibitions in paragraph (a), a lawyer 
may request referrals from a lawyer referral service operated, 
sponsored, or approved by a bar association or other non-profit 
organization, and cooperate with any other qualified legal assis-
tance organization.
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RULE 7.4: COMMUNICATION OF FIELDS OF PRACTICE
(a) A lawyer may communicate the fact that the lawyer does or 
does not practice in particular fields of law. 
(b) Lawyers may hold themselves out publicly as specialists in 
particular services, fields, and areas of law if the communication 
is not false or misleading. Such holding out includes a statement 
that the lawyer concentrates in, specializes in, is certified in, has 
expertise in, or limits practice to a particular service, field, or area 
of law. Lawyers who hold themselves out as specialists shall be 
held to the standard of performance of specialists in that particu-
lar service, field, or area. 
(c) A lawyer shall not state or imply that a lawyer is certified as a 
specialist in a particular field of law unless the name of the certi-
fying organization is clearly identified in the communication and:
(1)  the lawyer has been certified as a specialist by an organi-
zation that has been approved by an appropriate state 
authority or accredited by the American Bar Association, 
or
(2)  the communication states that the certifying organization 
is “a private organization, whose standards for certifica-
tion are not regulated by a state authority or the American 
Bar Association.”
RULE 7.5: FIRM NAMES AND LETTERHEADS
(a) A lawyer shall not use a firm name, letterhead, or other pro-
fessional designation that violates Rule 7.1. A trade name may be 
used by a lawyer in private practice if it does not imply a connec-
tion with a government agency or with a public or charitable legal 
services organization and is not otherwise in violation of Rule 7.1. 
(b) A law firm with offices in more than one jurisdiction may use 
the same name or other professional designation in each jurisdic-
tion, but identification of the lawyers in an office of the firm shall 
indicate the jurisdictional limitations on those not licensed to 
practice in the jurisdiction where the office is located.
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RULE 7.5: FIRM NAMES AND LETTERHEADS (cont’d.)
(c) The name of a lawyer holding a public office shall not be used 
in the name of a law firm, or in communications on its behalf, 
during any substantial period in which the lawyer is not actively 
and regularly practicing with the firm.
(d) Lawyers may state or imply that they practice in a partnership 
or other organization only when that is the fact.
A. The Lessons of Rule 7.1
Rule 7.1 establishes a high standard of truthfulness for a lawyer’s communi-
cations. It requires lawyers to ensure that communications about their practices 
or skills are not misleading to prospective clients.2 For instance, two Massachu-
setts lawyers sought out prospective clients and others by advertising in Rhode 
Island and claiming, truthfully, that they were “members of the ‘Rhode Island 
Bar Association’ without stating that these memberships were as ‘associates’ and 
that neither respondent was licensed to practice law in Rhode Island.” That con-
duct violated Rule 7.1.3
This rule applies to all marketing and business-generating communications 
by a lawyer and in that way serves as an overlay to the remaining rules this chap-
ter discusses.
Practice Tip
Lawyers are permitted to publicize prior successes in 
their marketing campaigns but must exercise special 
care to be accurate in describing those successes. Law-
yers may not imply any promise of success to prospec-
tive clients or favorably compare their services to other 
lawyers unless they can substantiate the claim.
2 In Matter of Zak, 476 Mass. 1034, 1038, 33 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___, ___ (2017), the SJC, in 
disbarring an attorney who engaged in unfair and deceptive practices in marketing his legal 
practice, noted that “[i]t is not necessary to show that a client or potential client relied on the 
respondent’s deliberate misrepresentations in order to establish that he made them.”
3 Ad. No. 03-47, 19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 609 (2003).
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B. The Lessons of Rule 7.2
Rule 7.2 provides guidance to lawyers about advertising, which is diﬀerent 
from solicitation, the subject of Rule 7.3. Lawyers may advertise freely, so long 
as their advertising is not false or misleading. The only requirements are that 
the lawyer’s name must be on any such advertising4 and the lawyer may not pay 
or otherwise reward anyone for recommending the lawyer’s services,5 except for 
such understandable items as payment for the cost of advertising or for a law-
yer referral service.6
Advertising means marketing to a broad audience and not targeting spe-
ciﬁc individuals known to need legal services. Because lawyers’ websites and home 
pages are a form of advertising, as are attorney proﬁles on sites such as LinkedIn,7
lawyers must comply with Rule 7.2 with respect to those communications. Some 
sources have expressed concern that advertising that employs testimonials about 
the lawyer’s successes may violate the “misleading” standard if the statements made 
cannot be documented as true for prospective clients, or they imply that the law-
yer will obtain certain results for a client.8
Practice Tip
Social media counts.9 Anything you say about your prac-
tice on social media sites may qualify as advertising and, 
therefore, must conform to the rules.
4 Mass. R. Prof. C. 7.2(c).
5 Mass. R. Prof. C. 7.2(b). See Matter of Zak, 476 Mass. at 1038, 33 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. at ___. 
(sharing fees with a nonlawyer agent to locate clients violated this Rule; respondent disbarred).
6 Mass. R. Prof. C. 7.2(b)(1), (2).
7 See Kasten, supra note 1, at 42. See also Matter of Saletan, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 574 (2013) 
(inactive lawyer’s identiﬁcation as counsel on LinkedIn page violated Rule 7.1).
8 See, e.g., Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. No. 09-01 (2009) (client testimonials are 
prohibited to the extent they are “false or misleading”); Conn. Informal Op. 01-07 (2001) (ex-
pressing that worry). Cf. Rule 7.1, comment [3].
9 See, e.g., Hunter v. Va. State Bar, 744 S.E.2d 611, 613 (Va. 2013) (lawyer’s blog entries consti-
tuted a form of advertising); Board Wrestles with LinkedIn Issues, The Florida Bar News ( Jan. 1, 
2014) (Florida Bar Board of Governors “authorized a committee to explore preparing an opin-
ion on lawyers using the business networking site LinkedIn”).
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C. The Lessons of Rule 7.3
The most extensive business-generating regulation applies to solicitation, 
which is governed by Rule 7.3. Comment [1] to Rule 7.3 deﬁnes solicitation as 
“a targeted communication initiated by the lawyer that is directed to a speciﬁc 
person and that oﬀers to provide, or can reasonably be understood as oﬀering to 
provide, legal services.”10 This rule states that lawyers may not solicit prospective 
clients at all if the person has indicated to the lawyer a desire not to be solicited;11
may not solicit for a fee if the prospective client is vulnerable and cannot exer-
cise reasonable judgment;12 and may not solicit for a fee by telephone, e-mail, real-
time electronic communication, or in-person communication, except for certain 
relatives of the lawyer, prior clients, and business or organizational representa-
tives, including a nonproﬁt.13
Therefore, if not intending to receive a fee from the client, lawyers may 
solicit individual clients directly (unless they have expressed a desire not to be 
contacted) by any means other than those that are deceptive or pressuring. If the 
lawyer is seeking a paying client, the lawyer may write to prospective clients gen-
erally but may not communicate with them directly by telephone, e-mail, real-
time electronic communication, or in person, unless the individual is related to 
the lawyer, is a former client, is an organization, or is engaged in a business.
Practice Tip
Be especially careful about soliciting business by tele-
phone, e-mail, real-time electronic communication, or 
in-person conversation from individual clients who you 
believe are in need of your legal services. Rule 7.3 is par-
ticularly protective of potentially vulnerable individuals.
D. The Lessons of Rule 7.4
Rule 7.4 regulates lawyers’ claims to special expertise. A Massachusetts law-
yer may claim to be an expert or a specialist, but only if that claim is not false 
10 Mass. R. Prof. C. 7.3 comment [1].
11 Mass. R. Prof. C. 7.3(b)(1).
12 Mass. R. Prof. C. 7.3(b)(3).
13 Mass. R. Prof. C. 7.3(a)(1)–(4).
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or misleading.14 If wishing to claim “certiﬁcation” in a speciﬁc legal area, the 
lawyer must identify the certifying organization and explain (if true) that the 
organization is not a governmental body.15 Claiming such expertise or certiﬁca-
tion no doubt has some marketing beneﬁts, but it has a corresponding cost. If 
a lawyer claims such special expertise or proﬁciency, or even if the lawyer sim-
ply claims to concentrate in or limit the practice to that area, the lawyer is held 
to a higher standard of care.16 That consequence has meaning for the lawyer fac-
ing a civil claim of malpractice but seldom, if ever, aﬀects a disciplinary proceed-
ing.17 Lawyers have occasionally faced discipline for misconduct implicating 
Rule 7.4, including earlier versions of this limitation.18
E. The Lessons of Rule 7.5
Rule 7.5 governs the name a lawyer may use for a law ﬁrm or practice.19 The 
rule restricts the options available to lawyers in a minor way. Law ﬁrm names 
may not be false or misleading, of course, but a law ﬁrm may use a trade name if 
the name satisﬁes that criterion.20 A Massachusetts law ﬁrm may use its name 
14 Mass. R. Prof. C. 7.4(b).
15 Mass. R. Prof. C. 7.4(c).
16 Mass. R. Prof. C. 7.4(b). The American Bar Association’s Model Rules do not include a pro-
vision corresponding to Rule 7.4(b), although some common law principles from other jurisdic-
tions establish that point. See, e.g., Hizey v. Carpenter, 830 P.2d 646, 651–52 (Wash. 1992) (noting 
the principle but not applying it); R. Mallen & J. Smith, Legal Malpractice § 15.4 (5th ed. 
2000).
17 No reported Massachusetts malpractice case has relied upon Rule 7.4(b), and as of May 1, 2018, 
no disciplinary case in the Commonwealth has cited that provision.
18 See Matter of Capone, 17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 105 (2001) (indeﬁnite suspension for multiple 
instances of misconduct, including falsely claiming board certiﬁcation on letterhead); Ad. 09-12, 
25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 674 (2009) (Rule 7.4(a) violation by holding self out as a specialist in immi-
gration law without experience in that area). In 1986, at a time when lawyers were forbidden to 
claim to be specialists, a lawyer received a private reprimand under DR 2-105(A) for advertising 
that his law ﬁrm “specialized” in employee/employer disputes. See PR 86-30, 5 Mass. Att’y Disc. 
R. 472 (1986). That claim, if true, would not violate any rule today. Also, a lawyer received a rep-
rimand in 1995 for claiming that his law ﬁrm had “specialists,” when those persons were parale-
gals. See PR 95-34, 11 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 371 (1995).
19 See also Massachusetts Rules and Orders of the Supreme Judicial Court r. 3:06 § 2(c) 
[hereinafter SJC Rule] (if a law ﬁrm operates as a limited liability entity, “[t]he name of the entity 
shall contain words or abbreviations that indicate that it is a limited liability entity”).
20 Mass. R. Prof. C. 7.5 comment [1]. If the trade name includes a geographic reference, the ﬁrm 
might have to disclaim any implication that it has any relationship to a governmental body. Id. In 
addition, a law ﬁrm may not use the name of a lawyer who is not in good standing with the bar, 
given the requirements of comment [1] that a ﬁrm name may include only current, retired, or de-
ceased law ﬁrm members.
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in a diﬀerent jurisdiction (the converse is also true), but it must identify the juris-
dictional limitations of its lawyers. If a law practice uses a name that implies 
more than one attorney (such as “Law Group” or “Associates”), that usage must 
not be misleading.21
Rule 7.5 becomes challenging in two settings.22 One relates to the role of a 
lawyer with an “of counsel” relationship with the ﬁrm. The other relates to the 
situation where lawyers share space but do not operate as a single ﬁrm.
In Formal Op. 90-357,23 the American Bar Association’s Committee on 
Ethics and Professional Responsibility deﬁned the concept of an “of counsel” 
arrangement as a lawyer with “a close, regular, personal relationship” with a law 
ﬁrm but excluding “that of a partner (or its equivalent, a principal of a profes-
sional corporation), with the shared liability and/or managerial responsibility 
implied by that term,” and excluding an associate, deﬁned as “a junior non-part-
ner lawyer, regularly employed by the ﬁrm.” The Oﬃce of the Bar Counsel has 
declared that ﬁrm names should not include lawyers serving in an “of counsel” 
position:
The name of a lawyer who is of counsel to a ﬁrm should not appear in the 
name of the ﬁrm unless the lawyer who is of counsel is a retired name 
partner of the ﬁrm. Including the name of a lawyer who is simply of 
counsel without the status of a prior named partner would be deceptive 
and misleading in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 7.1 and 7.5 because of the 
implication that the of counsel lawyer is an actual member of the ﬁrm.24
Based on the same reasoning, lawyers who share oﬃce space but who do not 
operate as a single law ﬁrm may not use a trade name that implies the existence 
of a law ﬁrm or partnership. Comment [2] to Rule 7.5 explains the limitation:
[L]awyers who are not in fact partners, such as those who are only 
sharing oﬃce facilities, may not denominate themselves as, for example, 
21 See Matter of Miller, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 608 (2012) (solo marketed his ﬁrm as “group” and 
“associates,” among other misconduct; public reprimand); Ad. 05-05, 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 672 
(2005) (admonition for implying associates while operating a solo practice).
22 See Chambers, supra note 1.
23 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof ’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 90-357 (1990).
24 Nancy Kaufman, The Of Counsel Relationship, Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers
(Oct. 2000), https://bbopublic.blob.core.windows.net/web/f/ofcounsel.pdf (last visited May 4, 2018). 
For further consideration of the “of counsel” relationship, see Harold G. Wren & Beverly J. 
Glascock, The Of Counsel Agreement: A Guide for Law Firm and Practitioner (3rd. 
ed. 2005).
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“Smith and Jones,” or “Smith and Jones, A Professional Association,” for 
those titles, in the absence of an eﬀective disclaimer of joint responsibil-
ity, suggest partnership in the practice of law or that they are practicing 
law together in a ﬁrm. Likewise, the use of the term “associates” by a 
group of lawyers implies practice in either a partnership or sole propri-
etorship form and may not be used by a group in which the individual 
members disclaim the joint or vicarious responsibility inherent in such 
forms of business in the absence of an eﬀective disclaimer of such 
responsibility.25
This comment to Rule 7.5 does not forbid lawyers who share space from using a 
collective name for their practice setting. With “an eﬀective disclaimer” of joint 
responsibility, lawyers who practice together may share a common trade name. 
The Oﬃce of Bar Counsel has oﬀered guidance for such lawyers:
In order for a disclaimer to be eﬀective, a more detailed statement 
about the relationship among the attorneys in the group practice is 
necessary, such as: “Each attorney in this oﬃce is an independent 
practitioner who is not responsible for the practice or the liability of 
any other attorney in the oﬃce.” This type of detailed disclaimer must 
appear on the letterhead, web site, advertising, and any other medium 
in which the name of the oﬃce appears, and not just the name of the 
individual attorney.26
On occasion, lawyers receive discipline for violating Rule 7.5 because of 
the trade name chosen, although typically the discipline arises in conjunction 
with other, more signiﬁcant misconduct.27 At least one attorney, however, has 
been publicly reprimanded for using misleading trade names, with no other 
misconduct.28
25 Mass. R. Prof. C. 7.5 comment [2].
26 Daniel C. Crane & John W. Marshall, Space-Sharers, Beware!, Massachusetts Board of 
Bar Overseers ( Jan. 2000), https://bbopublic.blob.core.windows.net/web/f/space.pdf (last vis-
ited May 4, 2018).
27 See, e.g., Matter of Airewele, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 3 (2012) (suspension for more serious mis-
conduct); Matter of O’Reilly, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 466 (2010) (suspension for more serious 
misconduct).
28 Matter of Zachery, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 792 (2007) (using the name of a lawyer who was 
not part of the law ﬁrm). 
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Practice Tip
Besides ensuring that the name of the practice is not 
misleading, lawyers in separate ﬁrms who share ofﬁce 
space encounter many other ethical challenges, espe-
cially involving conﬁdentiality and conﬂicts of interest. 
Chapter 10 discusses the issues surrounding sharing 
ofﬁce space and a receptionist.
III. DISCIPLINE FOR VIOLATING RULES 7.1 THROUGH 7.5
This section reviews the discipline imposed on Massachusetts lawyers for 
violating the rules governing marketing and solicitation. The review proceeds 
without separate treatments of each respective rule, as the decisions are few 
and, therefore, can be treated collectively. The most common sanction for vio-
lating the bar’s marketing rules has been an admonition, but occasionally more 
serious discipline has been imposed.
You Should Know
Lawyers do receive discipline for violating the marketing 
and solicitation rules. For improper solicitation of vulner-
able prospective clients, lawyers typically receive public 
reprimands. For advertising and marketing misconduct, 
lawyers typically receive admonitions.
A. Disbarment
No lawyer in Massachusetts has ever been disbarred solely for breaking the 
rules about marketing legal services or violating the duties these rules impose. 
On occasion, the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) has included a marketing vio-
lation among other misconduct in a disbarment decision,29 but the sanction for 
getting into trouble in this area is always less severe than losing one’s license.
29 See, e.g., Matter of Zak, 476 Mass. 1034, 33 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2017) (noting the law-
yer’s lack of understanding of the “seriousness of his misconduct with respect to the [false] radio 
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B. Suspension
No Massachusetts lawyer has been suspended primarily for a violation of 
Rules 7.1 through 7.5. Some lawyers have practiced law in jurisdictions where 
they were not licensed to practice and marketed their business as though they 
were licensed, and that combination of missteps has led to suspensions. For 
instance, in Matter of Saletan,30 the respondent was suspended for six months 
and a day for practicing law while he was in retired/inactive status. The attor-
ney’s letterhead used the term Esquire, and his LinkedIn page and résumé 
claimed he was an attorney. And in Matter of Airewele,31 the attorney was 
suspended for six months and a day after he opened a law oﬃce in Georgia and 
used a business card that failed to disclose that he was not authorized to prac-
tice law in Georgia. The attorney also used a misleading ﬁrm name, “Airewele 
& Associates.”32
Aside from those unauthorized practice cases and some occasional mat-
ters where the lawyers engaged in serious misconduct but also, incidentally, failed 
to comply with the rules governing marketing their services,33 no Massachu-
setts lawyer has been suspended for violating the rules governing advertising 
and solicitation.
announcements” as one of the factors warranting his disbarment for wide-ranging misconduct 
involving a loan modiﬁcation business); Matter of Krantz, 31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 372 (2015) 
(along with serious misappropriation of funds, practice of law in Florida without a license there, 
with a misleading ﬁrm name; disbarment); Matter of Duerr, 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 212 (2005) 
(along with other misconduct, the respondent distributed business cards while administratively 
suspended, in violation of Rule 7.1); Matter of Kaigler, 6 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 158 (1990) (among 
much misconduct, including converting client property, the respondent oﬀered free legal ser-
vices in return for referrals, in violation of DR 2-103(E), the predecessor to Rule 7.2(b)); Matter 
of Flak, 6 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 118 (1990) (disbarment for serious misconduct, including, as one 
count, falsely holding himself out as a specialist in federal parole postconviction relief ).
30 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 574 (2013).
31 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 3 (2012).
32 For similar suspensions combined with unauthorized practice, see Matter of Larkowich, 31 
Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 387, 2015 WL 9309007 (2015); Matter of Daniels, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. 
R. 102 (2007); Matter of Finn, 17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 200 (2001); Matter of Shea, 7 Mass. 
Att’y Disc. R. 269 (1991).
33 See, e.g., Matter of Barros, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 27 (2013) (along with assistance of unautho-
rized practice, misrepresenting the size and nature of the ﬁrm on letterhead and website; suspen-
sion of six months and a day); Matter of Shalom, 19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 389 (2003) (converting 
client funds, assisting criminal conduct, and paying another to refer matters to the lawyer; indef-
inite suspension); Matter of Galat, 18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 229 (2002) (serious conﬂict of inter-
est, misrepresentations to clients, and use of improper ﬁrm name; indeﬁnite suspension). 
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C. Public Reprimand
Many lawyers have received public reprimands for misconduct related to 
marketing legal services. Typically, that sanction occurs when the marketing vio-
lation accompanies other misconduct, but not always. In-person solicitation by 
a lawyer for a fee has led to a public reprimand on several occasions (although 
sometimes the same misconduct results in an admonition). In Matter of D’Arcy,34
the attorney urged a defendant to retain him for a fee, even though the attor-
ney knew that the defendant was represented by court-appointed counsel, vio-
lating DR 2-103(D), the predecessor to Rule 7.3(a).35 In Matter of Gordon,36 the 
respondent solicited a defendant after the man was arraigned for driving while 
under the inﬂuence. The attorney approached the defendant and his mother in 
the courthouse hallway to solicit their business and oﬀered to charge a discounted 
rate. The attorney also sent a letter on the same day oﬀering his legal services and 
improperly implied that he had contacts in the district attorney’s oﬃce that could 
be useful. In Matter of Mannion,37 an attorney appeared at a jail to oﬀer repre-
sentation to an inmate for $5,000. The disciplinary reports also contain other 
examples of a public reprimand for in-person solicitation.38
Outside of direct solicitation, few disciplinary matters involving primarily 
marketing have led to public reprimands. In Matter of Zachery,39 mentioned in 
Section II(E), note 28, an attorney used misleading stationery that identiﬁed her 
practice as a law partnership called “Williams & Zachery.” The respondent listed 
two other attorneys as “of counsel” without any aﬃliation to or authorization 
34 11 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 51 (1995).
35 Because the defendant whom the lawyer solicited already had counsel, the board cited a sepa-
rate violation of DR 1-102(A)(5) (“A lawyer shall not . . . [e]ngage in conduct that is prejudicial 
to the administration of justice.”). That board citation is puzzling because, as the discussion of 
Rule 4.2 in Chapter 13 shows, it is not improper for a lawyer to discuss with a prospective client 
the merits of the client’s case or the possibility of representation, as long as the lawyer complies 
with the rules governing solicitation. See Chapter 13, Section IV.
36 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 203 (2007); see also Matter of D’Arcy, 11 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 51 (1995) 
(attorney received a public reprimand after urging a defendant to retain him for a fee after over-
hearing a discussion between the presiding judge and the defendant).
37 12 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 265 (1996). In aggravation, the hearing committee found that the law-
yer intentionally lied about his actions during the Board of Bar Overseers proceedings.
38 See, e.g., Matter of Holzberg, 12 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 200 (1996) (solicitation letter with inten-
tionally too-small font (as required by prior version of the rules) identifying the communication 
as marketing). Cf. Matter of White, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 893 (2012) (improper solicitation, 
with a separate count of neglect of a matter; public reprimand).
39 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 792 (2007).
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from them. All of the other public reprimands involving violations of Rules 7.1 
through 7.5 have involved other, separate misconduct.40
D. Admonition
Most disciplinary matters involving improper marketing lead to admoni-
tions if the matters are not resolved informally through the bar counsel’s Attorney 
and Consumer Assistance Program. Lawyers who make mistakes about describ-
ing their practices or their status can probably expect an admonition at most, 
absent any signiﬁcant harm to others or some special element of irresponsibility. 
For example, in Ad. 06-07,41 the attorney, a sole practitioner, identiﬁed his law 
practice in his letterhead as his name “& Associates.” In Ad. 00-23,42 the attor-
ney practiced law in an oﬃce run by a paralegal who lawfully represented cli-
ents in Social Security disability matters. The oﬃce’s marketing materials failed 
to clarify that the paralegal was not a lawyer and that the organization was not 
a law ﬁrm. And in Ad. 96-41,43 the respondent advertised in the yellow pages 
as a multiservice domestic relations center made up of a lawyer, a therapist, an 
accountant, and a business advisor. No such center existed; the attorney intended 
to refer clients to outside professionals, who would charge separate fees. The attor-
ney received an admonition conditioned upon attending a continuing legal edu-
cation course designated by the bar counsel.
Several lawyers have received admonitions or private reprimands for improper 
listings on their stationery and letterhead. In Ad. 96-12,44 an attorney on inac-
tive status in Massachusetts identiﬁed himself on letterhead as a member of the 
Massachusetts bar without noting his inactive status. In PR 86-19,45 the attor-
ney’s law oﬃce included on ﬁrm letterhead the name of an attorney the ﬁrm had 
40 See, e.g., Matter of Nardi, 10 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 204 (1994) (public reprimand where attorney 
allowed corporation to solicit professional employment on his behalf in the course of selling living 
trusts to consumers; also conﬂict of interest, poor representation, and assistance with unautho-
rized practice); Matter of Connell, 6 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 63 (1990) (public reprimand and one-year 
probation where attorney, while performing legal services as an independent contractor, acqui-
esced in using his name in misleading advertising; also assisted with unauthorized practice).
41 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 856 (2006). See also Ad. No. 05-05, 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 672 (2005) 
(lawyer in solo practice used a ﬁrm name that falsely implied he employed associates or worked with 
partners, in violation of Rule 7.1); Ad. No. 98-64, 14 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 928 (1998) (lawyer in 
solo practice admonished for use of “Associates” in ﬁrm name).
42 16 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 482 (2000).
43 12 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 667 (1996).
44 12 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 617 (1996).
45 5 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 452 (1986).
364
Misconduct and Typical Sanctions
hoped to hire, but had not. In PR 87-8,46 the lawyer listed a nonlawyer on his 
stationery without designating her actual status. 
In two of these matters involving improper stationery or letterhead, the re-
spondents received an admonition for practicing law without a license and mar-
keting themselves as a lawyer. (As noted in Section III, a similar type of misconduct 
resulted in term suspensions for two lawyers.47) In Ad. 98-22,48 the attorney, one 
month before she was admitted to the Massachusetts bar, ﬁled a petition in court 
on behalf of a client in which she identiﬁed herself as an attorney. Her stationery 
also identiﬁed her as a member of the bar. In Ad. 99-43,49 the attorney with a 
“retired” status identiﬁed herself as a member of the bar on her letterhead, with-
out noting her retired status. She also represented clients and made appearances 
in at least two Probate and Family Court matters. While both lawyers received 
admonitions, the lawyers’ unauthorized practice was minimal compared to the 
active practices of the two lawyers who were suspended. The reports showing a 
lesser sanction were older as well, perhaps suggesting less tolerance today for 
that misconduct.
On occasion, a lawyer has received an admonition for improper solicita-
tion, which, as indicated in Section III(C), would typically result in a public 
reprimand. In each case, however, the solicitation eﬀort was less egregious than 
those encountered previously. For example, in Ad. 05-25,50 an inexperienced law-
yer approached a disabled woman in a nursing home to convince her to retain 
him, but only after receiving a telephone call from her son. In Ad. 99-17,51 the 
attorney sent letters to real estate brokers announcing “a special oﬀer for your 
buyers who wish to have their Purchase & Sale Agreements reviewed by an 
attorney.” The bar counsel concluded that this tactic circumvented the rules pro-
hibiting personal solicitation. In PR 93-1,52 the respondent attorney sent solic-
itation letters to prospective clients, which were not labeled as advertising as 
required by the rules in eﬀect at that time. And in PR 93-35,53 the attorney sent 
a letter to an individual three days after the wife’s death—the day of her 
funeral—expressing condolences and oﬀering legal assistance if needed. The 
46 5 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 490 (1987).
47 See Matter of Saletan, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 574 (2013), and Matter of Airewele, 28 Mass. 
Att’y Disc. R. 3 (2012), discussed in Section III(B).
48 14 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 845 (1998).
49 15 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 729 (1999).
50 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 724 (2005).
51 15 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 678 (1999).
52 9 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 355 (1993).
53 9 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 416 (1993).
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respondent attorney thought that the husband and wife were former clients, 
but in fact they had been former opposing parties.
A lawyer received an admonition for claiming expertise that he did not 
have, in violation of Rule 7.4(a). In Ad. 09-12,54 the attorney claimed to be a 
specialist in immigration law despite having represented only a few clients in 
immigration matters. On his website, the attorney represented that he provided 
“professional legal services to American and international clients with respect 
to corporate and commercial transactions, small business matters and immigra-
tion law matters.” The lawyer’s exaggerated claim of expertise led him to pro-
vide inadequate advice to his client.
IV. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR USING SOCIAL MEDIA
Lawyers, and not only tech-savvy bar members, use social media all the time. 
While this book cannot address in depth all of the complicated ethical issues that 
arise when legal practices use the Internet, the cloud, and social media sites,55 a
few important points deserve mention:
• Websites qualify as advertising: Your law practice’s website is a form of 
advertising, so everything on the site must comply with Rule 7.2.56
Assertions on the site that are not true may subject you to discipline.57
• Social networking sites qualify as advertising: If you belong to LinkedIn 
or Facebook, your proﬁle descriptions may qualify as advertising.58
• E-mails are written correspondence: An e-mail qualiﬁes as a “written 
communication” under Rule 7.3(c), which regulates certain written 
solicitations to persons in need of legal services.
• Tweets may also qualify as written correspondence: If you use Twitter and 
send tweets, those messages may qualify as “written communication” 
under Rule 7.3(c), as previously described in Section II(C).
54 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 674 (2009).
55 For a general discussion of the points listed here and others, see Robert Ambrogia et al., Social 
Media: Best Practices and Caveats, in Practicing With Professionalism (Mass. Cont. Legal 
Ed. 2014).
56 See Constance V. Vecchione, Tangled Web: Advertising, Solicitation, Ethics, and the Internet,Mas-
sachusetts Board of Bar Overseers ( Jan. 1999), https://bbopublic.blob.core.windows.net/
web/f/web.pdf (last visited May 4, 2018); Matter of Barros, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 27 (2013).
57 See e.g., Barros, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 27 (2013); Ad. 03-47, 19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 609 (2003) 
(admonition for misleading statements on website about bar membership).
58 Kasten, supra note 1.
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• Real-time electronic communications are considered in-person communica-
tions: Live chats and other communications with prospective clients in 
real time can constitute in-person solicitation. Those interactions can 
also form attorney-client obligations.59
• Be cautious about the unauthorized practice of law: Chapter 14 discussed 
the limitations imposed upon a Massachusetts attorney who provides 
legal services outside of the jurisdiction to which the attorney is ad-
mitted. When you are communicating with others via social media 
and the Internet, you may inadvertently oﬀer legal advice to clients 
with no con nection to Massachusetts. Your responsibility is to ensure 
that any prospective client is one to whom you are permitted to oﬀer 
help under Rule 5.5.
• Use disclaimers: Your e-mail messages probably include a disclaimer 
intended to preserve attorney-client privilege in the case of an errant 
“send.” Your ﬁrm website may also have a disclaimer to protect against 
inadvertently creating an attorney-client relationship.60 Review your 
LinkedIn, Facebook, or similar social media presences to determine 
whether a similar disclaimer might be necessary to ensure that visitors 
and readers do not misunderstand your intentions.61
• Be cautious about testimonials and endorsements: If a social media site 
permits endorsements, recommendations, or testimonials, your respon-
sibility is to ensure that anything said about your practice comports 
with Rules 7.1 and 7.2.62 And if you pay someone to endorse your 
practice, you are likely violating Rule 7.2(b).
• When blogging, attend to your clients’ interests: Lawyers may blog about 
any topics they wish (without revealing client conﬁdences, of course), 
but if you use a blog post to argue for a position adverse to that which 
you advocate on behalf of a client, you may have created a conﬂict of 
interest or undercut your competence on behalf of that client.63
• Social media is discoverable: This last message is best directed to your 
clients, but worth keeping in mind as you conduct your practice.
59 See Paul R. Tremblay, Forming Involuntary Client Relationships, 52 Boston B.J. 12 (Feb. 2008) 
(describing the risks of oﬀering advice during casual conversations).
60 Id.
61 See ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof ’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 10-457 (2010); 
Michael E. Lackey, Jr. & Joseph P. Minta, Lawyers and Social Media: The Legal Ethics of Tweet-
ing, Facebooking and Blogging, 28 Touro L. Rev. 149, 155 (2012).
62 Op. 09-10, S.C. Bar. Eth. Adv. Comm., 2009 WL 6850298 (2009).
63 See Vanessa S. Browne-Barbour, A Fork in the Road: The Intersection of Virtual Law Practice and 
Social Media, 52 Washburn L.J. 267 (2013).
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chapter sixteen
Prosecutor Duties
(Rules 3.8, 4.2, and 8.4(c))
I. INTRODUCTION
Lawyers who represent private parties do not have an obligation to ensure 
that the results of the proceedings in which they participate, or of the work they 
perform, are fair and just; instead, those lawyers act as zealous advocates for their 
clients within the bounds of the law. Not so for prosecutors. A prosecutor “owe[s] 
a particular care in discharging his duty to seek justice and not merely a convic-
tion by trying the case factually and dispassionately without inﬂammatory tac-
tics” (emphasis added).1 While prosecutors may (and usually do) perform zealously, 
they must temper their zeal with a concern for the defendant’s rights. “A pros-
ecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advo-
cate.”2 A lawyer acting in that role who fails to honor that responsibility may 
receive discipline and may be sanctioned by a court. The lawyer’s improper actions 
may also result in any conviction obtained being reversed. While these conse-
quences may happen from time to time, professional discipline of a lawyer serv-
ing as a prosecutor in Massachusetts has been rare, as this chapter explains.
II. THE NATURE OF THE PROSECUTOR’S
SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES
Rule 3.8 of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct ﬂeshes out the 
notion that a prosecutor has a special duty as a minister of justice. It articulates lim-
its on and obligations concerning charging decisions, interactions with criminal 
defendants and their counsel, plea bargains, discovery, publicity, and the wrongly 
convicted that do not apply to criminal defense counsel or civil practitioners.
1 Commonwealth v. Smith, 387 Mass. 900, 905 (1983). This special duty may apply to all govern-
ment lawyers. See Catherine J. Lanctot, The Duty of Zealous Advocacy and the Ethics of the Federal 
Government Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 951 (1991).
2 Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.8 comment [1].
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RULE 3.8: SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF A PROSECUTOR
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:
(a) refrain from prosecuting where the prosecutor lacks a good 
faith belief that probable cause to support the charge exists, and 
refrain from threatening to prosecute a charge where the prosecutor 
lacks a good faith belief that probable cause to support the charge 
exists or can be developed through subsequent investigation;
(b) make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been 
advised of the right to, and the procedure for obtaining, counsel 
and has been given reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel;
(c) not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of 
important pretrial rights, such as the right to a preliminary hear-
ing, unless a court first has obtained from the accused a knowing 
and intelligent written waiver of counsel;
(d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or infor-
mation known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of 
the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sen-
tencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivi-
leged mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except 
when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protec-
tive order of the tribunal;
(e) not subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury or other criminal pro-
ceeding to present evidence about a past or present client unless:
(1)  the prosecutor reasonably believes:
  (i)  the information sought is not protected from disclo-
sure by any applicable privilege;
  (ii)  the evidence sought is essential to the successful 
completion of an ongoing investigation or prosecu-
tion; and
  (iii)  there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the 
information; and
(2)  the prosecutor obtains prior judicial approval after an 
opportunity for an adversarial proceeding;
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RULE 3.8  (cont’d.)
(f ) except for statements that are necessary to inform the public of 
the nature and extent of the prosecutor’s action and that serve a 
legitimate law enforcement purpose:
(1)  refrain from making extrajudicial comments that have a 
substantial likelihood of heightening public condemna-
tion of the accused and from making an extrajudicial 
statement that the prosecutor would be prohibited from 
making under Rule 3.6 or this Rule; and
(2)  take reasonable steps to prevent investigators, law enforce-
ment personnel, employees or other persons assisting or 
associated with the prosecutor in a criminal case from 
making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor 
would be prohibited from making under Rule 3.6 or this 
Rule;
(g) not avoid pursuit of evidence because the prosecutor believes 
it will damage the prosecution’s case or aid the accused; and
(h) refrain from seeking, as a condition of a disposition agree-
ment in a criminal matter, the defendant’s waiver of claims of inef-
fective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct.
(i) When, because of new, credible, and material evidence, a 
prosecutor knows that there is a reasonable likelihood that a con-
victed defendant did not commit an offense of which the defen-
dant was convicted, the prosecutor shall within a reasonable time:
(1)  if the conviction was not obtained by that prosecutor’s 
office, disclose that evidence to an appropriate court or 
the chief prosecutor of the office that obtained the 
conviction, and
(2)  if the conviction was obtained by that prosecutor’s office,
  (i)  disclose that evidence to the appropriate court;
  (ii)  notify the defendant that the prosecutor’s office pos-
sesses such evidence unless a court authorizes delay 
for good cause shown;
  (iii)  disclose that evidence to the defendant unless a court 
authorizes delay for good cause shown; and
  (iv)  undertake or assist in any further investigation as the 
court may direct.
370
Misconduct and Typical Sanctions
RULE 3.8: SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF A PROSECUTOR
(cont’d.)
( j) When a prosecutor knows that clear and convincing evidence 
establishes that a defendant, in a case prosecuted by that prosecu-
tor’s office, was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not 
commit, the prosecutor shall seek to remedy the injustice.
(k) A prosecutor’s independent judgment, made in good faith, 
that the new evidence is not of such nature as to trigger the obli-
gations of sections (i) and (j), though subsequently determined to 
have been erroneous, does not constitute a violation of this Rule.
A. The Lessons of Rule 3.8
Before Massachusetts adopted Rule 3.8 in 1998, Massachusetts prosecutors 
were governed by Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) Rule 3:08, which included the 
Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function. The SJC repealed Rule 3:08 after 
incorporating many of its provisions into the then new Rule 3.8, which was then 
substantially revised in 2016. Rule 3.8, which resembles but is diﬀerent in certain 
respects from ABA Model Rule 3.8, outlines the following requirements for pros-
ecutors, which are summarized here, but the complexities of which require care-
ful attention.3
• Charging only with probable cause: Rule 3.8(a) prohibits a prosecutor 
from prosecuting a charge against a defendant without probable cause. 
Because charging is a powerful tool, a prosecutor must exercise that 
power with great care. The substantive law doctrine about the amount 
of evidence that qualiﬁes as “probable cause” is complex,4 but the duty 
of a prosecutor to honor that law is clear. No Massachusetts lawyer 
has ever been disciplined for violating this duty.
3 The substantive law governing the duties of prosecutors is vast and intricate, implicating criti-
cal rights of defendants and complex constitutional doctrine. This chapter only touches upon the 
most pertinent ethical duties. For a more in-depth discussion of this area, see, e.g., R. Michael 
Cassidy, Prosecutorial Ethics (2nd ed. 2013); Cathleen Cavell, Ethical Issues for Government 
Lawyers, in Ethical Lawyering in Massachusetts, Chapter 18 ( James S. Bolan ed., 4th ed., 
2015, 2017 Supp.).
4 See, e.g., Com. v. Perkins, 464 Mass. 92 (2013).
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• Limits on seeking waivers from unrepresented persons: While lawyers 
generally may seek to settle disputes or controversies with individuals 
who do not have counsel, prosecutors may not request from an 
unrepresented accused any “waiver of important pretrial rights, . . . 
unless a court ﬁrst has obtained from the accused a knowing and 
intelligent waiver of counsel.”5 This restriction is less rigorous than the 
version of the ABA Model Rule in eﬀect in most other jurisdictions. 
Model Rule 3.8 does not provide the judicial review exception to the 
ban on seeking pretrial waivers of important rights.6
• Duty to disclose exculpatory evidence: Rule 3.8(d) augments an obliga-
tion that the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution 
imposes.7 It requires prosecutors to “make timely disclosure to the 
defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that 
tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the oﬀense,” 
among other requirements.8 The contours of this fundamental consti-
tutional obligation are complex and the subject of considerable 
dispute; those complexities are beyond the scope of this book.9
• Limits on subpoenas to attorneys: Rule 3.8(e) limits a prosecutor’s discre-
tion to issue and enforce a subpoena to a lawyer to appear at a grand 
jury or other criminal proceeding to testify about a client. This provi-
sion arose after controversy in the 1980s and 1990s about prosecutors 
subpoenaing defense counsel, taking advantage of the nonapplicability 
of the attorney-client privilege to certain aspects of a criminal defense 
lawyer’s communications with clients engaged in criminal enterprises.10
5 Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.8(c).
6 Cf. ABA Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 3.8(c) (identical to the Massachusetts rule 
except for the absence of the “unless” clause).
7 See Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449 (2009); United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002); Giglio v. 
United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
8 Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.8(d). The Massachusetts rule implies that it imposes duties beyond those 
required by Brady and its progeny. Comment [3A] states, “The obligations imposed on a prose-
cutor by the rules of professional conduct are not coextensive with the obligations imposed by sub-
stantive law. Disclosure is required when the information tends to negate guilt or mitigates the 
oﬀense without regard to the anticipated impact of the information.”
9 For a discussion of the debates about the scope of the prosecutor’s disclosure duties, see, e.g.,
R. Michael Cassidy, Plea Bargaining, Discovery, and the Intractable Problem of Impeachment Dis-
closures, 64 Vand. L. Rev. 1429 (2011); Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Implicit Plea Agree-
ments and Brady Disclosure, 22 Crim. Just. 50 (2007).
10 For a review of that history, see, e.g., Stern v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Mass., 214 F.3d 4, 
8–9 (1st Cir. 2000) (ultimately concluding that the restrictive Massachusetts rule did not apply 
to federal prosecutors).
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The Massachusetts provision, which is stricter than the ABA Model 
Rule, prohibits a prosecutor from issuing a subpoena to a lawyer 
unless the material sought is not privileged, is “essential” to the 
investigation and prosecution, there is “no other feasible alternative” 
available to the prosecutor, and the prosecutor obtains prior judicial 
approval of the subpoena.11
• Duties toward the wrongly convicted: Rules 3.8(i) and ( j) describe the 
prosecutor’s ethical duties towards those who present evidence that 
they have been wrongly convicted. Rule 3.8(k) protects the prosecutor 
who attempts to comply with those obligations in good faith by exer-
cising independent professional judgment, even if that judgment later 
proves erroneous.
Rule 3.4(e), applicable to all lawyers, prohibits a lawyer from asserting a per-
sonal opinion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused or the justness of a cause.12
At least one commentator has asserted that this ban is more important for a 
prosecutor than for other lawyers.13
B. Discipline for Violating Rule 3.8
Only a handful of reported Massachusetts disciplinary decisions involve 
Rule 3.8. In Matter of Nelson,14 an assistant district attorney, in his closing argu-
ment, asserted his personal opinions about the facts and the witnesses’ credibil-
ity and improperly invited the jurors to act vengefully. After the jury convicted 
the defendant, the SJC ordered a new trial because of the prosecutor’s miscon-
duct. The Board of Bar Overseers (BBO) accepted the parties’ stipulation to a pub-
lic reprimand.
11 Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.8(e)(1), (2). The ABA’s Model Rule 3.8(e) omits the requirement of prior 
judicial approval.
12 See Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.4(e)(2), (3) (“A lawyer shall not . . . appearing before a tribunal on behalf 
of a client . . . assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness; or 
assert a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability 
of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an accused . . . .”) Until 2015, Rule 3.8(h) stated the 
same thing speciﬁcally for prosecutors.
13 See Cavell, supra note 3, at § 18.6.1 (“[P]rosecutors have a heightened obligation not to assert per-
sonal opinions as to credibility, culpability, and innocence, particularly because overstepping the 
bounds as to such matters can be deemed so prejudicial to a criminal defendant that otherwise solid 
prosecutions become tainted and subject to appellate reversal”).
14 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 413 (2009).
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You Should Know
The discipline imposed on a prosecutor who exceeds 
the bounds of Rule 3.8 seems to turn on whether the mis-
conduct affected the fairness of the trial. A prosecutor 
whose improper argument led to a reversal received a 
public reprimand; one whose misconduct did not affect 
the defendant’s right to a fair trial received an admonition.
In Ad. 00-60,15 the prosecutor engaged in similar misconduct during a trial, 
including making inﬂammatory arguments, asserting personal opinions about 
the evidence, calling himself “the thirteenth juror,” and referring to his past 
experience as an altar boy. The appeals court sustained the conviction but crit-
icized the lawyer’s conduct. Relying on the appeals court’s conclusion that “the 
respondent’s errors did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial because errors 
were corrected by instructions from the trial judge and did not make a diﬀer-
ence to the jury’s conclusions,” the BBO imposed an admonition.
An earlier report shows a laxer standard. In Ad. 80-18,16 the prosecutor made 
an improper closing argument that relied upon his personal opinions and knowl-
edge of the case and referred to matters the evidence did not support. As in Nelson,
an appellate court overturned the defendant’s conviction because of the prose-
cutor’s misconduct. This respondent, however, received a private reprimand, and 
not a public one, as bar counsel had requested. The single justice concluded that 
the respondent’s intentions were good and noted that neither the trial judge nor 
the defense lawyer took any steps to limit his “maladroit” closing argument.17
III. THE LIMITS ON THE PROSECUTOR’S CONTACT
WITH REPRESENTED PERSONS
Rule 4.2 protects represented parties from opposing counsel’s overbearing 
conduct by requiring the consent of counsel to any communication with the 
client by opposing counsel. It presents special problems for prosecutors.
15 16 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 540, 540 (2000).
16 2 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 110 (1980).
17 The former private reprimand sanction was a permanent part of a respondent’s record, unlike 
today’s admonition, which is vacated after eight years without further discipline. See Chapter 4, 
Part II(D). That diﬀerence might account for a seemingly more lax treatment of the misconduct.
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RULE 4.2: COMMUNICATION WITH PERSON REPRESENTED
BY COUNSEL
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about 
the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows 
to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the law-
yer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by 
law or court order.
A. The Lessons of Rule 4.2 for Prosecutors
Rule 4.2, which limits a lawyer’s contact with a represented person, receives 
in-depth treatment in Chapter 13. It deserves separate consideration here be-
cause applying the rule’s limitations to prosecutors has been a controversial topic 
in the past few decades. While the rule sensibly forbids a lawyer to communi-
cate, directly or through others, with a person represented by counsel regarding 
the subject matter the attorney seeks to discuss, enforcing it presents a chal-
lenge for prosecutors working with undercover informants investigating crim-
inal activity by persons who have counsel on retainer. Enforced strictly, Rule 4.2 
would prohibit district attorneys, assistant attorneys general, and assistant United 
States attorneys from overseeing covert investigations of suspected crime ﬁg-
ures who have lawyers.
Rule 4.2 reads as follows: “In representing a client, a lawyer shall not com-
municate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows 
to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the con-
sent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or court order.” Pros-
ecutors who wish to oversee a covert plan for contacting a suspect who has a 
lawyer may only do so in one of two situations. The ﬁrst is if the investigation 
and communication concern a different subject matter from that for which the 
suspect has counsel. That issue has been the subject of some reported decisions, 
although not in Massachusetts.18 Because often the investigation concerns mat-
ters for which the suspect does not yet know he is a suspect, the prosecutor may 
18 See, e.g., United States v. Ford, 176 F.3d 376 (6th Cir. 1999) (government could place informant 
in prison cell to investigate threats defendant allegedly made against government oﬃcials; threats 
not related to oﬀense for which defendant imprisoned); cf. In re Criminal Investigation of Doe, 
2008 WL 3274429 (D. Mass. 2008) (suspect had a lawyer for a related civil proceeding, but not for 
the criminal matter being investigated; covert contact allowed by order of the court and there-
fore “authorized by law”).
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successfully conclude that the lawyer is not the person’s lawyer for that matter. 
Sometimes, though, the suspect has the equivalent of “house counsel,” in which 
event that argument does not work for the prosecutor.19
The second possible justiﬁcation for a prosecutor to oversee an informant’s 
contact with a person represented by counsel is the argument that a prosecutor 
is “authorized by law” to investigate crimes through covert means.20 If that were 
so, the ban would not apply. Whether a prosecutor has such authority is much dis-
puted across the country, although the issue has not been addressed in Massachu-
setts or the First Circuit.21 A noteworthy Second Circuit opinion in 1988, United 
States v. Hammad, concluded that a prosecutor was “authorized by law” for pur-
poses of the state’s no-contact rules:
As we see it, under DR 7-104(A)(1) [the predecessor to Rule 4.2, with 
similar language], a prosecutor is “authorized by law” to employ legiti-
mate investigative techniques in conducting or supervising criminal 
investigations, and the use of informants to gather evidence against a 
suspect will frequently fall within the ambit of such authorization . . . . 
[T]he use of informants by government prosecutors in a pre-indictment, 
noncustodial situation . . . will generally fall within the “authorized by 
law” exception.22
Most courts have followed the Hammad principle,23 but the controversy it cre-
ated led the federal government to seek to exempt federal prosecutors from state 
ethics laws, eﬀorts that in the end were unsuccessful.24 The question of the scope 
of the “authorized by law” exception remains open for Massachusetts prosecutors. 
19 United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 839 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 871 (1990) 
(using the term “house counsel”).
20 A defendant has a separate Sixth Amendment right not to be questioned outside of counsel’s pres-
ence after “judicial proceedings have commenced.” Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977). The 
investigative questions addressed here arise before any such proceedings commence and before any 
indictment, so that constitutional right would not play a role in determining the propriety of the 
contact.
21 For a discussion of the history of this topic, see, e.g., Note, Federal Prosecutors, State Ethics Reg-
ulations, and the McDade Amendment, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 2080 (2000).
22 Hammad, 858 F.2d at 839, 840.
23 See United States v. Balter, 91 F.3d 427 (3d Cir. 1995) (collecting cases).
24 The eﬀort ultimately failed when Congress passed the McDade Amendment, requiring federal 
prosecutors to follow state ethics rules. For a discussion of the long and, at times, chaotic history 
of those eﬀorts, see Gregory B. LeDonne, Revisiting the McDade Amendment: Finding the Appro-
priate Solution for the Federal Government Lawyer, 44 Harv. J. on Legis. 231, 234 (2007); Note, supra
note 21.
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B. Discipline for Violating Rule 4.2
As of April 2018, no Massachusetts lawyer, as a prosecutor, has been dis-
ciplined for improper contact with a represented person,25 and no reported deci-
sions show a judge granting relief to a defendant for that reason.26
Practice Tip
Even though no prosecutor in the Commonwealth has 
been disciplined for improper contact with a represented 
person through an undercover investigation, prosecutors’ 
ofﬁces must exercise care in establishing covert contact 
with a person known to be represented by counsel, as 
the law remains unsettled in this area.
IV. LIMITS ON THE PROSECUTOR’S USE OF DECEPTION
IN UNDERCOVER INVESTIGATIONS
RULE 8.4: MISCONDUCT
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
* * *
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation[.]
25 In Matter of Carbone, SJC No. BD-2016-0105, 33 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2017), a single 
justice disbarred an attorney on reciprocal proceedings (see Chapter 20) for misconduct of a 
Pennsylvania prosecutor. The misconduct included contacting a represented party, as well as 
speaking with impaired witnesses in violation of court order, mentioning matters not in evidence 
during closing argument, and engaging in threatening conduct toward defendants and defense 
counsel. The single justice emphasized that disbarment was appropriate for “repeated dishonest 
conduct, misrepresentation to the court and lack of respect for the court in his capacity as a 
prosecutor” that was “particularly harmful to the public’s conﬁdence in the legal system.” It 
seems clear that the driver for the sanction was not primarily the communication with a repre-
sented party.
26 Cf. In re Criminal Investigation of Doe, 901 F. Supp. 2d 251 (D. Mass. 2012) (refusing to grant 
federal prosecutors advance authority to contact a targeted individual through covert means 
without the consent of that individual’s counsel, but not addressing whether under appropriate 
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A. The Lessons of Rule 8.4(c) for Prosecutors
Chapter 12 addresses Rule 8.4(c), the provision prohibiting a lawyer from 
“engag[ing] in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresenta-
tion,”27 but in one respect that rule warrants inclusion here. That discussion noted 
that lawyers sometimes use testers or undercover agents as part of client repre-
sentation to investigate suspected wrongdoing. A prosecutor’s use of undercover 
informants literally involves “deceit” and “misrepresentation,” so the question here 
is whether a prosecutor who oversees such a strategy is subject to discipline under 
Rule 8.4(c), as at least one court in another state has concluded.28
While neither the BBO nor any Massachusetts court has ever directly ad-
dressed that question, the SJC has strongly implied that it would not necessar-
ily consider a prosecutor’s actions involving undercover agents a violation of 
Rule 8.4(c). In Matter of Crossen,29 the respondent lawyer charged with violating 
Rule 8.4(c) analogized his deceptive conduct on behalf of a private client to that 
of a prosecutor and cited authority from other jurisdictions that supported a pros-
ecutor’s right to be deceptive. In rejecting his analogy, the SJC signaled its will-
ingness to approve the government attorneys’ use of such deception with certain 
safeguards in place:
The crucial factor distinguishing government and private attorneys is the 
lack of oversight for the latter. Whatever leeway government attorneys 
are permitted in conducting investigations, they are subject not only to 
ethical constraints, but also to supervisory oversight and constitutional 
limits on what they may and may not do, constraints that do not apply 
to private attorneys representing private clients.30
circumstances the prosecutors would be authorized by law to do so proactively); In re Criminal 
Investigation of Doe, 2008 WL 3274429 (D. Mass. 2008) (allowing government to conduct a 
noncustodial interview of an unindicted individual believed to have retained counsel in a related 
civil proceeding).
27 See Chapter 12, Section IV.
28 See In re Gatti, 8 P.3d 966 (Or. 2000) (concluding that prosecutors in Oregon violated Rule 
8.4(c) with covert investigation using undercover agents). The state of Oregon later amended its 
rules to invalidate the eﬀect of that decision.
29 Matter of Crossen, 450 Mass. 533, 565–66, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 122, 161–63 (2008).
30 450 Mass. at 566, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. at 164. In a companion case to Crossen, the SJC sug-
gested, by negative implication, that it might permit private lawyers to use imposters as investi-
gative tools in appropriate circumstances, which were not present in that case or in Crossen. See
Matter of Curry, 450 Mass. 503, 523–25, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 188, 214–16 (2008).
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A judge of the Federal District Court of Massachusetts has read Crossen in
this same approving way.31 Therefore, prosecutors in Massachusetts may feel con-
ﬁdent that their investigative strategies involving undercover agents or impos-
tors do not subject them to discipline under Rule 8.4(c).
B. Discipline for Violating Rule 8.4(c)
No Massachusetts prosecutor has ever been disciplined for violating Rule 
8.4(c). One assistant district attorney was disciplined for violating DR 1-102(A)
(4), the predecessor to Rule 8.4(c). In Matter of Bloom,32 in a matter the single 
justice labeled as “outrageous,” the respondent tried to trick two defendants into 
signing a false confession and also forged both a false confession of a third partic-
ipant and a police oﬃcer’s signature on that document. The respondent received 
a public reprimand, despite a proposal by bar counsel (called “inexplicable” by the 
single justice) for a private reprimand.
31 Leysock v. Forest Labs., Inc., 2017 WL 1591833 (May 25, 2017) (Saylor, J.) (discussed in 
Chapter 12, Section IV(C)).
32 9 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 23 (1993). The single justice’s opinion does not cite DR 1-102(A)(4), 
or any rule, but the lawyer’s misconduct presumably implicated that rule.
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Special Advocacy Duties
(Rules 3.6, 3.7, and 3.9)
I. INTRODUCTION
Chapter 13 discussed the provisions within the Massachusetts Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct that limit a lawyer’s zealous advocacy tactics. This chapter cov-
ers Rules 3.6, 3.7, and 3.9, which also apply to the lawyer’s role as an advocate.
II. THE NATURE OF THE LAWYER’S SPECIAL ADVOCACY DUTIES
This chapter covers rules applicable to lawyers in three contexts. Rule 3.6 
attempts to balance a litigant’s right to a fair trial with a lawyer’s right to commu-
nicate publicly about legal work. Rule 3.7 establishes protocols about when a 
lawyer who may need to testify in a proceeding may also serve as counsel to a 
client in that proceeding. And Rule 3.9 describes the responsibilities of lawyers 
who serve as lobbyists or in a rulemaking or policy-making capacity. The Board 
of Bar Overseers (BBO) and the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) have seldom dis-
ciplined a lawyer for violating these three rules.
RULE 3.6: TRIAL PUBLICITY
(a) A lawyer who is participating or has participated in the inves-
tigation or litigation of a matter shall not make an extrajudicial 
statement that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will 
be disseminated by means of public communication and will have 
a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative 
proceeding in the matter.
(b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may state:
(1)  the claim, offense, or defense involved, and, except when 
prohibited by law, the identity of the persons involved;
(2)  the information contained in a public record;
(3)  that an investigation of the matter is in progress;
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RULE 3.6: TRIAL PUBLICITY  (cont’d.)
(4)  the scheduling or result of any step in litigation;
(5)  a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and infor-
mation necessary thereto;
(6)  a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person 
involved, when there is reason to believe that there exists 
the likelihood of substantial harm to an individual or to 
the public interest; and
(7)  in a criminal case, in addition to subparagraphs (1) 
through (6):
  (i)  the identity, residence, occupation, and family status 
of the accused;
  (ii)  if the accused has not been apprehended, informa-
tion necessary to aid in apprehension of that person;
  (iii)  the fact, time, and place of arrest; and 
  (iv)  the identity of investigating and arresting officers or 
agencies and the length of the investigation.
(c) Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may make a state-
ment that a reasonable lawyer would believe is required to pro-
tect a client from the substantial undue prejudicial effect of
recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer or the lawyer’s client. 
A statement made pursuant to this paragraph shall be limited to 
such information as is necessary to mitigate the recent adverse 
publicity.
(d) No lawyer associated in a firm or government agency with a 
lawyer subject to paragraph (a) shall make a statement prohibited 
by paragraph (a).
(e) This Rule does not preclude a lawyer from replying to charges 
of misconduct publicly made against him or her or from partici-
pating in the proceedings of a legislative, administrative, or other 
investigative body.
A. The Lessons of Rule 3.6
Massachusetts’s laws and policies reﬂect a deep commitment to the fair-
ness and integrity of trials and similar adjudicative hearings. A participant in a 
litigated matter, and especially a defendant in a criminal proceeding, has the 
right to a fair trial untainted by pervasive publicity that might contaminate the 
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ﬁnder of fact.1 At the same time, Massachusetts lawyers who represent clients 
in such hearings have a constitutional right and, at times, a professional duty to 
speak publicly about their clients’ cases when necessary to advance the clients’ 
interests. Rule 3.6, in an eﬀort to balance those two principles, expressly limits 
what lawyers may say in some settings but also permits lawyers to speak freely 
when the circumstances ought to permit such speech.
No lawyer has ever been disciplined in Massachusetts for violating Rule 3.6, 
and the rule has been relied upon only once in reported case law in the Common-
wealth.2 For purposes of this book, therefore, the rule is not a signiﬁcant player 
in the disciplinary world, and the discussion about it will be brief. The Oﬃce of 
the Bar Counsel has published a helpful guide for lawyers about the meaning of 
this rule, and interested readers would beneﬁt from reviewing that column.3
Essentially, Rule 3.6 forbids a lawyer who participates or has participated in 
a matter from making any extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows, or should 
know, “a reasonable person” might expect to be publicly communicated and that 
“will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative pro-
ceeding in the matter.”4 Lawyers, therefore, may not make statements to the 
media, including in social media,5 if the statements have a good chance of prej-
udicing the proceeding about which the lawyer speaks. Because lawyers do have 
to speak about their work, though, the remainder of Rule 3.6 provides certain cat-
egories of information that lawyers may comment about without violating the 
rule. Also, the comments to Rule 3.6 list six types of information that “are more 
likely than not to have a material prejudicial eﬀect on a proceeding,” especially 
with respect to jury cases, criminal matters, and any other proceeding where in-
carceration is possible.6
In the most celebrated disciplinary matter involving Rule 3.6, a matter aris-
ing out of Nevada that reached the United States Supreme Court, the original 
1 Commonwealth v. Morales, 440 Mass. 536, 540–42 (2003).
2 PCG Trading, LLC v. Seyfarth Shaw, LLP, 460 Mass. 265 (2011) (lawyer’s public statements 
not suﬃcient grounds to deny him pro hac vice admission). Cf. Matter of Cobb, 445 Mass. 452 
(2005) (Rule 3.6 not applicable to the respondent’s statements).
3 See Arnold R. Rosenfeld, Spin Control and the Ethical Rules: When the Press Comes Knocking, Should 
You Be Talking? (Dec. 1998), Board of Bar Overseers, https://bbopublic.blob.core.windows.net/
web/f/spin.pdf.
4 Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.6(a).
5 See Michael E. Getnick, Social Media: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, 81 N.Y. St. B.J. 5, 5 (2009) 
(ABA Model Rule 3.6 applies equally to blogs and social networking sites just as it does to tra-
ditional media outlets).
6 Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.6 comment [5].
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sanction for the lawyer’s prejudicial statements was a private reprimand.7 One 
commentator expressed some dismay at the bar counsel’s and the BBO’s lack 
of attention to this rule, writing:
Commentary on Rule 3.6 would not be complete without a realistic 
word about the Rule in operation. It would be hard to imagine a lawyer 
or a lay reader of this text who believes that the Rule is not broken by 
attorneys, particularly in the context of infamous criminal and civil cases 
which are widely publicized in the news media. Correspondingly, the 
Rule does not appear to be aggressively enforced, at least not in this 
jurisdiction. Realistically, the Rule primarily serves as guidance to law-
yers as to the bounds of their pretrial public commentary, but, perhaps 
unfortunately, has not seemed to serve as extremely eﬀective restraint of 
lawyers faced with the glare of media lights and cameras and the pres-
ence of reporters and recorders.8
RULE 3.7: LAWYER AS WITNESS
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer 
is likely to be a necessary witness unless:
(1)  the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2)  the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal ser-
vices rendered in the case; or
(3)  disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial 
hardship on the client.
(b) A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another law-
yer in the lawyer’s firm is likely to be called as a witness unless 
precluded from doing so by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9.
B. The Lessons of Rule 3.7 and Discipline for Violating the Rule
On occasion, a lawyer representing a client in litigation has personal knowl-
edge of matters in dispute in the litigation. For example, in a lawsuit for breach 
7 Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991). In Gentile, the Supreme Court reviewed a 
previous version of Rule 3.6 and, while sustaining its constitutionality generally, vacated the bar’s 
sanction because of the state’s ambiguous application of the rule. The ABA amended Model Rule 
3.6 after Gentile, and that revised version is largely the basis of the Massachusetts rule.
8 Gilda Tuoni Russell, Massachusetts Professional Responsibility § 36.04 (2003).
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of contract, the lawyer who negotiated and drafted the contract may be the same 
lawyer who represents one of the parties to the lawsuit, and the negotiations about 
the contract terms may be relevant to resolving the claims. If the lawyer serves 
as both trial counsel and a witness for the client, complications ensue. Rule 3.7 
oﬀers guidance to lawyers who ﬁnd themselves in such a situation. The basic 
message of Rule 3.7 is that a lawyer ordinarily may not serve in both roles in a 
trial. Therefore, a lawyer who is likely to be called as a witness in a trial should 
not serve as trial counsel. By its terms, the rule applies to both jury and jury-
waived trials, although in practice in Massachusetts it has far greater relevance 
to jury trials. The rule oﬀers three exceptions to the presumptive ban: (1) when 
the lawyer testiﬁes about uncontested matters; (2) when the lawyer testiﬁes 
about the nature and value of the legal services provided; and, most impor-
tantly, (3) when disqualifying the lawyer “would work substantial hardship on 
the client.”9
The rationales for this rule are several and not always consistent.10 Some 
claim that Rule 3.7 protects the opposing party who needs to cross-examine 
the testifying lawyer. This claim asserts that a party gains an advantage by 
having the lawyer serve as a witness, and the other side a disadvantage in 
attacking the lawyer who is known to, and perhaps liked by, a judge or jurors 
in a diﬀerent capacity. Others claim that the rule protects the lawyer’s client, 
reasoning that a testifying lawyer may have a hobbling conﬂict of interest 
between the duty as a witness to oﬀer undistorted, truthful testimony and the 
duty as an advocate to present the facts in the most persuasive and favorable 
manner possible. Still others view the rule as protecting the trier of fact, who 
may be confused by observing a lawyer who, in the same proceeding, both 
testiﬁes personally about some facts and later argues for the fact-ﬁnder to 
believe those and other facts. While all three considerations have force, the 
choice of which one justiﬁes the rule matters, because the question of whether 
to permit a waiver of the rule calls for diﬀerent answers depending on the 
rationale adopted. If the rule is intended to protect one of the two parties, that 
party should be permitted to waive its protections if it chooses. If the rule 
beneﬁts the trier of fact, it should not be waivable by the parties, and a judge 
should raise it sua sponte, even if the parties do not.
9 Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.7(a)(1)–(3).
10 For a discussion of this rule and its policies, see Judith A. McMorrow, The Advocate as Witness: 
Understanding Context, Culture and Client, 70 Fordham L. Rev. 945 (2001).
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The SJC has agreed that the rule is primarily to prevent jury confusion11 but 
also to protect the lawyer’s client.12 Courts are also concerned that opposing coun-
sel may use Rule 3.7 strategically to disqualify a law ﬁrm, an approach that courts 
discourage. Discouraged or not, that tactic is not an uncommon one in Massa-
chusetts, and court decisions about Rule 3.7 and DR 5-101(B) and 5-102(A), 
the predecessors to Rule 3.7, are far more common than lawyer discipline for 
violating the rules.13
Practice Tip
Lawyers who are disciplined for violating Rule 3.7 often 
choose to continue to represent a client rather than 
withdraw from representation in order to testify in the 
matter. That choice appears to prioritize the lawyer’s 
ﬁnancial interests over the client’s legal interests and 
can lead to discipline.
Since Massachusetts adopted Rule 3.7 in 1998, few disciplinary matters have 
referred to it. In Matter of Lebensbaum,14 the respondent was suspended for six 
months for multiple counts of misconduct, one of which was violating Rule 3.7(a). 
The attorney, who had begun a sexual relationship with a woman while represent-
ing her in a divorce action, accompanied the woman when she unlawfully occu-
pied the marital home while the husband was out of the country. The attorney 
11 See, e.g., Smaland Beach Ass’n, Inc. v. Genova, 461 Mass. 214, 222 (2012) (“The primary pur-
pose of the rule is ‘to prevent the jury as fact-ﬁnder from becoming confused by the combination 
of the roles of attorney and witness.’ ” (quoting Steinert v. Steinert, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 287, 291 
(2008))).
12 Smaland, 461 Mass. at 222 (“Such strategic decisions [about whether trial counsel may testify but 
not withdraw] rest with the attorney and his client, unless a judge concludes that the attorney’s 
failure to testify is ‘obviously contrary to the client’s interests.’ ” (quoting Borman v. Borman, 378 
Mass. 775, 791 (1979))).
13 At least twenty-ﬁve Massachusetts court decisions cataloged on Westlaw refer to Rule 3.7, and 
more than half of those involve a question of disqualifying a lawyer. More than twenty reported 
cases refer to DR 5-101(B) or 5-102(A). The superior court rules limit a lawyer’s freedom to 
testify in a matter in which the lawyer serves as trial counsel, so this matter is more than an ethi-
cal rule. See Mass. Super. Ct. r. 12 (“No attorney shall be permitted to take part in the conduct 
of a trial in which he has been or intends to be a witness for his client, except by special leave of 
the court.”).
14 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 391 (2005).
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represented the wife at a criminal hearing resulting from her unauthorized entry 
and from her allegedly taking cash and using the husband’s computer while there. 
Because the lawyer was likely to be a necessary witness at that hearing, his rep-
resentation in that criminal proceeding violated Rule 3.7. In Matter of Zinni,15
the respondent represented a party at trial despite an obvious conﬂict of interest. 
He sought, unsuccessfully, to rely on Rule 3.7 in proposing that he did not have 
to withdraw as counsel until it was necessary for him to serve as a witness.
Other disciplinary matters arising from this kind of misconduct occurred 
under DR 5-101(B) and resulted in either a public or private reprimand. In Mat-
ter of Carroll,16 an attorney received a public reprimand for violating DR 5-101(B) 
when she represented her nephew in appointing him the administrator of the 
attorney’s aunt’s estate. Because the attorney’s aunt had consulted with the attor-
ney before her death regarding her property and possible heirs, the attorney was 
a likely witness to her aunt’s intentions regarding her bank accounts. She also 
ignored that she was an heir-at-law and, therefore, had a conﬂict of interest. And 
in Matter of Hurley,17 an attorney received a public reprimand for violating this 
obligation as well as facing a conﬂict of interest leading to a serious error in judg-
ment at trial. The attorney represented a client who was a suspect in the robbery 
and murder of a police oﬃcer. She accompanied her client to the police station, 
where two detectives interviewed him. When a detective later testiﬁed to a more 
damaging version of that interview at trial, the lawyer did not testify to impeach 
the detective. The board concluded that she should not have represented the 
client at the trial and in doing so violated DR 5-101(B).18
The remaining discipline for violating DR 5-101(B) or DR 5-102(A) has 
been private reprimands. In PR 90-39,19 the attorney received a private repri-
mand for representing one of his former joint clients in a lawsuit against the 
other former client on an issue related to the subject matter of his prior work. 
The primary misconduct was his clear conﬂict of interest, but the board summary 
also cited his violation of DR 5-101(B). As the summary noted, “Respondent 
received a private reprimand only because he withdrew from representing the 
daughter at an early stage of the civil litigation,” implying that the lawyer would 
15 31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 722 (2015) (public reprimand).
16 15 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 105 (1999).
17 17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 315 (2001).
18 The BBO opinion relied upon DR 5-102(A), which addressed the need to withdraw when a 
lawyer’s testimony becomes necessary.
19 7 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 449 (1990).
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have otherwise received a public reprimand. And in PR 88-19,20 the attorney 
failed to withdraw from representing a client when he knew he would be called 
as a witness and also engaged in other misconduct, including attempting to 
acquire a waiver of liability for his malpractice from a former client.
RULE 3.9: ADVOCATE IN NONADJUDICATIVE PROCEEDINGS
A lawyer representing a client before a legislative body or admin-
istrative agency in a nonadjudicative proceeding shall disclose 
that the appearance is in a representative capacity and shall con-
form to the provisions of Rules 3.3(a) through (c), 3.4(a) through 
(c), and 3.5.
C. The Lessons of Rule 3.9
While representing clients, lawyers occasionally advocate for those clients 
before legislative panels, regulatory agencies, and other rulemaking bodies, but 
not in an adjudicative function. Rule 3.9 addresses a lawyer’s obligations in those 
settings and essentially has two messages. First, a lawyer who appears in a non-
adjudicative proceeding on behalf of a client must disclose that his appearance is 
on behalf of a client. It matters to a regulator or legislator whether the arguments 
from a participant come from a position of particular interest, and, therefore, a 
lawyer should not imply that he is disinterested if he is not. Second, Rule 3.9 
conﬁrms, more by implication than by direct language, that when advocating in 
a nonadjudicative proceeding a lawyer is not bound by many of the same restric-
tions that must be honored before a tribunal. The rule lists the obligations that 
the lawyer must honor, which are obvious: those that prohibit false evidence, 
obstructing justice, and seeking to inﬂuence decision-makers by unlawful means. 
A comment to Rule 3.9 clariﬁes that, in most settings, the restriction against 
ex parte contact with those before whom the lawyer advocates does not apply to 
nonadjudicative proceedings.21 The rule also conﬁrms, again by implication, that 
a lawyer appearing in this role is not prohibited from making frivolous argu-
ments.22 Rule 3.9 has not been the source of discipline in Massachusetts.
20 5 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 560 (1988).
21 Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.9 comment [4].
22 ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct § 3.9 (8th ed. 2015).
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I. INTRODUCTION
A lawyer who engages in misconduct that violates the Massachusetts Rules 
of Professional Conduct will receive an appropriate sanction, taking into account 
the nature of the misconduct and the factors described in Part III. The sanction 
imposed on the lawyer cannot be “‘markedly disparate from those ordinarily entered 
by the various single justices in similar cases,’ recognizing that ‘[e]ach case must 
be decided on its own merits and every oﬀending attorney must receive the dispo-
sition most appropriate in the circumstances.’  ”1 The Board of Bar Overseers 
(BBO) and the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) must, however, consider mitigat-
ing and aggravating factors in assessing the severity of the sanction imposed.2
This chapter describes the factors that may mitigate a lawyer’s misconduct and, 
therefore, reduce the sanction, or aggravate it and increase the sanction.
This chapter ﬁrst describes factors that may mitigate a sanction, along with 
those that, according to the SJC, should not be given signiﬁcant mitigating weight. 
It then describes the considerations that may serve as aggravating factors. Finally, 
the chapter describes the necessary steps for maintaining the ability to introduce 
evidence of such factors in a disciplinary hearing.
1 Matter of Collins, 455 Mass. 1020, 1021, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 102, 104 (2010) (citations 
omitted) (quoting Matter of Alter, 389 Mass. 153, 156 (1983); Matter of the Discipline of an 
Attorney, 392 Mass. 827, 837, 4 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 155 (1984)).
2 Matter of Hurley, 418 Mass. 649, 652 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1036 (1995).
PART IV
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You Should Know
How successfully asserting a mitigating or aggravating 
factor affects the ultimate sanction depends on the cir-
cumstances of the lawyer’s misconduct. Except with 
suspensions, a successful claim typically changes the 
sanction by one “step,” that is, a presumptive admoni-
tion typically ends up as a public reprimand if aggrava-
tion is shown, while a presumptive public reprimand 
becomes an admonition if mitigation is proven. With 
suspensions, at times the aggravation or mitigation 
changes the suspension length; at other times a pre-
sumptive suspension may be stayed or turned into a 
public reprimand or a disbarment.
II. MITIGATING FACTORS
In some instances, mitigating circumstances may justify “a departure from 
the standard discipline” for the respondent’s misconduct.3 The SJC, a single jus-
tice, or the board must consider appropriate mitigating evidence if properly 
presented at a hearing, with the respondent bearing the burden of proving any 
mitigating factors.4 Not all explanations respondent lawyers oﬀer will excuse or 
diminish their misconduct. This section reviews what the SJC has termed “typ-
ical” mitigating factors—the circumstances that will probably not lead to a more 
favorable disposition. It then reviews “special” factors, the types of evidence that 
may justify such a departure.
A.  “Typical” Claims that Usually Do Not Serve
as Mitigating Factors
A respondent who has committed misconduct and faces a disciplinary sanc-
tion must understand what facts, if proven, can lessen the likely sanction. Before 
3 Matter of Johnson, 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 3 (2004), overruled on other grounds, 444 Mass. 
1002, 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 355 (2005). See also Matter of Balliro, 453 Mass. 75, 25 Mass. Att’y 
Disc. R. 31 (2009); Matter of Goldberg, 434 Mass. 1022, 1023, 17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 246 (2001) 
(“the mitigating circumstances warrant[] departure from the presumptive sanction”).
4 Matter of Dodd, 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 196, 209–10 (2005).
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this chapter addresses that important topic, however, it ﬁrst discusses consider-
ations that the SJC has stated usually do not serve as mitigation.5
You Should Know
The SJC has used the term “typical” to describe mitigating 
factors that the Court ordinarily does not consider rele-
vant or persuasive in reducing a sanction. As the following 
discussion shows, however, typical factors do play a role in 
determining the sanction at times, so respondents should 
raise them if a good-faith basis for doing so exists.
The SJC has identiﬁed certain “typical” mitigating factors that usually do not 
lessen a sanction. In Matter of Alter, the Court wrote:
One Justice has aptly listed typical mitigating circumstances as follows: 
(1) an otherwise excellent reputation in the community and a satisfac-
tory record at the Bar, (2) cooperation in the disciplinary proceeding and 
with governmental authorities, (3) the occurrence of the criminal pro-
ceedings, (4) the pressures of practice, (5) the conviction as a punish-
ment, (6) the absence of any dishonesty, such as a false tax return, and 
(7) in the ﬁnal result, no harm to anyone else by the misconduct.6
While the SJC announced that list several decades ago, the Court continues to 
treat those circumstances as not warranting a reduction in a typical or presump-
tive sanction. In 2010, the Court wrote that “bar discipline cases have recognized 
most of these considerations [oﬀered by the respondent] as ‘ “typical” mitigating 
circumstances’ that, while relevant, do not aﬀect the presumptive sanction.”7
5 “Typical” mitigation may nonetheless play some role in some circumstances. Matter of Doyle, 
429 Mass. 1013, 1014 n.5, 15 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 170 (1999) (rescript) (although typical mitiga-
tion historically has not been given substantial weight, “[t]hat is not to say, however, that these con-
siderations can play no role at all in the process, in an appropriate case”); Matter of Dodd, 21 Mass. 
Att’y Disc. R. 196, 209–10 (2005) (single justice may consider typical factors as part of the “total-
ity of the circumstances,” when considered along with special mitigating factors); Matter of Grew, 
23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 232, 241 (2007) (typical mitigating factors may be considered to place sanc-
tion within the range of permissible sanctions).
6 Matter of Alter, 389 Mass. 153, 157, 7 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 3, 7 (1983) (citing Matter of Barkin, 
1 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 18, 21 (1977)).
7 Matter of Finneran, 455 Mass. 722, 735, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 177, 193 (2010) (quoting Alter,
389 Mass. at 157) (citing Matter of Saab, 406 Mass. 315, 327, 13 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 177 (1989)).
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The Court then stated that “typical mitigating evidence generally [is] not given 
substantial weight.”8
The following typical mitigating considerations that the SJC or the board re-
jected as a basis for a lesser sanction usually carry little weight in a hearing com-
mittee’s deliberations:
Pro bono and volunteer service: In Matter of Otis, the respondent oﬀered evi-
dence of “her frequent pro bono representation of indigent clients” in an eﬀort 
to avoid disbarment, but the SJC considered that fact as a “typical” mitigating 
factor.9 In Matter of Dragon,10 the single justice rejected as a factor in mitigation 
the respondent’s record of substantial pro bono service on BBO matters. The 
respondent had claimed that his volunteer work had aﬀected his ability to man-
age his practice, but the single justice noted the special hearing oﬃcer’s conclu-
sion that “the extra time invested by the respondent in connection with his pro 
bono work had a ‘negligible impact on his workload’ . . . .” Several other reports 
emphasize that this factor does not serve as mitigation because it is typical.11
On occasion, though, a report cites a lawyer’s performance of pro bono services 
as a favorable factor in determining an appropriate sanction. For instance, in
Matter of Gleason,12 in approving a stipulation to a public reprimand, the board 
stated, “In mitigation, the respondent . . . had served as a past president of his 
local bar association and performed pro bono work in his community, espe-
cially for veterans and veterans’ organizations.”13
8 Finneran, 455 Mass. at 735 (citing Matter of Bailey, 439 Mass. 134, 151, 19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 
12, 32 (2003)) (that false testimony did not have material eﬀect on proceedings not a mitigating 
factor); Matter of Otis, 438 Mass. 1016, 1017 n.3, 19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 344, 346 (2003) (fre-
quent pro bono representation of indigent clients and lack of prior record of discipline); Matter of 
Kennedy, 428 Mass. 156, 159, 14 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 383, 388 (1998) (community service, pro 
bono representation of clients, and a favorable reputation in the community); Matter of Budnitz, 
425 Mass. 1018, 1019 (1997) (no prior discipline for eighteen years); Matter of Concemi, 422 Mass. 
326, 330, 12 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 63, 69 (1996) (reputation in community).
9 438 Mass. 1016, 1017 n.3, 19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 344, 346 (2003).
10 18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 171 (2002) (single justice opinion), aff ’d, 440 Mass. 1023, 19 Mass. Att’y 
Disc. R. 121 (2003).
11 See, e.g., Matter of Dasent, 446 Mass. 1010, 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 173 (2006) (disbarment); 
Matter of Dragon, 440 Mass. 1023, 19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 121 (2003) (disbarment); Matter of 
Johnson, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 326 (2007), aff ’d, 452 Mass. 1010, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 380 
(2008) (indeﬁnite suspension).
12 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 352 (2012).
13 See also Matter of Jebb, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 374 (2008) (reciprocal discipline; New York 
treated pro bono work as mitigating, single justice accepted that factor in imposing thirty-month 
suspension).
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Providing legal services to underserved or underprivileged communities: Sev-
eral reports describe as “typical” the claim that a lawyer has dedicated his career 
to working with underserved populations.14 For instance, in Matter of Serpa,15
the respondent was a criminal defense lawyer who regularly represented low-
income defendants, but the single justice deemed that fact “typical.”
Cooperation with the bar counsel: In Matter of Bulger, the respondent argued 
for a less severe sanction based on several mitigating considerations, including 
“that he cooperated with bar counsel’s investigation.”16 The board report rejected 
that claim as a “typical” mitigating factor and imposed a public reprimand. Sim-
ilarly, in Matter of Doyle, the SJC described such a claim as “[t]ypical mitigating 
evidence,” adding, “Remorse and cooperation do not necessarily warrant a level 
of discipline less than disbarment.”17 While never stated explicitly in SJC opin-
ions or board reports, the reasoning is that, since respondents are required to 
cooperate with the bar counsel’s investigation, doing so does not entitle one to 
any extra credit.18
However, extraordinary cooperation with and assistance to the bar counsel 
may mitigate a presumptive sanction in some instances. In Matter of Scola, the 
attorney unintentionally mismanaged his Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts 
(IOLTA), leading to his using some client funds to cover other client obliga-
tions. The hearing committee recommended a one-year suspension. The board 
imposed a public reprimand, relying on mitigating factors, including that the 
lawyer’s “eﬀorts went far beyond merely cooperating with the investigation. The 
committee observed that such eﬀorts would ordinarily be described as ‘typical’ 
mitigating factors, but that, in this case, the eﬀorts were unusual and notewor-
thy.”19 (The respondent had, on his own initiative, ordered “a long and costly 
forensic audit” to uncover the source of an inadvertent accounting imbalance in 
14 See, e.g., Matter of Osagiede, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 523 (2008), aff ’d 453 Mass. 1001, 25 
Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 478 (2009) (devoting his practice to working with an underserved commu-
nity considered typical); Matter of Abelson, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 1 (2008) (service to under-
privileged clients considered typical); Matter of Moore, 442 Mass. 285, 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 
400 (2004) (services provided to an underserved population considered typical); Matter of Finn, 
17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 200, 433 Mass. 418 (2001) (services provided to an underserved popu-
lation considered typical).
15 30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 358 (2014).
16 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 65, 68 (2013).
17 429 Mass. 1013, 1014 n.5, 15 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 170, 172 (1999). See also Ad. 02-12, 18 Mass. 
Att’y Disc. R. 631 (2002).
18 See Massachusetts Rules and Orders of the Supreme Judicial Court r. 4:01 §§ 3(1)
(b)–(d), (5) [hereinafter SJC Rule] (failure to cooperate is grounds for discipline).
19 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 568, 574 (2010).
392
Mitigating and Aggravating Factors
his IOLTA account.) On appeal, the SJC imposed a term suspension but stayed 
the sanction, largely because of the mitigating factor.20
Lack of prior discipline: While, as Section III below shows, prior discipline 
usually serves as an aggravating factor, lack of prior discipline is ordinarily a 
typical factor. As the SJC wrote in Matter of Pike, “The absence of prior mis-
conduct by the attorney carries little or no weight.”21 On occasion, however, 
this factor may play a mitigating role.22
Excessive workload: The fact that an attorney faced a burdensome workload 
at the time of the misconduct does not justify a departure from the standard 
discipline. For example, in Matter of Dragon,23 the SJC rejected a lawyer’s claim 
that his workload served as a special mitigating factor. He was disbarred after 
mismanaging his client funds account.
Criminal punishment for the same offense: The fact that an attorney received 
criminal punishment for the same oﬀense, or an argument that the attorney has 
otherwise received punishment for this misconduct, is given no weight.24 As 
the SJC has written, “The question is not whether the respondent has been 
‘punished’ enough. To make that the test would be to give undue weight to [the 
respondent’s] private interests, whereas the true test must always be the public 
welfare.”25
Effect on the attorney’s career: Because any public sanction is likely to nega-
tively aﬀect a lawyer’s career, that harm is not treated as a mitigating factor. For 
example, in Matter of Luongo, the Court dismissed the argument that an indef-
inite suspension would be a particular detriment to an older lawyer and serve 
as a “life sentence.”26
20 460 Mass. 1003, 27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 785, 800 (2011).
21 408 Mass. 740, 745, 6 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 256, 261 (1990).
22 See, e.g., Matter of Goldfarb, 18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 260 (2003) (lack of prior discipline listed 
as a mitigating factor).
23 440 Mass. 1023, 1024, 19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 121 (2003).
24 Matter of Concemi, 422 Mass. 326, 330, 12 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 63 (1996); Matter of 
McCarthy, 416 Mass. 423, 431 (1993); Matter of Neitlich, 413 Mass. 416, 425 (1992).
25 Matter of Nickerson, 422 Mass. 333, 337, 12 Mass. Att’y. Disc. R. 367, 375 (1996) (quoting 
Matter of Keenan, 314 Mass. 544, 547 (1943)).
26 Matter of Luongo, 416 Mass. 308, 311, 9 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 199, 203 (1993); see also Matter 
of Dawkins, 432 Mass. 1009, 1012 (2000) (rescript).
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Absence of aggravating factors: The absence of factors in aggravation is not 
a basis for mitigating an otherwise appropriate sanction. In Matter of Daniels,27
the single justice wrote, “While personal ﬁnancial motive and harm are usually 
considered aggravating factors, their absence is not a basis for departing down-
ward from a sanction that is warranted without them.”
The list of matters the Court does not give signiﬁcant mitigating weight did 
not stop after Alter. The Court continues the common law process of consider-
ing, accepting, or rejecting matters oﬀered in mitigation, taking into account the 
general purposes of bar discipline, i.e., generally deterring bar members, and the 
public perception that the bar is adequately policing itself with the public wel-
fare in mind.28
B. “Special” Claims that May Serve as Mitigating Factors
The SJC uses the term “special” for those mitigating factors that may reduce 
an otherwise appropriate sanction.29 The principle underlying a special mitigat-
ing consideration is that it shows that the lawyer who committed misconduct 
acted unintentionally, had some reason beyond the attorney’s voluntary control 
for engaging in the misconduct, or otherwise was less culpable than the category 
of misconduct would otherwise imply. Practitioners should bear in mind that the 
facts and circumstances of a case might distinguish it from precedent and indicate 
the propriety of a lesser sanction without necessarily satisfying some predeter-
mined category of special mitigation. For instance, the absence of a recognized 
aggravating factor, such as harm, might not by itself be mitigating, but the attor-
ney could use this to argue for a less severe sanction than that imposed for vio-
lating the same rules while causing harm. This is a straightforward application 
of the general principle that each case must be decided on its merits and that each 
attorney must receive the disposition most appropriate for the circumstances.30
27 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 102 (2007).
28 See, e.g., Matter of Otis, 438 Mass. 1016, 1017 n.3, 19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 344, 346 (2003) (pro 
bono service); Matter of Dragon, 440 Mass. 1023, 1024, 19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 121 (2003) (exces-
sive workload).
29 Alter, 389 Mass. at 157 (“[w]e emphasize the term ‘special,’ since it is apparent that ‘typical’ 
mitigating circumstances have not diverted the Justices from the imposition of disbarment or 
suspension”).
30 Matter of Balliro, 453 Mass. 75, 85, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 35, 47 (2009); Matter of Slavitt, 449 
Mass. 25, 30, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 662 (2007); Matter of Foley, 439 Mass. 324, 333, 19 Mass. 
Att’y Disc. R. 141 (2003).
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Practice Tip
To serve as a special mitigating factor, the respondent 
lawyer must allege the favorable or ameliorating circum-
stances in the answer to the petition, provide proof by 
competent evidence at the hearing, and (perhaps most 
critically important) demonstrate that the factor is caus-
ally connected to the misconduct.
The categories of special mitigating factors are limited and do not always 
achieve the goal the respondent intended. But respondents need to understand 
them and incorporate them into a strategic defense plan. The following mitiga-
tion arguments have, on occasion, reduced a sanction from its presumptive, or 
typical, level to something more favorable for the respondent.
Inexperience: In appropriate circumstances, an inexperienced attorney’s mis-
take may result in lesser discipline if the inexperience helps explain the lawyer’s 
error. This factor typically carries the most weight when an inexperienced sub-
ordinate lawyer is carrying out the directives of a senior lawyer. For example, in 
Matter of an Attorney,31 the SJC ordered an admonition for a lawyer who had par-
ticipated with her supervisor in making misleading statements in negotiations and 
in mishandling client funds. The Court concluded that “[t]he board properly con-
sidered the respondent’s inexperience” in recommending a lighter sanction.32 This 
factor is not likely to carry much weight where the inexperienced lawyer was not 
commanded by another, more senior, lawyer, or where the misconduct was so 
clearly wrong that even a new lawyer would know not to engage in it.33
31 448 Mass. 819, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 786 (2007).
32 See also Matter of Grossman, 3 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 89 (1983) (one-year suspension for fraud 
on the court; inexperience taken into account); Matter of McIntyre, 426 Mass. 1012, 1015, 14 
Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 526, 531 (1998); Matter of Hanserd, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 229 (2010); 
Ad. 05-04, 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 671 (2005); Matter of Nickerson, 422 Mass. 333, 12 Mass. 
Att’y Disc. R. 367 (1996).
33 Matter of Bryan, 411 Mass. 288, 292, 7 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 24 (1991) (misappropriation of 
funds with deprivation; disbarment despite inexperience); Matter of Marshall, 16 Mass. Att’y 
Disc. R. 275 (2000) (identity theft by a graduate of an unaccredited law school in order to 
become a member of the Arizona bar; indeﬁnite suspension despite inexperience).
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Self-reporting: A lawyer’s proactive, voluntary report of misconduct to the 
bar counsel may serve as a special mitigating factor. In Matter of Franchitto,34 a 
lawyer who had participated in improper residential real estate transactions not 
only alerted banking oﬃcials to the documentary problems and took the ini-
tiative to rectify the fraud, but “[p]erhaps most commendably, [the respondent] 
himself brought his own conduct to the attention of the board.” Those actions 
served as explicit mitigation in the SJC’s order imposing a public reprimand.
Family stress and illness: At times, if causally connected, the fact that a law-
yer or the lawyer’s family is suﬀering from extraordinary stress or illness may serve 
as a special mitigating factor. In Matter of Schoepfer, the SJC stated, “Our rule 
[about sanctions] is not mandatory. If a disability caused a lawyer’s conduct, the 
discipline should be moderated, and, if that disability can be treated, special 
terms and considerations may be appropriate.”35 In order for those facts to jus-
tify a departure from the standard discipline, the diﬃculties must have contrib-
uted directly to, and helped account for, the misconduct. For instance, in Matter 
of Dodd,36 the lawyer claimed that his serious cardiac illness interfered with his 
ability to manage his IOLTA account. The single justice agreed: “[T]his case in-
volves special mitigating circumstances that warrant a departure from the usual 
sanction. [The respondent’s] debilitating and worsening medical condition dur-
ing the relevant period was a signiﬁcant contributing cause of his misconduct.” 
In Matter of Guidry,37 a respondent who mismanaged his client trust account 
and misappropriated client funds “was under extreme ﬁnancial and emotional 
stress arising from grave and acute family problems.” That factor contributed to 
the misconduct and, therefore, served as a mitigating factor.
Similarly, in Matter of Blodgett,38 a lawyer failed to pay her annual registration 
fees to the board and continued to practice after her license had been administra-
tively suspended. In approving a two-month suspension, the single justice wrote:
In mitigation, the respondent’s failure to register and unauthorized 
practice occurred during a time when an immediate member of the 
respondent’s family was suﬀering from a mental illness and undergoing 
a serious crisis requiring direct, daily care by the respondent. The burden 
34 448 Mass. 1007, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 162 (2007).
35 426 Mass. 183, 188, 13 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 679 (1997).
36 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 196, 209 (2005).
37 15 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 255 (1999) (thirty-month suspension for intentional misuse of client 
funds where respondent experienced “extreme ﬁnancial and emotional stress arising from grave 
and acute family problems”).
38 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 71 (2009).
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on the respondent caused substantial stress and signiﬁcantly distracted 
the respondent from the requirements of her legal practice.39
To serve as special mitigation, the stresses must be causally related to the 
misconduct. In Matter of Johnson,40 the SJC concluded that they were not. As 
the Court wrote:
The panel of the board that heard the respondent’s evidence speciﬁcally 
concluded that he had not demonstrated a causal relationship between his 
circumstances and his misconduct. For example, while the tragic fatal inju-
ries of a family member surely caused him anguish, his misappropriation 
of client funds commenced before he received word of that event. More-
over, the respondent’s professional diﬃculties and ﬁnancial reversals began 
years before the misconduct and, while they undoubtedly were stressful, 
cannot excuse or explain abdication of professional responsibilities.41
Mental health problems: The fact that a lawyer suﬀers from a mental health 
illness may at times serve as a special mitigating factor, but only if the condi-
tion causally relates to the misconduct and only if the respondent has attempted 
to address the problem responsibly. For instance, in Matter of MacDonald,42 the 
young lawyer committed serious neglect as a sole practitioner and made false state-
ments to tribunals to cover the neglect. He sought a hearing limited to his claim 
of mitigation, including his psychological problems. In ordering a six-month sus-
pension, the single justice wrote: 
In mitigation, [the respondent] oﬀered evidence that he suﬀered from depres-
sion and was severely sleep deprived during the relevant time period . . . . 
[I]n light of the mitigating circumstances established by [the respondent], 
which I weigh heavily in the balance in this case, I agree that the board’s 
recommendation is reasonable, proportionate, and will protect the public.43
39 See also Matter of Hanserd, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 229, 233 (2010) (“the respondent was 
dealing with three very serious family illnesses during the relevant time, which involved hospi-
talizations and frequent travel out of town to care for family members, as a result of which she 
paid less attention than she should have to the consequences of her acts”); Ad. 04-11, 20 Mass. 
Att’y Disc. R. 680, 681 (2004) (“The respondent’s own divorce and a serious illness in his family 
contributed to his neglect of the complainant’s case.”).
40 444 Mass. 1002, 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 355 (2005).
41 444 Mass. at 358–59.
42 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 411 (2007).
43 See also Matter of Patch, 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 445, 446 (2004) (respondent’s “depression 
and ﬁnancial situation continued to deteriorate” despite treatment eﬀorts; that condition served 
as mitigation).
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By comparison, in Matter of Barrat,44 the respondent did not prove with 
suﬃcient evidence that his condition caused his misconduct. While the illness 
played some role in the length of the suspension the single justice imposed, it 
did not achieve the mitigation the respondent sought.45
In Matter of Balliro,46 a lawyer who falsely testiﬁed in a hearing involving a 
man who had physically abused her received a lesser sanction because of the psy-
chological state she was in at the time she testiﬁed. In Matter of Davidson,47 the 
lawyer oﬀered evidence of his depression as mitigation for his intentional mis-
conduct involving fabricating court documents. The single justice accepted that 
factor as it related to his neglect of client matters but did not credit that excuse.
Of course, a respondent who alleges psychological problems as a basis for 
mitigation must oﬀer competent evidence of that condition at the hearing, 
usually including expert testimony. Absent that submission, the respondent 
may not argue for a departure from the standard discipline.48 Furthermore, an 
argument for mitigation based on alleged psychological circumstances such as 
depression might be less than compelling where it has been proven that the 
respondent engaged in intentional and systematic misconduct.49
Addiction: Addiction is, of course, an illness, but that medical condition 
receives diﬀerent treatment from other forms of mental or physical illness 
when raised as a factor in mitigation. The fact that a lawyer suﬀers from drug 
or alcohol addiction might serve as a mitigating factor, but the results of the cases 
addressing this factor are mixed. In Matter of Sterritt,50 after a respondent 
neglected several matters, the single justice accepted a stipulated suspension for 
a year and a day. The report noted, in mitigation, that the neglect resulted from 
the attorney’s severe alcoholism. His achieving sobriety after contact from the 
44 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 27 (2004).
45 See also Matter of Haese, 468 Mass. 1002, 30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 196 (2014) (no evidence that 
attorney’s multiple acts of intentional misconduct were the product of his medical illness).
46 453 Mass. 75, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 31 (2009).
47 16 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 81 (2000).
48 See, e.g., Matter of Eberle, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 181 (2009) (unspeciﬁed “disability” warrants 
no weight); Matter of Wasserman, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 767 (2007) (no evidence of psychologi-
cal distress oﬀered).
49 Matter of Haese, 468 Mass. 1002, 30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 196 (2014); Matter of Johnson, 452 
Mass. 1010, 1011, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 380 (2008) (rescript); Matter of Davidson, 16 Mass. Att’y 
Disc. R. 81 (2000).
50 17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 542 (2001). See also Matter of Morgan, 17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 437 (2001) 
(year-and-a-day suspension for numerous instances of neglect; in mitigation, attorney treated for 
anxiety and severe depression).
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bar counsel also served as a favorable fact. In Matter of Epstein,51 the lawyer’s 
addiction to painkillers served as a mitigating factor to explain the misconduct.
The SJC has expressed some uncertainty, however, whether drug addiction 
ought to serve as a special mitigating factor. In Matter of Collins, in ordering a 
suspension after a lawyer misappropriated client funds, the Court wrote:
Setting aside the question whether Collins’s cocaine addiction caused or 
otherwise contributed to his misappropriations (or whether, even if it had, 
his addiction to an illegal drug should be considered a mitigating factor) the 
other circumstances of this case support the single justice’s choice of an 
indeﬁnite suspension over disbarment. The sanction is justiﬁed in light 
of [other circumstances].52
In an older report, Matter of Hull,53 an attorney received an indeﬁnite suspen-
sion for converting approximately $96,000 in client funds. His use of cocaine was 
rejected as a mitigating factor. In the more recent report of Matter of Morgan,54
the attorney’s alcoholism was not a mitigating factor because she had not sought 
treatment for it.
In both Hull and Collins, the Court emphasized the respondents’ signiﬁcant 
and successful rehabilitation eﬀorts as favorable. Absent such eﬀorts, addiction 
is unlikely to serve as a mitigating factor.
You Should Know
A respondent who relies on mental illness, including 
addiction, as a mitigating factor must establish, at a 
minimum, three things:
 1 . The condition asserted;
 2.  That the condition affected the actions constituting 
the misconduct; and
3. Successful treatment for the condition.
The respondent must be prepared to disclose all relevant 
medical records to the bar counsel.
51 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 199 (2009).
52 455 Mass. 1020, 1021, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 102, 105 (2010) (emphasis added). See also Mat-
ter of Gustafson, 6 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 140, 141 (1990) (alcoholism, even if proven, should not 
serve as mitigation in cases of misappropriation of client funds).
53 6 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 152, 153 (1990).
54 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 428 (2004).
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Restitution: Restitution to the person or organization a lawyer misappro-
priated funds from, or otherwise caused ﬁnancial harm, is always helpful, be-
cause failure to make restitution is a well-accepted aggravating factor.55 On some 
occasions, restitution is identiﬁed as a special mitigating factor,56 but making res-
titution does not serve as a special mitigating factor if the restitution occurs be-
cause of a client complaint or a court order.57
In matters involving intentional misappropriation of funds, with resulting 
deprivation to the intended recipient, the standard discipline is either disbar-
ment or indeﬁnite suspension, and the diﬀerence often turns on whether the 
lawyer has made restitution.58 In that respect, restitution directly serves a mitigat-
ing role, even if it does not receive that label. For example, in Matter of Boxer,59
the single justice concluded that “as between disbarment and indeﬁnite suspen-
sion, the aggravating circumstances and the absence of restitution tip the scales 
decisively in favor of disbarment.” Similarly, in Matter of Guidry,60 the single jus-
tice implied that the respondent’s proactive eﬀorts to ﬁnd a way to pay back the 
client whose money he had misappropriated, even before the bar counsel’s 
involvement, served to justify a thirty-month suspension, less than the pre-
sumptive indeﬁnite suspension.61
Forced restitution, by contrast, typically does not serve as a mitigating con-
sideration. In Matter of LiBassi, the SJC wrote that “[r]ecovery obtained through 
court action ‘is not “restitution” for purposes of choosing an appropriate sanc-
tion.’  ”62 Also, payment to the injured party through the respondent’s liability 
55 See infra Section III.
56 See Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement r. 10, Commentary (Am. Bar 
Ass’n 2002) (“timely good faith eﬀort to make restitution or to rectify consequences” is consid-
ered as matter in mitigation); Model Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions § 9.3(d) 
(Am. Bar Ass’n 1992) [hereinafter Model Standards] (mitigating factors include “timely good 
faith eﬀort to make restitution or to rectify consequences of misconduct”).
57 See, e.g., Matter of Sharif, 459 Mass. 558, 563 n.4, 27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 809 (2011) (“the pay-
ment of restitution to a client after a client ﬁles suit and complains to Bar Counsel typically is not 
considered in mitigation”); Matter of LiBassi, 449 Mass. 1014, 1017, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 396 
(2007) (restitution made through court action not considered in mitigation of sanction).
58 See Matter of Bryan, 411 Mass. 288, 292, 7 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 24, 29 (1991); Matter of the Dis-
cipline of an Attorney (“Three Attorneys”), 392 Mass. 827, 836–37, 4 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 155, 166–
67 (1984); Matter of Schoepfer, 426 Mass. 183, 187–88, 13 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 679, 685–86 (1997).
59 14 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 74, 88 (1998).
60 15 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 255 (1999).
61 See, e.g., Matter of Johnson, 444 Mass. 1002, 1004, 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 355, 358 (2005) (dis-
tinguishing Guidry based on the proactive restitution, among other reasons).
62 449 Mass. 1014, 1016, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 396, 402–03 (2007) (quoting Bryan, 411 Mass. 
at 292). See also Model Standards, supra note 56, at § 9.4 (a) (“forced or compelled restitution” 
should not be considered as either aggravating or mitigating factor).
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carrier does not likely qualify as a mitigating factor but it may aﬀect the degree 
of harm the lawyer’s misconduct caused.
Practice Tips
Do not confuse restitution with absence of injury. As the 
single justice wrote in Matter of Lansky,63 “There is no 
merit to the respondent’s claim that because the estate 
was made whole by his reimbursement of the $41,132 
paid by the estate, it did not sustain serious injury. The 
respondent confuses restitution, which in certain circum-
stances may be a factor in mitigation, with injury. Here, 
the restitution does not even merit mitigating weight 
because it was made two years after the bar counsel 
commenced the investigation in this case.”
Regardless of the kind of harm the lawyer’s miscon-
duct caused (misappropriation of client property, loss of 
a meritorious lawsuit, excessive fees charged, or other 
ﬁnancial injury), it is always to the respondent’s beneﬁt 
to minimize the loss suffered through compensation, no 
matter the source.
Delay in the disciplinary hearing process: Signiﬁcant delay in the bar counsel’s 
pursuit of the disciplinary process may be considered in mitigation, but only if the 
respondent can show the delay caused substantial prejudice. The SJC has stated 
that delay in the disciplinary proceeding “is a mitigating circumstance to be con-
sidered,”64 but “delay in the prosecution of attorney misconduct does not consti-
tute a mitigating factor absent proof that the delay has substantially prejudiced 
the defense, or evidence of resulting public opprobrium.”65
Few respondents have successfully used the fact of delay to obtain mitigation. 
In Matter of Kerlinsky,66 while the respondent’s attempt to have the proceedings 
dismissed on the grounds of undue delay did not succeed, the Court implied that 
the sanction imposed was mitigated by a substantial delay that interfered with his 
63 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 443 (2006).
64 Matter of Kerlinsky, 406 Mass. 67, 76 n.8, 6 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 172 (1989), cert. denied, 498 
U.S. 1027 (1991).
65 Matter of Grossman, 448 Mass. 151, 152, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 242, 244 (2007).
66 406 Mass. 67, 76 n.8 (1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1027 (1991).
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ability to obtain witness testimony. In Matter of Perrone,67 the special hearing 
oﬃcer’s report insisted that he did not apply mitigating factors in determining 
the sanction but did note the “unexplained” eight-year delay in the proceedings 
and the harm that delay caused the attorney’s career. The report describes delay 
as a factor in mitigation, even if it did not have that eﬀect in this case. In Matter 
of Gross,68 the SJC concluded that extensive delay in the disciplinary proceedings 
did not entitle the respondent to mitigation, because the attorney’s case was not 
prejudiced and there was no public awareness of pending charges and thus no pro-
longed period of public embarrassment, humiliation, or anxiety. Other lawyers 
have sought mitigation based on delay but none has succeeded.69
Practice Tip
If a delay in prosecuting a disciplinary matter makes it 
difﬁcult for the respondent to obtain evidence or wit-
nesses to assist with the defense, the respondent should 
bring that fact to the hearing committee’s or hearing 
ofﬁcer’s attention, either as a basis for mitigation or as a 
factor in determining whether the bar counsel has met 
the burden of proof.70
III. AGGRAVATING FACTORS
In determining an appropriate sanction for a lawyer who has committed 
misconduct, the board and the SJC consider aggravating circumstances, which, 
if present, contribute to a more serious level of discipline or diminish the eﬀect 
67 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 545 (2007).
68 435 Mass. 445, 451, 17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 271, 277 (2001).
69 See, e.g., Matter of Crossen, 450 Mass. 533, 577, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 122 (2008) (no preju-
dice proven); Matter of Early, 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 220 (2005) (no prejudice proven); Matter of 
McBride, 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 455 (2005), aff ’d, 449 Mass. 154, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 443 
(2007) (same).
70 In a disciplinary proceeding that has been sealed and, therefore, cannot be cited, the board mem-
orandum noted that the bar counsel’s attempt to establish misconduct through facts that occurred 
twenty-two years before presented serious obstacles for the respondent. “While there is no basis for 
disturbing [the] rejection [of a witness’s aﬃdavit] as an abuse of discretion, the proﬀer is ample proof 
that the respondent was foreclosed, by the passage of so much time, from introducing critical tes-
timony in support of his position.”
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of a proven mitigating factor. The SJC and the board have identiﬁed the fol-
lowing factors as aggravating under the right circumstances:
Prior discipline: Prior discipline must be considered in aggravation. In 1992, 
the SJC declared, “The existence of prior discipline, unlike the absence of prior 
discipline, is a substantial factor in selecting the level of discipline. We consis-
tently have considered a record of past misconduct, even if unrelated to the cur-
rent charges, in determining the appropriate sanction.”71 That position has not 
changed in the intervening decades.72 At times, the board employs a “step” approach, 
where each successive instance of discipline leads to the next sanction level.73 In 
Matter of Barrat,74 for example, the single justice accepted the board’s recom-
mendation that “[i]t is . . . appropriate to take the ‘next step’ up the ladder of dis-
ciplinary sanctions” given the lawyer’s prior discipline for similar misconduct. 
Prior discipline that is similar to the misconduct at issue in the new proceeding 
“is an especially weighty aggravating factor.”75
You Should Know
Prior discipline as an aggravating factor is different from, 
but related to, the cumulative effect of multiple counts of 
misconduct on a sanction. Just as it is proper to increase 
the sanction because of prior discipline, it is proper for a 
sanction based on the respondent’s having committed 
multiple violations to be more severe than that typically 
imposed for any one of those instances of misconduct.76
Lack of candor during the disciplinary process: The SJC and the board fre-
quently identify a respondent’s lack of candor during the disciplinary proceed-
ings as an aggravating factor justifying more serious discipline. For instance, in 
71 Matter of Dawkins, 412 Mass. 90, 96, 8 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 64, 70 (1992).
72 See, e.g., Matter of Murray, 455 Mass. 872, 883, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 402, 418 (2010) (“An 
increased sanction may be appropriate where the attorney has a prior history of discipline, even 
if the prior misconduct is unrelated to the present charges”) (citing Dawkins).
73 See Matter of Chambers, 421 Mass. 256, 260, 11 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 31, 36 (1995) (“[I]n the 
absence of mitigating factors, discipline should proceed in increments of escalating severity.”).
74 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 27 (2004).
75 Matter of Ryan, 24 Mass. Att’y R. 632, 641 (2008).
76 See Matter of Saab, 406 Mass. 315, 327, 6 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 278, 290 (1989) (in deciding 
sanction, the “consideration of the cumulative eﬀect of several violations is proper”).
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Matter of Crossen, the SJC, in ordering the respondent disbarred, noted as “even 
more compelling” an aggravating factor the respondent’s “ ‘marked’ lack of can-
dor in the disciplinary proceedings.”77 In Matter of Moore,78 the respondent re-
ceived a two-year suspension for failing to disclose pertinent information on his 
bar application, a sanction aggravated by his lack of candor at the disciplinary 
hearing. The Court has emphasized that presenting an unsuccessful defense is 
not a factor in aggravation as long as the testimony presented is not shown to be 
untruthful.79 A ﬁnding of lack of candor typically requires ﬁnding deliberately 
false testimony or testimony given with the intent to deceive.80
Presenting false testimony at a disciplinary hearing or being untruthful to 
the bar counsel during its investigation is an aggravating factor, even though the 
bar counsel may not have listed that misconduct in its petition for discipline.81
Selfish motive and intentional actions: The SJC and the board have cited as 
aggravating factors a lawyer’s intent in committing the misconduct and, sepa-
rately, a corrupt or selﬁsh motive. The fact that a lawyer’s actions were intentional, 
and not simply negligent, may be treated as a factor in aggravation.82 In Matter 
of Foley,83 the respondent intentionally prepared a false defense for his client fac-
ing criminal charges. In imposing a three-year suspension, the SJC noted as aggra-
vating factors that the attorney’s conduct, which also appeared to be his common 
method of practice, included “calculated corruption” that “repeatedly reﬂect[ed] 
complete disregard, if not utter contempt, for the fundamental ethical obligations 
of an oﬃcer of the court” and involved his client in “premeditat[ed] and deliber-
ate[]” misconduct. Similarly, in Matter of Aufiero,84 the attorney received a two-
77 450 Mass. 533, 580, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 122, 179 (2008) (quoting the hearing report).
78 442 Mass. 285, 289–90, 296, 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 400, 406 (2004). See also Matter of 
Murray, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R.465 (2013); Matter of Macero, 27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 554 
(2011); Matter of Buck, 27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 92 (2011); Matter of Lagana, 26 Mass. Att’y 
Disc. R. 295 (2010).
79 Matter of Eisenhauer, 426 Mass. 448, 455–56, 14 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 251, 261, cert. denied,
524 U.S. 919 (1998).
80 Matter of Crossen, 450 Mass. 533, 580, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 122, 179–180 (2008) (special 
hearing oﬃcer found “deliberately false testimony”); Matter of Hoicka, 442 Mass. 1004, 1006, 
20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 239, 243 (2004) (rescript) (hearing oﬃcer must determine whether respon-
dent’s testimony was deliberately false or simply mistaken); Matter of Friedman, 7 Mass. Att’y 
Disc. R. 100, 103 (1991) (lack of candor before tribunal weighed as aggravating circumstance).
81 See, e.g., Matter of Macero, 27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 554 (2011) (respondent’s “continued lack of 
candor at the disciplinary hearing” a factor in determining sanction).
82 See Matter of Pike, 408 Mass. 740, 6 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 256 (1990); Matter of Wise, 433 Mass. 
80, 16 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 416 (2000).
83 439 Mass. 324, 335, 339, 19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 141, 152, 158 (2003).
84 13 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 6, 25 (1997).
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year suspension after the board found that he deliberately continued his false 
statements “for years” after his initial attempts to cover up his actions. 
A lawyer’s motive is also relevant in determining the appropriate sanction,85
with a selﬁsh motive being an aggravating factor. In Matter of DeMarco,86 the 
lawyer’s disbarment resulted in part from his “selﬁsh” motivation in misappropri-
ating funds as a trustee.87 And in Matter of Rafferty,88 the respondent’s motive “to 
retain a client who was paying him large fees” constituted an aggravating factor.
Harm to others: The fact that the lawyer’s actions harmed a client or third 
party serves as an aggravating factor. In 1997, in Matter of Aufiero,89 the single 
justice identiﬁed harm caused to an innocent party as a factor in aggravation, and 
that consideration remains applicable today. In Matter of Eskenas,90 the lawyer 
mishandled the aﬀairs of an elderly, disabled client. In determining that a pub-
lic reprimand was the appropriate sanction, the board noted that “his conduct had 
the potential to cause serious harm to his client.” In Matter of Heartquist,91 the 
lawyer’s criminal activity caused physical harm to a victim, and that fact served 
as an aggravating consideration. In Matter of Gleason,92 the lawyer received a pub-
lic reprimand after the board considered as an aggravating factor the harm his 
neglect had caused his clients.93
Vulnerable client or third party: A lawyer who engages in misconduct will re-
ceive a more severe sanction if that misconduct aﬀects a vulnerable client or third 
85 See, e.g., Matter of Leahy, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 529 (2012) (no ﬁnancial motive distinguished 
this matter from otherwise comparable matters); Matter of O’Neill, 30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 289 
(2014) (“[i]n mitigation, the respondent had no selﬁsh motive and gained no personal advantage”).
86 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 156 (2009).
87 See also Matter of Hilson, 448 Mass. 603, 619, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 269, 289 (2007) (con-
duct motivated by personal ﬁnancial interests and gain is aggravating); Matter of O’Leary, 25 
Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 461 (2009); Matter of Bailey, 439 Mass. 134, 152, 19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 
12, 32 (2003); Matter of Kennedy, 428 Mass. 156, 159, 14 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 383, 388 (1998); 
Matter of Pike, 408 Mass. 740, 745–46, 6 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 256, 261 (1990).
88 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 538 (2010).
89 13 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 6 (1997).
90 30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 130 (2014).
91 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 332 (2013).
92 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 352 (2012).
93 The board has announced guidelines for sanctions for neglect and for conﬂict of interest that 
speciﬁcally designate the presence of harm as an aggravating factor triggering a higher sanc-
tion. Matter of Kane, 13 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 321 (1997) (existence of harm raises sanction for 
neglect to public reprimand); Ad. 02-13, 18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 640, 655 (2002) (while un-
adorned conﬂict will warrant an admonition, an obvious conﬂict aggravated by harm will war-
rant a public reprimand).
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party, even in the absence of actual harm. In Matter of Lupo, the SJC identiﬁed
as a factor in aggravation that the respondent “took advantage of elderly, unso-
phisticated, and vulnerable clients.”94 In Matter of Pemstein,95 the single justice
considered as an aggravating factor that the lawyer took advantage of “vulner-
able elderly women.” More recently, in Matter of Font,96 the single justice found 
as an aggravating factor that “the respondent was dealing with a vulnerable cli-
ent who was distressed by her son’s death and the military’s classiﬁcation of that 
death as a suicide.” The lawyer received a three-month suspension, stayed for a 
year, with conditions.97
Failure to make restitution: The presumptive sanction for intentional misap-
propriation of client funds with deprivation is disbarment or indeﬁnite suspen-
sion. The choice between those two sanctions usually turns on whether the lawyer 
made eﬀorts at restitution.98 Failure to make restitution, therefore, serves as an 
aggravating factor in misappropriation matters.99 So, in Matter of Pasterczyk,100
the single justice wrote, “Most signiﬁcantly, in deciding to recommend disbar-
ment over indeﬁnite suspension, the board and the hearing committee relied 
on the respondent’s failure to pay restitution. This was entirely appropriate.” On 
a petition for reinstatement, “making restitution . . . is an outward sign of the rec-
ognition of one’s wrongdoing and the awareness of a moral duty to make amends 
to the best of one’s ability. Failure to make restitution, and failure to attempt to 
do so, reﬂects poorly on the attorney’s moral ﬁtness.”101 By this reasoning, fail-
ure to oﬀer or to attempt restitution might be evidence that the attorney lacks 
appreciation for legal professional obligations or refuses to acknowledge the wrong-
fulness of the misconduct, another factor often cited in aggravation.102
94 447 Mass. 345, 354, 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 513 (2006).
95 16 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 339, 345 (2000).
96 30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 155, 156 (2014). See also Matter of Cammarano, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. 
R. 82 (2013); Matter of Donaldson, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 221 (2012); Matter of Espinosa, 28 
Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 307 (2012).
97 See also Matter of Crossen, 450 Mass. 533, 581, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 122 (2008) (harm 
caused to a judicial clerk).
98 Matter of Schoepfer, 426 Mass. 183, 187–88, 13 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 679, 685–86 (1997).
99 See Matter of Bryan, 411 Mass. 288, 292, 7 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 24, 29 (1991).
100 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 507, 519–20 (2013).
101 Matter of McCarthy, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 469, 470 (2007).
102 See Matter of Cobb, 445 Mass. 452, 480, 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 93, 125–26 (2005); Matter 
of Moore, 442 Mass. 285, 295, 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 400 (2004); Matter of Kerlinsky, 428 
Mass. 656, 666, 15 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 304, 315 (1999); Matter of Clooney, 403 Mass. 654, 657, 
5 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 59, 67–68 (1988); Model Standards supra note 56, at § 9.22(g).
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Experience in the field: Having a long career, even a discipline-free one, can 
serve as an aggravating factor, as an experienced lawyer has fewer excuses for 
committing misconduct. The SJC and the board often cite experience as an aggra-
vating factor and not (as some respondents claim) a mitigating factor. In Matter 
of Luongo,103 for example, the SJC determined that length of service was aggra-
vating, not mitigating. “An older, experienced attorney should understand eth-
ical obligations to a greater degree than a neophyte.”104 In Matter of Weisman,105
the single justice, quoting the Luongo language, treated a lawyer’s experience as 
an aggravating factor. In Matter of Bulger,106 the respondent received a public rep-
rimand, with the lawyer’s long experience inﬂuencing the board. And in Matter 
of Rafferty,107 the lawyer received a four-month suspension for charging and 
collecting an excessive fee, where the standard discipline is a public reprimand. 
Among the aggravating factors was the lawyer’s extensive experience as a prac-
ticing lawyer.
Failure to cooperate in the disciplinary process: Attorneys subject to discipline 
in Massachusetts are required to cooperate with the bar counsel’s investigation 
of complaints against them (or other attorneys), and failure to do so is itself an 
act of professional misconduct subject to discipline.108 In addition, an attorney’s 
failure to cooperate with the bar counsel’s investigation is often cited as aggra-
vating other charges and warrants increased discipline.109
As with mitigation, the range of facts that might constitute aggravation is 
not a closed class, and the Court continues the common-law development of 
factors considered in aggravation. These include considering a respondent’s role 
as instigator of a fraudulent scheme entered into for personal gain;110 the extent 
of an attorney’s planning, premeditation, and manipulation in the course of the 
misconduct;111 the length of time an attorney allowed a misrepresentation to stand 
103 416 Mass. 308, 9 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 199 (1993).
104 Id. 416 Mass. at 311–12.
105 30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 440 (2014).
106 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 65 (2013); see also Matter of Brandt, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 59 (2010) 
(public reprimand, experience cited as an aggravating factor).
107 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 538 (2010).
108 SJC Rule 4:01 § 3(1).
109 Matter of Gustafson, 464 Mass. 1021, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 292 (2013); Matter of Jean, 18 
Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 331, 339 (2002); Matter of Bartlett, 15 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 28 (1999).
110 Matter of Curry, 450 Mass. 503, 532, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 188 (2008).
111 Matter of Foley, 439 Mass. 324, 338–39, 19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 141, 158 (2003).
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uncorrected;112 the attorney’s failure to appreciate the fundamental obligations 
of a member of the bar;113 the decision to involve the client or a third party in 
dishonest behavior;114 or the persistence of misconduct after the bar counsel com-
mences an investigation.115
IV. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR MITIGATING
AND AGGRAVATING CLAIMS
A. Presenting Evidence in Mitigation
1. Procedural Requirements
In order to present facts in mitigation at a disciplinary hearing, respon-
dents must allege the facts supporting mitigation in their answers (or, as often 
happens, in an amended answer). Otherwise, the lawyer is barred from oﬀering 
such evidence.116 The Rules of the Board of Bar Overseers states the following:
(f ) Request to Be Heard in Mitigation. The Respondent shall include in 
the answer any facts in mitigation and may request that a hearing be 
held on the issue of mitigation. Failure to include facts in mitigation 
constitutes a waiver of the right to present evidence of those facts.117
If the respondent alleges such facts, the board rules imply that the lawyer is 
also required to request a hearing on the mitigation claims. As noted, the board 
rules state that the respondent in the answer “may request that a hearing be 
held on the issue of mitigation.”118 The board permits respondents to oﬀer at the 
hearing evidence of facts alleged in the answer relating to mitigation even if the 
respondent did not expressly request a hearing on the mitigation issue. If the 
112 Matter of Griﬃth, 440 Mass. 500, 508–10, 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 174, 189 (2003).
113 Matter of Clooney, 403 Mass. 654, 657, 5 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 59, 63–64 (1988) (the respon-
dent “continues to be unmindful of certain basic ethical precepts of the legal profession”).
114 Matter of Gross, 435 Mass. 445, 17 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 271 (2001).
115 Matter of Kerlinsky, 428 Mass. 656, 665, 15 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 304, 314 (1999); Matter of 
Shorton, 16 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 376, 381, 383 (2000).
116 See Matter of Patch, 466 Mass. 1016 (2007).
117 Rules of the Board of Bar Overseers § 3.15(f ), Board of Bar Overseers, https://
bbopublic.blob.core.windows.net/web/f/BBORules.pdf.
118 Id.
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respondent admits the facts alleged in the petition but includes claims of mit-
igation in the answer, the hearing then addresses only those mitigation matters 
(along with any aggravating factors the bar counsel raises).119
In Matter of Patch,120 the SJC refused to consider the respondent’s psycho-
logical condition as mitigation because he did not include it in his answer, did 
not oﬀer evidence of it at his hearing, and did not argue it before the single jus-
tice.121 In Matter of Lonardo,122 the lawyer ﬁled an answer but did not allege any 
facts in mitigation. His eﬀort to introduce mitigating evidence at the hearing 
was denied. By contrast, in Matter of D’Amato, the respondent waived any claims 
of mitigation and his right to a hearing. On appeal from the resulting sanction, he 
asserted mitigation claims, and the single justice did consider them, although she 
ultimately rejected the mitigation claims in imposing a six-month suspension.
Practice Tip
The hearing committee or the bar counsel ordinarily per-
mits a respondent to ﬁle an amended answer if done at 
a time that does not cause prejudice to the proceedings. 
A respondent who fails to allege mitigating facts in the 
original answer should consider seeking leave to ﬁle an 
amended answer if the respondent later realizes that 
mitigation should be raised.123
2. Evidentiary Requirements
A respondent who chooses to present evidence in mitigation has the bur-
den of proof to establish the facts supporting a departure from the standard 
discipline. The respondent must prove both the facts on which the mitigation 
claim is based and the causal connection between that evidence and the mis-
conduct. For example, in defending against a claim of lack of diligence, failure 
to maintain proper communications, or poor record-keeping (none of which 
includes intentional misconduct), a respondent’s alcoholism or drug addiction 
can account for the missteps and serve as mitigation. Some lawyers have failed 
119 Id. at § 3.19(b).
120 466 Mass. 1016 (2007).
121 466 Mass. at 1018.
122 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 360 (2009). Compare Matter of D’Amato, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 159 
(2013) (discussed in the text).
123 For a discussion of the process for ﬁling a motion to ﬁle an amended answer, see Chapter 6.
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to establish that relationship. For instance, in Matter of ( John Arthur) Johnson,124
the lawyer had misappropriated client funds and alleged both a family tragedy 
and his alcoholism as factors in mitigation. The single justice concluded that those 
claims did not account for the misconduct and, therefore, did not serve as miti-
gating factors.125 At other times, respondents sought to introduce evidence of a 
psychological or medical condition to explain the misconduct but failed to oﬀer 
reliable evidence proving the condition’s existence, and, as a result, their eﬀorts 
to establish mitigation failed.126
While the hearing committee must decide the facts regarding possible mit-
igation, whether those facts properly qualify as mitigating is a question of law 
for the reviewing board, single justice, or SJC. In Matter of Early,127 the hearing 
committee credited as mitigation the respondent’s evidence that he was suﬀer-
ing from serious family-related stress when he mismanaged a medical malprac-
tice claim on behalf of a child client and mishandled funds related to that client. 
In light of the mitigation, the hearing committee recommended an eighteen-
month suspension. On appeal, the board recommended a three-year suspension, 
in part because it disagreed that the stress-related factors qualiﬁed as special mit-
igation. The single justice aﬃrmed the board’s actions and its suggested sanction. 
The single justice noted that while the committee determines credibility, the 
board and the Court determine whether those facts amount to a proper mitiga-
tion claim.128 In this case, they did not.
B. Presenting Evidence in Aggravation
Neither the SJC nor the BBO rules governing the disciplinary process explic-
itly address the bar counsel’s responsibilities for alleging aggravating circumstances. 
124 444 Mass. 1002, 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 355 (2005).
125 See also Matter of (Gale Rosalyn) Johnson, 452 Mass. 1010, 1011 (2008) (rescript) (“the respon-
dent’s long-standing ﬁnancial problems, exacerbated by gambling large sums of money over a 
substantial period of time, rather than a medical or psychological disability, caused the misappro-
priation of client funds”).
126 See Matter of Pemstein, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 532 (2007) (committee rejected psychiatrist’s 
contention that respondent suﬀered from major depression).
127 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 220 (2005).
128 This division of function is consistent with the board’s power to “review, and . . . revise the ﬁnd-
ings of fact, conclusions of law and recommendation of the hearing committee . . . paying due 
respect to the role of the hearing committee . . . as the sole judge of the credibility of the testimony 
presented at the hearing,” SJC Rule 4:01 § 8(5), and the power of the single justice to review 
whether the board’s ﬁndings are supported by substantial evidence, SJC Rule 4:01 § (6), and to 
review de novo the board’s recommendation concerning the sanction. Matter of the Discipline 
of an Attorney, 448 Mass. 819, 829–30 (2007).
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In practice, the bar counsel often includes in the petition for discipline facts in 
aggravation, except prior discipline. Typically, however, the aggravating factors 
arise either from the respondent’s disciplinary history and are, therefore, known 
to the respondent or from the circumstances of the misconduct claims (e.g., 
selﬁsh or corrupt motive, vulnerable client, failure to make restitution, or expe-
rience). As a result, in contrast to respondents’ eﬀorts to pursue mitigation 
claims, no disciplinary report appears in which the bar counsel has been pre-
cluded from introducing evidence in aggravation because of a failure to allege 
the facts on which the aggravation claim rests. But, on basic fairness principles, 
the bar counsel may not introduce a new issue about which the respondent has 
no knowledge or is unable to confront.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Chapter 6 described the process by which the Board of Bar Overseers (BBO), 
through hearing committees, special hearing oﬃcers, or hearing panels, conducts 
adjudicatory hearings to determine whether a respondent lawyer has commit-
ted misconduct and, if so, what sanction should result. The fact-ﬁnder’s result-
ing report is informed by the posthearing briefs the parties submit. The board 
must adopt or amend the ﬁndings and conclusions in the committee, oﬃcer, or 
panel’s report. This chapter reviews the procedures by which a hearing report be-
comes a ﬁnal order for discipline or a ﬁnal order of dismissal of a petition as well 
as the avenues for review and appeal after certain orders are entered. The board 
reviews every disciplinary hearing report, even if no appeal is made; some reports 
are further reviewed by a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC), and 
the full SJC reviews some of the resulting orders. This chapter describes each of 
the processes and oﬀers practical tips to lawyers navigating these areas.1
II. THE SCOPE OF REVIEW
In any review of the hearing committee’s action, the committee’s ﬁndings of 
fact and recommendation carry great weight. In the board’s review of the hearing 
1 For the sake of convenience, the discussion here refers to a hearing committee as the trier of fact 
and, in doing so, encompasses special hearing oﬃcers and hearing panels. If the procedure diﬀers 
for those other triers of fact, this chapter expressly notes those diﬀerences.
PART V
The Posthearing Process
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committee’s ﬁndings and recommendation, the board may revise any ﬁndings
of fact that it determines to be erroneous, except for credibility determinations. 
The board must “pay[] due respect to the role of the hearing committee . . . as 
the sole judge of the credibility of the testimony presented at the hearing,”2 but 
otherwise the board may make its own independent ﬁndings of fact based 
upon the evidence it reviews. The board also reviews de novo the recommended 
sanction, although in practice the board gives some deference to the hearing 
committee’s recommendation. If the board does revise any ﬁnding or recom-
mendation, it must state the reasons for doing so in its vote or memorandum.3
In a proceeding before a single justice, “subsidiary facts found by the board 
and contained in its report ﬁled with the information shall be upheld if supported 
by substantial evidence, upon consideration of the record.”4 “ ‘Substantial evi-
dence’ means such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 
support a conclusion.”5 The SJC has explained the standard of review of factual 
ﬁndings as follows: “While we review the entire record and consider whatever 
detracts from the weight of the board’s conclusion, as long as there is substan-
tial evidence, we do not disturb the board’s ﬁnding, even if we would have come 
to a diﬀerent conclusion if considering the matter de novo.”6 “[A]lthough not 
binding on this court, the ﬁndings and recommendations of the board are enti-
tled to great weight.”7
With regard to the sanction to impose, the single justice’s review of the 
board’s recommendation is “de novo, but tempered with substantial deference to 
the board’s recommendation.”8 In practice, the single justice aﬀords the board 
2 Rules of the Board of Bar Overseers § 3.53 [hereinafter BBO Rules]; see Matter of Saab, 
406 Mass. 315, 328 (1989) (“Our rules concerning bar discipline . . . accord to the hearing com-
mittee the position of ‘the sole judge of the credibility of the testimony presented at the hear-
ing’”); Matter of Hachey, 11 Mass. Att’y Discipline R. 102, 103 (1995) (credibility ﬁnding may 
not be rejected unless it can be “said with certainty” that ﬁnding was “wholly inconsistent with 
another implicit ﬁnding”), and see Matter of Strauss, 479 Mass. 294, 298–99, 33 Mass. Att’y Disc. 
R. ___ (2018) (reiterating the “sole judge” and “irreconcilable inconsistency” standards of review).
3 BBO Rules § 3.53.
4 Massachusetts Rules and Orders of the Supreme Judicial Court r. 4:01 § 8(6) [here-
inafter SJC Rule].
5 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 30A, § 1(6).
6 Matter of Segal, 430 Mass. 359, 364, 15 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 544 (1999). While Segal was a full-
bench opinion, the principle expressed there applies to single justice proceedings. Matter of Buck, 
27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 92, 96 (2011).
7 Matter of Fordham, 423 Mass. 481, 487 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1149 (1997) (citing Mat-
ter of Hiss, 368 Mass. 447, 461 (1975)).
8 Matter of Buck, 27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 92, 97 (2011) (quoting Matter of Jackman, 444 Mass. 
1013, 1013 (2005)).
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deference but, as noted, on occasion orders a sanction diﬀerent from the board 
recommendation.9
III. THE REVIEW PROCESS WHEN NEITHER PARTY APPEALS
As described in Chapter 6, after the adjudicatory proceedings close, the 
hearing committee must issue its hearing report.10 If neither party ﬁles an 
objection to that report, it does not mean that the committee’s decision is ﬁnal. 
The board must review every hearing report even if no appeal is made.11 If no 
appeal is ﬁled within twenty days of the report being served on the parties, the 
board reviews the matter.12 Initially, the parties need do nothing except await 
the board’s decision. Whether or not an appeal is ﬁled, the scope of the board’s 
review over a hearing report is signiﬁcantly broader than that of an appellate 
court reviewing a trial court’s judgment. 
The board must review the ﬁndings and conclusions of the committee, and 
it has the authority to revise any ﬁndings, including ﬁndings of fact, “paying due 
respect to the hearing committee . . . as the sole judge of credibility of the testi-
mony presented at the hearing,”13 and may order or recommend a diﬀerent dis-
position or sanction. The board issues its own memorandum after its review. In 
many instances where neither party appeals, the board adopts the committee’s 
ﬁndings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended sanction, although it need 
not do so. If the proposed sanction is an admonition or a public reprimand, the 
board votes to adopt the ﬁndings of fact and conclusions of law and serve the 
memorandum on the parties. Such service “shall constitute the admonition or 
public reprimand.”14 If the proposed sanction is a suspension or disbarment, 
the board must ﬁle a pleading known as an Information with the clerk of the 
SJC for Suﬀolk County,15 because only the SJC may impose those sanctions.16
Section VI describes the procedure that follows the ﬁling of an Information.
9 See supra notes 6–7.
10 See Chapter 6, Section XII; BBO Rules § 3.46–3.49.
11 BBO Rules § 3.52.
12 BBO Rules § 3.50(a) establishes the twenty-day deadline for ﬁling an appellate brief, subject 
to extension. Section 3.52 provides for board review “[w]hen the time for ﬁling an appeal . . . has 
expired and neither [party] . . . has ﬁled an appeal with the Board.”
13 BBO Rules § 3.53, and see supra, note 2.
14 BBO Rules § 3.56(a).
15 BBO Rules § 3.58.
16 SJC Rule 4:01 §§ 5(3)(g), 8(6).
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The board is not required to accept the hearing committee’s ﬁndings or pro-
posed sanction, even where neither party has ﬁled an objection. If the board does 
not aﬃrm the committee’s recommendation, it must give the parties “appropri-
ate notice” of that decision and the opportunity to ﬁle briefs.17 The matter then 
proceeds as if a party had appealed. The board cannot, and will not, unilaterally 
change a hearing committee decision without giving the parties the opportu-
nity to be heard.
Where the parties have stipulated to factual ﬁndings and a recommended 
sanction, the board need not accept the stipulation.18 The parties typically agree 
that if the board rejects their stipulation, it is void. Such a stipulation is referred 
to as “collapsible.” If the stipulation is collapsible, and the board does not obtain 
a more satisfactory stipulation from the parties, the board rejects the proposal. In 
that situation, the Oﬃce of the Bar Counsel then pursues formal disciplinary pro-
ceedings. In other instances, the parties agree that the stipulation is binding as to 
the facts and disciplinary violations, even if the board rejects the stipulated sanc-
tion (a “noncollapsible” or “binding” stipulation). If the board rejects a binding 
stipulation, it will then recommend or impose its own sanction based on the 
facts agreed to by the parties. To the respondent, the strategic advantage of a non-
collapsible stipulation is that bar counsel will not oppose the respondent before 
the board or the single justice.19 The disadvantage is that neither the respondent 
nor bar counsel may challenge the agreed-upon facts, and the ultimate sanction 
is left to the board or the Supreme Judicial Court.
IV. THE REVIEW PROCESS WHEN A PARTY APPEALS
A. The Procedural Steps for Appeal to the Board
A party seeking to appeal the hearing committee report’s ﬁndings, conclu-
sions, or proposed sanction must take the following steps to participate in the 
board’s review of the report.20 (Remember, the board always reviews the report 
on its own and it allows brieﬁng if it does not accept an unappealed report; the 
17 BBO Rules § 3.52.
18 Note that the BBO Rule 3.52 process described previously, where the board does not aﬃrm a hear-
ing report, is diﬀerent from when the parties propose a disposition by stipulation to the board. For 
further discussion of the stipulation process, see Chapter 5, Section IV.
19 See Matter of Ring, 427 Mass. 186 (1998) (the bar counsel and respondent defended a proposed 
disposition, requiring the board to seek a diﬀerent disposition before the single justice and later 
the full SJC). Cf. Matter of Neitlich, 413 Mass. 416 (1992) (respondent unsuccessfully sought to 
circumvent a stipulation with the bar counsel accepting ﬁndings of a hearing committee).
20 The procedure described here is established in BBO Rules § 3.50.
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steps described here allow the dissatisﬁed party to participate in that review pro-
cess at the outset and to persuade the board before it forms an opinion on the mat-
ter that the committee was wrong in some respects.)
1. The dissatisﬁed party shall, within twenty days after service of the com-
mittee report, ﬁle a brief on appeal.21 That deadline, and all brieﬁng dead-
lines described here, may be extended on motion to the board.22 Note 
that the pleading due within this time period is not simply a notice of 
appeal or similar intention-documenting ﬁling—it is the full brief. 
Practice Tip
The party appealing the hearing committee’s ﬁndings and 
recommendations must act promptly to prepare not just a 
simple notice of appeal, but a full brief, within twenty days of 
receiving the committee report. The board gen erally allows 
for extensions of time if the party establishes good cause.
2. Within twenty days of the filing of that appeal brief, the other party must 
ﬁle its brief opposing the appeal and presenting any cross-appeal. The 
original appellant has another twenty days from that ﬁling to ﬁle a 
response to the cross-appeal.23
3. Further brieﬁng is permitted after those submissions only by leave of 
the board. A party may ﬁle a motion with the board requesting leave 
to ﬁle a further response, but additional ﬁlings are discouraged.24
4. No party is entitled to oral argument unless it expressly requests that 
opportunity in its brief. A failure to request oral argument constitutes 
a waiver of that opportunity.25 Even if oral argument is requested, the 
board has the discretion to proceed without a hearing, but typically 
when a party requests oral argument, the board allows it.
21 BBO Rules § 3.50(a).
22 The rule states that the time for ﬁling the brief is twenty days or “such other longer or shorter 
time as may reasonably be ﬁxed by a Board member” (emphasis added). BBO Rules § 3.50(a). The 
board has never imposed a shorter deadline on a party.
23 BBO Rules § 3.50(a).
24 Id. See also the board’s new policy concerning appellate briefs, https://bbopublic.blob.core.windows
.net/web/f/bbopolicy.pdf (last visited May 17, 2018).
25 BBO Rules § 3.50(b).
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5. If neither party ﬁles a brief within twenty days of service of the committee 
report, the parties will have waived the opportunity to participate at 
that stage in the board review of the matter and to object to any of the 
committee’s ﬁndings, conclusions, or recommendation for disposition.26
6. Upon receipt of an appeal, the board hears the matter as a full board.27
7. If a party requests oral argument (and if the board grants the request), 
the board schedules a hearing. Otherwise, the board reviews the full 
record and the briefs and issues its vote, and typically, a memorandum 
of decision. While the board has the discretion to remand the matter 
to the hearing committee for further evidence, it seldom does so.
B. The Content and Form of the Briefs
A brief ﬁled by an appealing party must include the following:28
• A short statement of the case
• A summary of the basic position of the party ﬁling the brief
• The grounds on which the appeal rests
• Argument in support of the appeal, with references to the record and 
to legal authority
Practice Tip
A brief challenging or proposing a particular sanction on 
appeal should focus primarily on prior board discipline 
reports and SJC opinions to support that party’s position. 
A brief challenging the ﬁndings of fact should pay special 
attention to the record and cite it with speciﬁcity. While 
the board has access to the full record, a party may attach 
parts of the record to its brief for ease of reference. Where 
appropriate, insist on subsidiary ﬁndings of fact.
A record appendix or other supporting documents are not required because 
the board has all the exhibits and the transcripts available to the hearing com-
mittee. The BBO Rules impose no page limit but the board has adopted a policy 
26 BBO Rules § 3.50(c). But see § 3.52, discussed in Section III.
27 BBO Rules § 3.50(d). Rule 3.50(d) permits the board to assign the appeal to a three-member 
panel, but that is not the board’s practice.
28 BBO Rules § 3.51(a).
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expressing its preference that briefs not exceed thirty pages. The web address 
where this policy can be found is noted in the previous section.
If a party disagrees with the proposed sanction, the brief must explain the 
basis for that disagreement and may argue for a diﬀerent, identiﬁed disposition.
The party opposing the appeal has twenty days to ﬁle a brief in opposition, 
and that brief may also raise any cross-appeal. Any cross-appeal must be ﬁled within 
that same twenty-day period. The same rules governing the appellant’s brief apply 
to the appellee’s brief and an appellant’s opposition to a cross-appeal, except that 
the appellee may omit the statement of the case if the appellant’s brief suﬃciently 
describes it.29
C. The Board’s Action on Appeal
After considering the appeal, the board typically issues a decision with a 
memorandum, drafted with the aid of general counsel. If the board issues a 
decision, and the proposed sanction is an admonition or a public reprimand, 
the board serves its vote and memorandum on the parties, and such service “shall 
constitute the admonition or public reprimand.”30 If the proposed sanction is a 
suspension or disbarment, the board must ﬁle an Information with the clerk of 
the SJC for Suﬀolk County.31
V. APPEAL FROM THE BOARD DECISION
If the parties accept the ﬁnal report and disposition of the board, then either 
(1) an admonition, a public reprimand, or a dismissal goes into eﬀect through the 
service of the board’s vote and memorandum,32 or (2) the board ﬁles an Infor-
mation to obtain the SJC’s approval of a suspension or disbarment.33
A party who disagrees with the board’s recommendation of an admonition, 
a public reprimand, or a dismissal must seek SJC review of that decision. Other-
wise, the decision is ﬁnal. To obtain review of an admonition, a public reprimand, 
or a dismissal, a party must, within twenty days of the date of service of the board 
vote, ﬁle with the board a demand that the board ﬁle an Information with the 
SJC.34 That twenty-day time limit is jurisdictional; neither the board nor the 
29 BBO Rules § 3.51(b).
30 BBO Rules § 3.56(a).
31 BBO Rules § 3.58.
32 BBO Rules §§ 3.55, 3.56(a).
33 BBO Rules § 3.58.
34 BBO Rules § 3.57(a).
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SJC may enlarge the time for ﬁling the demand.35 Upon receipt of the demand, 
the board ﬁles the Information.
After board review, a proposed suspension or disbarment requires no fur-
ther action by a party at the board level because the board is required to ﬁle an 
Information with the SJC, after which the dissatisﬁed party, if any, has the 
opportunity to present its objections to the Court.
VI. THE INFORMATION AND THE PROCEEDING
FOLLOWING ITS FILING
Because the SJC has the exclusive authority to impose a suspension or dis-
barment, the Court reviews every proposed disposition involving those sanctions. 
The SJC also reviews any other disposition where a party has requested review 
of the board recommendation. In each instance, the SJC review process begins 
with the Information document.36 The Information is a pleading that the board 
presents to the SJC.
A. Filing of an Information
The Information typically opens as follows: “The Board of Bar Overseers 
brings to the attention of this Court, pursuant to Rule 4:01, Section 8(6), of the 
Rules of this Court, matters regarding the character and conduct of [the respon-
dent lawyer] . . . .” The Information then identiﬁes all the steps of the proceed-
ings before the board, with dates and references to the record, including the 
proposed sanction the board approved as well as the costs the board incurred 
in conducting the proceedings.
Accompanying the Information is “the entire record of [the] proceedings” 
before the board.37 This includes the petition, the answer, dispositive or other-
wise pertinent motions and rulings, the transcript of the hearing proceedings, 
the exhibits admitted into evidence (as well as any excluded exhibits, if such 
exclusion is a matter in dispute), the committee report, the party briefs, and the 
35 SJC Rule 4:01 § 8(6); BBO Rules § 3.57(a). While the rule for ﬁling the demand is much stricter 
than most of the other ﬁling deadlines identiﬁed in this chapter, nothing in the SJC nor BBO rules 
describes the method for calculating when the period has expired, and no disciplinary report shows 
any dispute about that deadline or its interpretation.
36 SJC Rule 4:01 § 8(6).
37 BBO Rules § 3.58.
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board vote and memorandum, if any. The board ﬁles all of this material with 
the clerk of the SJC for Suﬀolk County. In doing so, the board notiﬁes the par-
ties of this ﬁling by serving them with a copy of the Information. An example 
of an Information is appended as Appendix G. The SJC clerk then dockets the 
matter using a special cover sheet designed for discipline cases. An example of 
the clerk’s cover sheet is appended as Appendix H. The parties need not ﬁle 
anything with the SJC as part of this process.
You Should Know
With one exception, every sanction is entitled to SJC 
review through the ﬁling of an Information. If a respon-
dent who has received an admonition from the bar 
counsel that the board has accepted requests an expe-
dited hearing to review that sanction, the order follow-
ing that hearing is ﬁnal, and no appeal to the SJC is 
allowed. That special expedited hearing process is dis-
cussed in Section VII of this chapter.
B. Proceedings Before the SJC
1. The Single Justice Hearing
Upon receipt of an Information, the chief justice of the SJC assigns the 
matter to a single justice, in rotation,38 and a hearing date is set before the single 
justice. The parties ﬁle no further pleadings at this stage and simply await a 
hearing date.39
 The single justice, who has the board-level briefs, may oﬀer the parties the 
opportunity for oral argument. On occasion, before or after the hearing, one or 
both parties can submit additional briefs to the court, either their own motion or 
upon the single justice’s request. After the oral argument, the justice either issues 
a decision or reserves and reports the case to the full SJC for hearing. The single 
justice may accept the board’s recommendation,40 reject it and order a diﬀerent 
38 SJC Rule 4:01 § 1(2).
39 A party who cannot attend the hearing on the date assigned may ﬁle a motion with the single 
justice requesting a diﬀerent date. The Court tends to accommodate the parties’ scheduling needs.
40 See, e.g., Matter of Manoﬀ, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 421 (2013) (accepting board’s recommen-
dation of public reprimand).
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Practice Tips
The clerk for the SJC of Suffolk County typically tele-
phones each party to the proceeding to arrange a mutu-
ally acceptable date for the single justice hearing.
* * *
A respondent who has defaulted at every stage of the 
proceedings prior to the single justice hearing neverthe-
less receives notice of the hearing and may attend and 
argue. That strategy is hardly recommended. At each suc-
cessive stage of the proceeding, obtaining a reversal of 
factual ﬁndings becomes more difﬁcult. Also, if a respon-
dent failed to participate in the board proceedings, the 
single justice will not have a brief in support of the respon-
dent’s position, unless the single justice allows such a ﬁling.
sanction or disposition,41 or remand the matter for further proceedings at the 
board level.42 According to the SJC rules:
The subsidiary facts found by the Board and contained in its report ﬁled 
with the Information shall be upheld if supported by substantial evidence, 
upon consideration of the record, or such portions as may be cited by the 
parties.43
2. Appeal from the Single Justice Decision
A party dissatisﬁed with the single justice’s decision (including the bar 
counsel, the respondent, or the board) may request a full-bench review.44 To 
expedite appeals, the SJC in 2009 issued a standing order (Order Establishing 
41 See, e.g., Matter of Sousa, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 804 (2012) (rejecting board’s recommended 
sanction on indeﬁnite suspension; two-year suspension imposed); Matter of Serpa, 30 Mass. 
Att’y Disc. R. 358 (2014) (rejecting board’s recommendation of six-month suspension in favor 
of sixty-day suspension).
42 See, e.g., Matter of Greenidge, 30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 174 (2014) (remanding for evidentiary 
hearing on question of mitigation and appropriate sanction).
43 SJC Rule 4:01 § 8(6).
44 By comparison, a party in a civil action dissatisﬁed with the appeals court decision may petition 
the SJC to hear the matter but is not entitled to further appellate review as a matter of right. 
Mass. R. App. P. 27.1. In bar discipline matters, a party has the right to a review by the full SJC 
but not to a hearing before the full bench.
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a Modiﬁed Procedure for Appeals in Bar Discipline Cases) governing such 
appeals. That standing order was replaced in 2015 with SJC Rule 2:23,45 which 
establishes the following procedures. A party dissatisﬁed with the single justice 
decision must ﬁle a notice of appeal within ten days of the entry of the single jus-
tice’s order. That ﬁling does not stay the order the single justice issued. The appel-
lant then prepares a record appendix containing copies of all relevant papers that 
were before the single justice, including, at a minimum:
• Hearing committee report
• Appeal panel report, if any
• Board memorandum
• Single justice order and memorandum
The record appendix does not include the transcript of the hearing before the 
committee or the briefs submitted at the board level. If there are multiple appel-
lants, they share the cost of producing the joint record appendix. 
Practice Tip
While not addressed in SJC Rule 2:23, parties with good 
cause may request to supplement the record with material 
not available before the single justice. While uncommon 
and not favored, this strategy has succeeded on occasion.
The appellant must also prepare a “preliminary memorandum,” not more 
than twenty pages double-spaced, with a summary of the argument, supported 
by citations. In that memorandum, the appellant must demonstrate one or more 
of the following:
• There has been an error of law or abuse of discretion by the single 
justice. 
• The decision is not supported by substantial evidence. 
• The sanction is markedly disparate from the sanctions imposed in 
other cases involving similar circumstances. 
• The decision, for other reasons, will result in a substantial injustice.
45 SJC Rule 2:23, eﬀective April 1, 2015. The only diﬀerence between the standing order and the 
new rule is that SJC Rule 2:23 changes references to “standing order” to “rule” in 2:23(d). The 
order’s subsection (e), instructing the court clerk to give a copy of the order to all parties in bar 
discipline cases, was omitted from the rule.
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The appellant must ﬁle nine copies of the record appendix and the prelim-
inary memorandum within thirty days of the appeal being docketed in the SJC.
Extensions “will rarely be granted,” so that deadline is eﬀectively mandatory. In 
addition to ﬁling the nine copies, the party must also serve those papers on the 
other party to the appeal. The appellee may ﬁle a responsive memorandum of the 
same length as the appellant’s, but only if the Court requests and within twenty 
days of that request. The appellee who ﬁles such a responsive memorandum must 
ﬁle nine copies of that pleading and serve a copy on the appellant.
Typically, the Court decides the matter on the papers without oral argu-
ment. A party may request oral argument as part of this review, but the court 
rarely holds a hearing. If three justices so vote, however, the matter may be 
directed to the “regular course” of appeals to the SJC, and the parties are then 
invited to ﬁle full briefs and await oral argument. By “full briefs,” the order 
refers to the principal briefs ﬁled in ordinary appeals, which may be as long as 
ﬁfty pages.46 Reply briefs have the same twenty-page limit as required by the 
standing order.47
VII. REVIEW OF AN ADMONITION
THROUGH AN EXPEDITED HEARING
The procedures described in the previous section apply to reviews of all 
discipline the board imposed or recommended, except, in some instances, for 
admonitions, which at times trigger a separate review procedure. (The preced-
ing procedures also do not apply in the same way to reviews of board recom-
mendations after hearing a petition for reinstatement. See Chapter 23 for a 
discussion of reinstatement procedures.)
If the board recommends an admonition after a full hearing and a hearing 
committee report, that sanction is reviewed under the procedures described in the 
previous section. By contrast, if the admonition sanction results from the bar 
counsel’s recommendation and board approval prior to a petition for discipline being 
filed, a diﬀerent procedure applies. That procedure is known as an expedited hear-
ing.48 There is no SJC review of the results of an expedited hearing; an admo-
nition or dismissal resulting from that process, or an order referring the matter 
to full and formal disciplinary proceedings, is ﬁnal.
46 Mass. R. App. P. 16(h).
47 Id.
48 SJC Rule 4:01 § 8(4); BBO Rules §§ 2.11–2.12.
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You Should Know
The expedited hearing process has rarely been used. The 
Ofﬁce of the Bar Counsel reports that, through the mid-
dle of 2017, only four such hearings have occurred. In three 
such cases, the matters were heard within thirty days.
The procedure for an expedited hearing is as follows:
1. After the bar counsel serves the respondent with the admonition (which, 
in eﬀect, imposes the sanction), the respondent who seeks review of 
that sanction must, within fourteen days of the service of the admonition,
ﬁle a written demand with the bar counsel that the admonition be 
vacated and a hearing provided. That deadline is jurisdictional, mean-
ing that the bar counsel or the board cannot extend it, even for good 
cause.49 The written demand must include a “statement of objections” 
to the factual allegations and the rule violations listed in the admoni-
tion, detailing the reasons why the admonition must be rejected and 
any facts to consider in mitigation.50 Failure to identify mitigating 
factors in the demand pleading prohibits the respondent from oﬀer-
ing any such evidence at the hearing.
2. Upon receiving the demand to vacate the admonition, the bar counsel 
ﬁles its admonition summary with the board, along with the respon-
dent’s demand. The board then assigns a special hearing oﬃcer (not a 
hearing committee) to conduct an expedited hearing on the matter. 
That hearing takes place within thirty days of the bar counsel ﬁling 
the papers with the board. A later hearing date may be set by agree-
ment or on motion, “for good cause shown.”51
3. Prior to the expedited hearing, the parties must exchange witness lists, 
proposed exhibits, and objections, as well as agreed-upon exhibits and 
49 BBO Rules § 2.12(1). The BBO Rules state that “service [on the respondent] is complete 
upon mailing,” but a party’s ﬁling occurs on the board’s receipt of the paper to be ﬁled. BBO 
Rules §§ 3.3, 3.4(c). Therefore, the respondent must ensure that the board receives the written 
demand no later than fourteen days after the date of the admonition’s service.
50 BBO Rules § 2.12(1).
51 BBO Rules § 2.12(2)(c). The language of this rule states that “the matter . . . shall be set for hear-
ing within 30 days of the ﬁling . . . .” That language might be read to mean that a hearing date must 
be established, but not necessarily occur, within thirty days, but the board interprets it to require 
that the hearing occur within thirty days.
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stipulations, all by dates speciﬁed in the notice of hearing. There is no 
mandatory prehearing conference procedure.52 The hearing oﬃcer 
then conducts the hearing in the same way as a disciplinary hearing, 
described in Chapter 6, except for the following diﬀerences.
4. The proceedings and the record are conﬁdential. At the conclusion of 
the hearing, the parties do not ﬁle briefs or requests for ﬁndings of 
fact or conclusions of law.53 The hearing oﬃcer issues a report in the 
same way as a hearing committee after a conventional disciplinary 
hearing.54 The report may recommend dismissal or an admonition, or 
it may conclude that some discipline more severe than an admonition 
is warranted and recommend referring the matter for full disciplinary 
proceedings.55
5. A party dissatisﬁed with the hearing oﬃcer’s report and recommenda-
tion may ﬁle an appeal brief, as described previously for disciplinary 
hearings, but the matter will be decided on the papers.56
6. The board’s decision after that review (including the decision to refer 
the matter for full disciplinary proceedings, which proceedings would 
be subject to the normal path of review) is ﬁnal. No party may demand 
that the board ﬁle an Information in order to obtain SJC review.57
52 BBO Rules §§ 2.12(d) (notice of hearing to set dates for the exchange of exhibits, witness 
lists, etc.), 3.23(a)(1) (excepting expedited hearings from the prehearing conference requirement).
53 BBO Rules §§ 2.12(2)(a), (d), (g).
54 SJC Rule 4:01 § 8(4)(a).
55 SJC Rule 4:01 § 8(4)(a).
56 SJC Rule 4:01 § 8(4)(b). See Section IV, supra.
57 SJC Rule 4:01 § 8(4)(b).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Many lawyers in Massachusetts are bar members in another state or jurisdic-
tion, including a federal court. A lawyer may also be admitted to practice before 
an administrative tribunal, such as the United States Patent and Trademark Oﬃce. 
When lawyers are disciplined in another jurisdiction in which they are licensed to 
practice law,1 Massachusetts usually responds reciprocally. This chapter addresses 
how reciprocity works in the Commonwealth and what lawyers should know 
about the process. Reciprocal discipline is common in Massachusetts.
II. REPORTING SANCTIONS TO THE BOARD OF BAR OVERSEERS
The Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) rules require every Massachusetts lawyer 
to report any sanction received from another disciplinary authority or from any 
tribunal to the Board of Bar Overseers (BBO) and the Oﬃce of the Bar Counsel 
within ten days of the sanction being imposed. Rule 4:01 § 16(6) of the Massa-
chusetts Rules and Orders of the Supreme Judicial Court addresses this as follows.
1 A Massachusetts lawyer may be subject to primary discipline in the Commonwealth for miscon-
duct that occurs in another state. That discipline, though, would not be considered reciprocal. See, 
e.g., Matter of Airewele, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 3 (2012) (unauthorized practice of law in Georgia, 
among other misconduct; lawyer suspended for six months and one day); Matter of Marshall, 16 
Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 275 (2000) (respondent used a false identity to apply for the Arizona bar; 
indeﬁnite suspension ordered); Matter of Ramos, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 554 (2013) (unautho-
rized practice in Ohio; six-month suspension).
PART VI
Disciplinary Procedures Not Requiring 
an Evidentiary Hearing
chapter twenty
Reciprocal Discipline
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SECTION 16. RECIPROCAL DISCIPLINE
* * *
(6) A lawyer subject to public or private discipline in another 
jurisdiction (including any federal court and any state or federal 
administrative body or tribunal), or whose right to practice law 
has otherwise been curtailed or limited in such other jurisdiction, 
shall provide certified copies of the order imposing such discipline 
or other disposition to the Board and to the bar counsel within 
ten days of the issuance of such order.2
In addition, a lawyer denied admission to the bar of another jurisdiction, 
other than for failing the bar examination, must also notify the board and the bar 
counsel within ten days of the order being issued.3
Failure to report the sanction may serve as an independent basis for dis-
cipline.4 An important advantage to a lawyer complying with this obligation is 
that the bar counsel will almost certainly learn of the discipline, either from 
public reports or through the American Bar Association (ABA) National Law-
yer Regulatory Data Bank, a clearinghouse of discipline that the bar counsel 
regularly monitors.5 Once the bar counsel learns of discipline in another juris-
diction, the reciprocal discipline process commences. If the sanction from the 
other jurisdiction is a suspension, the lawyer typically requests that the Massa-
2 Massachusetts Rules and Orders of the Supreme Judicial Court r. 4:01 § 16(6) [here-
inafter SJC Rule].
3 Id. at § 16(7).
4 SJC Rule 4:01 § 3(1). Cf. Matter of Burnbaum, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 80 (2012) (“The respon-
dent’s misconduct warranting sanction includes both failing to report his conviction and conse-
quent disciplinary resignation from the Florida bar, in violation of S.J.C. Rule 4:01, §§ 12(8) and 
16(6), and his felony conviction . . . .”). The full bench of the SJC later overruled the Burnbaum
suspension sanction and ordered the lawyer disbarred. Matter of Burnbaum, 466 Mass. 1024 (2013).
5 The ABA National Lawyer Regulatory Data Bank “is the only national repository of information 
concerning public regulatory actions relating to lawyers throughout the United States. It was estab-
lished in 1968 and is operated under the aegis of the ABA Standing Committee on Professional 
Discipline.” National Lawyer Regulatory Data Bank, AmericanBar.org, http://www.americanbar
.org/groups/professional_responsibility/services/databank.html (last visited May 18, 2018). The 
Data Bank is not without its critics. See Jennifer Carpenter & Thomas Cluderay, Implications of 
Online Disciplinary Records: Balancing the Public’s Interest in Openness with Attorneys’ Concerns for 
Maintaining Flexible Self-Regulation, 22 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 733, 746 (2009) (noting that 
“the Data Bank lacks widespread state participation”).
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chusetts reciprocal discipline order be issued nunc pro tunc, retroactive to the 
original sanction date in the other jurisdiction.6 A lawyer who fails to report the 
discipline may forfeit the opportunity to obtain nunc pro tunc treatment of the 
Massachusetts discipline.7
Practice Tip
Lawyers suspended in another state will typically want 
the Massachusetts discipline to operate nunc pro tunc, 
to avoid extending the local suspension period due to the 
reciprocity process. Therefore, lawyers should promptly 
report a suspension to the board and the bar counsel as 
well as consider limiting their Massachusetts practice 
after receiving the other state’s suspension order. A retro-
active reciprocal suspension order in Massachusetts is 
easier to accommodate if lawyers act suspended once 
they report the out-of-state suspension.
III. OUT-OF-STATE DISCIPLINE: PROCEDURES AND STANDARDS
Discipline imposed on a Massachusetts lawyer by another state bar triggers 
a response by the bar counsel, which diﬀers depending on the sanction level the 
lawyer receives. This section reviews the process and the diﬀerences in the re-
sponses based on the discipline imposed.
6 See e.g., Matter of Dvorak, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 269 (2012) (reciprocal discipline after suspen-
sion by the Board of Immigration Appeals, Immigration Courts, and the Department of Home-
land Security; suspension order made retroactive to correspond to the immigration order); Matter 
of Rocha, 30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 352 (2014) (suspension in Rhode Island; Massachusetts sus-
pension retroactive to the start of the Rhode Island order, and reinstatement conditioned on Rhode 
Island reinstatement).
7 See Matter of Sheridan, 449 Mass. 1005, 1008, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 646, 652 (2007) (SJC 
upheld single justice’s refusal to make the respondent’s suspension retroactive because respondent 
failed to notify the board and the bar counsel of disciplinary orders against him in New Hamp-
shire); Matter of Cronin, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 90, 91 (2007) (no retroactivity where lawyer 
failed to report discipline pursuant to SJC Rule 4:01 § 16(6)); Matter of Steinberg, 22 Mass. 
Att’y Disc. R. 745, 756 (2006) (same); Matter of Hager, 19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 192, 192 (2003) 
(same); Matter of Sussman, 18 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 518, 519 (2002) (same); Matter of Albiani, 
14 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 2, 4 (1998) (same).
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A. Private Discipline
The SJC requires a lawyer to report private discipline within ten days,8 and 
once the bar counsel has notice of that nonpublic sanction, it treats that disci-
pline the same as an admonition imposed in Massachusetts. 
Practice Tip
A Massachusetts lawyer who fails to report an order from 
another jurisdiction imposing private discipline risks dis-
cipline for that misconduct, with possible later conse-
quences. If the lawyer is disciplined in the future, the other 
jurisdiction’s private discipline will serve as an aggra vat-
ing factor, along with the lawyer’s failure to report that 
sanction.
The SJC rules do not allow a Massachusetts lawyer to challenge the valid-
ity of an out-of-state private sanction.
B. Public Reprimand
Upon receiving an order from another jurisdiction imposing a public rep-
rimand or its equivalent on a Massachusetts lawyer, the bar counsel notiﬁes the 
board and the clerk of the SJC. The order is then ﬁled and made public, the same 
as a public reprimand issued by the board or the Court,9 and remains on the law-
yer’s public record like any other public reprimand.
The SJC rules do not expressly allow a Massachusetts lawyer to challenge 
the validity of an out-of-state public reprimand.
C. Suspension or Disbarment
Suspensions and disbarments entered in another state are usually treated 
with similar reciprocal discipline in Massachusetts.
8 SJC Rule 4:01 § 16(6).
9 SJC Rule 4:01 § 16(4).
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1. Procedure for Reciprocal Discipline Involving Suspension or Disbarment
When the bar counsel learns that another jurisdiction has suspended or dis-
barred a Massachusetts lawyer, it obtains a certiﬁed copy of that order (unless 
the lawyer has properly self-reported and already ﬁled a certiﬁed copy of the order 
with the bar counsel and the board). The bar counsel then submits the certiﬁed 
copy to the clerk of the SJC, along with a petition for reciprocal discipline.
Upon receiving that disciplinary order, the Court issues its own order direct-
ing the lawyer to inform the Court, within thirty days from service of the notice, of 
any claim or argument why the Court should not impose identical discipline in 
Massachusetts.10 The bar counsel is required to serve this order and notice on 
the lawyer, which includes delivering a copy of the other jurisdiction’s order.11
If the lawyer does not respond within thirty days, the Court almost always 
imposes the same suspension or disbarment order in Massachusetts as the other 
jurisdiction imposed, unless the bar counsel ﬁles a pleading with the Court re-
questing a diﬀerent sanction. While the SJC rules do not expressly authorize such 
a ﬁling by the bar counsel, the Court permits it.12 The Court holds a hearing on 
the matter, typically before a single justice, before issuing its reciprocal discipline 
order, unless the parties waive a hearing and agree to an order’s entry.
Practice Tip
A lawyer who receives a suspension order from the SJC 
equal in length to the suspension order from the other 
jurisdiction will, by necessity, be suspended in Massachu-
setts longer than in the ﬁrst jurisdiction, given the time 
it takes to process the Massachusetts sanction, unless 
the Massachusetts suspension order is made retroactive 
to the date of the out-of-state order.
2. Substantive Standards for Reciprocal Discipline Involving
Suspension or Disbarment
In determining the proper sanction in reciprocal discipline involving a sus-
pension or disbarment, the single justice “may enter such order as the facts brought 
10 SJC Rule 4:01 § 16(1).
11 Id.
12 See Matter of Tunney, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 857 (2012) (no appearance by respondent, yet hear-
ing held before a single justice, evidencing the bar counsel’s attempt to impose a stricter sanction).
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to its attention may justify.”13 Presumably, this includes any of the “reasons” a 
respondent is entitled to present to the Court to show that imposing discipline in 
Massachusetts is unwarranted.14 The judgment of the other jurisdiction carries 
great, almost conclusive weight with respect to the misconduct:
The judgment of suspension or disbarment shall be conclusive evidence 
of the misconduct unless the bar counsel or the respondent lawyer estab-
lishes, or the court concludes, that the procedure in the other jurisdiction 
did not provide reasonable notice or opportunity to be heard or there 
was signiﬁcant inﬁrmity of proof establishing the misconduct.15
As the Court has stated, “[O]ur inquiry ‘is generally limited to determin-
ing whether the attorney received a fair hearing at which suﬃcient evidence 
was presented to justify our taking reciprocal disciplinary action.’ ”16 In Matter 
of McCabe,17 for example, the SJC refused to impose any sanction on an attor-
ney who had received a term suspension of ﬁve years in federal court in Loui-
siana. The respondent had played a minor role as defense counsel in an action 
involving the enforcement of a purchase and sale agreement, an action in which 
prior defense counsel had behaved unprofessionally.18 After reviewing the record, 
the Court found that the respondent had engaged in no activity that it recog-
nized as meriting discipline.19 The Court noted that the respondent had unfor-
tunately managed to get “caught in the vortex of justiﬁed anger and disbelief 
on the part of the District Court judge created by unethical and pettifogging 
conduct of other lawyers. The judge seemed unable to divorce [the respondent’s] 
representation and minor part in this litigation from the whole.”20 The Court 
therefore declined to impose reciprocal discipline on the respondent.21
Where discipline is warranted, the single justice presumptively orders the 
same discipline as the other jurisdiction:
13 SJC Rule 4:01 § 16(3).
14 Id. at § 16(1)(b).
15 Id. at § 16(3).
16 Matter of Bailey, 439 Mass. 134, 136, 19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R 12, 15 (2003) (quoting Matter 
of Lebbos, 423 Mass. 753, 756 (1997)). The language in the text was quoted approvingly by the 
Court in Matter of Mitrano, 453 Mass. 1026, 1027, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 385, 386–87 (2009).
17 411 Mass. 436, 7 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 181 (1991).
18 411 Mass. at 437, 7 Mass. at 182–83.
19 411 Mass. at 450, 7 Mass. at 196.
20 411 Mass. at 449, 7 Mass. at 175.
21 411 Mass. at 450, 7 Mass. at 196.
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The court may impose the identical discipline unless (a) imposition of 
the same discipline would result in grave injustice; (b) the misconduct 
established does not justify the same discipline in this Commonwealth; 
or (c) the misconduct established is not adequately sanctioned by the 
same discipline in this Commonwealth.22
The SJC has held that “Rule 4:01, s. 16, implicitly adopts a modiﬁed rule 
of res judicata” on the question of the nature of the sanction.23 The Court has 
indicated, however, a more independent role in reviewing reciprocal discipline:
In determining the appropriate level of discipline to be imposed in 
Massachusetts, however, we look to Massachusetts law because “our task 
is not to replicate the sanction imposed in another jurisdiction but, 
rather, to mete out the sanction appropriate in this jurisdiction, ‘even if 
that discipline exceeds, equals, or falls short of the discipline imposed in 
another jurisdiction.’ ”24
If the respondent or the bar counsel can demonstrate that identical disci-
pline would be unfair or inappropriate, then the single justice performs an 
independent analysis to determine the appropriate sanction.25 As the Court 
has stated, after reviewing the facts to determine what the appropriate sanc-
tion should be, a single justice may impose discipline “that equals, exceeds, or 
falls short of the discipline imposed in another jurisdiction.”26 As with all 
22 SJC Rule § 16(3). The use of the word may in the quoted language of the SJC rule is not how 
the rule is applied. The practice is to treat that word as if it read shall. The Court has stated, 
“[O]ur inquiry is generally limited to determining whether the attorney received a fair hearing 
at which suﬃcient evidence was presented to justify our taking reciprocal disciplinary action.” 
Matter of Bailey, 439 Mass. 134, 136 (2003) (quoting Matter of Lebbos, 423 Mass. 753, 756, 12 
Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 237, 241–42 (1996). See also Matter of McCabe, 411 Mass. 436 (1991) (no 
discipline imposed; not warranted on the record of the other jurisdiction).
23 Lebbos, 423 Mass. at 756.
24 Matter of Burnbaum, 466 Mass. 1024, 1025, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 72 (2013) (quoting Mat-
ter of Steinberg, 448 Mass. 1024, 1025, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 689, 691 (2007); Matter of Watt, 
430 Mass. 232, 234, 15 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 624, 626–27 (1999)).
25 See, e.g., Matter of Kilduﬀ, 27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 510 (2011); Matter of Brett, 22 Mass. Att’y 
Disc. R. 102 (2006).
26 Matter of Watt, 430 Mass. 232, 233, 15 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 624 (1999) (citing Matter of 
Daley, 11 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 57, 59 (1995)). Note that some states do not allow reciprocal dis-
cipline to be more severe than the original sanction. See, e.g., In re Welker, 100 P.3d 1197 (Utah 
2004) (Utah rule, as written, only permits equivalent or lesser sanctions).
432
Disciplinary Procedures Not Requiring an Evidentiary Hearing
discipline cases, any single justice decision is subject to review by a full bench 
of the SJC.27
Imposing an equivalent sanction is by far the most common form of recip-
rocal discipline,28 but in some cases greater or lesser sanctions than the original 
sanction were imposed. Occasionally, the bar counsel supports a lesser sanction. 
For example, in Matter of Amaral,29 the bar counsel argued that the respondent 
should only receive an indeﬁnite suspension for conduct that led to disbarment in 
Rhode Island, and the single justice agreed. In Matter of Watt, the Court imposed 
a more severe sanction than the foreign jurisdiction ordered. The respondent had 
received a term suspension of one year in Rhode Island for commingling client 
funds with his personal funds and converting them for his own use.30 Bar coun-
sel, arguing that the Rhode Island discipline was inadequate, sought an indeﬁ-
nite suspension.31 A single justice ordered a two-year suspension and the bar 
counsel appealed. The SJC aﬃrmed the two-year term suspension.32 The Court 
conﬁrmed that, while deference is ordinarily shown to other courts’ decisions in 
reciprocal discipline matters, it is not required when the presumptive discipline 
in Massachusetts is diﬀerent from that imposed in the other jurisdiction.33 The 
SJC declined to impose the presumptive sanction in Massachusetts, however, 
“in deference to our sister jurisdiction.”34
When appropriate, the Court considers the jurisprudence of the other 
jurisdiction, in comparison to Massachusetts, in assessing whether to accept 
the presumptive out-of-state sanction. In Matter of Grew,35 New Hampshire 
had imposed a six-month suspension on a lawyer who had been convicted of 
insurance fraud. After much consideration of the lawyer’s misconduct in com-
27 See SJC Rule 2:23 (2015). Until April 1, 2015, SJC Rule 2:23 existed as the SJC’s Order Estab-
lishing a Modiﬁed Procedure for Appeals in Bar Discipline Cases (2009) (see discussion in Chap-
ter 19, Section VI(B)(2)).
28 See, e.g., Matter of Lepore, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 390 (2013) (imposed same sanction as in 
foreign jurisdiction); Matter of Martin, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 430 (2013) (same); Matter of 
Kesinger, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 363 (2013) (same); Matter of Massicotte, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. 
R. 433 (2013) (same); Matter of Pellenz, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 530 (2013) (same).
29 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 7 (2010).
30 430 Mass. 232, 233, 15 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 624, 625 (1999).
31 430 Mass. at 234, 15 Mass. at 626.
32 430 Mass. at 236, 15 Mass. at 628–29.
33 430 Mass. at 234, 15 Mass. at 626.
34 430 Mass. at 236, 15 Mass. at 629.
35 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 232 (2007).
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parison to previous Massachusetts discipline reports, the single justice imposed 
a one-year suspension, retroactive to the date of the lawyer’s temporary suspen-
sion. In noting that the New Hampshire sanction order was on appeal, the 
single justice observed:
[T]here are two signiﬁcant diﬀerences between New Hampshire and 
Massachusetts jurisprudence. First, New Hampshire, it seems, does not 
make a distinction between misconduct outside the practice of law and 
misconduct committed in the practice of law. Massachusetts makes such 
a distinction . . . . Second, New Hampshire allows a disbarred attorney to 
petition for reinstatement at any time, whereas Massachusetts does not 
permit reinstatement until eight years after disbarment, or ﬁve years 
after an indeﬁnite suspension.36
If the sanction imposed in another jurisdiction has been stayed, any recip-
rocal discipline given in Massachusetts may, but need not, be deferred as well.37
For example, in Matter of Foley,38 the respondent received a six-month suspen-
sion in New Hampshire, with the suspension stayed on certain conditions. A 
single justice issued an order for reciprocal discipline but stayed the order, pro-
viding that the respondent comply with the conditions set forth in the New 
Hampshire disciplinary proceeding. In Matter of Cronin,39 by contrast, the law-
yer’s six-month suspension imposed by New Hampshire was stayed in that state, 
but his failing to report that sanction to the bar counsel or the board led to a sus-
pension without a stay in Massachusetts.40
For purposes of reinstatement, the SJC has written, “In cases involving recip-
rocal discipline, it is the usual practice to condition reinstatement in the Com-
monwealth upon prior reinstatement in the jurisdiction in which the discipline 
originated.”41
36 Id. note 3 at 237–38.
37 SJC Rule 4:01 § 16(2).
38 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 268 (2013).
39 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 120 (2008).
40 See also Matter of Alcala, 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 8 (2005) (California suspension stayed there, 
but not in Massachusetts because of the lawyer’s failure to report the foreign sanction).
41 See Tunney, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. at 866 (supra note 12), citing Matter of Ritzo, 26 Mass. 
Att’y Disc. R. 555 (2010); Matter of Carey, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 89 (2009); Matter of 
Anderson, 23 Mass Att’y Disc. R. 14 (2007). See also Matter of Kesinger, 29 Mass. Att’y R. 363 
(2013); Matter of Martin, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 430 (2013).
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Practice Tip
Reciprocal discipline adheres to a weak presumption of 
match ing the foreign jurisdiction’s sanction. But, as the 
reports show, the bar counsel at times argues for a stiffer 
sanction, and the respondent sometimes argues for less 
severe discipline; the Court will consider those arguments. 
Ultimately, the Court must honor the bedrock principle 
that it consider whether any sanction imposed “ ‘is mark-
edly disparate from those ordinarily entered by the vari-
ous single justices in similar cases,’ recognizing that 
‘[e]ach case must be decided on its own merits and every 
offending attorney must receive the disposition most 
appropriate in the circumstances.’ ”42
D. Disciplinary Resignations 
As described in Chapter 21, a lawyer may resign during disciplinary proceed-
ings or investigation, and that resignation has vastly diﬀerent implications than 
a lawyer in good standing leaving law through a nondisciplinary resignation.43 If 
a lawyer submits a disciplinary resignation in another jurisdiction, that action has 
a reciprocal eﬀect in Massachusetts.
SJC Rule 4:01 § 16(1) makes clear that the Court will issue the same notice 
to show cause, described previously in Section III(C), to a lawyer who “has 
resigned during the pendency of a disciplinary investigation or proceeding” in 
a foreign jurisdiction.44 The challenges are whether, and if so how, the Court 
gives conclusive eﬀect to the other jurisdiction’s judgment in the case of a resig-
nation, especially in jurisdictions where the lawyer need not admit the truth of 
the allegations against him as a condition of resigning.45 In a 2009 opinion of 
the full SJC, the Court answered those questions.
42 Matter of Pudlo, 460 Mass. 400, 404, 27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 736, 745 (2011) (citations 
omitted) (quoting Matter of Alter, 389 Mass. 153, 156, 3 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 3, 8 (1983); Matter 
of Crossen, 450 Mass. 533, 574, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 122, 172 (2008); Matter of the Discipline 
of an Attorney, 392 Mass. 827, 837, 4 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 155, 166 (1984) (“Three Attorneys”)).
43 Chapter 21, Section II(B).
44 SJC Rule 4:01 § 16(1).
45 In Massachusetts, a disciplinary resignation must include an aﬃdavit by the lawyer acknowledg-
ing the accuracy of material facts alleged or that suﬃcient evidence exists of those facts. See SJC 
Rule 4:01 § 15(1)(c). Not every jurisdiction requires lawyers to make such an admission.
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In Matter of Ngobeni,46 the bar counsel sought a reciprocal disbarment order 
after a lawyer had resigned from practicing law in Connecticut, without admit-
ting to misconduct. The lawyer contended that he resigned not to evade a sanction 
but to avoid the expense and hardship of contesting discipline in Connecticut 
while he was living in South Africa. After carefully reviewing the language and 
the underlying purposes of SJC Rule 4:01 § 16, the SJC held that “[A]n attor-
ney who voluntarily resigns from the bar of another jurisdiction while discipli-
nary proceedings are pending against him or her is subject to reciprocal discipline 
in the Commonwealth . . . whether or not there has been a ﬁnding or admission 
of misconduct in the other jurisdiction.”47 The Court wrote:
Important policy reasons support the conclusion that the respondent’s 
voluntary resignation in Connecticut unaccompanied by an admission 
or ﬁnding of misconduct warrants the imposition of reciprocal disci-
pline in Massachusetts without the need to litigate the validity of the 
Connecticut charges. If an attorney like the respondent may perma-
nently resign in another State in the face of serious allegations of miscon-
duct—here involving multiple clients—but do so without admission of 
misconduct, and then practice in Massachusetts without restriction 
unless Bar Counsel undertakes the burdensome and expensive task of 
investigating and proving the other State’s charges, it would “tend [ ] to 
undermine public conﬁdence in the eﬀectiveness of attorney disciplinary 
procedures and threaten[ ] harm to the administration of justice and to 
innocent clients.”48
The Court concluded that the resignation was a form of discipline that sup-
ported reciprocal proceedings, noting other states’ similar conclusions.49 A law-
yer who resigns from another state bar and who faces reciprocal discipline in 
46 453 Mass. 233, 237, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 415 (2009).
47 453 Mass. at 241, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. at 426–27.
48 Id. at 243, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. at 429 (quoting Matter of Lebbos, 423 Mass. 753, 755, 12 
Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 237, 241 (1996)).
49 Id. at 237–38, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. at 422–23. The Court cited In re Richardson, 692 A.2d 
427, 430–32 (D.C. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1118 (1998) (concluding that, under Florida law, 
attorney’s voluntary resignation from practice in Florida while disciplinary proceedings were 
pending constituted discipline and could form the basis of reciprocal discipline in District of 
Columbia); Florida Bar v. Eberhart, 631 So. 2d 1098, 1099 (Fla. 1994) (resignation from Con-
necticut bar while disciplinary actions were pending treated as discipline warranting disbarment 
in Florida); Oﬃce of Disciplinary Counsel v. Acker, 583 N.E.2d 1305 (Ohio 1992) (resignation 
of attorney in Maine treated as disciplinary in nature and basis of indeﬁnite suspension in Ohio).
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Massachusetts may seek to resign here to avoid a disbarment order, and that 
request may be allowed.50
IV. RECIPROCAL EFFECT OF DISCIPLINE FROM A TRIBUNAL
As described earlier, a tribunal imposing a disciplinary sanction of suspen-
sion or disbarment triggers the same reciprocal discipline attention as a sanc-
tion imposed by the bar of a foreign jurisdiction.51 However, only sanctions 
imposed by a tribunal pursuant to lawful bar disciplinary authority, such as a 
federal court,52 qualify as a disciplinary sanction that triggers reciprocity.53 All 
the procedures are the same, including the respondent lawyer’s obligation to 
report the tribunal’s order to the bar counsel and the board.
You Should Know
The SJC requires a lawyer to report all “public or private 
discipline in . . . any federal court and any state or fed-
eral administrative body or tribunal” to the board and to 
the bar counsel.54 A sanction order from a federal or 
state trial court, other than one that suspends the law-
yer from practice before it, does not receive reciprocal 
treatment by the bar counsel or the BBO. The attorney 
must report case-management sanction orders, but they 
will likely be treated as a complaint about or request for 
investigation of the underlying misconduct.
Because courts and administrative tribunals employ diﬀerent sanctioning 
schemes from those the state bars or the District of Columbia typically employ, 
the presumptive replication of the foreign discipline cannot operate the same 
50 See Matter of Hormann, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 248 (2010) (resignation accepted; no disbar-
ment order); Matter of Golburgh, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 300 (2008) (same); Matter of Tyler, 
22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 782 (2006) (same).
51 See, e.g., Matter of Dvorak, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 269 (2012) (immigration court and agency 
suspension; discussed supra, Section II, note 6).
52 See, e.g., Matter of Zeno, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 794 (2007).
53 Ellis v. Dep’t of Indus. Accidents, 463 Mass. 541, 551 (2012) (state statute that ostensibly autho-
rized administrative judge to discipline attorneys by denying or suspending their right to appear 
or practice before the department violates the state constitution and is invalid).
54 SJC Rule 4:01 § 16(6).
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way. Few reported reciprocal discipline cases involve courts or administrative 
tribunals, but the following principles appear to be well founded:
• Whenever a lawyer is disciplined by a court or tribunal, the lawyer 
must report that discipline to the board and the bar counsel.55 As 
previously noted, however, not every sanction by a court or agency 
constitutes “discipline” with reciprocal eﬀect.56
• If the tribunal’s sanction represents public discipline other than a 
suspension or disbarment (or its equivalent given the nature of 
practice before the tribunal), the board will “ﬁle [the order] and make 
it available to the public to the extent that the record of any other 
public disciplinary proceeding would be made available.”57
• The board does not make public or ﬁle a petition for discipline based 
upon a trial court’s order imposing a sanction of costs and attorney’s 
fees on a lawyer for violating the tribunal’s rules, such as an order 
under Rule 37 of the Rules of Civil Procedure sanctioning a lawyer for 
discovery abuse,58 or an order under Rule 11 of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure or under Massachusetts General Laws awarding fees and costs 
because of frivolous positions asserted in a civil matter.59 The miscon-
duct underlying those sanctions might, however, serve as the basis for 
nonreciprocal discipline against the lawyer.60
• If the court suspends a lawyer from practice, the presumption that 
the SJC will impose identical discipline still applies. For instance, in
Matter of Zeno,61 the United States District Court for the District of 
Puerto Rico suspended the respondent for three months for engaging 
in improper behavior during a criminal case in that court. The single 
55 Id.
56 No board or SJC report or decision addresses this distinction, however. The guidance in the text 
represents the best assessment of the understanding of the reporting duty.
57 SJC Rule 4:01 § 16(4).
58 Mass. R. Civ. P. 37; cf. In re Williams, 156 F.3d 86 (1st Cir. 1998) (imposing sanctions against 
counsel under the federal rule).
59 Mass. R. Civ. P. 11; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 6F; see, e.g., Doe v. Nutter, McClennen & 
Fish, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 137, 144 (1996), further appellate review denied, 423 Mass. 1111 (1996) 
(lawyer sanctioned by superior court under Rule 11); Tilman v. Brink, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 845, 855 
(2009) (violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 6F resulted in attorney’s fees assessed against plain-
tiﬀ ’s counsel).
60 See, e.g., Matter of Cobb, 445 Mass. 452, 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 93 (2005) (disbarment after 
court-imposed sanctions); Matter of O’Leary, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 461 (2009) (term suspen-
sion after court-imposed sanctions).
61 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 794 (2007).
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justice, noting the deference required to another jurisdiction’s deci-
sions, ordered an identical three-month suspension. The single justice 
took pains to ensure that the term suspension was “not ‘markedly dis-
parate from that ordered in comparable cases’ in the Commonwealth.”62
The three-month suspension was not retroactive, however, because 
the respondent reported his sanction to the board more than ten days 
after he had received the order.
V. REINSTATEMENT AFTER RECIPROCAL DISCIPLINE
A lawyer suspended from practice in Massachusetts due to reciprocal disci-
pline is eligible for reinstatement under the same rules as other suspended law-
yers in Massachusetts.63 However, reinstatement from reciprocal discipline is 
likely to be conditioned on reinstatement in the other jurisdiction.64 For a full 
discussion of the reinstatement process, see Chapter 23.
62 Id. at 797 (quoting Matter of Kersey, 444 Mass. 65, 70, 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 369 (2005), citing 
Matter of Lebbos, 423 Mass. 753, 754–55).
63 See, e.g., Matter of Dobie, 2009 WL 8598146 (2009) (single justice order requiring respondent 
to submit petition for reinstatement before reinstatement may occur after reciprocal suspension 
sanction).
64 See, e.g., Matter of Doerr-Hicks, 32 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___, 2016 WL 3681514 (2016); 
Matter of Hoﬀman, 31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 298, 2015 WL 3551159 (2015); Matter of Tunney, 
28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 857 (2012).
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chapter twenty-one
Resignation and Disability Inactive Status
I. INTRODUCTION
A lawyer may lose the right to practice by means other than by a sanction 
based on a stipulation to, or formal ﬁndings after a hearing on, charges of miscon-
duct. These include (1) resigning while under disciplinary investigation, (2) being 
required to stop practicing because the lawyer is no longer physically or mentally 
capable of practicing law, (3) being disbarred by consent, and (4) being tempo-
rarily or administratively suspended. Temporary and administrative suspen-
sions are discussed in Chapter 4, Sections II(F)(5) and (6). Disbarment by 
consent, provided for in SJC Rule 4:01 § 8(7), is rarely invoked because disbar-
ments by agreement are typically handled by a stipulation for discipline. See 
Chapter 5, Section IV. This chapter reviews the procedures for resignation while 
under disciplinary investigation and for assignment to disability inactive status.
II. RESIGNING WHILE UNDER DISCIPLINARY INVESTIGATION
An attorney’s resignation from the bar while under disciplinary investiga-
tion is not a unilateral act. Bar counsel may object, and the board has the power 
to recommend that the resignation not be accepted or that its acceptance be on 
terms the resigning attorney has not proposed. The following sections discuss 
how an attorney under disciplinary investigation must proceed to obtain the 
beneﬁts of a resignation as compared to a contested disciplinary adjudication.
A. Process of Resigning While Under Disciplinary Investigation
Chapter 4, Section II, brieﬂy describes how a lawyer being investigated by the 
Oﬃce of the Bar Counsel can voluntarily resign and thereby end the investiga-
tion and the disciplinary process.1 Once the bar counsel opens an investigation 
1 Of course, as noted in Chapter 4, a lawyer may resign at any time for any reason. If the lawyer 
resigns while under investigation, however, special steps must be taken, and the resignation has 
a diﬀerent eﬀect than a nondisciplinary resignation.
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on a lawyer, that lawyer may not resign from practice in the Commonwealth 
while that investigation or the resulting disciplinary proceedings are pending 
without admitting to misconduct or that suﬃcient evidence exists that could 
prove such misconduct at a hearing. To resign during pending disciplinary pro-
ceedings, a lawyer must ﬁle an aﬃdavit with the board stating the desire to 
resign. The aﬃdavit must include the following statements:2
• That the resignation is “freely and voluntarily rendered,” not the result 
of coercion or duress, and that the lawyer understands the implications 
of resigning
• That the lawyer is aware of a pending investigation regarding alleged 
misconduct, the nature of which must be speciﬁcally set forth 
• That the material facts, or identiﬁed portions of those material facts, 
on which the complaint against the lawyer is based are true or can be 
proved by a preponderance of the evidence3
• That the lawyer waives the right to the disciplinary hearing otherwise 
provided under SJC Rule 4:01
Practice Tip
Because a lawyer must admit to certain facts in an afﬁ-
davit to resign during disciplinary proceedings, some 
counsel advise that a lawyer facing discipline should 
instead not respond to the investigation but receive dis-
cipline by default. While a failure to respond to the disci-
plinary proceedings is a form of misconduct and can be 
a factor in aggravation,4 the default strategy allows the 
respondent to avoid any afﬁrmative statement on record 
admitting to any facts.
2 Massachusetts Rules and Orders of the Supreme Judicial Court r. 4:01 § 15(1)(a) 
[hereinafter SJC Rule].
3 A lawyer need not admit that the misconduct occurred, only that it can be proved. To get the 
bar counsel’s consent, a lawyer typically has to agree not to contest the facts in any admission or 
reinstatement proceeding, whether or not the lawyer admits to the facts, or instead agree that the 
bar counsel can prove the charges by a preponderance of the evidence. A resigning attorney is 
not entitled to a declaration by the Court that the lawyer did not admit to factual guilt. Matter 
of Dahl, 15 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 160 (1999).
4 See, e.g., Matter of Gustafson, 464 Mass. 1021, 1023–24, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 292 (2013); 
Matter of Greenidge, 30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 174 (2014).
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Note the implications of this aﬃdavit. A lawyer is not permitted to resign 
during the bar counsel’s investigation or during the disciplinary proceedings 
after a petition for discipline is ﬁled, without admitting to some of the miscon-
duct or that suﬃcient evidence exists that could prove such misconduct at a 
hearing.
Under the applicable rules,5 the respondent lawyer must ﬁle the aﬃdavit 
with the board. Upon receipt, the board serves that request and aﬃdavit on the 
bar counsel, who, within seven days of receipt, must ﬁle a recommendation and the 
reasons for the recommendation with the board.6 The bar counsel must serve that 
document on the respondent. A board member may extend the seven-day period 
for good cause. In a typical case, however, the respondent negotiates the specif-
ics of the aﬃdavit of resignation with the bar counsel before ﬁling. As a result, 
the board usually receives a complete packet from the bar counsel indicating the 
bar counsel’s assent to the resignation.
Having received the aﬃdavit and the bar counsel’s recommendation or 
assent, the board must vote whether to approve the resignation. If needed, the 
board may order “any hearing or investigation it deems appropriate.”7 While it 
is conceivable that the hearing ordered would be to present witnesses and evi-
dence and, therefore, would follow the procedures described in Chapter 6, in 
practice the board decides the matter on the papers. Otherwise, a hearing 
defeats the point of the resignation—permitting the attorney to withdraw 
from practice without a hearing or without stipulating to all or most of the 
charges the bar counsel presents.
Occasionally, the bar counsel objects to the proposed resignation,8 although, 
as just noted, it usually supports the lawyer’s oﬀer to resign and assists the 
5 SJC Rule 4:01 § 15; Rules of the Board of Bar Overseers § 4.1 [hereinafter BBO Rules]. 
Technically, these rules require the attorney to ﬁle a request to resign supported by aﬃdavit. In 
practice, the aﬃdavit serves both functions.
6 SJC Rule 4:01 § 15(2); BBO Rules § 4.1.
7 BBO Rules § 4.1.
8 The bar counsel has argued, thus far unsuccessfully, that the lawyer’s resignation came too late in 
the process, that is, after a hearing or the ﬁling of a hearing report. See, e.g., Matter of Lee, 3 Mass. 
Att’y Disc. R. 129 (1983); Matter of Orme, 27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 677 (2011). But see Matter 
of Oates, 5 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 274 (1986), where the single justice imposed disbarment rather 
than accepting resignation because the resignation was tendered after the board had ﬁled an Infor-
mation recommending disbarment.
   The bar counsel may object if the resigning attorney fails to acknowledge enough misconduct 
in the aﬃdavit. For instance, where an attorney seeks to resign with an admission to technical vio-
lations of trust account record-keeping rules while under investigation for intentional misuse of 
trust funds, the bar counsel might argue that the respondent must admit to more. A primary rea-
son for such a demand is the bar counsel’s desire to establish misconduct for the purpose of any 
reinstatement proceedings, should the lawyer seek readmission after the mandatory eight-year 
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lawyer by assembling and presenting a complete resignation “package” to the 
board.
If the board votes to accept the resignation, it ﬁles the document with the 
clerk of the SJC, along with its recommendation and “the entire record of any 
hearing.”9 The matter is then assigned to a single justice, who must accept the 
resignation before it can be eﬀective. As described in Chapter 4, a disciplinary 
resignation does not always include an order of disbarment, although most often 
the Court orders the lawyer disbarred if the admitted matters would have war-
ranted disbarment.10 On rare occasions, a single justice has rejected a proposed 
resignation,11 but it is unclear whether that would occur now that the Court has 
adopted the practice of accepting a resignation with additional orders or lan-
guage, such as that the attorney is also disbarred, or that the resignation is accepted 
“as a disciplinary sanction.”12 The possibility of such additional orders or lan-
guage, and that the bar counsel might recommend them, is typically acknowl-
edged in aﬃdavits that result from negotiation with the bar counsel, and the 
resigning attorney usually has the opportunity to address the board concerning 
their propriety. 
If the board receives an aﬃdavit that complies with SJC Rule 4:01 § 15(2), it 
submits the aﬃdavit to the SJC either recommending the resignation or providing 
waiting period. See Chapter 23, discussing reinstatement. Neither the rule nor, to date, decisional 
law has provided useful guidance on the suﬃciency of admissions in an aﬃdavit of resignation.
See SJC Rule 4:01 § 15(1)(c) (requiring that “the lawyer acknowledge[] that the material facts, or 
speciﬁed material portions of them, upon which the complaint is predicated are true or can be proved 
by a preponderance of the evidence”). Compare Matter of McCarthy, 27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 584 
(2011) (resignation accepted, with disbarment order, over the bar counsel’s objections that the respon-
dent’s aﬃdavit did not admit suﬃcient misconduct) with Matter of Murawski, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. 
R. 636 (2012) (after hearing before the single justice, the respondent submitted a revised aﬃdavit 
clarifying his admissions).
9 SJC Rule 4:01 § 15(2); BBO Rules § 4.1.
10 Chapter 4, Section II(H). See Matter of Nason, 7 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 202 (1991) (ﬁrst reported 
instance of acceptance of resignation, with disbarment, over the board’s objection). In Matter of 
Clark, 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 87 (2005), the attorney challenged the disbarment order on consti-
tutional grounds, but the single justice rejected the challenge and ordered the disbarment along 
with accepting the resignation.
11 See Matter of Toscano, 5 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 364, 371–72 (1987) (both the board and the bar 
counsel recommended accepting the resignation; the single justice denied the request and ordered 
disbarment). In Toscano, the published report includes a June 1986 order and memorandum from 
the single justice allowing, over the bar counsel’s objections, the respondent’s request for a limited 
suspension applicable only to civil matters and not to criminal matters, followed by a May 1987 
order denying the tendered resignation, contrary to all of the parties’ recommendations. A read-
er’s inference is that the single justice was displeased with the respondent’s actions after the 1986 
favorable order.
12 See text accompanying note 13, infra, and Chapter 4.
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an alternative recommendation.13 The board will recommend that the aﬃdavit 
be accepted and the attorney disbarred if the matters admitted would warrant 
disbarment. If the matters admitted warrant public discipline up to and includ-
ing indeﬁnite suspension, the board will recommend that the aﬃdavit be 
accepted as a disciplinary sanction.14
Practice Tip
The board’s records show that it has rejected few resig-
nations lawyers have offered. However, the SJC and board 
rules allow the board to recommend rejecting the resig-
nation and give the Court the power to reject it. A law-
yer seeking to resign while under investigation cannot 
be assured of that result. Therefore, a lawyer seeking to 
resign should enlist the cooperation of the bar counsel, 
where possible, so that the resignation goes before the 
board and the Court as an agreed disposition. While this 
strategy does not guarantee acceptance of the resigna-
tion, it makes it more likely.
B. Effect of Resigning While Under Disciplinary Investigation
There are few diﬀerences between resigning with an accompanying order of 
disbarment and awaiting a formal disbarment order following formal disciplinary 
proceedings. The fact that lawyers elect the former status, and that the bar coun-
sel or the board has occasionally sought to block such resignations,15 suggests that 
resignation oﬀers some advantages to the respondent relative to a disbarment 
order. In Matter of Orme,16 the single justice addressed this question as follows:
An order of disbarment arising from the allowance of an aﬃdavit of res-
ignation ﬁled in accordance with Supreme Judicial Court Rule 4:01 § 15, 
is no less an order of disbarment than one arising from a Board ﬁnding 
13 SJC Rule 4:01 § 15(2). See Matter of Lee, 3 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 129 (1983) (single justice describ-
ing a “Motion of the Board not to accept this resignation”; resignation accepted).
14 The board’s policy concerning its recommendation can be found on its website, https://bbopublic
.blob.core.windows.net/web/f/bbopolicy.pdf (last visited May 21, 2018).
15 See, e.g., Matter of Lee, 3 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 129 (1983) (board objection); Matter of Orme, 
27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 677 (2011) (bar counsel objection).
16 27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 677 (2011).
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and recommendation. The practical consequences for the disbarred attor-
ney are the same; under Supreme Judicial Court Rule 4:01, § 17, he must 
take the same course of action [i.e., notices of withdrawal, closing trust 
accounts, etc.] and, under § 18(2), he must wait the same period of time 
before he may petition for reinstatement to the bar. [The respondent] 
acknowledges that it is doubtful he will ever practice law again, but 
believes that acceptance of his resignation will allow him “to leave the 
practice of law with a modicum of self-respect.” . . . I share the view that 
“the purpose of the resignation provision is to permit respondent attor-
neys who wish to acknowledge their wrongdoing and exit the profession 
with dignity to do so forthwith, while saving Bar Counsel, the Board and 
the court the time and expense of lengthy disciplinary proceedings.”17
In Orme, the bar counsel objected to the respondent’s seeking to resign after a 
full evidentiary hearing with a committee report recommending disbarment. The 
single justice nevertheless accepted the resignation, noting that the respondent’s 
actions saved the board and single justice from a full review of the discipline.
For the reasons the single justice articulated in Orme, disbarment follow-
ing a hearing and the board’s ﬁling of an Information and resignation have some 
identical consequences. Still, some practical diﬀerences exist beyond preserving 
the lawyer’s “modicum of dignity” and saving the board and the Court’s time. The 
lawyer who resigns under an aﬃdavit acknowledging that the charges are prov-
able arguably avoids issue preclusion in related civil or administrative proceedings 
as well as transcripts of testimony and counsel statements that potential opponents 
in civil, criminal, or related administrative proceedings might ﬁnd useful. Further, 
using an aﬃdavit of resignation gives the lawyer some control over what record 
of misconduct will exist in the event the lawyer later seeks reinstatement.
Not every accepted resignation includes an order of disbarment, because 
not every resignation is for conduct that warrants disbarment.18 On occasion, 
17 Id. (quoting Matter of Oates, 5 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 274, 277 (1986)).
18 See, e.g., Matter of Sohmer, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 553 (2009) (“the Court entered a judgment 
accepting the aﬃdavit of resignation as a disciplinary sanction eﬀective immediately”; no order of 
disbarment issued); Matter of Lallier, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 388 (2007) (same). See also Massa-
chusetts Office of the Bar Counsel of the Supreme Judicial Court, Annual Report 
to the Supreme Judicial Court, Fiscal Year  at 14 (SJC accepted disciplinary resigna-
tions from three lawyers without disbarment); Massachusetts Office of the Bar Counsel 
of the Supreme Judicial Court, Annual Report to the Supreme Judicial Court, Fiscal 
Year  at 15 (ten such lawyers); Massachusetts Office of the Bar Counsel of the 
Supreme Judicial Court, Annual Report to the Supreme Judicial Court, Fiscal Year 
 at 15 (three such lawyers).
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a lawyer facing even lesser suspension chooses to resign and be done with prac-
ticing law. The resulting order is “resignation as a disciplinary sanction” but not 
resignation with disbarment. Lawyers whose order of resignation is not accom-
panied by disbarment, despite the advantages the omission of the “disbarment” 
label oﬀers, nevertheless face the same practice restrictions as a disbarred law-
yer and are required to petition for reinstatement, and only after an eight-year 
period. For the most part—except with respect to the contents of the record of 
discipline in any subsequent reinstatement proceedings—there is no substan-
tive disciplinary diﬀerence.
III. DISABILITY INACTIVE STATUS
A lawyer who loses the ability to practice law due to physical or mental 
disability may be transferred to “disability inactive status.” While in such sta-
tus, the lawyer’s license to practice law is suspended until reinstated, and the 
lawyer must follow all the requirements of a suspended lawyer. The transfer to 
disability inactive status may be eﬀected voluntarily or involuntarily.
A. Involuntary or Stipulated Assignment to Disability Inactive Status
Lawyers may encounter or present a claim for transfer to disability inactive 
status in three ways: (1) after receiving an order from a separate source relating 
to incompetence or incapacity, (2) when claiming in a disciplinary proceeding 
the inability to assist in their own defense, and (3) when the bar counsel proves 
the respondents’ incapacity and the SJC enters an order transferring them to 
that status.19
1. Adjudication of Incompetence
If a court declares a lawyer to be incompetent or commits a lawyer to a hos-
pital or facility for the mentally ill, or if the lawyer is placed on disability inac-
tive status by a diﬀerent jurisdiction, any such determination will lead to an order 
19 Of course, a disabled lawyer who proactively recognizes a disability has the option of simply elect-
ing “inactive” status. A lawyer may elect to transfer to inactive status by ﬁling a notice with the board 
and then paying the reduced fee associated with that status. See SJC Rule 4:02 § 4(a). The lawyer 
is removed from the rolls of active lawyers and is ineligible to practice law “until and unless he 
or she requests reinstatement to the active rolls and pays for the year of reinstatement the fee 
imposed . . . for active attorneys.” SJC Rule 4:02 § 4(b). This action does not, however, suspend 
or terminate any pending disciplinary investigation or charges.
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transferring the lawyer to disability inactive status.20 The SJC, once it has “proper 
proof ” of the order relied upon, “shall enter an order transferring the lawyer to 
disability inactive status.”21 The lawyer’s due process rights would, in an appro-
priate circumstance, permit a challenge to the “proper proof ” of the facts as 
required by SJC Rule 4:01 § 13(1) to be submitted to the SJC.22
2. Inability to Assist in Defense
SJC Rule 4:01 § 13(3) states that, in the course of a disciplinary proceed-
ing, if a lawyer alleges the inability to assist in the defense due to mental or 
physical incapacity, the lawyer is “immediately” transferred to disability inactive 
status until further order of the SJC. The rule requires the bar counsel (or the 
respondent) to ﬁle a petition with the Court describing the respondent’s alle-
gation, and upon receipt of such petition the Court enters the order. If the bar 
counsel contests the respondent lawyer’s allegation—meaning that the bar coun-
sel challenges whether the lawyer is as incapacitated as claimed—an expedited 
adjudicatory hearing occurs, as described in the next section. SJC Rule 4:01 § 13(3) 
operates as follows:
• During a disciplinary proceeding, the respondent claims to have a dis-
ability that precludes the respondent from assisting with the defense.
• If the bar counsel does not object and the SJC accepts the claim, the 
Court orders the lawyer transferred to disability inactive status, and 
the disciplinary proceedings cease until the lawyer is reinstated from 
that status.
• If the bar counsel objects to the claim that the lawyer is unable to 
assist in the defense, a hearing takes place, as described in the next 
section, during which the disciplinary proceedings are not stayed. 
Because the hearing is expedited, the absence of a stay is not likely to 
be disruptive. If the respondent prevails, the Court orders the lawyer 
transferred to disability inactive status, and the disciplinary proceed-
ings cease until the lawyer regains capacity.
• If, after the expedited hearing, the committee determines that the law-
yer’s claim is invalid, the Court, upon accepting that determination, 
“shall immediately temporarily suspend the respondent-lawyer from 
20 SJC Rule 4:01 § 13(1).
21 Id.
22 See Matter of Ruﬀalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968) (attorney entitled to due process in disciplinary pro-
ceedings); Matter of Foley, 439 Mass. 324, 336 n.13, 19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 141 (2013) (“Attor-
neys in bar discipline proceedings are entitled to due process rights.”).
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the practice of law pending ﬁnal disposition of the [underlying disci-
plinary] matter.”23 If that underlying proceeding does not result in 
suspension or disbarment, the lawyer may then resume practice.
A respondent who seeks to invoke § 13(3) must satisfy the Dusky standards 
of incompetence to stand trial:24
The standard for determining incapacity under this rule is the same as 
the standard for determining whether a criminal defendant is competent 
to stand trial: “[W]hether [the defendant] has suﬃcient present ability 
to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational under-
standing—and whether he has a rational as well as factual understand-
ing of the proceeding against him.”25
3. Petition to Determine Incapacity
This subsection describes the procedure for the involuntary transfer of an 
attorney to disability inactive status. The expedited hearing process has not yet 
occurred in practice,26 but this discussion explains how it would work.
Practice Tips
Disability inactive status is almost always achieved by 
agreement. No reported decisions address the procedure 
under SJC Rule 4:01 § 13(4). The Court has, however, 
determined the sufﬁciency of a claim of incapacity, such 
as in Matter of Puglia, discussed in Section III(A)(2).27
* * *
Separate from the process described here, under SJC 
Rule 4:01 § 12A the bar counsel may, if appropriate, seek 
a temporary suspension of an attorney who presents an 
immediate threat to clients.28
23 SJC Rule 4:01 § 13(4)(f ).
24 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
25 Matter of Puglia, 14 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 581, 586 (1998) (quoting Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402). 
See also Matter of Margolis, 15 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 372, 376 (1999) (applying the Dusky standard).
26 Cf. Matter of Dwyer-Jones, 470 Mass. 582, 31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 167 (2015) (Court imposes 
reciprocal disability inactive status based upon an order from another jurisdiction without a sep-
arate hearing in Massachusetts).
27 See Matter of Puglia, 14 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 581 (1998).
28 See Chapter 4, Section II(F)(5).
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Proceedings for transfer to disability inactive status most commonly occur 
when the bar counsel investigates a claim that a lawyer has lost the ability to 
function adequately as a lawyer. Typically, this issue arises after the bar counsel 
has received complaints about the lawyer’s actions and, in the course of inves-
tigating those claims, learns that the lawyer may be suﬀering from a physical 
or mental disability that interferes with legal functioning. If that happens, the 
bar counsel must seek permission from the board to ﬁle a petition alleging that 
the lawyer is incapable of maintaining a legal practice.29
Upon the board’s approval, the bar counsel ﬁles a petition the same as it 
does when seeking to impose discipline for misconduct.30 The matter is assigned 
to a hearing committee, special hearing oﬃcer, or panel of the board the same 
as other disciplinary proceedings and proceeds in the usual fashion, with two 
exceptions. First, unlike in disciplinary hearings, the board may appoint a law-
yer to represent the respondent lawyer if the respondent does not have repre-
sentation.31 Second, the rules expressly state that the hearing committee “may 
require the examination of the respondent-lawyer by qualiﬁed medical experts 
designated by them.”32 The standard that the hearing committee, the board, and 
the SJC apply is whether the respondent is “incapacitated from continuing to prac-
tice law,” presumably as a result of a physical or mental condition that adversely 
aﬀects the lawyer’s ability to practice.33 No report or SJC decision has interpreted 
that phrase.
The resulting order eﬀects the lawyer’s transfer to disability inactive status, 
usually for an indeﬁnite period. The order may also state how long the lawyer 
must wait before petitioning for reinstatement (as described in Section III(D), 
below) or the length of the intervals between successive petitions for reinstate-
ment. The default provision allows an attorney on disability inactive status to 
petition for reinstatement to active status “once a year or at such intervals as this 
court may direct . . . .”34
The board publishes a notice of the lawyer’s transfer to disability inactive 
status “in the same manner as a disciplinary sanction imposed under section 8 of 
29 SJC Rule 4:01 § 13(2).
30 SJC Rule 4:01 § 13(4)(a). See Chapter 6 for a discussion of adjudicatory proceedings.
31 SJC Rule 4:01 § 13(4)(c).
32 SJC Rule 4:01 § 13(4)(b). The rule states that the lawyer “may” be required to pay for the 
experts, implying that otherwise the board or the Court will pay that cost. Id. at § 13(4)(f ).
33 SJC Rule 4:01 §§ 13(2), (4)(e).
34 SJC Rule 4:01 §13(6)(b).
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[SJC Rule 4:01] is published.”35 Notwithstanding that quoted language, the SJC 
does not include any of the facts or arguments involved in the matter in its single 
justice reports ordering the transfer, as it does regularly with discipline reports. 
The published report lists only the fact that the lawyer has been transferred to 
that status, with the notation, “The complete Order of the Court is available by 
contacting the Clerk of the Supreme Judicial Court for Suﬀolk County.”36
B. Effect of Disability Inactive Status
A lawyer who is placed on disability inactive status may not practice law until 
reinstated. The status is tantamount to a suspension for an unstated term, and 
a lawyer, or a lawyer’s representative, must take all the steps required in a disci-
plinary suspension. As with any suspended or disbarred lawyer, the lawyer trans-
ferred to disability inactive status may not participate in any activities that qualify 
as the practice of law, or otherwise work in any capacity for a lawyer.37 Chapter 22 
discusses the limits on the activities of a suspended or disbarred lawyer.
C. Appointment of Commissioner
Because a disabled lawyer might be unable to take the steps necessary to wind 
down a practice as required of a suspended lawyer, SJC Rule 4:01 § 14 provides 
for appointing a lawyer to serve as a “commissioner” to manage the inactive law-
yer’s practice and to protect the interests of the lawyer’s clients.38 The appointed 
commissioner may inventory the ﬁles and take whatever actions may be neces-
sary to eﬀect the transition to new counsel. The inactive lawyer pays the com-
missioner’s reasonable expenses and, if appropriate, reasonable compensation 
unless the Court orders otherwise.39 The commissioner may not reveal any infor-
mation contained in the lawyer’s ﬁles without client consent.40
35 SJC Rule 4:01 §13(5).
36 See, e.g., Matter of White, 30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 458 (2014). Orders of administrative and 
temporary suspension are often similarly unilluminating concerning the basis for the order.
37 See Matter of Kolofolias, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 334 (2009) (disabled inactive attorney worked 
as a paralegal; term suspension of six months and one day imposed).
38 A commissioner may be appointed in other circumstances as well. See SJC Rule 4:01 § 14(1) 
(authorizing such appointment when a lawyer disappears or dies).
39 SJC Rule 4:01 § 14(1).
40 SJC Rule 4:01 § 14(2).
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D. Reinstatement from Disability Inactive Status
A lawyer transferred to disability inactive status may seek reinstatement 
the same way as any lawyer subject to a suspension, with some important qual-
iﬁcations. The general discussion of reinstatement in Chapter 23 applies to these 
reinstatements. This section addresses the steps and requirements unique to rein-
statement from disability inactive status.
Unless the order transferring the lawyer to disability inactive status states 
a diﬀerent interval, the lawyer is entitled to petition for transfer to active status 
once a year.41 That requirement means that, absent a diﬀerent Court-ordered 
interval, the lawyer must wait one year from the date of the transfer before seek-
ing reinstatement. (A transfer order based on an external determination, such as 
a judicial determination of incapacity or a disability ﬁnding from a diﬀerent juris-
diction, may forbid the lawyer to seek reinstatement except when that external 
order is vacated or withdrawn.) The lawyer seeks reinstatement by ﬁling a peti-
tion with the SJC, as described in Chapter 23. The board may retain an expert 
or experts to examine the lawyer and advise the board as to the lawyer’s current 
ﬁtness.42 In addition, the lawyer seeking reinstatement must aﬃrmatively dis-
close the identity of all medical and psychological providers consulted since the 
time of the transfer as well as provide written consent to the Court and the bar 
counsel for release of all information related to the disability.43
In the reinstatement proceeding, the lawyer has the burden of establishing 
two separate elements: (1) that the medical and physical condition does not 
adversely aﬀect the lawyer’s ability to practice law, and (2) that the lawyer pos-
sesses the competency and learning required for admission to practice.44 There-
fore, a lawyer whose incapacity has been remedied and who has recovered from 
a disabling condition may still be denied reinstatement if unable to prove the 
learning and skills necessary to competently practice law.
In Matter of Dodge,45 the petitioner sought reinstatement after being placed 
on disability inactive status because of major depressive episodes that interfered 
signiﬁcantly with his ability to serve his clients and manage his practice.46 At the 
41 SJC Rule 4:01 § 13(6)(b). The order from the Court may designate a diﬀerent time frame. Id.
42 SJC Rule 4:01 § 13(6)(c).
43 SJC Rule 4:01 § 13(7).
44 SJC Rule 4:01 § 13(6)(e).
45 31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 157 (2015).
46 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 217 (2012). The 2012 report (as with all disability inactive status assign-
ment reports) omits all relevant information, instructing the reader to request the full report from 
the clerk of the SJC.
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hearing on his petition for reinstatement, he persuaded the hearing panel that 
his condition had improved, that he was competent to resume practice, and that 
he has adequate learning in the law. The panel recommended reinstatement, 
subject to several conditions, including mentoring and participation in ﬁrm-
management seminars. In Matter of White,47 the respondent had been placed on 
inactive disability status in 2014 after suﬀering from severe anxiety and depres-
sion. In 2015, she petitioned for reinstatement, but the hearing panel denied 
her petition. The panel determined that the petitioner had met the burden of 
showing competence and learning in the law but, based on her conduct during 
the reinstatement proceeding, concluded that her illness was not under control 
and her judgments were still impaired.
If a lawyer is transferred to disability inactive status because of an external 
order, such as a judicial determination of incapacity or transfer to disability inac-
tive status from a diﬀerent jurisdiction, and if that external order is removed or 
vacated, the Court may, after its own hearing and without referral to the board, 
immediately reinstate the lawyer.48
47 SJC No. BD-2014-009 ( Jul. 27, 2016), 32 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___ (2016).
48 SJC Rule 4:01 § 13(6)(d). See Matter of Dwyer-Jones, 470 Mass. 582, 589, 31 Mass. Att’y Disc. 
R. 167, 175 (2015) (“if [the respondent] is returned to active status in [the original] jurisdiction, 
she may petition a single justice of this court to ‘immediately direct’ her reinstatement to active 
status, without the necessity of petitioning for reinstatement”).
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I. INTRODUCTION
This chapter reviews the requirements a lawyer must meet after receiving an 
order of suspension, disbarment, or transfer to disability inactive status, or after 
having a resignation accepted as a disciplinary sanction. In each instance, the law-
yer must cease practicing law for some deﬁned or undeﬁned period of time. This 
chapter addresses the steps a lawyer must follow to end an ongoing practice and 
the activities the lawyer may, and may not, engage in during the period of time 
while practice is forbidden (as discussed generally in Chapter 4). For ease of dis-
cussion, this chapter refers to the lawyer who cannot practice as a “suspended 
lawyer,” including both disbarred and suspended lawyers. Chapter 23 discusses 
the process of reinstating a law license.
II. REQUIRED STEPS AFTER AN ORDER TO CEASE PRACTICE
A. Required Steps in All Instances 
A lawyer who must cease practice because of a disciplinary resignation or 
an order of suspension, disbarment, or transfer to disability inactive status must 
follow a series of steps to terminate an active practice. 
PART VII
After Suspension or Disbarment
chapter twenty-two
Duties and Restrictions After Suspension
or Disbarment
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Practice Tip
A suspended lawyer who practices within a ﬁrm will 
likely ﬁnd the transition to nonpractice easier on clients 
than a sole practitioner. In most instances, a client’s 
relationship is effectively with the law ﬁrm rather than 
the individual lawyer, so in a ﬁrm setting other lawyers 
may continue representing the client, if the client 
agrees.1 The clients of a solo lawyer, by contrast, will 
need to retain new counsel unless the clients choose to 
proceed pro se.
1. Within Fourteen Days: Notices to Clients, Courts, Agencies, and Others
When the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) enters an order restricting a lawyer’s 
practice (except for temporary suspensions; see Section II(B)) it typically be-
comes eﬀective thirty days after the order is entered.2 The suspended lawyer is 
authorized to practice law in a limited fashion during those thirty days (and may 
You Should Know
The steps described here apply to every suspension order, 
no matter how short, unless the order states otherwise. 
A lawyer suspended for as little as one month must follow 
all of these steps.3
1 See, e.g., In re Kiley, 459 Mass. 645, 652 (2011) (“Where, as here, the client enters into a repre-
sentation agreement with a law ﬁrm rather than a sole practitioner, the law ﬁrm may not termi-
nate the agreement simply because the attorney who had been handling the case has died, left 
the practice of law, or moved to a diﬀerent ﬁrm. While the departure of the responsible attorney 
may cause the client to leave the ﬁrm, it may not cause the ﬁrm to leave the client if withdrawal 
will have a material adverse eﬀect on the client’s interests and none of the circumstances requir-
ing or permitting withdrawal is present. See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.16.”).
2 The suspended lawyer may request an extension of the thirty-day period from the SJC if the 
lawyer needs more time to accomplish the required items. Also, in some instances, the SJC will 
make a suspension order retroactive to the date of a prior administrative or temporary suspen-
sion, if the aﬃdavit of compliance was timely ﬁled following the earlier suspension. In that in-
stance, the suspended lawyer will have fewer than thirty days to comply with the requirements 
described in the text.
3 See, e.g., Matter of Guinane, 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 191 (2004) (one-month suspension, not 
stayed).
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not accept any new matters) but must cease all practice at the end of the thirty 
days. The thirty-day period gives the lawyer time to complete the necessary steps 
to cease practice. As the following list shows, complying with the requirements 
applicable to suspended lawyers is detailed and time-consuming, especially dur-
ing the ﬁrst two weeks.
Within fourteen days from the date the order is entered, the lawyer must 
complete the following, with every notice sent by certiﬁed mail, return receipt 
requested:4
1. Provide a notice (the “client notice”) to each active client, ward, heir, 
and beneﬁciary,5 stating that the lawyer has resigned or has been dis-
barred, suspended, temporarily suspended, or transferred to disability 
inactive status, with the eﬀective date of the exclusion. The notice 
must state that if the recipient is not represented by co-counsel, the 
recipient should act promptly to locate successor counsel.6 The client 
notice must be sent in a format approved by the Board of Bar Over-
seers (BBO), or in a manner substantially similar to that template. 
(See Appendix I for a sample Notice of Disbarment to Client.)
Practice Tip
The client notice as described is mandatory. In many 
instances, of course, the suspended lawyer will work with 
the affected client or beneﬁciary to retain successor coun-
sel. That assistance, even if successful, does not relieve 
the lawyer of sending the notice.
2. Send notice to counsel for each party (or the party itself, if not rep-
resented by counsel) in “pending matters” stating the fact and basis
for the lawyer’s exclusion and the eﬀective date of the loss of license 
to practice.7 (This communication is referred to here as the “other 
4 Massachusetts Rules and Orders of the Supreme Judicial Court r. 4:01 § 17(1) [here-
inafter SJC Rule]. The fourteen-day period consists of calendar days, not business days, and runs 
from the date the order is entered, not the date the order notice is received.
5 The word beneficiary refers to any person for whom the lawyer serves as a ﬁduciary at the time 
of the order. See Rules of the Board of Bar Overseers § 4.17(a) [hereinafter BBO Rules].
6 SJC Rule 4:01 § 17(1)(c).
7 SJC Rule 4:01 § 17(1)(d).
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counsel notice,” but the term refers also to the notice sent to unrepre-
sented parties.) In litigation contexts, the identity of the participants 
in a “pending matter” is largely apparent. In transactional matters, the 
excluded lawyer should include all counsel and parties to the transac-
tion. The other counsel notice must also be sent in a board-approved 
format or in a manner substantially similar to that template.8 (See 
Appendix I for samples of other counsel notice templates.)
3. File a notice of withdrawal with every court, agency, or tribunal before 
which a matter is pending, and include in that communication a copy 
of both the client notice and the other counsel notices as well as the 
client’s residential address.9 (See Appendix I for a sample Notiﬁcation 
of Disbarment to Court, Agency, or Tribunal.)
4. Resign, as of the eﬀective date of the exclusion from practice, from all 
appointments as guardian, executor, administrator, trustee, attorney-
in-fact (which includes an appointment under a power of attorney), or 
similar ﬁduciary capacity. The resignation notice must be in writing 
and must include a copy of both the client notice and the other counsel 
notice; the residential address of each ward, heir, and beneﬁciary entitled 
to the client notice; and the case caption and docket number of any 
pending proceedings.10 (See Appendix I for a sample Notice to Ward, 
Heir, or Beneﬁciary of Resignation as Fiduciary and a sample Resigna-
tion as Fiduciary.)
5. Close all Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts (IOLTA) as well as any 
other trust or ﬁduciary account, and disburse the client and ﬁduciary 
funds appropriately.11
6. Refund all fees held by the suspended lawyer but not yet earned.12 The 
lawyer may earn fees during this period and use retained funds to 
cover those fees, but any fees accepted during this period will receive 
close scrutiny.
8 See BBO Rules § 4.17(b).
9 SJC Rule 4:01 § 17(1)(a).
10 SJC Rule 4:01 § 17(1)(b). This rule does not address the obvious complication of the suspended 
lawyer sending a resignation notice to a ward who is not competent to understand its meaning. If 
the ﬁduciary appointment came about because of a court proceeding, the notice goes to the court, 
so the ward is protected. If the appointment came about because of a springing power of attorney 
without court oversight, the lawyer’s ﬁduciary duties seemingly would impose an obligation to give 
notice to some other person or agency capable of protecting the ward’s interests.
11 SJC Rule 4:01 § 17(1)(g).
12 SJC Rule 4:01 § 17(1)(f ).
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Practice Tip
A suspended lawyer must resign from all appointments 
as guardian, executor, trustee, and similar roles, even if 
the appointment had no relationship to the lawyer’s prac-
tice, and even if the appointment predated the lawyer’s 
admission to the bar. A lawyer must take this step even 
in a short-term suspension. If the suspended lawyer serves 
as a ﬁduciary for a family member, the lawyer may request 
permission from the SJC to continue in that role. The SJC 
has often granted such permission.
7. Make available to each client in a pending matter the ﬁles and papers 
in the lawyer’s possession to which the client is entitled.13
8. Accept no new matters, even if the lawyer is conﬁdent of accomplish-
ing the client’s goals before the suspension is eﬀective.14
Practice Tip
Suspended lawyers may not accept new matters during 
the thirty-day wind-down period but may, and often must, 
continue to represent ongoing clients during the transi-
tion month. The lawyers may bill clients for that work and 
may pay themselves a reasonable fee from client funds 
held for that purpose. Those fees are likely to be scruti-
nized with special attention, however.
The suspended lawyer must complete all of these steps in less than two weeks 
(absent an extension granted by the SJC), given the time period between the entry 
of the order and the lawyer’s notice of it.
13 SJC Rule 4:01 § 17(1)(e). For a description of the materials to which the client is entitled upon 
a lawyer’s withdrawal from representation generally, see Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.16(e): A lawyer may 
not withhold from a client any materials whose “retention would prejudice the client unfairly.” 
This rule also addresses when the lawyer must pay for materials he chooses to keep and when a 
client must pay for materials the lawyer is obligated to provide to the client.
14 SJC Rule 4:01 § 17(3).
457
Duties and Restrictions After Suspension or Disbarment
2. Within Twenty-One Days: Compliance Affidavit and Reports
Within twenty-one days from the date the order is entered, the lawyer must 
do the following:
1. File with the Oﬃce of the Bar Counsel an aﬃdavit certifying that 
the lawyer has complied with all of the requirements that needed to 
be completed at the end of the fourteen-day period, as described in 
the Section II(A)(1).
2. Append to that aﬃdavit the following items:
  •  A copy of the client notice, other party notice, tribunal withdrawal 
notice, and ﬁduciary resignation notice, along with the names and 
addresses of each recipient of any such notice and all return receipts 
or returned mail received by that point. (The suspended lawyer will 
supplement the ﬁling of the return receipts or mail from time to 
time thereafter.) The bar counsel must maintain the conﬁdentiality 
of the client names, unless otherwise ordered by the SJC.15
  •  A schedule showing the location, title, and account number of any 
IOLTA, client, trust, or other ﬁduciary accounts the lawyer held as 
of the entry date of the exclusion order.16
  •  A separate schedule tracking the previous schedule, showing the 
disposition of all ﬁduciary and client funds identiﬁed in the previ-
ous schedule.17
  •  A list of every other jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to 
practice (to facilitate the bar counsel’s giving notice of the Massa-
chusetts sanction to other jurisdictions).18
  •  A residential or other street address (not a post oﬃce box) where 
the lawyer may receive communications from the bar counsel, the 
board, or the Court.19
3. File with the clerk of the SJC for Suﬀolk County a copy of the aﬃdavit 
ﬁled with the bar counsel (but without all of the appendices just listed), 
along with a list of all other state, federal, and administrative jurisdic-
tions to which the lawyer is admitted to practice and a street address 
where the Court may direct communications to the suspended lawyer.20
15 SJC Rule 4:01 § 17(5)(a).
16 SJC Rule 4:01 § 17(5)(b).
17 SJC Rule 4:01 § 17(5)(c).
18 SJC Rule 4:01 § 17(5)(e). See Chapter 20 for a discussion of reciprocal discipline.
19 SJC Rule 4:01 § 17(5)(f ).
20 SJC Rule 4:01 § 17(6).
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3. Other Steps After Entry of the Order
In addition to the steps the suspended lawyer must take within fourteen 
and twenty-one days, respectively, from the Court’s entry of the exclusion order, 
other administrative processes follow from the order. The SJC may, in appro-
priate circumstances, appoint a commissioner to manage the responsibilities of 
the suspended lawyer.21 The Court appoints a commissioner—always an attor-
ney—when it concludes that the excluded lawyer lacks the capacity or the 
responsibility to provide the necessary notices and protections when a practice 
ends on such short notice.22 The suspended lawyer is responsible for paying for 
the commissioner’s time, unless the Court orders otherwise.
You Should Know
A commissioner appointed by the SJC under SJC Rule 4:01 
§ 17(2) may be given the authority to appear, on a tem-
porary basis, in court or before administrative tribunals 
as provisional substitute counsel for a suspended lawyer 
who cannot protect clients’ interests.
After receiving the SJC’s order, the board must promptly send a copy of that 
order to the clerk of each state or federal court in the Commonwealth in which 
the board has reason to believe that the excluded lawyer has practiced.23 This step 
serves to increase the likelihood of the courts learning that the lawyer will soon 
have no right to practice.
B. Required Steps in a Temporary Suspension
As discussed in Chapter 4,24 SJC Rule 4:01 refers to the concept of a “tem-
porary suspension,”25 even though the rule does not deﬁne that term. SJC opin-
ions use this term to refer to an immediate suspension, under SJC Rule 4:01
§ 12A, of a lawyer who “poses a threat of substantial harm to clients or potential 
21 SJC Rule 4:01 § 17(2).
22 See, e.g., Matter of Hodgdon, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 247 (2010) (disbarment; SJC appoints 
second commissioner).
23 SJC Rule 4:01 § 17(4).
24 See Chapter 4, Section II(F)(5).
25 See, e.g., SJC Rule 4:01 §§ 17(1)–(6).
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clients, or [whose] whereabouts are unknown,”26 or, under SJC Rule 4:01 § 12, 
to a lawyer convicted of a “serious crime.”27 Under Sections 12 and 12A, a law-
yer may be immediately suspended pending ﬁnal disposition of the disciplinary 
proceeding that the bar counsel commenced against the lawyer or will com-
mence within a reasonable time.28
For present purposes, the noteworthy requirement of a temporary suspen-
sion is that it takes effect immediately.29 In contrast to other suspension orders dis-
cussed in this chapter, this order gives the lawyer no advance time during which 
to wrap up a practice. The lawyer’s right to practice ceases when the SJC enters 
the suspension order. However, the lawyer will have had considerable warning 
that the SJC might enter such an order. Under both Sections 12 and 12A, the 
Court issues an order to show cause why the attorney should not be immedi-
ately suspended from practice.30
The temporarily suspended lawyer must still comply with every requirement 
described in the preceding sections concerning notices, withdrawals, and account 
closings within the same fourteen- and twenty-one-day time periods. The crit-
ical diﬀerence is that the lawyer may not practice for thirty days while wrap-
ping up legal aﬀairs.
Practice Tip
A lawyer who receives a temporary suspension order 
from the SJC most likely has a practice that is not in good 
shape, given the ﬁndings necessary for such an order. The 
suspended lawyer must nevertheless act immediately to 
inform clients that they must ﬁnd other lawyers to man-
age all ongoing activity and who may appear at court 
hearings.
26 SJC Rule 4:01 § 12A.
27 Id. at §§ 12(3), (4).
28 See, e.g., Matter of Kenney, 399 Mass. 431, 437, 5 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 167 (1987); Matter of 
Griﬃn, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 286 (2013); Matter of Pomeroy, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 507 
(2009).
29 SJC Rule 4:01 § 17(3) (“[o]rders imposing temporary suspension shall be immediate and 
forthwith”).
30 SJC Rule 4:01 §§ 12(4), 12A.
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C. Required Steps in an Administrative Suspension
A lawyer may receive an administrative suspension for failure to comply 
with registration renewal requirements31 or for failure to cooperate with the bar 
counsel during an investigation.32 As described more fully in Chapter 4,33 an ad-
ministratively suspended lawyer has thirty days to resolve the administrative dif-
ﬁculties (that is, cooperate with the bar counsel or ﬁx the registration lapse); the 
lawyer may continue to practice during this time. After that thirty-day period, 
the administratively suspended lawyer must take all the steps described in the 
previous sections.
The SJC rules addressing administrative suspensions may be read to treat 
a suspension based on noncooperation as having immediate eﬀect, and a suspen-
sion based on registration lapse as having delayed eﬀect. Those rules state that a 
noncooperation suspension “shall be eﬀective forthwith upon entry of the sus-
pension order,”34 and the language regarding registration lapses omits the “forth-
with” language.35 Both rules, however, include the following reference: “[The 
suspension] shall be subject to the provisions of section 17(4) of this rule. If not 
reinstated within thirty days after entry, the lawyer shall become subject to the 
other provisions of section 17 of this rule.”36
D.  Consequences of Failure to Comply with the Required Steps 
After an Order to Cease Practice
The suspended lawyer must comply with the requirements described in the 
previous sections within the time limits. Because the suspended lawyer must cer-
tify compliance through the aﬃdavit ﬁled with the bar counsel and the SJC, 
any failure to meet the required deadlines will be apparent. Missing a deadline 
by more than a few days constitutes a serious problem for the lawyer when later 
31 SJC Rule 4:03 § 2.
32 SJC Rule 4:01 § 3(2).
33 For a discussion of administrative suspensions generally, see Chapter 4, Section II(F)(6).
34 SJC Rule 4:01 § 3(3).
35 SJC Rule 4:03 § 3.
36 SJC Rule 4:01 § 3(2). Rule 4:03 § 3 reads eﬀectively, but not precisely, the same: “Any attorney 
suspended under the provisions of subsection (2) above shall become subject to the provisions of 
Rule 4:01, Section 17(4), upon entry of the suspension order, and if not reinstated within thirty 
days after entry shall become subject to the other provisions of said Section 17.” The reference to 
SJC Rule 4:01 § 17(4) appears to be a misprint, with the Court most likely intending to refer to 
SJC Rule 4:01 § 17(3), which permits the lawyer to practice for thirty days after entry of the 
suspension order.
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seeking reinstatement.37 Even if the reinstatement qualiﬁes as “automatic” 
under the SJC rule (which ordinarily includes suspensions of not more than a 
year38), the suspended lawyer must apply for reinstatement “by ﬁling with the 
court and serving upon the Bar Counsel an aﬃdavit stating that the lawyer . . . 
has fully complied with the requirements of the suspension order . . . .”39 A law-
yer who misses the deadlines without obtaining an extension cannot submit 
such an aﬃdavit.
Practice Tip
If a suspended lawyer needs more time to complete the 
required steps after suspension, the lawyer should request 
the bar counsel’s agreement to an extension of time.
A lawyer who fails to satisfy the required steps and who continues to prac-
tice, or who continues to serve as a ﬁduciary without the SJC’s permission, will 
likely be held in contempt,40 as discussed in Section III(B). The lawyer’s suspen-
sion term will normally increase as a result of failing to comply with the sus-
pension order. SJC Rule 4:01 § 17(8) allows for the addition of “a speciﬁed term 
determined by the court after a ﬁnding that the lawyer has violated the provi-
sions of this rule.”41 The lawyer’s failure to comply is also considered in any later 
reinstatement proceeding.
37 See Chapter 23 for a discussion of the reinstatement process.
38 SJC Rule 4:01 § 18(1). For examples of the Court referring to some reinstatements as “auto-
matic,” see, e.g., Matter of Gustafson, 464 Mass. 1021, 1023 n.4, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 291 
(2013); Matter of Cullen, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 123 (2010). See also Chapter 23.
39 SJC Rule 4:01 §§ 18(1)(a), (b).
40 See Matter of Johnson, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 487 (2012) (contempt for failing to resign as trus-
tee; two-year suspension increased by one year). Because the contempt order is ordinarily accom-
panied by an order increasing the length of the suspension, it is not apparent what practical eﬀect 
the contempt order itself creates.
41 SJC Rule 4:01 § 17(8). That section applies to a lawyer “who is found by the court to have 
violated the provisions of this rule by engaging in legal or unauthorized paralegal work prior to 
reinstatement . . . .” The SJC has held that acting as a ﬁduciary qualiﬁes as “legal work.” Johnson,
28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 487. Until recently, SJC Rule 4:01 § 17(8) required that the added sus-
pension term be at least twice the length of the original suspension, or ten years if the original 
order was for an indeﬁnite suspension or disbarment. See SJC Rule 4:01 § 17(8), eﬀective until 
2009. The current version of that section allows for a more ﬂexible determination of the added 
sanction.
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III. ACTIVITIES NOT PERMITTED DURING THE SUSPENSION
A. Limitations
When barred from practice, whether through a disbarment, suspension, dis-
ciplinary resignation, or assignment to disability inactive status, the suspended 
lawyer may not, without express permission from the SJC, do the following:
• Engage in legal or paralegal work; or
• Work for, volunteer for, or assist a lawyer or law ﬁrm in any way.42
Serving as an assistant or paralegal, a suspended lawyer might be a valuable asset 
to a sole practitioner or law ﬁrm, given the expertise and experience, but SJC 
Rule 4:01 § 17 forbids that employment or activity. The rule also forbids the sus-
pended lawyer from serving as a secretary, translator, IT consultant, or in any other 
capacity if the employer engages in the practice of law. As the bar counsel has 
written, a suspended lawyer “can’t be employed as a janitor” in a law practice.43
A suspended lawyer may ﬁle a motion with the SJC for permission to engage 
in employment as a paralegal (or in another capacity in a law oﬃce, such as an 
oﬃce manager or secretary), but only after the following time periods:
• After a term suspension expires (but before formal reinstatement); or 
• After four years of an indeﬁnite suspension; or
• After seven years of a disbarment order or a disciplinary resignation.44
A lawyer prohibited from practice because of disability inactive status may not 
seek permission from the Court to perform paralegal services, at least not accord-
ing to SJC Rule 4:01 § 18.
A lawyer is not automatically permitted to work as a paralegal or within a 
law practice in any capacity, even after the suspension period expires; the law-
yer must prove to the Court that permission to do so will not harm the public 
interest. In Matter of Thalheimer, the single justice wrote: 
Permission to work as a paralegal is not a matter of right, and a motion 
for leave to engage in such employment is, in reality, “a motion for
42 SJC Rule 4:01 § 17(7).
43 Hope Viner Samborn, Disbarred—but Not Barred from Work,ABA Journal ( June 2007), http://
www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/disbarred_but_not_barred_from_work/ (quoting Bar Coun-
sel Constance V. Vecchione).
44 SJC Rule 4:01 § 18(3) (not listing disability inactive status among the exceptions).
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partial reinstatement of the rights and privileges the petitioner engaged 
before discipline.” The respondent “bears the burden of showing that
[s]he is qualiﬁed to work as a paralegal and that her proposed employ-
ment will not harm the public interest, the integrity and standing of the 
bar, or the administration of justice.”45
In Thalheimer, the respondent, who had been indeﬁnitely suspended for misus-
ing client funds and representing clients with conﬂicting interests, sought per-
mission to serve as a paralegal for her son, a solo practitioner. The single justice 
denied the request, unpersuaded that the son would provide suﬃcient over-
sight to protect the public interest in light of the reasons for the suspension.46
Practice Tips
A lawyer hoping to achieve reinstatement after a lengthy 
suspension or disbarment should petition the Court for 
permission to work as a paralegal, if qualiﬁed to do so. 
In petitions for reinstatement, the Court must consider 
whether the suspended lawyer possesses “learning in 
law required for admission to practice in this Common-
wealth,”47 and several lawyers have been denied rein-
statement for failure to prove this.48 A single justice has 
described service as a paralegal as a “good step” in pre-
paring for reinstatement.49
* * *
   Suspended lawyers should attend continuing legal 
education classes and engage in similar professional 
development activities. Nothing prevents a suspended 
lawyer from actively studying law; the lawyer is only 
forbidden from practicing law.
45 Matter of Thalheimer, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 842 (2012) (quoting Matter of Gonick, 21 
Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 307 (2005) and Matter of Ellis, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 130 (2007)).
46 On her second attempt to obtain permission, Thalheimer succeeded. Matter of Thalheimer, 29 
Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 259 (2013).
47 SJC Rule 4:01 § 18(5).
48 See, e.g., Matter of Dawkins, 432 Mass. 1009, 16 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 94 (2000); Matter of 
Fletcher, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 259 (2013); cf. Matter of Wong, 442 Mass. 1016, 20 Mass. 
Att’y Disc. R. 540 (2004) (remanded for more evidence of learning in law).
49 Matter of Sullivan, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 578 (2009).
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In Matter of Wynn,50 the single justice allowed a suspended lawyer to serve as 
a paralegal with conditions, including reports from the law ﬁrm about the super-
vision of the paralegal’s work.
B. Consequences of Failure 
A suspended lawyer who serves as a paralegal (or in another banned capac-
ity in a law practice) without permission will likely be held in contempt and have 
the original suspension period extended or be denied reinstatement. SJC Rule 
4:01 § 17(8) declares that an excluded lawyer who engages in legal or paralegal 
work without permission “may not be reinstated until after the expiration of a 
speciﬁed term determined by the court after a ﬁnding that the lawyer has vio-
lated the terms of this rule.”51 For a lawyer assigned to disability inactive status, 
violating the ban will result in the lawyer being temporarily suspended pending the 
outcome of disciplinary proceedings, which the bar counsel shall commence.52
When the bar counsel learns that an excluded lawyer has engaged in banned 
activity, it ﬁles a petition for contempt with the SJC. In Matter of McBride,53 a 
disbarred lawyer, while engaged in practicing law, also forged a check, for which 
he pled guilty. On the bar counsel’s petition for contempt, the single justice held 
the lawyer in contempt and added eight years to the disbarment period, relying 
on SJC Rule 4:01 § 17(8). In Matter of Shanahan,54 discussed in Section III(C) 
with regard to an excluded lawyer practicing law, the respondent had been 
disbarred after he resigned following a conviction for bankruptcy fraud. He 
proceeded to join a consulting ﬁrm, where he represented clients in develop-
ment and permitting activities, including appearing on their behalf at local 
zoning and planning boards. The bar counsel ﬁled a petition for contempt, seek-
ing to add eight to ten years to his disqualiﬁcation period before the lawyer could 
apply for reinstatement. After concluding that the respondent’s actions consti-
tuted the practice of law, the single justice issued a contempt order and added 
three additional years to the original eight-year disbarment period.55
50 15 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 643 (1999).
51 See supra note 41 (discussing the recent amendment to SJC Rule 4:01 § 17(8)). For one example 
of a lawyer being held in contempt and the suspension length increased, see Matter of Johnson, 
28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 487 (2012).
52 SJC Rule 4:01 § 17(8).
53 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 440 (2013).
54 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 583 (2010).
55 See also Johnson, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 487; Matter of Kafkas, 451 Mass. 1001, 24 Mass. Att’y 
Disc. R. 386 (2008) (contempt order conﬁrmed, suspension period doubled based on prior version 
of SJC Rule 4:01 § 17(8)).
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C. Nature of the Restrictions on Practice
It is clear that an excluded lawyer may not serve as a lawyer for a client, as a 
paralegal, or in any other capacity for a lawyer or law ﬁrm during the exclusion 
period without explicit SJC permission. Questions have arisen, however, about 
whether certain activities that nonlawyers may engage in are also oﬀ limits to the 
excluded lawyer. Three SJC decisions have addressed this issue in Massachusetts.
In Matter of Shanahan, the excluded lawyer obtained employment at a ﬁrm 
that specialized in site analysis and property development consultation at the 
local, state, and federal levels. The ﬁrm employed no attorneys. After working 
there for almost two years, the respondent opened his own ﬁrm to provide sim-
ilar services. The bar counsel ﬁled a petition for contempt, claiming that the re-
spondent was practicing law. The respondent argued that because nonlawyers may 
lawfully engage in the work he was doing, he could not be violating the disbar-
ment order prohibiting him from practicing law. He emphasized that his cus-
tomers understood that he was not a licensed lawyer and that he referred legal 
activities that he formerly provided, such as drafting and negotiating purchase 
and sale agreements and conducting real estate closings, to licensed lawyers.
The single justice concluded that his actions qualiﬁed as the practice of law. 
The Court relied on the principle that “[a]n activity that may not constitute prac-
ticing law when performed by another category of professional may well be-
come the practice of law when a lawyer, disbarred or not, performs it.”56 Even 
though nonlawyers engage in similar activities, the single justice concluded that 
the respondent’s work was suﬃciently similar to the work he performed as a 
lawyer and involved “his ‘professional judgment in applying legal principles to 
address [his clients’] individualized needs.’ ”57 The respondent was held in con-
tempt, but his added sanction (three additional years before he was permitted to 
seek reinstatement) was less than that imposed upon an excluded lawyer who 
directly practiced law.58
Suspended lawyers who represent themselves in court proceedings do not 
qualify as practicing law. In Matter of Ellis,59 the respondent had been disbarred 
56 Shanahan, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 582, 587 (2010) (citing Matter of Eastwood, 5 Mass. Att’y 
Disc. R. 70, 76–77 (1994) (disbarred real estate lawyer prohibited from work abstracting deeds); 
Matter of Behenna, 9 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 17 (1993) (title examination, without rendering advice, 
constitutes practice of law); Matter of Levine, 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 311 (2004) (real estate 
activity)).
57 Id. (quoting Matter of Chimko, 444 Mass. 743, 750 (2005), quoting Oregon State Bar v. Smith, 
149 Or. App. 171, 183 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1117 (1998)).
58 Cf. Matter of McBride, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 440 (2013).
59 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 258 (2008).
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Practice Tips
A suspended lawyer must take special care to avoid 
employment that relies upon the judgments lawyers typ-
ically make, even if nonlawyers are permitted to perform 
that work. It is especially important to avoid employment 
in ﬁelds that are close to the work performed before the 
lawyer lost his or her license.
* * *
   While the SJC in recent years has begun to relax the 
strict interpretation of the doctrine barring nonlawyers 
from engaging in activities that come close to practicing 
law,60 any such relaxation does not likely apply to the 
suspended lawyer. Suspended lawyers should not infer 
that they may engage in activities in which nonlawyers 
might now be permitted to engage.
* * *
   The above practice tips notwithstanding, a suspended 
lawyer most likely may engage in federal tax work, if 
authorized by the federal government, without risking a 
contempt order or an added suspension. Federal tax 
practice may not be limited by state authorities.61
for participating in an insurance fraud scheme with his family’s law ﬁrm. After 
disbarment, he brought an action against a former client of the ﬁrm seeking to 
recover legal fees. The bar counsel ﬁled a petition for contempt, arguing that the
fees were accrued while working in a partnership with his brother, so the re-
spondent was actually representing the partnership in court. The single justice 
60 See, e.g., Real Estate Bar Ass’n v. Nat’l Real Estate Info. Servs., Inc., 459 Mass. 512 (2011). For 
a discussion of the evolving standards regarding unauthorized practice, see Alexis Anderson, “Cus-
tom and Practice” Unmasked: The Legal History of Massachusetts’s Experience with the Unauthorized 
Practice of Law, 94 Mass. L. Rev. 124 (2013).
61 See Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Florida State Bar, 373 U.S. 379 (1963) (Supremacy Clause prevents 
states from restricting practice before federal agencies); Lowell Bar Ass’n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 
176, 181–83, 186 (1943) (federal tax practice not the practice of law); Joﬀe v. Wilson, 381 Mass. 
47, 51 (1980) (certiﬁed public accountant’s work as an advocate and negotiator with the Internal 
Revenue Service was not unlawful; relying on Loeb and Sperry). See also Matter of Kafkas, 451 
Mass. 1001, 1002, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 386 (2008) (suspended lawyer’s argument that he was 
completing forms that resembled tax forms, and therefore not in violation of the suspension 
order, rejected based on the ﬁnding that the lawyer’s work was not federal tax work).
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concluded that, because his brother had assigned to the respondent all rights to 
the claim against the former client, the respondent was merely representing 
himself as the sole assignee of the claim, and that a disbarred attorney may under-
take legal work in a pro se capacity.
In Matter of Bott,62 a lawyer who had resigned as a disciplinary sanction aﬃr-
matively petitioned the SJC for permission to serve as a mediator while suspended 
from practicing law. The single justice reserved and reported the case to the full 
Court, which addressed whether mediation is an activity, like the zoning and per-
mitting advice in Shanahan, that is covered by the SJC Rule 4:01 § 17(7) exclu-
sion. The Court ﬁrst concluded that “as a general proposition, a person does not 
engage in the practice of law when acting as a mediator in a manner consistent 
with the [Uniform Rules on Dispute Resolution].”63 Whether an excluded disbarred 
or suspended lawyer may nevertheless oﬀer mediation services was a more com-
plex question. The Court oﬀered the following guidance:
The following considerations are relevant to determining whether 
mediation or other activities that do not constitute the practice of law 
when performed by nonlawyers may, in the context of bar discipline 
cases, nevertheless constitute legal work when performed by a lawyer:
(1) whether the type of work is customarily performed by lawyers as
part of their legal practice; (2) whether the work was performed by the 
lawyer prior to suspension, disbarment, or resignation for misconduct; 
(3) whether, following suspension, disbarment, or resignation for mis-
conduct, the lawyer has performed or seeks leave to perform the work
in the same oﬃce or community, or for other lawyers; and (4) whether 
the work as performed by the lawyer invokes the lawyer’s professional 
judgment in applying legal principles to address the individual needs
of clients.64
The Court also noted the diﬀerence between “facilitative” mediation (which does 
not call on the mediator to exercise professional judgment as a lawyer) and “eval-
uative” mediation (where a mediator evaluates the merits of the case and may 
oﬀer an opinion about its worth).65 The latter is more likely to qualify as the 
practice of law; the former is less likely.
62 462 Mass. 430, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 51 (2012).
63 462 Mass. at 434 (citing Uniform Rules on Dispute Resolution, SJC Rule 1:18, as amended, 442 
Mass. 1301 (2005)).
64 462 Mass at 438.
65 462 Mass at 438–39.
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The Court in Bott remanded the matter for more fact-ﬁnding regarding the 
lawyer’s plans. The single justice later allowed the petition and allowed the law-
yer to serve as a mediator, with several conditions, including that he only engage 
in “facilitative” mediation.66
IV. CONCLUSION
A suspension of a license to practice law is a serious matter, both for the law-
yer and, especially so, for the lawyer’s clients. The SJC has established the proto-
cols and requirements described here to ensure a responsible transition from active 
practice to closed operation. The requirements are detailed and time-consuming 
but must be satisﬁed. It is crucial for a suspended lawyer to carefully follow the 
SJC guidelines and to seek assistance or extensions when needing more time to 
complete the process. The most important responsibility is ensuring that each 
client is attended to and cared for, so that the lawyer’s suspension compromises 
no client matters.
A lawyer who has been suspended, either for a deﬁnite term or indeﬁnitely, 
should also anticipate and prepare for the later reinstatement petition. The law-
yer should not engage in any activities that might be considered practicing law 
and should not work for any lawyer in any capacity without express permission 
of the Court. At the same time, the suspended lawyer should actively stay abreast 
of the law and attend seminars and continuing legal education programs.
66 Matter of Bott, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 51 (2012).
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chapter twenty-three
Reinstatement: Standards and Procedures
I. INTRODUCTION
A critical goal for a suspended or disbarred lawyer is recovering the privilege 
of practicing law. This chapter addresses the reinstatement process, which is de-
manding and requires careful thought and preparation.
How a lawyer returns to practicing law after having the license to practice 
revoked depends on the nature of the conduct that caused the suspension, the law-
yer’s interim conduct, and the suspension’s length. This chapter addresses rein-
statement following (1) suspension for one year or less, (2) a term suspension for 
more than one year, and (3) an indeﬁnite suspension, disbarment, or discipli-
nary resignation. The chapter also explains the procedure for a contested rein-
statement hearing.
Practice Tip
No reinstatement is automatic. Occasionally, the Supreme 
Judicial Court (SJC) has referred to the most routine 
reinstatement process after a short suspension as “auto-
matic,”1 but every reinstatement requires an SJC order 
upon an application by the suspended lawyer. The Ofﬁce 
of the Bar Counsel may oppose any application if the 
circumstances warrant.
1 See, e.g., Matter of Gustafson, 464 Mass. 1021, 1023 n.4, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 292 (2013) 
(“essentially, automatic reinstatement” after a suspension of six months or less); Matter of 
Ramos, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 554 (2013) (“automatic reinstatement” after six-month suspen-
sion); Matter of Cullen, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 123 (2010) (respondent “entitled to seek auto-
matic reinstatement” after one-year suspension).
470
After Suspension or Disbarment
II. REINSTATEMENT PROCEDURES AND PROTOCOLS
Depending on the length of an attorney’s suspension from the practice of 
law, the attorney must meet certain criteria to be reinstated. Under the SJC 
rules, these are stratiﬁed for the following term lengths: six months or less; 
between six months and one day up to and including one year; and a year and 
a day or more.2
A. Routine Reinstatement: Suspensions of One Year or Less
In general, a lawyer who has been suspended for any length of time must 
petition for reinstatement before being readmitted to practice. For shorter sus-
pensions, though, the SJC rules permit a streamlined process without the need 
for a formal petition. The rules diﬀer depending on the length of the suspension: 
six months or less, or six months and one day to one year.
1. Reinstatement After Suspensions of Six Months or Less
A lawyer who is suspended for six months or less is entitled to routine 
reinstatement, unless the suspension order requires petitioning for reinstate-
ment, as short suspension orders occasionally do.3 The routine reinstatement 
occurs after the respondent ﬁles an aﬃdavit of compliance with the SJC and the 
bar counsel representing compliance with every requirement of the suspension 
order, unless the bar counsel objects within ten days of the aﬃdavit ﬁling. SJC 
Rule 4:01 § 18(1)(a) describes the contents of that aﬃdavit as follows:
A lawyer who has been suspended for six months or less pursuant to 
disciplinary proceedings shall be reinstated at the end of the period of 
suspension by ﬁling with the court and serving upon the Bar Counsel an 
aﬃdavit stating that the lawyer (i) has fully complied with the require-
ments of the suspension order, (ii) has paid any required fees and costs, 
2 Prior to a change in the SJC rules in 1998, a suspension of any length required a reinstatement 
hearing. Thus, it can be misleading to rely on older cases to suggest that a one-year suspension with-
out a reinstatement hearing is an appropriate sanction for certain misconduct. See, e.g., Matter of 
Neitlich, 413 Mass. 416, 8 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 167 (1992); Matter of McCarthy, 416 Mass. 423, 
9 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 225 (1993).
3 See, e.g., Matter of Beery, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 46 (2012) (three-month suspension with a re-
quirement that the respondent ﬁle a petition for reinstatement); Matter of Raﬀerty, 26 Mass. Att’y 
Disc. R. 538 (2010) (four-month suspension, with reinstatement conditioned on passing the Multi-
State Professional Responsibility Examination); Matter of Collins, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 132 
(2009) (six-month suspension with an order to petition for reinstatement).
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and (iii) has repaid the Clients’ Security Board any funds awarded on 
account of the lawyer’s misconduct.4
The lawyer may ﬁle the aﬃdavit the day after the term suspension is served.5
If the bar counsel objects within ten days, a hearing before the single justice 
occurs, as described in Section II(A)(3). Otherwise, the Court enters an order re-
instating the lawyer after ten days. If, however, the lawyer ﬁles the aﬃdavit more 
than six months after the suspension ends, the reinstatement requires a petition.6
Practice Tip
A lawyer who prepares an afﬁdavit seeking routine rein-
statement should confer with the bar counsel before 
serving the afﬁdavit and request that the bar counsel 
notify the Court immediately in writing that the lawyer 
does not object to the reinstatement. Bar counsel regu-
larly accommodates such requests.
2. Reinstatement After Suspensions Between Six Months and One Year
For suspensions of more than six months but not more than one year, the 
same reinstatement process applies as for less than six months, but the lawyer’s 
aﬃdavit must address an additional requirement. SJC Rule 4:01 § 18(1)(b) re-
quires that the suspended lawyer also certify that the lawyer “has taken the Multi-
State Professional Responsibility Examination during the period of suspension 
and received a passing grade as established by the Board of Bar Examiners.”7
As with suspensions of six months or less, the suspended lawyer is rein-
stated automatically after ten days unless the bar counsel objects, or unless the 
4 Massachusetts Rules and Orders of the Supreme Judicial Court r. 4:01 § 18(1)(a) 
[hereinafter SJC Rule].
5 Neither the SJC nor the BBO rules explicitly establish the date after which the lawyer may ﬁle an 
aﬃdavit. The SJC rule states that the suspended lawyer who is eligible for routine reinstatement 
“shall be reinstated at the end of the period of suspension by ﬁling” the compliance aﬃdavit. SJC 
Rule 4:01 §§ 18(1)(a)–(b). In contrast, a lawyer who has been suspended for a term exceeding 
one year is explicitly permitted to ﬁle the petition for reinstatement three months before the end 
of the speciﬁed term. SJC Rule 4:01 § 18(2)(c). A fair reading of the rules as a whole is that for sus-
pensions of one year or less the lawyer may not ﬁle the compliance aﬃdavit until after serving the full 
term of the suspension.
6 SJC Rule 4:01 § 18(1)(d).
7 Id. at § 18(1)(b).
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respondent has submitted the aﬃdavit more than six months after the end of the 
suspension. In the latter case, the lawyer must ﬁle a petition for reinstatement.
Practice Tip
A suspended lawyer who fails to ﬁle an afﬁdavit within 
the required six-month period may ﬁle a petition to sub-
mit the afﬁdavit late, if the lawyer has good cause for 
missing the deadline. With no good cause for the late ﬁl-
ing, the lawyer must ﬁle a petition for reinstatement, the 
same as for lawyers suspended for more than one year. 
That petition process adds signiﬁcantly to the length of 
the lawyer’s suspension, so a lawyer suspended for six 
months or less should pay close attention to the dead-
lines for requesting routine reinstatement.
3. Bar Counsel ’s Objection to a Routine Reinstatement
When the Oﬃce of the Bar Counsel receives the suspended lawyer’s aﬃdavit, 
it has ten days to ﬁle with the Court and serve on the respondent an objection to 
the reinstatement.8 Bar counsel objects when aware of facts that raise concerns 
Practice Tip
Because SJC Rule 4:01 § 18(1)(c) permits the bar counsel 
to object to an otherwise automatic reinstatement if con-
cerns remain about the lawyer’s ﬁtness to resume prac-
tice, a single justice has cited this option in declining to 
impose a longer suspension that would automatically 
require a reinstatement hearing.9 A respondent arguing 
at a disciplinary hearing for a suspension of one year or 
less might rely on that reasoning in support of the lesser 
sanction.
8 Id. at § 18(1)(c).
9 Matter of Gustafson, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 397, 402 (2012), aff ’d 464 Mass. 1021, 29 Mass. 
Att’y Disc. R. 292 (2013). See also Matter of Greenidge, 30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 174, 193 (2014) 
(same justice noting the bar counsel’s ability to prevent an automatic suspension if there are 
concerns).
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about the respondent’s return to practice, and where bar counsel believes a more 
deliberate consideration is warranted. The ﬁling of the objection leads to a hear-
ing before a single justice on the question whether the suspended lawyer must 
ﬁle a petition for reinstatement and proceed through that hearing process. If 
the Court concludes that questions remain about the lawyer’s ﬁtness, it requires 
a petition. If not, it permits the reinstatement.
When the bar counsel objects, the procedure is as follows: When the SJC 
receives the bar counsel’s objection, it assigns the matter to a single justice. The 
Court schedules a hearing on short notice to address the question of a reinstate-
ment hearing. If the single justice concludes that routine reinstatement is not 
appropriate, the respondent follows the petition process described in the fol-
lowing subsection.
B. Reinstatement After Suspensions of More than One Year
You Should Know
An SJC order suspending a lawyer for a period of more 
than one year does not mean that the lawyer presump-
tively returns to practice at the end of the time period. 
The practical presumption, even with a term suspension, 
is that the lawyer will not return to practice at that time. 
The burden always rests with the lawyer to persuade the 
board and the Court of ﬁtness to return to practice. And 
even when the lawyer satisﬁes that burden, the reinstate-
ment process potentially adds months to the length of 
the ordered suspension.
* * *
   For reinstatement purposes, an indeﬁnite suspension 
is the equivalent of a ﬁve-year suspension. A disbarment 
order is equivalent to an eight-year suspension. A lawyer 
who is subject to either order type may petition early, 
i.e., three months prior to the end of the respective 
period before ﬁling a reinstatement petition, although 
the reinstatement hearing will not be held until after the 
suspension period ends.
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An order suspending a lawyer from practice for a ﬁxed term implies that, 
at the end of the term, the lawyer can petition to return to practice. But for any 
term suspension longer than one year, reinstatement requires a formal process, 
and the lawyer must persuade the Board of Bar Overseers (BBO) and the Court 
of reinstatement. That process begins when the lawyer ﬁles a petition for rein-
statement and a questionnaire. A hearing, usually before a panel of three board 
members, then follows. The board then reviews the panel’s recommendation and, 
ultimately, the SJC reviews the board’s recommendation. Only the Court may 
order a lawyer reinstated.
1. Petition for Reinstatement
The ﬁrst step in the reinstatement process is to ﬁle a petition for reinstate-
ment. A lawyer may ﬁle this petition with the clerk of the SJC for Suﬀolk County 
as early as three months prior to the end of the suspension and, at the same time, 
ﬁle a reinstatement questionnaire with the board and the bar counsel, as described 
in Section II(B)(2). The petition must state the following seven elements:10
1. Whether the lawyer has complied with all the terms and conditions of 
the order imposing the suspension
2. Whether the lawyer has paid any costs the Court assessed to defray 
the expenses of the disciplinary process, as permitted by SJC Rule 
4:01 § 2311
3. The extent to which the lawyer has made restitution to, or otherwise 
made whole, all clients or others injured by the misconduct
4. Whether the lawyer has repaid the Clients’ Security Board (CSB) any 
funds it awarded because of the misconduct
5. That the lawyer has taken and passed the Multi-State Professional 
Responsibility Examination (MPRE) after the order of suspension 
was entered
6. That the lawyer has posted with the board any bond the board may 
have required as a condition of reinstatement12
7. That the lawyer has ﬁled with the board and served upon the bar 
counsel copies of the petition and the completed questionnaire 
required by the board under its rules
10 SJC Rule 4:01 §§ 18(4)(a)–(g).
11 SJC Rule 4:01 § 23.
12 Under SJC Rule 4:01 § 18(6), the board may, in lieu of receiving full payment of any costs 
assessed against the lawyer, require the lawyer to post a bond to guarantee such payment.
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Practice Tips
The SJC rule requires the suspended lawyer to state 
whether the lawyer has complied with the listed condi-
tions. A lawyer who reports in the afﬁdavit that the 
listed conditions have not yet been fulﬁlled will not be 
reinstated, except in the most unusual circumstances.13
* * *
   A lawyer preparing a petition and its two-part ques-
tionnaire should share the documents with the bar coun-
sel before ﬁling the petition in order to learn from the 
bar counsel whether the ofﬁce has any concerns about 
the petition or the questionnaire. Bar counsel’s advance 
opinion may help the lawyer improve the ﬁling or defer 
ﬁling until all concerns are addressed and remedied. A 
lawyer who loses a reinstatement hearing must wait a 
year before ﬁling a new petition, unless the Court other-
wise allows. A lawyer who realizes that a reinstatement 
petition is likely to fail should consider seeking leave to 
withdraw it without prejudice. The lawyer may then 
reapply within twelve months (or less, if permitted by 
the SJC) and after having cured whatever defects or 
shortcomings that might have otherwise led to a denial 
of the petition.
2. Two-Part Reinstatement Questionnaire
Along with the petition for reinstatement, the lawyer must also complete 
two parts of a lengthy questionnaire, included as appendices to the BBO rules.14
The lawyer must sign both questionnaire parts under the penalties of perjury. 
Part I of the questionnaire must be ﬁled with the board and the bar counsel 
(but not with the Court) and is a public document that is part of the record of 
the open reinstatement hearing process. Part II of the questionnaire is ﬁled only 
13 Demonstration of full restitution of misappropriated funds is, for all practical purposes, a 
requirement for reinstatement. “[W]hatever the discipline, no defalcating attorney has been 
reinstated to the practice of law without ﬁrst having made full restitution.” Matter of Collins, 24 
Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 105, 112 (2008).
14 Rules of the Board of Bar Overseers § 3.63, Appendix [hereinafter BBO Rules], avail-
able at https://bbopublic.blob.core.windows.net/web/f/BBORules.pdf.
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with the bar counsel and no part of it is made public, except as ordered during 
the reinstatement hearing.
Part I requires the petitioner to describe any activities in detail since the sus-
pension began, including all steps taken to develop the competence and “learn-
ing in law”15 necessary to resume practice. The petitioner must also describe any 
involvement in other legal proceedings since the suspension as well as the peti-
tioner’s plans for practice after reinstatement, including identifying mentors and 
monitors. It includes a “Personal Statement” in which the lawyer can advocate 
the case for reinstatement. The lawyer must also provide three references, two 
of whom must be members of the Massachusetts bar.
Practice Tip
Part I of the reinstatement questionnaire is a critical 
advocacy document. It should persuade the reader that 
this lawyer has earned the privilege of returning to the 
practice of law. Any suspended lawyer who hopes to be 
reinstated should prepare this submission diligently and 
honestly. Honesty and accuracy are the most critical 
qualities of this submission. Treating this document with 
less than due care may signal to the board and the 
Court that the lawyer cannot yet be trusted with the 
affairs of clients. The members of the hearing panel pay 
special attention to how the petitioner describes the 
earlier misconduct, accepts responsibility for it, and 
communicates remorse. It does not help the lawyer to 
try to relitigate the underlying misconduct ﬁndings.
Part II of the reinstatement questionnaire collects data and information not 
always appropriate for public attention, but which are nevertheless essential for 
persuading the board and the Court that the lawyer may return to practice with-
out being “detrimental to the integrity and standing of the bar, the administra-
tion of justice or the public interest.”16 It is ﬁled only with the bar counsel, who 
maintains it as a conﬁdential document, except if any of the information is oﬀered 
15 SJC Rule 4:01 § 18(5).
16 Id.
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in evidence at the hearing and without being impounded. (Some hearing pan-
els ask to see Part II, however.) Part II of the questionnaire reviews, in consid-
erable detail, the lawyer’s complete ﬁnancial status, including documentation, 
tax returns, and releases to ensure complete transparency. It also asks for infor-
mation and documents that describe the status of the lawyer’s physical and 
mental health as well as any disabling condition or circumstances, if those 
factors played a role in the lawyer’s misconduct or discipline. Finally, Part II 
invites the lawyer to provide an “Additional Statement” describing “any other 
matter not previously described in the Questionnaire which should, in the 
interest of full disclosure, be brought to the attention of the Board of Bar 
Overseers in considering your petition for reinstatement.”17
Practice Tips
Part II of the reinstatement questionnaire is not ﬁled with 
the board and, therefore, not automatically provided to 
the hearing panel. Most hearing panels, however, inquire 
about this submission at a prehearing conference or 
order that Part II be included as a hearing exhibit. The 
panel also knows of its contents to the extent the bar 
counsel or petitioner seeks to introduce information 
from it. If offered as an exhibit, Part II of the question-
naire is usually ordered to be impounded.
* * *
   A lawyer seeking reinstatement need not complete 
the “Additional Statement” section in Part II of the rein-
statement questionnaire. It is not the place to repeat 
what the lawyer included in the “Personal Statement” in 
Part I. It is a useful place to identify anything, helpful or 
not-so-helpful, not covered in either of the two question-
naire parts. It is better to address an unfavorable fact or 
development here than to hope that the bar counsel or 
the board never learns of it.
17 The reinstatement questionnaire is Appendix 1 to the BBO Rules.
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The BBO Rules permit Part II to be admitted into evidence at the reinstate-
ment hearing “at either party’s request . . . subject to redaction or protective order 
where warranted.”18 In practice, the parties and the board do not permit public 
dissemination of the petitioner’s personal ﬁnancial or medical information unless 
the facts in dispute at the hearing make such disclosure necessary. If oﬀered as 
an exhibit, Part II of the questionnaire is usually ordered to be impounded.
3. Filing the Petition for Reinstatement
A suspended lawyer seeking reinstatement must ﬁle documents in three 
places, along with a “deposit.” The petition itself is ﬁled with the clerk of the 
SJC for Suﬀolk County.19 At the same time, the lawyer must ﬁle four copies of 
Part I of the reinstatement questionnaire with the board, and the originals of 
Parts I and II with bar counsel.20 The lawyer must also provide a $500 deposit 
with the board “for costs” of the reinstatement proceedings.21 The board holds 
that sum to apply to any payment order requiring the lawyer to pay the costs of 
the reinstatement hearing.22
Practice Tip
If the costs of the reinstatement proceedings are less than 
the $500, the petitioner is entitled to receive the balance 
from the board after the reinstatement process ends.
4. Proceedings Upon Filing of a Petition for Reinstatement
Within three days of receiving the petition, the clerk of the SJC transmits 
the petition to the board. The board then assigns a date for the hearing to take 
place after the suspension order expires and, in any event, no earlier than sixty 
days after the board receives the petition from the Court.23 Therefore, if the law-
yer ﬁles the petition three months before the suspension expires (as the rules 
permit), no hearing can take place for at least three months, until the term sus-
pension ends. If the lawyer ﬁles the petition after the suspension expiration date, 
the hearing will not take place for at least sixty more days.
18 BBO Rules § 3.63.
19 SJC Rule 4:01 § 18(4).
20 BBO Rules § 3.62.
21 BBO Rules § 3.64.
22 BBO Rules § 3.66; SJC Rule 4:01 § 18(6).
23 SJC Rule 4:01 § 18(5).
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At least two weeks before the hearing date, the board must publish the notice 
of the reinstatement petition ﬁling and the date and time of the hearing in at least 
two newspapers—“the newspaper designated by the Court as an authorized source 
for the publication of all Rules of court” (typically, Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly)
and a general circulation newspaper in the community of the petitioner’s resi-
dence and law oﬃce.24 While the rule does not require it, the board also gives 
notice to the CSB.
The board may hear the petition itself or assign it to a hearing committee, 
a special hearing oﬃcer, or a panel of the board.25 In practice, the board assigns 
the matter to a panel of three board members. A hearing is held in the same way 
as a disciplinary hearing (described in Chapter 6), except that the petitioner has 
the burden of proof in establishing the qualiﬁcations for reinstatement. The hear-
ing panel transmits its ﬁndings and recommendations to the board, which the 
board reviews and either accepts or revises. The board then ﬁles its ﬁndings and 
recommendations with the SJC. The Court, through a single justice (the same 
single justice who imposed the suspension or disbarment order), either allows 
the petition for reinstatement or holds a hearing on the matter. If a petitioner 
is dissatisﬁed with the single justice’s order, the petitioner may appeal to the 
full bench of the SJC, as outlined in SJC Rule 2:23, described in Chapter 19, 
Section VI(B)(2).
III. REQUIREMENTS FOR REINSTATEMENT
There is quite a bit of case law elucidating the requirements for reinstate-
ment, as described in SJC Rule 4:01 § 18(5). The following subsections address 
them in detail.
A. Standard for Reinstatement
A disbarred lawyer or a suspended lawyer required to petition for reinstate-
ment bears the burden of showing that reinstatement is warranted. The standard 
the petitioner must prove at the reinstatement hearing is as follows:
“The test of ﬁtness for reinstatement is two pronged. Not only must a 
petitioner demonstrate the requisite moral qualiﬁcations and learning in 
the law, but he also must show that his resumption of the practice of law 
24 BBO Rules § 3.67.
25 SJC Rule 4:01 § 18(5).
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will not be detrimental to the integrity of the bar, the administration of 
justice, or the public interest.” The petitioner must show that he has so 
rehabilitated himself that he “currently possesses the necessary moral 
character to be admitted to the bar of the Commonwealth,” and will 
“inspire public conﬁdence once again, in spite of his previous actions.” 
“[I]t is appropriate, despite the lack of speciﬁc directives, to consider the 
public perception of and conﬁdence in the bar when determining the 
ﬁtness of original applicants to practice law in the Commonwealth.”26
In making these determinations, a panel considering a petition for reinstate-
ment “looks to ‘(1) the nature of the original oﬀense for which the petitioner 
was [suspended], (2) the petitioner’s character, maturity, and experience at the 
time of his [suspension], (3) the petitioner’s occupations and conduct in the time 
since his [suspension], (4) the time elapsed since the [suspension], and (5) the 
petitioner’s present competence in legal skills.’ ”27
The hearing panel must also consider the public’s perception of the legal pro-
fession as a result of the reinstatement and the eﬀect on the bar. “In this inquiry 
we are concerned not only with the actuality of the petitioner’s morality and 
competence, but also on the reaction to his reinstatement by the bar and pub-
lic.”28 “The impact of a reinstatement on public conﬁdence in the bar and in the 
administration of justice is a substantial concern.”29
The panel must also look at the petitioner’s compliance with any conditions 
imposed at the time of the suspension or disbarment order, including restitution. 
An application for reinstatement that lacks either full repayment, or at least a con-
certed eﬀort at restitution and a realistic plan for paying the remainder, would 
have little, if any, chances of success.30
26 Matter of Shyavitz, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 612 (2010) (citations omitted) (quoting Matter of 
Prager, 422 Mass. 86, 92, 93 (1996); Matter of Hiss, 368 Mass. 447, 452, 1 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 
122 (1975)).
27 Matter of Daniels, 442 Mass. 1037, 1038, 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 120, 122–23 (2004) (quoting 
Matter of Prager, 422 Mass. 86, 92 (1996); Matter of Hiss, 368 Mass. 447, 460, 1 Mass. Att’y Disc. 
R. 122, 133 (1975)).
28 Matter of Gordon, 385 Mass. 48, 53, 3 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 69, 73 (1982).
29 Matter of Waitz, 416 Mass. 298, 307, 9 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 336, 345 (1993).
30 See, e.g., Matter of Dawkins, 432 Mass. 1009, 1010, 16 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 94, 95 (2000) (fac-
tor in denial of reinstatement was failure to make restitution); Matter of Heﬀernon, 14 Mass. 
Att’y Disc. R. 305 (1998) (denial of reinstatement “until some monies have been paid on the mal-
practice judgments against him and a realistic plan for full payment of both judgments is proposed”); 
Matter of Waitz, 7 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 302 (1989) (denial of reinstatement based in part on lack 
of suﬃcient attempts to pay debt to IRS); Matter of Wynn, 7 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 316, 317 (1991) 
(failure to pay tax debt and lack of restitution to wronged clients “pose[d] substantial impediment 
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B. Burden on the Petitioner, Likelihood of Reinstatement
The SJC has stated that the petitioner bears a “heavy burden of establishing 
her present qualiﬁcations for readmission” (emphasis added).31 A petitioner for 
reinstatement must understand that the misconduct giving rise to the petition-
er’s suspension is “conclusive evidence that [he] was, at the time, morally unﬁt to 
practice law,”32 and that the misconduct “continue[s] to be evidence of his lack 
of moral character . . . when he petition[s] for reinstatement.”33
Lawyers have been denied reinstatement after serving a term suspension 
for failing to satisfy one or more of the foregoing requirements. For instance, in
Matter of Weiss,34 the petitioner, who had been suspended for one year and a day 
in 2011,35 was denied reinstatement in 2016, after his third petition for rein-
statement, because he failed to persuade the hearing panel or the Court that he 
had “attained a suﬃcient understanding of the basis for his discipline to sup-
port true rehabilitation.”36 In Matter of Shaughnessy,37 the lawyer had been sus-
pended for six months and one day for neglect.38 That sanction, which would 
have permitted him to resume practice without a reinstatement petition, was 
doubled to one year and two days after the lawyer advised clients while under 
suspension.39 When he sought reinstatement at the end of that extended sus-
pension, the hearing panel, board, single justice, and full SJC each agreed in 
turn that he had not proven that he had the moral character or the learning in 
law to return to practice.
One reported case illustrates how a lawyer may not be reinstated after a term 
suspension has ended. In Matter of Wong,40 the SJC suspended the lawyer for 
three years, retroactive to 1993, after a conviction in New Hampshire for re-
ceiving stolen property. In 1995, before the three years had expired, the lawyer 
to a ﬁnding that reinstatement would be in the interests of the bar and the public”), Matter of 
Sullivan, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 578, 585, 586 (2009) (failure to have a plan on reinstatement as 
a factor in denying it). See also supra note 14.
31 Matter of Fletcher, 466 Mass. 1018, 1020, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 259 (2013).
32 Matter of Dawkins, 432 Mass. 1009, 1010–11, 16 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 94, 95 (2000) (citations 
omitted).
33 Id.
34 474 Mass. 1001 (2016).
35 Matter of Weiss, 460 Mass. 1012 (2011).
36 474 Mass. at 1002.
37 456 Mass. 1021, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 601 (2010).
38 Matter of Shaughnessy, 442 Mass. 1012, 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 482 (2004).
39 Matter of Shaughnessy, 446 Mass. 1013, 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 674 (2006).
40 11 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 308 (1995).
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petitioned for reinstatement. Although the board’s hearing panel recommended 
reinstatement, the board and the single justice refused his request.41 The lawyer 
then reapplied for reinstatement in 1998, with less success with the hearing panel. 
The panel recommended that his petition be denied, concluding that, even though 
he had served ﬁve years after a three-year suspension, the evidence presented 
at the hearing about his moral qualiﬁcations and his learning in law was 
“sketchy” and “weak.”42 The board and a single justice agreed. The full SJC re-
versed the ﬁnding of the board and the single justice regarding the petitioner’s 
moral character (see Section III(C)(2)), concluding that the evidence showed 
that he had the requisite character, but agreed that the proof of his learning in 
the law since his suspension was not adequate. The Court remanded the matter 
for further evidence on that question, and the lawyer was ultimately reinstated.
Lawyers seeking readmission after an indeﬁnite suspension or disbarment 
face an even greater burden in persuading the board and the Court to permit 
them to return to practice. The majority of the reports in which a lawyer who 
had been indeﬁnitely suspended or been disbarred sought reinstatement show 
the Court denying reinstatement. Besides not acknowledging responsibility for 
the original misconduct and its gravity,43 the other major hurdle for reinstate-
ment in this context is the length of time the lawyer had been away from the 
law, making proof of adequate learning in law diﬃcult. For instance, in Matter 
of Sullivan,44 the lawyer sought reinstatement ﬁve years after an indeﬁnite sus-
pension and nine years after last practicing law. The single justice denied his 
petition because, among other worries, “the petitioner ha[d] failed to put forth 
a speciﬁc plan for resuming a law practice after a hiatus of nine years.” In Mat-
ter of Fletcher,45 the full SJC denied the lawyer’s reinstatement petition in part be-
cause “[t]he petitioner has not practiced law in the Commonwealth for more than 
twenty years, and she has not practiced law or worked in a ﬁeld related to the law 
for at least ten years.”46 Her claim of having read and studied legal materials was 
41 Those facts appear in Matter of Wong, 442 Mass. 1016 n.1, 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 540, 542 
(2004).
42 442 Mass. at 1016, 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. at 542.
43 See, e.g., Matter of Fletcher, 466 Mass. 1018, 1020, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 259 (2013) (rein-
statement denied; petitioner’s claim of innocence of charges for which she was convicted cited 
as evidence against her); Matter of Shyavitz, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 612 (2010) (reinstatement 
denied, but moral character shown by accepting responsibility); Matter of Estrene, 22 Mass. 
Att’y Disc. R. 313 (2006) (lawyer reinstated after thirty-month suspension; accepting responsi-
bility helped prove his moral character).
44 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 578, 585–86 (2009).
45 466 Mass. 1018, 1020, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 259 (2013).
46 466 Mass. at 1020.
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not suﬃcient to show that she had suﬃcient learning in law to be trusted with 
client matters.
On occasion a disbarred lawyer achieves reinstatement. The most notewor-
thy case of reinstatement after disbarment in the Commonwealth is Matter of 
Hiss.47 In Hiss, the petitioner was disbarred in 1952 after a perjury conviction fol-
lowing his highly publicized testimony before the House Un-American Activi-
ties Committee during the “red scare” hearings of the 1940s and 1950s. In 1974, 
the lawyer ﬁled a petition for reinstatement, claiming that he possessed the qual-
iﬁcations to practice law again. While he persisted in denying his guilt on the 
perjury charge, the Court concluded that, on the record before it, his refusal to 
accept the conviction was not a sign of moral deﬁciency:
[W]e cannot say that every person who, under oath, protests his inno-
cence after conviction and refuses to repent is committing perjury. Sim-
ple fairness and fundamental justice demand that the person who believes 
he is innocent though convicted should not be required to confess guilt 
to a criminal act he honestly believes he did not commit (emphasis in 
original).48
Finding that otherwise the petitioner had proven his qualiﬁcations, the Court 
granted the petition for reinstatement.49
Practice Tip
While Matter of Hiss shows that a lawyer’s refusal to accept 
responsibility for misconduct does not necessarily pre-
vent the lawyer’s reinstatement, as a practical matter, a 
lawyer who fails to demonstrate contrition or to accept 
responsibility has a much harder time persuading the 
board and the Court to permit the lawyer to resume 
practicing law.
47 Matter of Hiss, 368 Mass. 447, 1 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 122 (1975).
48 368 Mass. at 457, 1 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. at 132.
49 In another highly publicized case at the time, William J. Cintolo was disbarred following his 
conviction in federal court for obstruction of justice. Matter of Cintolo, 6 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 54 
(1990). He was reinstated eﬀective July 1, 1995. 10 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 40 (1994). At the time, 
disbarment carried a sanction of only ﬁve years, instead of eight years as it has since 1998.
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C. Proof of Facts in Support of Reinstatement
A suspended lawyer seeking reinstatement must prepare carefully and thor-
oughly for the reinstatement hearing, and understand both the evidence and 
strategies that are persuasive and those that are self-defeating and ineﬀective. 
Experienced practitioners oﬀer the following suggestions when developing a 
reinstatement strategy after a suspension.
1. Carefully Preparing the Reinstatement Questionnaire
The petitioner’s statements in the reinstatement questionnaire drive the case’s 
theory in the reinstatement hearing. A suspended lawyer should, if at all possi-
ble, retain experienced counsel to assist in preparing the questionnaire, as it serves 
as a petitioner’s critical set of statements, under oath, establishing the arguments 
to be used in the hearing. The questionnaire must acknowledge the misconduct 
that led to the suspension, communicate credible and genuine remorse for the 
misconduct, and convincingly describe what has changed since the misconduct 
occurred and why the misconduct will not recur. It should also expressly address 
why reinstatement serves the public interest.
Practice Tips
Several Practice Tips in this book tout the advantages of 
a lawyer facing discipline retaining counsel for represen-
tation. That advice is never more important than in the 
reinstatement process, which is fraught with pitfalls that 
experienced counsel can help navigate.
* * *
   A suspended lawyer who quickly ﬁles a petition and 
submits a reinstatement questionnaire before complet-
ing every necessary step to achieve reinstatement should 
consider either withdrawing the petition or negotiating 
with the bar counsel to defer action on the matter. This 
way the suspended lawyer can arrange affairs to present 
the best case to the hearing panel through an amended 
petition. As noted previously, it is always beneﬁcial to share 
the proposed petition with the bar counsel before ﬁling.
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2. Develop a Reinstatement Strategy That Accounts for All Required Elements
A petitioner’s reinstatement strategy must include persuasive evidence and 
arguments on each of the factors that the hearing panel must address in any re-
instatement decision, as required by SJC Rule 4:01 § 18(5). Those factors include: 
(1) the petitioner possesses suﬃcient moral character, despite the prior miscon-
duct, (2) the petitioner is competent to return to practice, (3) the petitioner has 
suﬃcient learning in law, and (4) resuming the practice of law is not detrimental 
to the bar and serves the public interest. The fact that the petitioner has served 
the allotted suspension time is not suﬃcient.50 The presumption is that the peti-
tioner is, in fact, not entitled to return after completing the suspension; the dis-
cipline is “conclusive evidence that he was, at the time [of the sanction], morally 
unﬁt to practice law” and continues to have evidentiary force showing unﬁt-
ness.51 Petitioners must persuade the panel that they are no longer unﬁt. To do 
so, they bear the “diﬃcult burden”52 of proving each of the identiﬁed elements.
Each element presents important strategic opportunities for a petitioner. 
Experienced practitioners suggest the following:
• Proving sufficient moral character: The petitioner must account, if rea-
sonably possible, for the fact, treated as established for the reinstate-
ment proceedings, that the petitioner engaged in misconduct in the 
past and has improved in some identiﬁable way to warrant being 
trusted to represent clients again. The strategic reinstatement plan 
should include the following considerations, depending on the facts
of the suspension or disbarment:
Q  Typically, and in all but the most unusual cases, the petitioner must 
be prepared to admit previous wrongdoing and communicate gen-
uine remorse for mistakes made. But “sincere remorse, standing 
alone, does not equal reform.”53
Q  If the petitioner stipulated to certain ﬁndings or entered into an 
agreed-upon stipulation during the disciplinary proceedings, at the 
reinstatement hearing the petitioner cannot claim never engaging 
in the misconduct and only stipulating to the charges to avoid the 
50 “Passage of time alone is insuﬃcient to warrant reinstatement.” Matter of Daniels, 442 Mass. 
1037, 1038, 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 120, 123 (2004) (rescript).
51 See Matter of Dawkins, 432 Mass. 1009, 1010–11, 16 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 94, 95 (2000) (rescript).
52 Matter of Corben, 31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 92 (2015).
53 Id. at 97.
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risks of the hearing process. The stipulation and the resulting sanc-
tion mean that, for reinstatement purposes, the misconduct occurred.54
Q  The petitioner must also demonstrate having changed and how, 
and may call witnesses or submit aﬃdavits from witnesses, 
whether lay or professional. Supporters may write letters to the 
board, which are typically considered.
Q  A witness who testiﬁes about the petitioner’s good moral character 
must be prepared to answer questions about the petitioner’s engage-
ment in misconduct and to reconcile the present favorable opinion 
with the facts from the lawyer’s past. It is essential that the wit-
nesses fully understand the nature of the misconduct in which the 
petitioner engaged and how the petitioner has changed.
Q  The bar counsel or the hearing panel may ask the witnesses to 
relate how the petitioner described the misconduct to them, and 
the witnesses’ understanding of the basis for the suspension and 
why it occurred.
Q  The bar counsel may invite individuals aﬀected or harmed by the 
petitioner’s misconduct to attend the hearing and oﬀer testimony. 
If the misconduct was associated with litigation outside of the 
disciplinary proceedings, the bar counsel may explore evidence 
about the petitioner’s stance and allegations in that litigation.55
Q  While never suﬃcient, it is almost always useful for the petitioner 
to show, with competent evidence beyond simply the petitioner’s 
own testimony, engaging in volunteer, charitable activities through-
out the suspension period and not only in the months before the 
reinstatement eﬀort.56
54 A petitioner cannot lie about the reasons for engaging in negotiations during the disciplinary 
proceedings, of course. The lesson of the Practice Tip is that it is usually a strategic mistake to 
claim in a reinstatement petition that the suspended lawyer did not engage in misconduct, Mat-
ter of Hiss notwithstanding. See Matter of Hiss, 368 Mass. 447, 1 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 122 (1975) 
(petitioner was not disqualiﬁed for reinstatement solely because he continued to deny that he had 
committed the crime on which his disbarment had been based).
55 See, e.g., Matter of Harrington, 27 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 432 (2011) (petitioner suspended for 
making baseless, insulting accusations against the judge who presided over his personal divorce; on 
his petition for reinstatement, the board took notice of the continued pursuit of his claims through 
civil lawsuits and appeals).
56 “A petitioner’s moral character can be illustrated by charitable activities, volunteer activities, 
commitment to family, or community work.” Matter of Sullivan, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 578, 583 
(2009). In Matter of Wong, 442 Mass. 1016, 1018, 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 540, 543–44 (2004), 
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Q  Misstatements or failure to disclose all matters on the reinstate-
ment questionnaire always reﬂect poorly on the petitioner’s moral 
character and may be a basis for the panel recommending against 
reinstatement.57
Often a petitioner’s misconduct was related to a medical condition, 
including psychological distress or drugs or alcohol addiction. In such 
instances, a reinstatement strategy must persuade the panel with com-
petent evidence that the condition is under control and the petitioner 
is unlikely to reoﬀend.58 The following strategies might aid such a 
petitioner:
Q  As a practical matter, a petitioner who suﬀered from a medical 
diﬃculty or substance abuse in the past must oﬀer evidence of a 
professional opinion that concludes that the medical problem has 
improved and no longer presents a substantial risk. Written testi-
mony, along with medical records, will likely be accepted, making a 
doctor’s in-person testimony unnecessary.
Q  A nonexpert sponsor from an Alcoholics Anonymous–type pro-
gram who has worked closely with the petitioner and can testify to 
the petitioner’s personal development and commitment can be 
eﬀective. Typically, the petitioner will want to oﬀer professional 
medical testimony of recovery beyond any sponsor testimony, 
where appropriate.
Q  A “sobriety mentor,” oﬀered as a condition of reinstatement, can 
play a useful role in ensuring that an addicted lawyer remains in 
recovery. Lawyers Concerned for Lawyers can usually assist with 
sobriety monitoring.
• Proving competence: SJC Rule 4:01 § 18(5) requires the petitioner to 
prove “competency” to practice law. This is diﬀerent from, although 
under the section captioned “moral qualiﬁcations,” the Court noted that the petitioner had been 
“active in his church community and supportive of his sons’ group activities, particularly the 
activities stressing social responsibility. He has undertaken community-oriented activities with 
an attitude that evidences a sensitivity beyond himself and a respect for others. He has, in short, 
established the self-reform necessary to make him a ‘person proper to be held out by the court 
to the public as trustworthy.’”
57 See, e.g., Matter of Weekes, 31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 678 (2015).
58 An example of this having been done well is Matter of Ostrovitz, 31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 486 
(2015).
488
After Suspension or Disbarment
connected to, the “learning in law,” discussed in the next item. This 
factor is most relevant in those matters where discipline was based 
upon a lack of competence, but every lawyer must prove it. Strategies 
to prove competence may include the following:
Q  A petitioner whose misconduct included mismanaging a practice 
must demonstrate through speciﬁc, concrete strategies the capabil-
ity to maintain a well-managed law oﬃce. The petitioner should 
expect direct questions from the bar counsel or hearing panel mem-
bers about the speciﬁc requirements of Rule 1.15 of the Massachu-
setts Rules of Professional Conduct, governing client trust accounts 
and similar law oﬃce management topics. The petitioner should be 
articulate in explaining how a law ﬁrm engages in three-way rec-
onciliation of its trust account.59
Q  How a petitioner manages the reinstatement process itself can 
reﬂect directly on competence as a lawyer. Presenting a well-written, 
error-free, well-organized, and professional reinstatement eﬀort 
will help persuade the hearing panel of the lawyer’s skill.60
Q  Showing a high level of competence as a lawyer presuspension will 
also help a petitioner meet the burden of this element. Testimony 
from prior clients and other lawyers may be useful. Where the sus-
pension was based on lack of competence, some explanation that 
the misconduct was an anomaly and not likely to recur is important.
Q  A petitioner who oﬀers proof of a well-developed support network 
and a plan to practice if reinstated has a better chance of achieving 
reinstatement than one with a limited network or no support. A 
reliable and respected “practice mentor” for the petitioner can 
make an important diﬀerence.
• Proving learning in the law: Related to the requirement of competence 
is demonstrating suﬃcient “learning in law.”61 Because a suspended or 
disbarred lawyer may not practice during the suspension period, even 
59 See, e.g., Matter of Ostrovitz, 31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 486 (2015) (reinstatement allowed after 
panel “favorably impressed” with petitioner’s familiarity with three-way reconciliation required 
by Rule 1.15). See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f )(1)(E).
60 See, e.g., Matter of Todrin, 32 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. __, 2016 WL 7493936 (2016) (petitioner’s 
sloppy presentation, typographical errors, and math mistakes in the reinstatement proceeding evi-
denced a lack of competency).
61 SJC Rule 4:01 § 18(5).
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as a paralegal, and may only act as a paralegal after the suspension 
period has ended, upon a successful petition to the Court,62 it can 
be a challenge to satisfy this element with evidence demonstrating 
acquired learning. Some petitioners have faltered in their reinstate-
ment eﬀorts on this element,63 but many others have satisfactorily 
proven such learning.64 In addressing this element, a petitioner might 
consider the following approaches:
Q  It is essential that the petitioner show a consistent pattern of atten-
dance at continuing legal education courses and similar substantive 
law presentations, along with regular review of legal materials. Spo-
radic or only recent eﬀorts may not be suﬃcient. A scattershot 
approach in continuing legal education courses will be unpersua-
sive compared to focusing on intended practice areas.
Q  Evidence of mastery in a ﬁeld of law prior to the suspension can 
help to support the required showing, including evidence that the 
petitioner mentored others. The longer the suspension, however, 
the more evidence of continuing study is needed.
Q  Petitioners who have demonstrated learning in law often present 
evidence from attorneys who can vouch for the petitioner’s inter-
est, activity, and ongoing curiosity about legal developments.65
Q  At the reinstatement hearing, a petitioner may expect speciﬁc ques-
tions about developments in the substantive or procedural law in 
the practice areas as well as about developments in the rules govern-
ing professional conduct. The petitioner’s testimony about follow-
ing such developments carefully is not enough; the petitioner must 
aﬃrmatively demonstrate expertise and should prepare for direct 
questions. If the sanction was for mishandling ﬁduciary funds, the 
petitioner should be prepared to explain the record-keeping 
requirements for such funds.
62 See discussion in Chapter 22, Section III.
63 See, e.g., Matter of Waitz, 416 Mass. 298, 9 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 336 (1993); Matter of Fletcher, 
466 Mass. 1018, 29 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 259 (2013); Matter of Dawkins, 432 Mass. 1009; 16 
Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 94 (2000).
64 See, e.g., Matter of Owens, 21 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 533 (2005) (“We ﬁnd that the Petitioner 
has demonstrated he has the requisite learning in the law. In addition to his many years of able 
practice, while under suspension, he read advance sheets, subscribed to Lawyers Weekly, took an 
MPRE review and an MCLE in tort law.”).
65 See, e.g., Matter of Gibson, 32 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. ___, 2016 WL 7493937 (2016); Owens, 
supra at note 64.
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Q  If possible, a petitioner should seek permission from the SJC to 
work or volunteer as a paralegal after the suspension term ends and 
before petitioning for reinstatement.66 Particularly when there has 
been a long-term suspension, a petitioner will fare better in prov-
ing learning in the law by having worked as a paralegal (with SJC 
permission) before seeking to be reinstated as a lawyer.67
• Proving that reinstatement serves the public interest: Reinstatement 
reports regularly address the “public interest prong”68 of the reinstate-
ment requirements under SJC Rule 4:01 § 18(5). The petitioner must 
show with persuasive evidence that the reinstatement will not reﬂect 
badly on the bar or undercut the public’s conﬁdence in the bar’s over-
sight of lawyers. “In this inquiry we are concerned not only with the 
actuality of the petitioner’s morality and competence, but also on the 
reaction to his reinstatement by the bar and public.”69 “Consideration 
of the public welfare, not [a petitioner’s] private interest, dominates in 
considering the reinstatement of a [suspended] applicant.”70
   In most reinstatement reports, the public interest factor follows 
closely from, and often incorporates, the factors previously described—
petitioners who have demonstrated remorse, good moral character, 
competence, and learning in law typically do not have problems 
showing that reinstatement creates no problems for the public.71 But 
the petitioner’s reinstatement strategy must address this component. 
Suggestions for such a strategy include the following:
Q  A petitioner’s record of substantial charitable and volunteer activi-
ties, by demonstrating an appropriate service-oriented moral com-
pass, will assist in arguing that the petitioner has met this component. 
Petitioners often produce supportive documents, letters, or aﬃdavits 
66 For a discussion of that process, see Chapter 22, Section III.
67 See, e.g., Matter of Sullivan, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 578, 587 (2009) (denying reinstatement; 
noting petitioner had not worked as a paralegal).
68 See, e.g., Matter of O’Sullivan, 31 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 498 (2015); Matter of Pudlo, 31 Mass. 
Att’y Disc. R. 537 (2015).
69 Matter of Gordon, 385 Mass. 48, 53, 3 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 69, 73 (1982).
70 Matter of Ellis, 457 Mass. 413, 414, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 162, 164 (2010).
71 See Matter of Dawkins, 432 Mass. 1009, 1012 (2000) (rescript) (“[The petitioner]’s failure to 
prove the moral qualiﬁcations, competency, and learning in law necessary for reinstatement leads 
us to the inescapable conclusion that he also has failed to prove that the standing and integrity of 
the bar, the administration of justice, and the public interest would not be compromised if he were 
to be readmitted.”). For one example where this prong was the primary question at the hearing, see 
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from members of the community or former clients detailing the 
petitioner’s activities and good character.72
Q  If the petitioner’s suspension order included any conditions, such 
as making restitution, the evidence at the hearing must show that 
these conditions were met. If the lawyer has made restitution, 
proof of that through competent evidence is essential. If the lawyer 
has expended good-faith eﬀorts to make restitution but has not yet 
completed the repayment process, a hearing panel may permit 
reinstatement on the condition that contributions continue on a 
schedule, but that result is highly unusual.73
Q  A critical issue, and perhaps the decisive one, is whether the hear-
ing panel can hold the petitioner out as worthy of trust without 
raising serious questions about consistency with precedent, con-
cerns about special treatment, or the appearance of trivializing the 
underlying misconduct.74
Q  If a petitioner has had a lengthy suspension, it would be advisable 
to work as a paralegal before petitioning for reinstatement and to 
have a practice mentor.75
IV. REINSTATEMENT AFTER ADMINISTRATIVE SUSPENSION
The reinstatement process for administrative suspensions is typically diﬀer-
ent from disciplinary suspensions or disbarments. How the administrative sus-
pension ends depends on how it arose. If the administrative suspension occurred 
Matter of Allen, 400 Mass. 417, 420, 5 Mass, Att’y Disc. R. 14 (1987) (“Bar counsel and the Board 
agree that the petitioner has the necessary moral character, competency and learning for readmis-
sion. The more diﬃcult issue concerns the second requirement, the public interest.”). The Court 
in Allen rejected the board’s recommendation and ordered reinstatement.
72 See, e.g., Matter of Wong, 19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 502 (2003) (In concluding that petitioner 
did not satisfy the public interest prong, the single justice wrote, “For example, there are no let-
ters from any attorneys, bar associations, community leaders, business people, or the like. As Bar 
Counsel stated, the petitioner did not oﬀer a single character witness, either in person or through 
letters or aﬃdavits.”).
73 See discussion supra note 27.
74 See Matter of Shyavitz, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 612 (2010) (reconsidering and denying rein-
statement because petitioner could not, if reinstated, be trusted to handle client funds).
75 See, e.g., Matter of Sullivan, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 578, 587 (2009) (denying reinstatement; 
noting the petitioner had not worked as a paralegal and had not had a practice mentor if he were 
reinstated).
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because the lawyer failed to register with the board, the lawyer may be reinstated 
by registering and paying the past-due annual fees, a late assessment, and a rein-
statement fee.76 The lawyer must also ﬁle an aﬃdavit with the board conﬁrming 
compliance with whatever obligations the lawyer failed to meet that led to the sus-
pension.77 The SJC rule implies, in cases where the administrative suspension 
resulted from a default on bar registration and nonpayment of fees, that rein-
statement rests with the discretion of the board and the Court.78 In practice, how-
ever, reinstatement is typically automatic after the lawyer registers and pays all fees 
and the late assessment, assuming no other reason for discipline exists. While the 
administratively suspended lawyer is not permitted to practice during that sus-
pension,79 those suspended for failure to register typically do not learn of their 
suspension until weeks later. (Most failure-to-register suspensions result from 
the lawyer failing to notify the board of an address change.80) Bar counsel cus-
tomarily overlooks any intervening practice during the suspension period if the 
attorney responds immediately after the suspension is entered.81
If the administrative suspension resulted instead from failing to cooperate 
with the bar counsel’s investigation of a disciplinary complaint, the same pro-
cess applies, including the reinstatement fee and the aﬃdavit. However, the Court 
may be more deliberate about reinstatement, depending on the quality of the law-
yer’s cooperation. To be reinstated, the lawyer must provide the information that 
the bar counsel requested within thirty days, unless the single justice can be per-
suaded that the bar counsel has no right to the information or that its substance 
has been provided. A lawyer who is administratively suspended for noncooper-
76 In 2016, the late fee was $50 and the ﬁne was $100. Those ﬁgures are, of course, subject to 
change.
77 SJC Rule 4:03 § 3.
78 The petition for reinstatement that the administratively suspended lawyer must ﬁle requires 
Court approval by the terms of SJC Rule 4:01.
79 See, e.g., Matter of Linnehan, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 310 (2010) (term suspension for several 
instances of misconduct, including practicing law while subject to an administrative suspension); 
Matter of Gillespie, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 223 (2010) (public reprimand for practicing law 
while subject to an administrative suspension; lawyer had reason to believe that a partner had 
paid her fees).
80 In 2014, the board began to request an e-mail address from attorneys in addition to an oﬃce 
address. That development may lead to fewer failure-to-register suspensions in future years.
81 If the lawyer does not promptly address the lapse, however, discipline may result. See, e.g.,
Gillespie, supra note 79 (reprimand after respondent failed to respond to several notices, and con-
tinued to practice); Matter of Blessington, 19 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 54 (2003) (suspension of six 
months and one day after practicing while administratively suspended); Matter of Payton, 26 
Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 495 (2010) (public reprimand for practicing while administratively sus-
pended; two prior admonitions served as aggravating factors).
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ation and who is not reinstated within thirty days becomes subject to the require-
ments of a lawyer who has been suspended for disciplinary reasons.82
One recent example shows that reinstatement in that setting may be prompt 
if the lawyer begins to cooperate. In Ad. 12-09,83 the SJC ordered an adminis-
trative suspension of the respondent for noncooperation with a disciplinary in-
vestigation about a claim that the lawyer had not returned unearned fees to a 
client. That suspension order was issued on February 27, 2012. On March 8, 
2012, the respondent met with the bar counsel and, on the following day, ﬁled 
a written response to the grievance and returned the fees to the clients. On 
March 14, 2012, the respondent was reinstated.84
82 SJC Rule 4:01 §§ 3(3) and 17.
83 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 926 (2012).
84 For other examples of administrative suspensions based upon failure to cooperate with the bar 
counsel’s investigation, see, e.g., Matter of Manchester, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 594 (2012) (prompt 
reinstatement, followed by further failure to cooperate, led to public reprimand); Matter of Beery, 
28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 46 (2012) (lawyer did not seek reinstatement after administrative suspen-
sion for failure to cooperate; three-month suspension resulted); Matter of Brooks, 26 Mass. Att’y 
Disc. R. 61 (2010) (suspension for one year and a day after failure to cooperate and for the under-
lying misconduct of neglect; respondent never cooperated after the administrative suspension).
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I. INTRODUCTION
This chapter covers several important administrative topics for Massachu-
setts lawyers. It ﬁrst reviews the requirements to become, and then to continue 
in good standing as, a member of the Massachusetts bar. That topic also includes 
alternative status designations oﬀering nonlawyers certain privileges subject to 
the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Board of Bar Overseers (BBO). Next, the chap-
ter outlines the requirements for establishing and maintaining trust accounts, in-
cluding Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts (IOLTA). Finally, the chapter 
reviews how the Clients’ Security Board (CSB) operates.
II. BECOMING AND REMAINING A MEMBER
OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAR
A.  Gaining Admission to the Massachusetts Bar or the Right
to Practice in the Commonwealth 
An individual may become a Massachusetts lawyer by (1) taking and passing 
the Massachusetts bar examination or by obtaining recognition of their having
passed a Uniform Bar Examination administered in another state, (2) “waiving 
in” by motion after being a member of the bar of another jurisdiction, or (3) spe-
cial permission, given to bar members of another jurisdiction for a limited time 
while representing indigent clients through a nonproﬁt or law school program. 
PART VIII
Special Obligations as a Licensed Professional
chapter twenty-four
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In all instances, individuals must also satisfy the Board of Bar Examiners (BBE) 
of their good moral character and they must pass the Multi-State Professional 
Responsibility Examination (MPRE).1 Someone who is not a full bar member 
may also practice law in the Commonwealth under the following circumstances: 
• As a certiﬁed law student
• As a member of an in-house counsel oﬃce
• Where a retired or an inactive member of the Massachusetts bar seeks 
to perform only certain pro bono legal services
• As a lawyer from another jurisdiction appearing pro hac vice in an iden-
tiﬁed court proceeding with the judge’s permission
Massachusetts also permits a lawyer admitted to practice in a foreign country to 
practice law in a limited manner as a foreign legal consultant (FLC).
1. Admission Through Examination
Most persons seeking to become members of the Massachusetts bar do so 
by sitting for and passing the Massachusetts bar examination (MBE), oﬀered each 
July and February. To sit for the MBE, an applicant (a) must have a bachelor’s 
degree from a college or university or its equivalent2 and (b) must have graduated 
from a law school accredited by the American Bar Association (ABA) or an insti-
tution that is “authorized by statute of the Commonwealth to grant the degree 
of bachelor of laws or juris doctor.”3 In addition, a graduate of a law school from 
a foreign country may obtain permission from the BBE to sit for the MBE if the 
BBE concludes that the foreign law school provided an educational program “sim-
ilar in nature and quality” to that of an ABA-accredited law school.4 Graduates
1 It is possible that an applicant who attended law school prior to the introduction of the MPRE 
may gain admission on motion without having passed that test, but in the vast majority of in-
stances an applicant has to show a passing score on the MPRE.
2 Massachusetts Rules and Orders of the Supreme Judicial Court r. 3:01, at § 3.1.2 [here-
inafter SJC Rule].
3 Id. at § 3.1.3.
4 SJC Rule 3:01 § 3.2. The BBE has articulated the criteria upon which it relies in making that 
determination, with diﬀerent standards applying to common law and civil law countries. See Rules 
of the Board of Bar Examiners, Rule VI, Foreign Law School Graduates (2017) [hereinafter 
BBE Rules], available at https://www.mass.gov/professional-conduct-rules/board-of-bar-examiners-
rule-vi-foreign-law-school-graduates (last visited April 26, 2018). See Wei Jia v. Board of Bar 
Examiners, 427 Mass. 777 (1998) (applicant denied admission when his law degree from a law 
school in China was not deemed equivalent to an accredited U.S. law school, despite his having 
an LL.M. from an accredited U.S. law school and bar admission in two other states).
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from Canadian law schools that are recognized by the Law School Admissions 
Council are deemed to have graduated from an ABA-accredited U.S. law school.5
The Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) imposes several other requirements for 
MBE applicants, including the applicant’s law school certifying the applicant’s 
moral qualiﬁcations to be a lawyer, a petition signed by a licensed lawyer from a 
U.S. jurisdiction requesting permission for the applicant to take the examination, 
two letters of recommendation, and proof of a passing, scaled score of 85 or higher 
on the MPRE.6
Passing the MBE and the MPRE does not authorize applicants to become 
Massachusetts lawyers. Applicants must also satisfy the BBE that they have the 
requisite moral character to be entrusted with the responsibilities of the profes-
sion.7 Section II(B) of this chapter discusses the character and ﬁtness requirement.
Under 2017 amendments to SJC Rule 3:01, an applicant for admission to 
the Massachusetts bar may, in eﬀect, request that taking and passing the Uni-
form Bar Examination in another jurisdiction serve in lieu of taking and pass-
ing the MBE.8
2. Admission on Motion
An applicant for the Massachusetts bar may alternatively seek admission 
by “waiving in” on motion after being a member of the bar of the highest judi-
cial court of another U.S. state, district, or territory9 for at least ﬁve years, with 
educational credentials equivalent to those required of an applicant seeking to sit 
for the MBE.10 A Canadian lawyer may also seek admission on motion, with the 
same standards applying.11 The applicant must have actively practiced for at least 
ﬁve of the seven years preceding the petition for admission on motion.12 The BBE 
5 BBE Rules VI.7.
6 SJC Rule 3:01 § 1.1. Those requirements are also described on the BBE website. Seeking Admis-
sion to the Bar in Massachusetts, Massachusetts Board of Bar Examiners, http://www.mass
.gov/courts/court-info/sjc/attorneys-bar-applicants/bbe/ (last visited April 26, 2018).
7 SJC Rule 3:01 § 5.1; BBE Rule V.1; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 221, § 37.
8 SJC Rule 3:01 § 1.2.
9 For convenience, the discussion uses the term jurisdiction to refer to a state, district, or territory 
as referenced in the SJC’s rule.
10 SJC Rule 3:01 §§ 1.2, 6.
11 Id. at § 6.2.
12 Id. at § 6.1.1. In Schomer v. Board of Bar Examiners, 465 Mass. 55 (2013), the applicant, a 
member of the New Jersey bar, had spent three of the past seven years working as a contract 
attorney in New York, despite not possessing a New York license. The BBE denied his petition, 
asserting that the New York practice did not count toward the requisite “active” practice experi-
ence because it was unauthorized and therefore “illegal.” 465 Mass. at 59. The SJC reversed that 
determination and ordered the BBE to count that experience as active. The Court noted that New 
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formerly required that “an attorney’s practice credited toward meeting the active 
practice requirement be physically located in a jurisdiction to which he or she 
is admitted in good standing to the bar.”13 The SJC has expressly disapproved of 
that requirement.14
An attorney who has practiced for the required time in another jurisdiction 
or in Canada must include with the petition three letters of recommendation, a 
certiﬁcate of good standing from each jurisdiction in which the applicant is ad-
mitted, and conﬁrmation from the bar disciplinary authority in each jurisdiction 
attesting that no charges are pending against the applicant.15
From 1997 through 2017, the SJC has denied admission on motion three 
times. In Matter of Application for Admission to the Bar, 443 Mass. 1010 (2005), 
an attorney who had failed the MBE then obtained admission in the District of 
Columbia was denied admission on motion because her legal experience was held 
to be insuﬃcient. In Matter of Corliss, 424 Mass. 1005 (1997), the applicant, who 
graduated from a law school not accredited by the ABA and was admitted to prac-
tice in California, sought permission to take the limited bar examination then 
authorized for out-of-state lawyers seeking admission on motion. The applica-
tion was denied because the applicant had not attended a qualifying law school.16
In Yakah v. Board of Bar Examiners, 448 Mass. 740 (2007), the SJC denied an 
York had permitted the applicant to sit for the New York bar examination after his contract work 
and inferred from that fact that the practice was not “unauthorized.” 465 Mass. at 61. The appli-
cant now appears as a Massachusetts lawyer on the BBO website.
13 This requirement, which appeared in an advisory on the BBE website entitled “Determining 
Whether You May Be Eligible for Admission on Motion,” Schomer, 465 Mass. at 56 n.2, is no lon-
ger on the BBE website, https://www.mass.gov/service-details/learn-about-admission-by-motion- 
in-massachusetts (last visited April 26, 2018).
14 Schomer, 465 Mass. at 56 n.2.
15 SJC Rule 3:01 § 1.3. These requirements are also described on the BBE website, at https://www
.mass.gov/how-to/petition-for-admission-by-motion (last visited April 26, 2018).
16 At the time Corliss was decided, only graduation from an ABA-accredited law school qualiﬁed 
an attorney admitted in another U.S. jurisdiction for admission on motion. That requirement has 
now been changed to permit application by an attorney admitted in another U.S. jurisdiction who 
graduated from either an ABA-accredited law school or from a school authorized by state statute 
to grant the degree of bachelor of laws or juris doctor. See SJC Rule 3:01 § 6.1.4. In Mitchell v. 
Board of Bar Examiners, 452 Mass. 582 (2008), the Court allowed an attorney to seek admission 
on motion where that attorney had graduated from an online law school, limiting its holding to the 
facts, which included the applicant’s demonstration of academic achievement, the then-ongoing ABA 
re-evaluation of its accreditation standards, and the Court’s anticipated review of the admission-
on-motion rule. See Mitchell, 452 Mass. at 586–89. The SJC has long allowed graduates of foreign 
law schools the opportunity to demonstrate that their foreign education was equivalent to that 
required for admission. See, e.g., SJC Rule 3:01 § 6.2 (as in eﬀect in 1986); SJC Rule 3:01 § 6.1.4 
(as in eﬀect in 2010).
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application for admission on motion submitted by a lawyer licensed in Ghana, 
because the applicant had not demonstrated that the legal education he received in 
Ghana was equivalent to that of an ABA-accredited law school.
3.  Limited Admission for Lawyers Working in Legal Assistance or Graduate 
Law School Programs
SJC Rule 3:04 permits a lawyer admitted in another U.S. (but not Canadian 
or other foreign) jurisdiction to obtain a temporary license in Massachusetts, if 
the lawyer “is enrolled in a graduate criminal law or poverty law and litigation 
program in an approved Massachusetts law school,”17 or works for or is associ-
ated with “an organized nonproﬁt legal services program providing legal assis-
tance to indigents in civil or criminal matters” in the Commonwealth.18 The 
“graduate . . . program” referred to in the rule covers an LL.M. degree arrange-
ment in which the participants supervise J.D. law students certiﬁed to represent 
clients in a clinical course. The SJC Rule 3:04 authorization applies only to the 
lawyering activity associated with the graduate program or the legal assistance 
organization and may last no longer than two years.19
4.  Limited Admission for Certified Law Students
SJC Rule 3:03 permits certain law students to represent indigent clients or 
governmental entities while supervised by a Massachusetts lawyer in identiﬁed 
settings. While practicing under this special arrangement, the law students assume 
all of the responsibilities and obligations of any practicing lawyer, and all of the 
standard ethical rules apply to the students’ representation of clients.20
Rule 3:03 distinguishes between “senior” (typically third-year) law students 
and students who have “begun [their] next to the last year of law school” (typi-
cally second-year law students).21 A senior law student may appear on behalf of 
the Commonwealth or its subdivisions or agencies in civil, probate, or criminal 
proceedings in district court, juvenile court, probate and family court, or hous -
ing court but not in the superior court or an appellate court unless special 
17 SJC Rule 3:04 § 1.
18 Id.
19 SJC Rule 3:04 § 2.
20 SJC Order Implementing Supreme Judicial Court Rule 3:03 (1986) §§ 3, 4 [hereinafter SJC 
Order 3:03]. A certiﬁed law student is deemed to be a lawyer for purposes of all ethical duties. Id.
at § 4; see also Peter A. Joy, The Ethics of Law School Clinic Students as Student-Lawyers, 45 S. Tex. 
L. Rev. 815 (2004).
21 SJC Rule 3:03 §§ 2, 8. For students enrolled in a part-time program, a “senior” student is one 
who is in the last year of the program, which ordinarily means the fourth year.
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permission is obtained.22 The student must be supervised by a Massachusetts law-
yer serving as an assistant district attorney, assistant attorney general, or an equiv-
alent municipal or agency counsel.23 A senior law student may appear on behalf 
of an indigent criminal defendant in district court, juvenile court, housing court, 
and the SJC and appeals court, but not in the superior court, unless special per-
mission is obtained. A senior law student may represent an indigent party in a 
civil matter in district court, juvenile court, probate and family court, or housing 
court but not in the superior court or an appellate court unless special permission 
is obtained.24 For civil or criminal indigent representation, the senior law stu-
dent must be supervised by a Massachusetts attorney assigned by the Commit-
tee for Public Counsel Services (CPCS) or by a lawyer employed by a nonproﬁt 
legal assistance organization or a law school clinical program.25 Finally, a senior 
law student may appear “on behalf of the Commonwealth or indigent parties 
before any administrative agency, provided such appearance is not inconsistent 
with its rules.”26 Permission for a senior law student to appear in criminal mat-
ters in the superior court, on behalf of either the Commonwealth or the defen-
dant, is tightly circumscribed.27
A second-year law student has more limited appearance rights. That law stu-
dent may appear only in civil matters in those courts available to senior law stu-
dents, and only if the law student is enrolled in a law school clinical program.28 SJC 
Rule 3:03 § 7, by implication, denies a second-year student the right to appear on 
behalf of indigent persons before administrative agencies, but that restriction has 
limited eﬀect, if any, given that state and federal administrative agencies generally 
permit nonlawyers to appear on behalf of parties in administrative hearings.29
22 SJC Rule 3:03 §§ 1, 4, 5, 6.
23 SJC Rule 3:03 § 1.
24 SJC Rule 3:03 §§ 1, 5, 6.
25 SJC Rule 3:03 § 1.
26 SJC Rule 3:03 § 7.
27 SJC Rule 3:03 § 4. A Superior Court judge may permit a qualiﬁed senior law student to prac-
tice on behalf of the Commonwealth or an indigent criminal defendant in selected reviews of 
convictions, sentences, and bail determinations.
28 SJC Rule 3:03 § 8.
29 Most agencies permit nonlawyer representation of claimants in agency adjudicatory proceed-
ings. See, e.g., 107 C.M.R. 1.00 (nonlawyers may represent claimants before the Massachusetts 
Rehabilitation Commission); 29 C.F.R. § 2200.22(a) (Occupational Safety and Health Review 
Commission); 29 C.F.R. § 702.131(a) (U.S. Department of Labor under the Longshore and Har-
bor Workers’ Compensation Act); 29 C.F.R. § 102.38 (National Labor Relations Board); 29 C.F.R. 
§ 404.1705(b) (Social Security Administration, if the nonlawyer (1) is generally known to have a 
good character and reputation, (2) is capable of giving valuable help in connection to the claim; and 
(3) is not disqualiﬁed or suspended from acting as a representative in dealings before the agency).
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The law students who represent clients pursuant to SJC Rule 3:03 must do 
so “without compensation.”30 That phrase does not prohibit the law students’ 
employers from paying them for their work on the matter; instead, it prohibits 
the law students from receiving a fee from the client.31
Any law student seeking to represent a client under SJC Rule 3:03 must be 
enrolled in, or have successfully completed, a course in evidence or trial practice.32
The rule implies necessarily, but does not state explicitly, that a certiﬁed law stu-
dent, in addition to “appear[ing] . . . in proceedings in” the listed courts, may rep-
resent the eligible clients in pretrial and other nonlitigation activities outside the 
courtroom. For courtroom appearances, the rule states that “supervision” by a mem-
ber of the bar of the Commonwealth shall not “require the attendance in court 
of the supervising member of the bar.”33 The prevailing practice of attorneys par-
ticipating in client representation governed by SJC Rule 3:03, however, is to 
accompany the law student to court in all instances, except, on rare occasions, 
when an appearance is entirely perfunctory.
For senior law students, who need not be enrolled in a law school clinical 
program, the SJC Rule 3:03 authorization remains in eﬀect until the date of 
the ﬁrst bar examination following the student’s graduation. If the student sits 
for that bar, the certiﬁcation remains in eﬀect until the results are announced, 
and if the graduate passes the bar, the certiﬁcation continues for six months or 
until the individual is admitted to the bar, whichever is sooner.34 The rule also 
states that its authority “applies only to a student whose right to appear com-
menced at least three months prior to graduation from law school.”35
Any law student representing a client under SJC Rule 3:03 authorization 
must obtain the client’s informed consent to the student representation through 
a signed document that the student and the supervisor must ﬁle with the court 
or administrative agency where the matter is pending.36
As noted above, SJC Rule 3:03 requires that any nongovernmental party 
that a law student represents be “indigent,” although the rule does not deﬁne that 
term. For nonproﬁt legal assistance organizations, the qualiﬁcation typically tracks 
the income and asset limits generally applicable to the organization’s clients.
30 SJC Rule 3:03 § 1.
31 SJC Order Implementing Supreme Judicial Court Rule 3:03, § 7 (1980, last amended 1986) 
(hereinafter Rule 3:03 Implementing Order).
32 SJC Rule 3:03 § 1.
33 SJC Rule 3:03 § 2.
34 SJC Rule 3:03 § 3.
35 SJC Rule 3:03 § 9.
36 Rule 3:03 Implementing Order, § 2.
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5.  Practicing as In-House Counsel
An attorney admitted to practice and in good standing in another juris-
diction or, in some circumstances, a foreign country, who is not licensed in the 
Commonwealth may provide legal services “through an oﬃce or other system-
atic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction that . . . are provided to the law-
yer’s employer or its organizational aﬃliates and are not services for which the 
forum requires pro hac vice admission.”37 This exception to the usual prohibition 
on unauthorized practice of law covers in-house counsel providing legal services 
to a single employer38 but not to any other client, except in pro bono matters,
as described in Section II(A)(6). A lawyer not admitted to the Massachusetts bar 
who practices as in-house counsel in Massachusetts under this exception must 
register with the BBO and pay the same registration fee as a licensed Massachu-
setts lawyer but does not receive a bar card.39
Certain foreign lawyers may also practice law as in-house counsel in Mas-
sachusetts and oﬀer legal services to an employer as just described40 if the foreign 
lawyer is “a member in good standing of a recognized legal profession in a for-
eign jurisdiction, the members of which are admitted to practice as lawyers or 
counselors at law or the equivalent, and are subject to eﬀective regulation and 
discipline by a duly constituted professional body or a public authority.”41
The authority aﬀorded to foreign lawyers to serve as in-house counsel for 
an employer is broader than that available under the version of Rule 5.5(d) in 
37 Mass. R. Prof. C. 5.5(d)(1) (2016); SJC Rule 4:02 § 9(b).
38 SJC Rule 4:02 § 9(b) (“ ‘to engage in the practice of law as in-house counsel’ means to provide 
on behalf of a single organization (including governmental entity) or its organizational aﬃliates any 
legal services that constitute the practice of law”) (emphasis added).
39 SJC Rule 4:02 § 9(a). Rule 4:02 § 9(a) does not by its terms explicitly limit its registration re-
quirements to the kind of “systematic and continuous presence” allowed to in-house counsel under 
Mass. R. Prof. C. 5.5(d). Rather, it has a broad deﬁnition, “to engage in the practice of law as in-
house counsel,” that sweeps up any legal services constituting the practice of law. See SJC Rule 
4:02 § 9(b). Nevertheless, it seems likely that Rule 4:02 § 9 was intended to capture only in-house 
practice by a “systematic and continuous presence,” permitted under Mass. R. Prof. C. 5.5(d), but 
not to impose its registration requirements on in-house counsel admitted in another jurisdiction 
who conducts “temporary basis” representation as permitted under Mass. R. Prof. C. 5.5(c). “Tem-
porary basis” representation is the practice of law, or the exception to Rule 5.5 would be unnec-
essary. The Rule 5.5(c) exception for such “one-oﬀ ” representation applies to any attorney—
in-house or otherwise—admitted in a state other than Massachusetts. There appears to be no 
substantial reason why in-house counsel practicing temporarily in Massachusetts under Rule 5.5(c) 
would have been singled out for a registration requirement while all other out-of-state lawyers 
practicing in Massachusetts under Rule 5.5(c) would avoid its ﬁnancial and administrative costs.
40 Mass. R. Prof. C. 5.5(d).
41 Mass. R. Prof. C. 5.5(e).
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the ABA Model Rules, which limits the foreign lawyer’s legal services author-
ity to advising on matters of the law of that person’s country.42 A comparable lim-
itation applies in Massachusetts to FLCs, discussed in Section II(A)(8).
In-house counsel may not appear in court except with pro hac vice permis-
sion (described in Section II(A)(7)). SJC Rule 4:02 § 9(b) permits in-house coun-
sel “to provide on behalf of a single organization (including, for attorneys admitted 
in a United States jurisdiction, a governmental entity) or its organizational aﬃl-
iates, any legal services that constitute the practice of law.” That blanket autho-
rization, like that of Rule 5.5(d), both of which by their literal language would 
otherwise include court appearances, is limited by SJC Rule 4:02 § 9(e), which 
states: “Nothing in this section permits an attorney registered under this section 
to provide services for which the forum requires pro hac vice admission,” and by 
a similar exception to Rule 5.5(d)(1).43
SJC Rule 4:02 § 9(b) permits licensed in-house counsel to represent clients 
on a pro bono basis without compensation, as long as the lawyer does so in asso-
ciation with either a nonproﬁt legal assistance organization or a licensed Massa-
chusetts lawyer.
6.  Practicing in Limited Pro Bono Representation
A Massachusetts lawyer with inactive or retired status (and, therefore, not 
ordinarily authorized to represent clients) may nevertheless oﬀer legal services 
on a pro bono basis under an arrangement adopted by the SJC.44 The lawyer must 
ﬁle a specially designated registration statement with the BBO, with no required 
registration fee, and then limit the practice to pro bono matters in association 
with an SJC-approved legal assistance organization.45
42 Cf. Model. R. Prof. C. 5.5(d)(1):
[W]hen performed by a foreign lawyer and requires advice on the law of this or another 
jurisdiction or of the United States, such advice shall be based upon the advice of a lawyer 
who is duly licensed and authorized by the jurisdiction to provide such advice.
43 The exclusion of pro hac vice matters from Rule 5.5(d)(1)’s authorization to practice does not 
mean that an in-house counsel may not seek pro hac vice status in appropriate cases. Instead, that 
reference is intended to communicate that the authorization to practice that the rule provides to 
licensed in-house counsel does not include authority to appear in court. See Paul D. Boynton, 
Some Question New Rule Aimed at In-House Counsel, Mass. Lawyers Weekly (March 31, 2008) 
(“in-house lawyers aﬀected by this rule still cannot appear in court unless admitted under pro hac 
vice rules”).
44 SJC Rule 4:02 §§ 8(a), (b).
45 SJC Rule 4:02 §§ 8(a), (b), (c).
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7.  Appearing Pro Hac Vice
The ﬁnal avenue for an individual to practice as an attorney in the Common-
wealth is through pro hac vice status in an ongoing court proceeding. An attorney 
not admitted to practice in Massachusetts can seek admittance in Massachusetts 
on a particular case or occasion, pro hac vice, if the attorney is a member in good 
standing of another state’s bar, and the state in which the attorney is admitted 
grants similar pro hac vice privileges to Massachusetts bar members.46 Pro hac vice
admission is granted at the discretion of the Massachusetts court before which 
the out-of-state attorney seeks to appear.47 Only individual attorneys, not law 
ﬁrms, can seek pro hac vice admission in Massachusetts.48
To apply for pro hac vice admission, each attorney must ﬁll out a registra-
tion form and pay a fee to the BBO.49 In 2018, the fee to appear in the superior 
court, land court, or any appellate court was higher than the fee for all other 
courts.50 The nonrefundable fee is not returned if the attorney is not admitted 
to practice pro hac vice in Massachusetts.51 The attorney must identify the court 
in which the attorney seeks pro hac vice admission, the party the attorney is to 
represent, and the case docket number, if available.52 For the attorney to appear 
in the matter, a member of the Massachusetts bar must present the attorney’s 
motion for pro hac vice admission.53
8.  Advising as a Foreign Legal Consultant
Massachusetts has established a designation for lawyers admitted to prac-
tice in foreign countries who wish to advise clients in Massachusetts about for-
eign law.54 An individual who “is a member in good standing of a recognized legal 
46 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 221, § 46A. Note that in this context, “state” means “state,” not “state, dis-
trict, or territory of the United States,” as other provisions discussed in this chapter include. See 
supra note 9.
47 Id. See also DiLuzio v. United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers of Am., Local 274, 391 Mass. 
211, 214 (1984) (no abuse of discretion in denial of motion for pro hac vice appearance); Meschi v. 
Iverson, 60 Mass. App. Ct. 678 (2004) (same).
48 See SJC Rule 3:15 § 1.
49 Id.
50 Board of Bar Overseers Registration Statement for Pro Hac Vice Attorneys, Board of Bar Over-
seers, https://bbopublic.blob.core.windows.net/web/f/prohacvice.pdf (last visited April 27, 
2018). As of April 2018, the fee for the former courts was $301 per case; for all other courts, the 
fee was $101 per case. SJC Rule 3:15 § 1. The rule contains exceptions for indigent clients.
51 The fee may be waived for pro bono representation. SJC Rule 3:15 § 1.
52 SJC Rule 3:15 § 1(b).
53 SJC Rule 3:15 § 2.
54 SJC Rule 3:05.
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profession in a foreign country”55 may apply to the SJC for a license as an FLC, 
and the SJC, in its discretion, may authorize practice under that designation. 
An FLC “may render legal services in this Commonwealth subject, however, to 
the limitations that he or she shall not . . . render professional legal advice on 
the law of this Commonwealth or of the United States of America (whether ren-
dered incident to the preparation of legal instruments or otherwise) . . . .”56 The 
rule lists other more speciﬁc restrictions as well (including a ban on court appear-
ances57), but the intent of the rule is that the FLC may not practice Massachu-
setts or federal law and may only provide legal services related to foreign law. 
The FLC is bound by the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct,58 and the 
attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrines apply to the FLC’s com-
munications the same as for a Massachusetts lawyer.59 An FLC may work for a 
law ﬁrm and may become a partner, member, or equity owner of a law ﬁrm.60
Recall that certain foreign lawyers may practice in Massachusetts as in-
house counsel, as previously described in Section II(A)(5), without qualifying 
as FLCs and with no restrictions on the subject matter of the advice provided 
to their employers.
B.  Character and Fitness Requirements
As noted at the beginning of the chapter, to become a member of the Mas-
sachusetts bar, applicants must obtain BBE approval as to their character and 
ﬁtness to practice law.61 “The [BBE] considers good character to embody that 
degree of honesty, integrity and discretion that the public and members of the 
bench and the bar have the right to demand of a lawyer.”62 Some applicants 
have been denied admission because of concerns about the applicants’ moral 
character. For example, in three unrelated bar admission cases in 2015, Matter 
of Chalupowski,63 Matter of Panse,64 and Matter of Britton,65 the SJC denied the 
applicants’ admission to the bar, emphasizing their failure to completely and 
accurately disclose required information in the bar applications and noting that 
55 Id. at § 1.2(a).
56 Id. at § 5.1(e).
57 Id. at § 5.1(a).
58 Id. at § 6.1.
59 Id. at § 6.3.
60 Id. at §§ 6.2(b), (c).
61 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 221, § 37; SJC Rule 3:01 § 1.4.
62 BBE Rules V.1.
63 473 Mass. 1008 (2015).
64 473 Mass. 1001 (2015).
65 471 Mass. 1015 (2015).
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candor with the BBE is essential. The applicants also had a history of litigious-
ness that was a factor in the decisions.66
Some lawyers have gained admission by lying about or omitting reference 
to earlier misconduct or accusations of misconduct that would have caused the 
BBE concern, which perhaps would have denied the application or at least engaged 
in further investigation before acting on the application. When the application-
related misconduct later came to light, the SJC did not revoke the attorney’s 
license.67 The solution on two occasions was a one-year suspension, with rein-
statement conditioned on the lawyer obtaining a report from the BBE con-
ﬁrming that the lawyer now satisﬁed the character and ﬁtness qualiﬁcations.68
Any dishonesty on the petition for admission, even about something that 
would not necessarily interfere with admission, can result in a sanction in a bar 
discipline proceeding. For example, not disclosing on the admission question-
naire charges for drunk driving or an out-of-state conviction for drug possession 
has resulted in bar discipline; if the charges had been disclosed on the question-
naire, they probably would not have prevented admission.69
Some applicants have gained admission to the Massachusetts bar despite be-
ing previously convicted of serious crimes. In Matter of Prager,70 the applicant, 
a graduate of Bowdoin College and a Harvard graduate school, had been con-
victed in federal court of crimes involving distributing narcotics. He later grad-
uated summa cum laude from the University of Maine Law School, clerked for 
the Maine Supreme Court, and worked as a law student for a legal aid program. 
On his application to the Massachusetts bar, the BBE recommended admission, 
ﬁnding that he was rehabilitated and possessed satisfactory moral character. The 
SJC invited the Oﬃce of the Bar Counsel to intervene, and that oﬃce opposed 
66 See also Matter of Desy, 452 Mass. 1012 (2008) (applicant, as a law student, engaged in abusive 
and unlawful debt-collection practices; admission denied (applicant later published a book about 
how to succeed on the bar examination)); In re Application for Admission to the Bar (Krohn), 444 
Mass. 393 (2005) (applicant’s history included two felonies; the SJC denied admission, express-
ing more concern about the record of abusive, accusatory tactics in litigation, including during 
work as a certiﬁed law student, than with the felony convictions).
67 See, e.g., Matter of Voykhansky, 24 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 719, 723–24 (2008) (board memoran-
dum stating: “Courts in other states sometimes revoke law licenses that were obtained through 
fraud, thus leaving it to the lawyer to seek fresh admission on a proper footing . . . . That dispo-
sition, however, is not listed among the available sanctions the Court has empowered us to rec-
ommend.”) (citations omitted).
68 Id.; Matter of Resnick, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 544 (2010). As of April 26, 2018, neither 
Voykhansky (one-year suspension in 2008) nor Resnick (one-year suspension in 2010) had been 
reinstated.
69 See, e.g., Matter of Betts, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 44 (2010) (twelve-month suspension, six months 
stayed, with conditions, for failure to disclose misdemeanor record on bar admission application).
70 422 Mass. 86 (1996).
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admission. The SJC denied the application in 199671 but allowed admission in 
2003.72 In another example, an applicant applied for admission to the Massa-
chusetts bar after pleading guilty in Maryland to conspiracy to distribute mar-
ijuana, for which he received a one-year prison sentence.73 After the applicant 
was denied admission in Florida because of his criminal history,74 he successfully 
applied to the District of Columbia75 and Massachusetts76 bars. He ultimately suc-
ceeded in gaining admission in Florida, where he was later subject to discipline 
for misconduct.77 Other lawyers have been reinstated after disbarment for seri-
ous criminal activity, with the SJC applying the same character and ﬁtness test 
as the BBE applies to applicants.78
C.  Maintaining Membership in the Massachusetts Bar 
This subsection discusses the registration and related activities required for 
an attorney to maintain good standing as a member of the Massachusetts bar, 
whether the attorney seeks to continue to practice or instead seeks to discon-
tinue practice (except perhaps for the pro bono work discussed in previous sub-
sections of this chapter) while remaining a member of the bar.
1.  Maintaining Good Standing for Permanent Members
of the Massachusetts Bar
Once admitted to practice in Massachusetts, an attorney must pay an annual 
registration fee determined by length of service and ﬁle an annual registration state-
71 422 Mass. at 95.
72 https://www.massbbo.org/AttorneyLookup?ﬁrstName=Harvey&lastName=Prager (last visited 
May 24, 2018).
73 In re Kleppin, 768 A.2d 1010, 1013 (D.C. 2001).
74 Id. at 1013.
75 Id. at 1018.
76 As of 2018, attorney Kleppin appears on the rolls of Massachusetts lawyers, with a 2001 admis-
sion date.
77 Florida Bar v. Kleppin, 2010 WL 6983305 (Fla. 2010) (admonition for misconduct involving 
asserting unsubstantiated claims and discovery infractions during litigation).
78 The most prominent example of an applicant satisfying the character and ﬁtness test in Massa-
chusetts despite serious misconduct in the past is the reinstatement case Matter of Hiss, 368 Mass. 
447 (1975) (discussed in Chapter 23, Section III(B)). Alger Hiss was disbarred in 1952 after con-
viction on two counts of perjury for false testimony before the House Un-American Activities 
Committee regarding Russian espionage. Despite Hiss’s continued claims of innocence and refusal 
to acknowledge any wrongdoing, the SJC aﬃrmed the board’s recommendation to reinstate Hiss 
because of his long record of successful work after release from prison. See also Matter of Prager, 
422 Mass. 86, 92–95 (1996) (the factors for evaluating reinstatement of an attorney after disbar-
ment, as in Hiss, also apply to original applicants for admission after conviction of a felony).
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ment. For a discussion of how an attorney may elect inactive status or resign (other 
than through the disciplinary process), see Section II(D). After admission to the 
bar, and unless the attorney is suspended and seeks reinstatement, a lawyer in 
Massachusetts need not establish, nor does the BBE or any agency assess, ongo-
ing moral character or legal competence. Massachusetts does not impose any con-
tinuing legal education requirements.79
The board identiﬁes each attorney’s annual registration renewal date.80 To 
renew registration, lawyers must submit a form reporting admissions to prac-
tice in other jurisdictions, including federal courts and administrative agencies. 
The statement must also disclose whether they are in good standing in each such 
jurisdiction and, if not, explain the circumstances of that determination, iden-
tify IOLTA account information, or provide any exemption from the IOLTA 
account requirement,81 as well as disclose whether they have professional liabil-
ity insurance.82 Massachusetts does not require that a lawyer have professional lia-
bility or malpractice insurance, but the BBO website publicly discloses whether 
a lawyer carries such insurance. Misrepresenting insurance coverage to the BBO 
may be a basis for discipline.83
The registration submission must also include business and residential ad-
dresses as well as an e-mail address. The business address, including telephone 
number, is public. E-mail addresses may be shared with courts. The residential 
79 As of 2015, Massachusetts is one of only six jurisdictions (out of the ﬁfty states, the District of 
Columbia, and the four U.S. territories) that do not require continuing legal education. (The other 
jurisdictions are Connecticut, DC, Maryland, Michigan, and South Dakota.) See MCLE Informa-
tion by Jurisdiction, American Bar Association, http://www.americanbar.org/cle/mandatory_
cle/mcle_states.html (last visited May 24, 2018). Massachusetts does, however, require every new 
admittee to complete a one-day, in-person, mandatory Practicing with Professionalism course. 
SJC Rule 3:16.
80 SJC Rule 4:02 § 1 (suggesting that the board establish a “system of staggered annual
registrations”).
81 The on-line form the BBO’s website provides to attorneys lists three bases for an IOLTA account 
exemption: (1) the lawyer is not practicing law in Massachusetts, (2) the lawyer practices law but is 
not in private practice (e.g., as a government or in-house lawyer) and does not receive client funds, 
or (3) some “other” explanation the lawyer provides.
82 SJC Rule 4:02 § 2(a).
83 See, e.g., Matter of Days, 30 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 89 (2014) (two-month suspension for falsely 
claiming coverage on the BBO registration form and an application for assignment of cases from 
CPCS); Matter of Durodula, 28 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 267 (2012) (two-month suspension for falsely 
certifying to the BBO that he was covered by professional liability insurance and for accepting
appointments from CPCS, knowing that he did not have insurance); Matter of O’Meara, 28 Mass. 
Att’y Disc. R. 666 (2011) (similar facts, same discipline); cf. Matter of Powers, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. 
R. 518 (2010) (year-and-a-day suspension for falsely claiming to CPCS and altering documents to 
show liability insurance coverage).
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address remains conﬁdential with the board and the bar counsel, unless the res-
idential address is the same as the business address.84
Since September 2016, all attorneys have been required to provide their 
annual registration statement online.85
The lawyer must submit the BBO form along with a “periodic assessment,” 
or registration fee.86 The fee structure provides a standard fee for most lawyers 
with active status, which is reduced for lawyers in practice for ﬁve or fewer years 
or for more than ﬁfty years. Those fees cover the costs of the BBO, the bar coun-
sel operations, the CSB, and Lawyers Concerned for Lawyers.87 In addition to the 
standard required fee, the board includes a separate, voluntary annual fee in its 
assessment to support access to justice.88 The requested fee includes that volun-
tary payment, so a lawyer must opt out if choosing not to contribute; opting out 
of the payment is conﬁdential. An attorney who fails to ﬁle a registration state-
ment and pay the required registration fee will be administratively suspended.89
2.  Maintaining Good Standing for Nonpermanent, Nonactive Members
of the Massachusetts Bar
As previously described, attorneys may practice law in Massachusetts under 
a variety of circumstances, even if not an active full member of the bar. An FLC 
must register in the same manner as an active attorney, including paying a reg-
istration fee established by the board.90 A retired attorney who wishes to repre-
sent clients on a pro bono basis must also ﬁle an annual registration statement, 
but does not pay fees.91 An inactive attorney registers the same as an active attor-
ney, but pays a reduced fee.92 An attorney practicing with an out-of-state license 
84 SJC Rule 4:02 § 10. The BBO’s practice is to allow lawyers to list a business address as a resi-
dential address only if the attorney actually resides at that address.
85 The board’s website contains a link to the announcement of this requirement and also to the 
registration pages, which require the registering lawyer to create an account. The announcement 
is available at https://bbopublic.blob.core.windows.net/web/f/reg2016.pdf. (last visited April 26, 
2018). The registration pages can be accessed at https://www.massbbo.org/AttorneyType (last 
visited April 26, 2018).
86 SJC Rule 4:03 § 1.
87 Id. In ﬁscal year 2015, 78.36 percent of registration fees were allocated for BBO and bar coun-
sel operations, 14.07 percent for CSB awards, and 7.57 percent for Lawyers Concerned for Law-
yers expenses.
88 SJC Rule 4:03 § 1(b). The funds contributed are paid to the IOLTA Committee. See Section III 
for a discussion of IOLTA funding.
89 SJC Rule 4:02 § 3. For a description of administrative suspension, see Chapter 4, Section II(F)(6).
90 SJC Rule 4:02 § 1(a) (an FLC is subject to the annual ﬁling requirement and to SJC Rule 4:03, 
requiring payment of annual registration fees).
91 SJC Rule 4:02 § 8(b); 4:03 § 1(a).
92 SJC Rule 4:02 § 8(a); 4:02 § 4; 4:03 § 1(a).
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pursuant to SJC Rule 3:04 (limited to indigent representation) must register the 
same as active bar members.93
D. Electing to Resign, Retire, or Assume Inactive Status 
1.  Resigning or Retiring Other Than While Subject to Discipline
A lawyer may end membership in the bar in one of two ways (aside from dis-
barment or discipline-related resignation covered elsewhere in this book94): the 
lawyer may resign or retire. These two choices have diﬀerent consequences. A non-
disciplinary resignation oﬀers little, if any, advantage relative to retirement, as this 
section describes.
To resign, the attorney must be in good standing, which means that no dis-
cipline is pending. The attorney must submit a resignation request to the Gen-
eral Counsel of the Board, who submits the request to the board, which then 
makes a recommendation to the SJC.95 The board does not attend to resigna-
tion requests for six months, in case any disciplinary charges appear. The SJC 
then issues an order certifying that the attorney has resigned. A lawyer who has 
resigned but who then wishes to return to practicing law in Massachusetts prob-
ably must take and pass the bar examination and fulﬁll the other admission re-
quirements.96 While resigned (if not for disciplinary reasons), the former lawyer 
may work as a paralegal.
A retirement is a less ﬁnal alternative. To retire from practice, a lawyer checks 
the “Retired” box on the annual registration form. While the lawyer pays no reg-
istration fees while retired, the retired lawyer must ﬁle registration statements 
for three years after retiring so that the bar counsel can locate the lawyer should 
any disciplinary matters arise.97 In contrast to a resigned attorney, a retired attor-
ney may resume practice at any time by requesting reinstatement and paying 
the fees for the years of retirement.98 Also, a retired attorney (but not a resigned 
93 SJC Rule 3:04 § 1.
94 See Chapter 21, Section II and Chapter 4, Section II(H).
95 No rule addresses nondisciplinary resignation. A 1978 SJC standing order addresses “Non-
disciplinary Voluntary Resignations,” but oﬀers very little detail about the process. See Appendix J 
for a copy of the SJC Standing Order on Nondisciplinary Voluntary Resignations.
96 The SJC standing order, supra note 95, declares that the clerk shall remove the attorney “from 
the oﬃce of attorney at law in the courts of this Commonwealth, without prejudice to any request 
of the said attorney for readmission at a later date.” The standing order does not state whether 
readmission includes retaking the bar examination.
97 SJC Rule 4:02 § 5(a).
98 SJC Rule 4:02 § 5(b).
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attorney) may provide pro bono legal services in connection with an authorized 
legal assistance program99 and may work as a paralegal.
2.  Electing Inactive Status
A lawyer may temporarily cease practice by electing inactive status on the 
annual registration ﬁling. An inactive attorney may not practice law but contin-
ues to register annually and pays a reduced registration fee.100 Unlike a retired 
lawyer, who must pay the full registration fee for each year of retirement to 
resume practice, an inactive attorney may be authorized to practice by notify-
ing the board and paying the registration fee for the year practice resumes.101
An inactive lawyer may work as a paralegal.
III. IOLTA AND OTHER TRUST ACCOUNT
OBLIGATIONS AND COMPLIANCE
As described in Chapter 11, Massachusetts lawyers holding funds for others 
must maintain the money in a separate interest-bearing account or, for amounts 
too small or held for too short a time to warrant the administrative costs of a 
separate account, in an IOLTA account.102 Banks at which lawyers may estab-
lish an IOLTA account are required to pool all such funds, pay interest on the 
pooled funds, and deliver that interest, after some allowable administrative ex-
penses, to the state’s IOLTA Committee.103 The IOLTA Committee distributes 
the funds to legal assistance and nonproﬁt organizations to improve the admin-
istration of justice and deliver civil legal services to low-income clients.104
The IOLTA Committee publishes a careful, comprehensive manual instruct-
ing lawyers about every step of the IOLTA and trust account requirements.105
99 SJC Rule 4:02 §§ 5(a), 8(b). See supra Section II(A)(6).
100 SJC Rule 4:02 § 4(a).
101 SJC Rule 4:02 § 4(b).
102 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(6) refers to this as a “pooled account (‘IOLTA account’).”
103 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(3), (e)(6), (g)(2), and (g)(4); IOLTA Guidelines, Massachusetts 
IOLTA (2009), § B. The IOLTA Guidelines may be found on the IOLTA Committee’s website: 
https://maiolta.org/for-attorneys (last visited April 27, 2018).
104 Under Mass R. Prof. C. 1.15(g)(4)(i), 67 percent of IOLTA funding must be distributed to the 
Massachusetts Legal Assistance Corporation; the remaining 33 percent goes to other agencies or 
programs as the SJC orders.
105 See Jayne B. Tyrrell and Stephen M. Casey, Managing Clients’ Funds and Avoiding Ethical Prob-
lems (Client Funds Manual 2015), Massachusetts IOLTA ( July 2015), https://www.maiolta
.org/for-attorneys (last visited April 27, 2018).
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Every practicing attorney should have that handbook and refer to it often. This 
chapter highlights some important considerations, but does not substitute for 
the handbook.
Every lawyer in Massachusetts must have an IOLTA account, individually 
or through a law ﬁrm, unless the lawyer is not engaged in private practice and 
does not hold client funds, or has other good cause.106 Only those banks certi-
ﬁed by the SJC’s IOLTA Committee may receive trust funds in a designated 
IOLTA account.107 To obtain certiﬁcation, a bank must agree to pay interest at 
a minimum level, determined through a complicated formula.108 Some select banks 
have agreed to pay interest at a higher rate, and the IOLTA Committee recog-
nizes them as “Leadership Institutions.”109
The lawyer’s requirements for any trust accounts, whether IOLTA or other-
wise, are as follows:
• The name of any trust account must include some variation of “IOLTA 
Account,” “client funds account,” or the like.110 For each account 
opened, the lawyer must provide written notice to the depository or 
bank conﬁrming the nature of the trust account and maintain a copy of 
that notice.111
106 No speciﬁc rules establish this principle, but it can be derived from the requirement that trust 
funds be held in trust accounts, and from the related rules that require that an IOLTA account be 
maintained for trust funds under certain circumstances, and the BBO’s annual registration form so 
states. See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(1), 1.15(e)(6).
107 The current version of the guidelines deﬁnes the “eligible ﬁnancial institutions” into which trust 
funds may be deposited as, among other things, a ﬁnancial institution that the IOLTA Commit-
tee has certiﬁed as being compliant with its guidelines. IOLTA Guidelines B, B(1)(c), https://
maiolta.org/for-attorneys (last visited April 27, 2018).
108 According to Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(g)(1), a lawyer may only establish an IOLTA account at 
a bank, savings and loan association, or credit union authorized by federal or state law to conduct 
business in the Commonwealth and insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or a 
similar state insurance program for state chartered ﬁnancial institutions. The IOLTA Committee 
certiﬁes compliance with its participating institutions on a yearly basis. See IOLTA Guidelines 
B(1)(b). IOLTA Guidelines, Massachusetts IOLTA, https://www.maiolta.org/for-attorneys. 
To be eligible for certiﬁcation, a ﬁnancial institution must have the characteristics described in 
section B of the IOLTA Guidelines. A list of ﬁnancial institutions certiﬁed to hold IOLTA funds 
is available on the IOLTA Committee’s website. Approved IOLTA Depositories, Massachusetts 
IOLTA, https://www.maiolta.org/ﬁnancial-institutions/approved-iolta-depositories (last visited 
May 24, 2018).
109 Approved IOLTA Depositories, Massachusetts IOLTA, https://www.maiolta.org/ﬁnancial-
institutions/approved-iolta-depositories.
110 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(2).
111 Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(3).
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• While commingling a lawyer’s own funds with those held in trust is a 
serious breach of ﬁduciary duty,112 some of the lawyer’s own funds may 
be deposited into the account to pay any required bank charges.113
• Once the lawyer deposits funds in a trust account, careful records of 
the funds and their movement must be kept. Mass. R. Prof. C. Rule 
1.15(f ) lists the speciﬁc requirements, including the following:
Q  All funds in the account must be identiﬁed by the client or third 
person on whose behalf the funds are held. The lawyer must estab-
lish a separate account for the lawyer’s business funds.
Q  The trust account must have a check register with numbered checks, 
and that register must show, in chronological order, all deposits, 
checks paid, or bank charges paid. No check may be paid to “cash”; 
all checks must be paid to an identiﬁed person or entity.114
Q  Separate from the account check register, the lawyer must maintain a 
ledger for each client matter or third-party matter for which funds are 
held, identifying the purpose of each deposit and recording all activity 
with respect to that client or third-party matter. The lawyer must also 
maintain a separate ledger for personal funds in the bank account.
Q  The account must be reconciled at least every sixty days, such that 
the bank statements, the individual client and bank ledgers, and the 
account register balance exactly. (This is known as the three-way 
reconciliation requirement.)
Q  The accounts, records, and documentation required by Mass. R. 
Prof. C. Rule 1.15(f ) may be maintained electronically, but, if so, 
the lawyer must be capable of producing a printed report of the 
records that the rule requires. Any records the rule requires must be 
maintained for six years after ﬁnal distribution of the funds and the 
termination of representation.
Q  Generally, a lawyer may only distribute funds on behalf of a client 
or third party for the purposes for which the funds were received.115
112 As noted in Chapter 11, commingling funds alone, without deprivation, typically results in an 
admonition. See, e.g., Matter of O’Driscoll, 22 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 621 (2006) (noting an admo-
nition in 2005 for commingling funds in an IOLTA account); Ad. 02-27, 18 Mass. Att’y Disc. 
R. 682 (2002).
113 See Mass R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(2)(i). See also IOLTA Guidelines B(2), IOLTA Guidelines,Massa-
chusetts IOLTA, https://www.maiolta.org/for-attorneys (permitting deposits of lawyer funds 
into a trust account to maintain a required minimum balance).
114 Mass R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(4).
115 Of course, the client might direct some other use of funds, delivered to the attorney by or for 
the client, for some purpose other than that for which it was received; the key notion is that the 
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The bank the lawyer uses must have an agreement with the board to 
report to the board any instance of a check being returned for insufﬁ-
cient funds.116 Therefore, if a lawyer writes a check on a trust account 
and the check is returned for insuﬃcient funds, the board receives 
notice, causing the bar counsel to investigate. In practice, however, 
notices concerning dishonored trust account checks typically go 
directly to bar counsel.
IV. THE CLIENTS’ SECURITY BOARD AND FUND
When the SJC created the BBO and the Oﬃce of the Bar Counsel in 1974 
to centralize and unify lawyer discipline, it also created the CSB and the Clients’ 
Security Fund. The CSB includes seven Massachusetts lawyers the Court appoints 
to serve as trustees of the fund. The fund’s purpose is to discharge, as far as prac-
ticable and in a reasonable manner, the collective responsibility of Massachusetts 
bar members regarding losses caused to the public through bar member defalca-
tions, thereby protecting the bar’s reputation and integrity. 
The CSB distributes funds to individuals who have suﬀered losses caused 
by defalcation by Massachusetts lawyers, acting either as attorneys or as ﬁduci-
aries.117 The CSB accepts claims for restitution triggered by “a wrongful act 
committed by a lawyer against a person by defalcation or embezzlement of 
money or the wrongful taking or conversion of money, property, or other things 
of value.”118 Any such fund payments “shall be a matter of grace, not right, and 
no client, beneﬁciary, employer, organization or other person shall have any 
right or interest in the Fund.”119 Therefore, a CSB reimbursement claim that is 
denied may not be reviewed or appealed,120 although the CSB will reconsider a 
decision if presented with new evidence or for other good cause. The fund is 
money belongs to the client, not the attorney. Common sense and good discretion suggest that if 
the client (or third party) whose money the lawyer holds directs that it be used for some purpose 
other than that for which it was received, this should be documented carefully, and the attorney 
should be careful not to violate the rights that some other person might have in or to the money. 
A lawyer’s ethical obligations concerning other people’s money are discussed in Chapter 11.
116 Mass R. Prof. C. 1.15(h)(1).
117 SJC Rule 4:04 § 1.
118 Clients’ Security Board Rules, Rule 2(d), Clients’ Security Board, http://www.mass.gov/
ClientsSecurityBoard/rules_.html#2 (last visited May 24, 2018).
119 SJC Rule 4:05 § 1.
120 SJC Rule 4:05 § 1 (“No decision to grant or deny reimbursement shall be subject to judicial 
review in a court of either appellate or original jurisdiction.”).
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ﬁnanced by a portion of the annual registration fees lawyers and FLCs pay and, 
to a minor extent, from monies recovered from defalcating lawyers or other 
parties responsible for the loss.121 In ﬁscal year 2013, the most recent year for 
which a report is available, the fund awarded close to $3 million.122
For an applicant to be eligible for an award, the loss must have occurred due 
to defalcation during client representation, and the lawyer, at the time the claim 
arose, must have been an active member of the bar with an oﬃce in the Com-
monwealth. In addition, the lawyer must have died, been disbarred or suspended, 
or resigned from practice.123 The CSB does not reimburse for losses caused by 
lawyer malpractice or other negligent practice, or resulting from a fee dispute. 
It only compensates for misappropriation of funds held in trust or failure to return 
unearned fees.
A client claiming a reimbursable loss must ﬁle an application with the CSB 
using an approved form.124 The application requires detailed information about 
the facts surrounding the loss, and all eﬀorts the client or others have made to 
recover the funds from the lawyer, an insurer, or another source. The CSB sends 
a copy of the application to the attorney alleged to have caused the loss and asks 
the bar counsel for any information regarding the matter. If a viable claim against 
a third party exists, the CSB typically addresses the claim ﬁrst and then, with an 
assignment of claims obtained from the injured party, pursues recovery from the 
third party. Once the CSB has a complete set of facts and documents, it either 
adjudicates the claim without a hearing or schedules a hearing on the matter. At 
any such hearing, which respondent attorney may attend, one or more CSB mem-
bers serves as the hearing oﬃcer or panel. The claimant may be represented by 
counsel, but no lawyer for a claimant may accept a fee for representing a CSB 
claim. All such services must be provided on a pro bono basis.125
121 See supra note 91 (describing the funding allocation to the CSB).
122 Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2013, Clients’ Security Board, http://www.mass.gov/
ClientsSecurityBoard/annual_reports.html (reporting awards totaling $2,801,666) (last visited 
May 24, 2018). Annual reports for later years may be obtained by contacting the CSB.
123 SJC Rule 4:05 § 2.
124 Claim Form [“Conﬁdential Application”], Clients’ Security Board, http://www.mass.gov/
ClientsSecurityBoard/Appli-Form-99_High.pdf (last visited April 27, 2018).
125 See CSB Rules, Rule 9. Clients’ Security Board Rules, Clients’ Security Board, http://www
.mass.gov/ClientsSecurityBoard/rules_.html#2 (last visited May 24, 2018).
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The CSB makes awards based upon “fair, reasonable and consistent prin-
ciples,”126 including the following factors:
• Funds available to the CSB in light of the projected claims for that 
ﬁscal year and the total amount of losses caused by any one attorney
• Amount of the claimant’s loss as compared with those of other claimants
• Degree of hardship the claimant suﬀered as compared with that of 
other claimants
• Any negligence or conduct by the claimant that may have contributed 
to the loss127
As a condition of any such award, a claimant must agree to cooperate with 
the CSB and any other source in obtaining payment for the loss from other sources 
and must agree to any appropriate assignment or subrogation agreements.128 Un-
like most other jurisdictions, and unlike the arrangement the ABA Model Rules 
for Lawyers’ Funds for Client Protection suggests,129 Massachusetts does not impose 
a cap on the amount of any given award.
The board website publishes summaries of the board’s decisions, which in-
clude the respondent’s name but not the claimant’s. In determining whether to 
recommend reinstatement of a lawyer, the BBO takes into account whether the 
lawyer has reimbursed the CSB for any award granted to the lawyer’s clients;130
the petition for reinstatement must include a statement whether the CSB has 
been reimbursed,131 and part one of the reinstatement questionnaire, question 
3(D), asks about payments by the CSB and the date of the petitioner’s reim-
bursement to the CSB.132
126 SJC Rule 4:05 § 3.
127 Id.
128 SJC Rule 4:05 § 4.
129 Model Rules for Lawyers’ Funds for Client Protection–Rule 14(1), American Bar Association,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/client_protection/
rule14.html (last visited April 27, 2018).
130 Matter of McCarthy, 23 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 469, 470 (2007) (reinstatement denied; “princi-
pal” reason for denial was failure to make restitution).
131 SJC Rule 4:01 § 18(4)(d).
132 The reinstatement questionnaire appears as an appendix to the rules of the BBO, which may 
be found at https://bbopublic.blob.core.windows.net/web/f/BBORules.pdf (last visited April 27, 
2018).
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Sample Petition for Discipline
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
BOARD OF BAR OVERSEERS
OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
BAR COUNSEL,
Petitioner
vs. B.B.O. File No. C8-67-5309
JOHN DOE, ESQ.1
Respondent
PETITION FOR DISCIPLINE
Count One
1. This petition is brought pursuant to Rule 4:01, Section 8(3), of the 
Rules of the Supreme Judicial Court and Sections 3.13(2) and 3.14 of the Rules 
of the Board of Bar Overseers. 
2. The respondent, John Doe, was admitted to practice in the Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts on December 23, 1999. 
3. At all times relevant to this petition, the respondent maintained an IOLTA 
account at Sovereign Bank (Sovereign IOLTA). During this same time period the 
respondent also maintained an IOLTA account at Citizens Bank (Citizens IOLTA), 
and personal accounts with TD Bank (TD account) and Eastern Bank (Eastern 
account).
1 “Esq.” is not included if the attorney is not in good standing.
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4. On August 10, 2012, bar counsel received notices of dishonored checks 
in the respondent’s trust account from Sovereign Bank.
5. On or about August 16, 2012, bar counsel sent the respondent a copy of 
the dishonored check notices and requested an explanation along with trust 
account records. The respondent did not respond. 
6. On or about September 20, 2012, bar counsel sent a second letter to the 
respondent enclosing a copy of the August 16 letter and requesting an explanation 
for the dishonored checks and trust account records. The respondent did not 
respond.
7. On October 1, 2012, pursuant to Supreme Judicial Court Rule 4:01 § 3, 
bar counsel filed a petition for administrative suspension with the Supreme 
Judicial Court for Suffolk County based on the respondent’s failure to respond.
8. On October 7, 2012, the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County 
entered an order immediately administratively suspending the respondent from 
the practice of law. The respondent received the order in due course. 
9. On or about November 29, 2012, the respondent sent a motion for 
reinstatement, in the form of a letter, to Chief Justice Ireland. The motion was 
denied on January 20, 2013.
10. On January 21, 2013, the Board of Bar Overseers issued a subpoena
duces tecum requiring the respondent to appear on February 24, 2013, at the 
Office of the Bar Counsel to give testimony and to produce documents listed in 
the subpoena. 
11. The respondent appeared pursuant to a subpoena to testify under oath 
on February 24, 2013. The respondent did not produce any records required by 
the subpoena.
12. By knowingly failing without good cause to respond to bar counsel’s 
requests for information during the course of an investigation, the respondent 
violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.1(b) and 8.4(d) and (g).
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Count Two
13. Paragraphs one through three are hereby incorporated as if fully set 
forth herein.
14. Prior to January 1, 2008, the Internal Revenue Service filed a lien 
against the respondent for over $250,000. The lien is still in effect.
15. Prior to January 1, 2010, the Massachusetts Department of Revenue 
filed a lien against the respondent for over $25,000. The lien is still in effect.
16. Between June 20, 2010, and June 1, 2012, the respondent made 
approximately sixteen deposits of personal funds into the Sovereign IOLTA 
account totaling about $28,000. 
17. Between June 22, 2010, and May 23, 2012, the respondent held both 
personal funds and client funds in the IOLTA account at the same time. 
18. Between November 5, 2011, and December 22, 2011, the respondent 
wrote approximately fourteen checks from his Sovereign IOLTA directly to a 
creditor to pay personal expenses. 
19. Between July 1, 2010, and August 1, 2012, the respondent made 
approximately forty-five cash withdrawals from his Sovereign IOLTA totaling 
about $10,200.
20. The respondent made the above-described deposits and withdrawals of 
personal funds to and from his IOLTA account in order to avoid the IRS and 
DOR liens. 
21. The respondent did not keep a check register listing every transaction, 
a client identifier for every transaction, and a running balance as required by 
Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B) for his Sovereign IOLTA account.
22. The respondent did not keep an individual client ledger listing every 
transaction and a running balance after every transaction as required by Mass. R. 
Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C) for his Sovereign IOLTA account.
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23. The respondent did not keep an individual ledger for funds held for 
bank fees and expenses listing every transaction and a running balance as required 
by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(D).
24. The respondent did not do a three-way reconciliation of his Sovereign 
IOLTA at least every sixty days as required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E).
25. By failing to keep a check register listing every transaction with a 
client identifier for each transaction and running balance, the respondent violated 
Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B).
26. By failing to keep individual client matter ledgers listing every 
transaction with a running balance after every transaction, the respondent 
violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C).
27. By failing to keep an individual ledger for funds held for bank fees 
and expenses listing every transaction and a running balance after every 
transaction, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1.5(f)(1)(D).
28. By failing to reconcile his bank statement balance with the total of his 
client ledgers balances and his adjusted bank statement balance, the respondent 
violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E). 
29. By depositing and disbursing personal funds to and from his IOLTA 
account, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(2)(i).
30. By intentionally holding and disbursing personal funds in and from his 
IOLTA account to avoid an Internal Revenue Service lien, the respondent 
violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h).
31. By intentionally holding and disbursing personal funds in and from his 
IOLTA account to avoid a Massachusetts Department of Revenue lien, the 
respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h).
32. By making cash withdrawals from his IOLTA account, the respondent 
violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(3).
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Count Three
33. Paragraphs one through three are hereby incorporated as if fully set 
forth herein.
34. On or about September 30, 2010, the respondent was hired by Klaus 
Client to represent him in a personal injury case. 
35. The fee agreement stated that the respondent was to be paid reasonable 
compensation not to exceed 33 1/3% of the settlement plus expenses. 
36. On July 5, 2012, the respondent opened a personal account at TD Bank 
with a $5 deposit. The balance in the TD account was never greater than $5.
37. Between July 11 and August 12, 2012, the respondent wrote eleven 
checks from his TD account totaling $13,000 to Bud E. Guy. 
38. Bud E. Guy is an acquaintance or business associate of the respondent. 
Guy is not a client to whom the respondent owed any funds held in his IOLTA 
account at any time relevant to this petition. 
39. On or about July 15, 2012, the respondent deposited a $65 check from 
Guy into his TD account. This check was dishonored due to insufficient funds. 
40. Between July 15 and July 19, 2012, the respondent wrote Guy four 
checks for a total of $5,000 from his Sovereign IOLTA account against a balance 
of only $25.18. The bank honored two checks totaling $1,600, thereby creating 
an overdraft in the Sovereign IOLTA in the amount of (–$1,574.82).
41. On or about July 16, 2012, the respondent settled the Client case for 
$6,500. On or about July 20, 2012, the respondent deposited the settlement check 
into his Sovereign IOLTA.
42. The respondent used $1,574.82 to cover the checks Guy already 
cashed to bring the Sovereign IOLTA balance back to $0.
43. Between July 20 and July 31, 2012, the respondent intentionally 
misused the balance of the Client settlement by withdrawing funds and writing 
checks for his own business or personal purposes, including checks to Guy.
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44. On or about July 27, 2012, the respondent wrote a check from his TD 
account payable to himself for $3,000 and deposited it into his Sovereign IOLTA 
account.
45. The respondent knew when he wrote this check that he did not have 
sufficient funds in his TD account to cover this deposit. 
46. On or about July 30, 2012, the respondent withdrew a total of $3,700 
in cash from his Sovereign IOLTA. The respondent knew when he made these 
withdrawals that he did not have $3,700 in his Sovereign IOLTA. 
47. On or about August 1, 2012, the $3,000 TD account check was 
dishonored due to insufficient funds. 
48. On July 30, 2012, the balance in the respondent’s Sovereign IOLTA 
was negative (–$2,893.64), without any payment to or for the benefit of Client.
49. Between July 30 and September 7, 2012, the respondent wrote nine 
more checks to Guy from his Sovereign IOLTA account totaling $6,689.50. 
50. On September 7, 2012, Sovereign Bank closed the respondent’s IOLTA 
account with a negative balance.
51. The respondent has never reimbursed Sovereign Bank for the overdrawn 
amount.
52. On or about October 30, 2012, Klaus Client filed a complaint with the 
Office of Bar Counsel. On December 14, 2012, the respondent remitted a cashier’s 
check for $5,000 to an attorney representing Client. 
53. By intentionally misusing Client’s funds, the respondent violated 
Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h) and 1.15(b) and (c).
54. By authorizing transactions from his IOLTA account that caused a 
negative balance for a client, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C.
1.15(f)(1)(C).
55. By writing checks from his IOLTA account when he knew he did not 
have sufficient funds in his IOLTA account to cover the checks, the respondent 
violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(b), (c), and (h).
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56. By participating in a scheme to defraud banks, the respondent violated 
Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(b), (c), and (h).
57. By failing to promptly pay clients the funds due to them, the respondent 
violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(c).
58. The Rules of Professional Conduct violated by the respondent provide 
as follows:
Rule 1.15 Safekeeping Property
(b) Segregation of Trust Property. A lawyer shall hold trust property separate 
from the lawyer’s own property.
(1) Trust funds shall be held in a trust account, except that advances 
for costs and expenses may be held in a business account.
(2) No funds belonging to the lawyer shall be deposited or retained 
in a trust account except that:
(i) Funds reasonably sufficient to pay bank charges may 
be deposited therein, and
(ii) Trust funds belonging in part to a client or third 
person and in part currently or potentially to the lawyer 
shall be deposited in a trust account, but the portion 
belonging to the lawyer must be withdrawn at the earliest 
reasonable time after the lawyer’s interest in that portion 
becomes fixed. A lawyer who knows that the right of the 
lawyer or law firm to receive such portion is disputed shall 
not withdraw the funds until the dispute is resolved. If the 
right of the lawyer or law firm to receive such portion is 
disputed within a reasonable time after notice is given that 
the funds have been withdrawn, the disputed portion must 
be restored to a trust account until the dispute is resolved.
(3) Trust property other than funds shall be identified as such and 
appropriately safeguarded.
(c) Prompt Notice and Delivery of Trust Property to Client or Third 
Person. Upon receiving trust funds or other trust property in which a client or 
third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third 
person. Except as stated in this rule or as otherwise permitted by law or by 
agreement with the client or third person on whose behalf a lawyer holds trust 
property, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or 
other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive.
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(e) Operational Requirements for Trust Accounts.
(3) No withdrawal from a trust account shall be made by a check 
which is not prenumbered. No withdrawal shall be made in cash or by 
automatic teller machine or any similar method. No withdrawal shall 
be made by a check payable to “cash” or “bearer” or by any other 
method which does not identify the recipient of the funds.
(f ) Required Accounts and Records: Every lawyer who is engaged in the 
practice of law in this Commonwealth and who holds trust property in 
connection with a representation shall maintain complete records of the receipt, 
maintenance, and disposition of that trust property, including all records required 
by this subsection. Records shall be preserved for a period of six years after 
termination of the representation and after distribution of the property. Records 
may be maintained by computer subject to the requirements of subparagraph 1G 
of this paragraph (f) or they may be prepared manually.
(1) Trust Account Records. The following books and records must 
be maintained for each trust account:
B. Check Register. A check register recording in chronological 
order the date and amount of all deposits; the date, check or 
transaction number, amount, and payee of all disbursements, 
whether by check, electronic transfer, or other means; the date 
and amount of every other credit or debit of whatever nature; the 
identity of the client matter for which funds were deposited or 
disbursed; and the current balance in the account.
C. Individual Client Records. A record for each client or 
third person for whom the lawyer received trust funds documenting 
each receipt and disbursement of the funds of the client or third 
person, the identity of the client matter for which funds were 
deposited or disbursed, and the balance held for the client or third 
person, including a subsidiary ledger or ledger for each client 
matter for which the lawyer receives trust funds documenting 
each receipt and disbursement of the funds of the client or third 
person with respect to such matter. A lawyer shall not disburse 
funds from the trust account that would create a negative balance 
with respect to any individual client.
D. Bank Fees and Charges. A ledger or other record for 
funds of the lawyer deposited in the trust account pursuant to 
paragraph (b)(2)(i) of this rule to accommodate reasonably 
expected bank charges. This ledger shall document each deposit 
and expenditure of the lawyer’s funds in the account and the 
balance remaining. 
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E. Reconciliation Reports. For each trust account, the 
lawyer shall prepare and retain a reconciliation report on a 
regular and periodic basis but in any event no less frequently than 
every sixty days. Each reconciliation report shall show the 
following balances and verify that they are identical:
(i) The balance which appears in the check register as of the 
reporting date.
(ii) The adjusted bank statement balance, determined by 
adding outstanding deposits and other credits to the bank 
statement balance and subtracting outstanding checks and 
other debits from the bank statement balance.
(iii) For any account in which funds are held for more than 
one client matter, the total of all client matter balances, 
determined by listing each of the individual client matter 
records and the balance which appears in each record as of 
the reporting date, and calculating the total. For the purpose 
of the calculation required by this paragraph, bank fees and 
charges shall be considered an individual client record. No 
balance for an individual client may be negative at any time. 
Rule 8.1 Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters
An applicant for admission to the bar, or a lawyer in connection with a bar 
admission application or in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not:
(a) knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or
(b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the 
person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful 
demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority, except that 
this rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.
Rule 8.4 Misconduct
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, 
trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;
(g) fail without good cause to cooperate with the Bar Counsel or the Board of 
Bar Overseers as provided in Supreme Judicial Court Rule 4:01 § 3; or
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(h) engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his or her fitness to 
practice law. 
WHEREFORE, bar counsel requests that the Board of Bar Overseers:
A. consider and hear the matter set forth herein;
B. determine that discipline of the said John Doe is 
required;
C. file an Information concerning these matters with the 
Supreme Judicial Court.
Respectfully submitted,
CONSTANCE V. VECCHIONE
BAR COUNSEL
By  ________________________________
Sally Roe
Assistant Bar Counsel
BBO #987654
99 High Street
Boston, MA 02110
Date: ___________________
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PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
John Doe, Esq.
1 Any Road
Sometown, MA 02345
RE: BBO File No(s). C8-67-5309 (Bar Counsel)
Dear Mr. Doe:
You are hereby notified by the Board of Bar Overseers that your answer to 
the enclosed Petition for Discipline must be filed with the Board of Bar 
Overseers, 99 High Street, Boston, MA 02110, no later than 20 days after the 
date of this letter. In addition, you must send a copy of your answer to Assistant 
Bar Counsel Jane Roe at the same address.
These requirements are set forth in Rule 4:01, Section 8(3), of the Rules of 
the Supreme Judicial Court. Pursuant to Rule 4:01, Section 20(1), all pleadings 
and proceedings before the Board of Bar Overseers in this matter are public.
Please be advised that the originals of all documents in formal proceedings 
must be filed with the Board to maintain the docket and the records of the 
proceedings. See BBO Rule 3.5(e). A copy of each document must be served on 
the Bar Counsel.
Section 3.15 of the Rules of the Board of Bar Overseers sets forth the rules 
governing service of the petition and the answer of the respondent. In particular, 
please note:
•  Failure without good cause to file a timely answer shall be deemed an act of 
professional misconduct in violation of SJC Rule 4:01 § 3(1)(c), and shall be 
grounds for administrative suspension under § 3(2) without further hearing.
• Failure to file a timely answer shall be deemed an admission of the charges.
•  Your answer must be in writing and state fully and completely the nature of 
the defense. The answer must admit or deny specifically, and in reasonable 
appendix b
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detail, each material allegation of the petition and state clearly and concisely 
the facts and matters of law relied upon. General statements like “denied” 
are not acceptable responses. Averments in the petition are admitted when 
not denied in the answer in accordance with these requirements.
•  You must include in your answer any facts in mitigation, and you may request 
that a hearing be held on the issue of mitigation. Failure to include facts in 
mitigation constitutes a waiver of the right to present evidence of those facts.
In addition, Section 3.17(a) of the Rules of the Board of Bar Overseers, as 
amended effective September 1, 2009, governs discovery and provides as follows:
Section 3.17 Discovery
  (a) Scope. Within 20 days following the filing of an answer, Bar 
Counsel and the Respondent shall exchange the names and addresses of all 
persons having knowledge of facts relevant to the proceedings. Bar Counsel 
and the Respondent shall, within 10 days, comply with reasonable requests 
made within 30 days following the filing of an answer for (1) non-privileged 
information and evidence relevant to the charges or the Respondent, and
(2) other material upon good cause shown to the chair of the hearing 
committee, hearing panel or special hearing officer. Applications for 
depositions may be made pursuant to Sections 4.9 or 4.10.
You are entitled to be represented by counsel in these proceedings. Counsel 
must file a written notice of appearance on your behalf in accordance with the 
Rules of the Board of Bar Overseers, Section 3.4(b). If you wish to be 
represented in these proceedings but are unable to afford counsel, the Board will 
attempt to assist you in obtaining pro bono counsel. See Rules of the Board of 
Bar Overseers, Section 3.4(d). Such request should be addressed to me and made 
before you file your answer.
Finally, for scheduling purposes, please fill out the attached form and return 
it with your answer, to the Board and to the Bar Counsel, estimating the length of 
time necessary to present your defense.
Sincerely yours,
Joseph S. Berman
General Counsel
JSB/prt
Enclosures
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Sample Answer to Petition for Discipline
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
BOARD OF BAR OVERSEERS
OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
BAR COUNSEL,
Petitioner
vs. B.B.O. File No. C8-67-5309
JOHN DOE, ESQ.
Respondent
RESPONDENT’S ANSWER
Respondent John Doe, by his counsel, and pursuant to Rule 3.15 of the 
Rules of the Board of Bar Overseers, answers the Petition in this matter as 
follows. Mr. Doe also requests that he be heard on the issue of mitigation.
Count One
1. This petition is brought pursuant to Rule 4:01, Section 8(3), of the Rules 
of the Supreme Judicial Court and Sections 3.13(2) and 3.14 of the Rules of the 
Board of Bar Overseers.
ANSWER
Respondent admits that the Petition is purportedly brought by bar counsel 
pursuant to legal authority.
2. The respondent, John Doe, was admitted to practice in the Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts on December 23, 1999.
ANSWER
Admitted.
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3. At all times relevant to this petition, the respondent maintained an 
IOLTA account at Sovereign Bank (Sovereign IOLTA). During this same time 
period the respondent also maintained an IOLTA account at Citizens Bank 
(Citizens IOLTA), and personal accounts with TD Bank (TD account) and 
Eastern Bank (Eastern account).
ANSWER
Admitted.
4. On August 10, 2012, bar counsel received notices of dishonored checks 
in the respondent’s trust account from Sovereign Bank.
ANSWER
Admitted, upon information and belief.
5. On or about August 16, 2012, bar counsel sent the respondent a copy of 
the dishonored check notices and requested an explanation along with trust 
account records. The respondent did not respond.
ANSWER
Admitted that bar counsel sent the respondent a copy of the dishonored 
check notices and requested an explanation on or about August 16, 2012. Denied 
that respondent did not respond. Mr. Doe states that after receiving a letter from 
bar counsel, he telephoned bar counsel within a week to advise that he needed 
additional time in which to provide the documentation because he was preparing 
to relocate his office to his home.
6. On or about September 20, 2012, bar counsel sent a second letter to the 
respondent enclosing a copy of the August 16 letter and requesting an explanation 
for the dishonored checks and trust account records. The respondent did not respond.
ANSWER
Admitted that on or about September 20, 2012, bar counsel sent a second 
letter to the respondent enclosing a copy of the August 16 letter and requesting 
an explanation for the dishonored checks and trust account records. Denied that 
respondent did not respond. Mr. Doe spoke with bar counsel in August, 2012, to 
advise that he needed additional time in which to provide the documentation 
because he was preparing to relocate his office to his home. Mr. Doe further states 
that he responded in writing to Bar Counsel on December 4, 2012, after relocating 
his office.
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7. On October 1, 2012, pursuant to Supreme Judicial Court Rule 4:01 § 3, 
bar counsel filed a petition for administrative suspension with the Supreme 
Judicial Court for Suffolk County based on the respondent’s failure to respond.
ANSWER
Respondent admits that the Petition was purportedly brought by bar counsel 
pursuant to legal authority.
8. On October 7, 2012, the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County 
entered an order immediately administratively suspending the respondent from 
the practice of law. The respondent received the order in due course.
ANSWER
Admitted.
9. On or about November 29, 2012, the respondent sent a motion for 
reinstatement, in the form of a letter, to Chief Justice Ireland. The motion was 
denied on January 20, 2013.
ANSWER
Admitted.
10. On January 21, 2013, the Board of Bar Overseers issued a subpoena
duces tecum requiring the respondent to appear on February 24, 2013, at the 
Office of the Bar Counsel to give testimony and to produce documents listed in 
the subpoena.
ANSWER
Admitted.
11. The respondent appeared pursuant to a subpoena to testify under oath 
on February 24, 2013. The respondent did not produce any records required by 
the subpoena.
ANSWER
Admitted that the respondent appeared pursuant to a subpoena to testify 
under oath on February 24, 2013. Denied that the respondent did not produce any 
records required by the subpoena. Respondent brought with him to the hearing 
checkbooks from several bank accounts as well as a list of cases that he worked 
on between 2010 and 2012. Under separate cover in December 2012, respondent 
provided other documents, including a copy of his fee agreement with Klaus 
Client, a deposit slip, and the insurance company check from the Client matter.
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12. By knowingly failing without good cause to respond to bar counsel’s 
requests for information during the course of an investigation, the respondent 
violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.1(b) and 8.4(d) and(g).
ANSWER
Denied. Respondent states that he provided to bar counsel documents 
responsive to bar counsel’s request and testified at length under oath.
Count Two
13. Paragraphs one through three are hereby incorporated as if fully set 
forth herein.
ANSWER
No response required.
14. Prior to January 1, 2008, the Internal Revenue Service filed a lien 
against the respondent for over $250,000. The lien is still in effect.
ANSWER
Admitted that prior to January 1, 2008, the Internal Revenue Service filed a 
lien against the respondent for over $250,000. Respondent states, however, that 
he has not received notice that the lien has been renewed and thus does not 
believe that it remains in effect.
15. Prior to January 1, 2010, the Massachusetts Department of Revenue 
filed a lien against the respondent for over $25,000. The lien is still in effect.
ANSWER
Admitted that prior to January 1, 2010, the Massachusetts Department of 
Revenue filed a lien against the respondent for over $25,000. Denied that the lien 
is still in effect. The debt was satisfied by a levy on a retirement account.
16. Between June 20, 2010, and June 1, 2012, the respondent made 
approximately fifteen deposits of personal funds into the Sovereign IOLTA 
account totaling about $28,000.
ANSWER
Admitted that between June 20, 2010, and June 1, 2012, the respondent 
deposited some personal funds into his Sovereign IOLTA account. Respondent is 
unable to state at this time the amount of such funds and further states that some 
of the funds deposited in the account at that time were client funds.
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17. Between June 22, 2010, and June 1, 2012, the respondent held both 
personal funds and client funds in the IOLTA account at the same time.
ANSWER
Admitted.
18. Between November 5, 2011, and December 22, 2011, the respondent 
wrote approximately fourteen checks from his Sovereign IOLTA directly to a 
creditor to pay personal expenses.
ANSWER
Admitted. Respondent further states that the funds used were not client funds.
19. Between July 1, 2010, and August 1, 2012, the respondent made 
approximately forty-five cash withdrawals from his Sovereign IOLTA totaling 
$10,200.
ANSWER
Admitted.
20. The respondent made the above-described deposits and withdrawals of 
personal funds to and from his IOLTA account in order to avoid the IRS and 
DOR liens.
ANSWER
Denied. As stated above, the IRS and DOR liens were secured by liens on 
the respondent’s property and/or were later satisfied with funds from his 
retirement account.
21. The respondent did not keep a check register listing every transaction, a 
client identifier for every transaction, and a running balance as required by Mass. 
R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B) for his Sovereign IOLTA account.
ANSWER
Denied. Respondent states that he kept a check register listing every 
transaction for his Sovereign IOLTA account but has been unable to locate it.
22. The respondent did not keep an individual client ledger listing every 
transaction and a running balance after every transaction as required by Mass. R. 
Prof. C. 1.15(f)(l)(C) for his Sovereign IOLTA account.
ANSWER
Admitted. Respondent states that he maintained expense information in 
individual client files.
536
Appendices
23. The respondent did not keep an individual ledger for funds held for 
bank fees and expenses listing every transaction and a running balance as 
required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(D.
ANSWER
Admitted.
24. The respondent did not do a three-way reconciliation of his Sovereign 
IOLTA at least every sixty days as required by Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E).
ANSWER
Admitted.
25. By failing to keep a check register listing every transaction with a client 
identifier for each transaction and running balance, the respondent violated 
Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(B).
ANSWER
Denied. As stated above, respondent kept a check register but has been 
unable to find it.
26. By failing to keep individual client matter ledgers listing every transaction 
with a running balance after every transaction, the respondent violated Mass. R. 
Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C).
ANSWER
The respondent admits that he failed to keep individual client matter ledgers 
listing every transaction with a running balance after every transaction. The 
remainder of the allegations in this paragraph are denied.
27. By failing to keep an individual ledger for funds held for bank fees and 
expenses listing every transaction and a running balance after every transaction, 
the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(D).
ANSWER
The respondent admits that he failed to keep an individual ledger for funds 
held for bank fees and expenses listing every transaction and a running balance after 
every transaction. The remainder of the allegations in this paragraph are denied.
28. By failing to reconcile his bank statement balance with the total of his 
client ledgers balances and his adjusted bank statement balance, the respondent 
violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(E).
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ANSWER
The respondent admits that he failed to reconcile his bank statement balance 
with the total of his client ledgers balances and his adjusted bank statement 
balance. The remainder of the allegations in this paragraph are denied.
29. By depositing and disbursing personal funds to and from his IOLTA 
account, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(b)(2)(i).
ANSWER
The respondent admits that he deposited and disbursed personal funds to 
and from his IOLTA account. The remainder of the allegations in this paragraph 
are denied.
30. By intentionally holding and disbursing personal funds in and from his 
IOLTA account to avoid an Internal Revenue Service lien, the respondent 
violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h).
ANSWER
Denied. The respondent states that he did not intentionally hold or disburse 
personal funds in and from his IOLTA account to avoid an IRS lien. Respondent 
further states that the IRS lien was secured by a lien on the respondent’s property.
31. By intentionally holding and disbursing personal funds in and from his 
IOLTA account to avoid a Massachusetts Department of Revenue lien, the 
respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h).
ANSWER
Denied. The respondent states that he did not intentionally hold or disburse 
personal funds in and from his IOLTA account to avoid a DOR lien. Respondent 
further states that the DOR lien was satisfied with funds from his retirement 
account.
32. By making cash withdrawals from his IOLTA account the respondent 
violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(e)(3).
ANSWER
Admitted.
Count Three
33. Paragraphs one through three are hereby incorporated as if fully set 
forth herein.
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ANSWER
No response required.
34. On or about September 30, 2010, the respondent was hired by Klaus 
Client to represent him in a personal injury case.
ANSWER
Admitted.
35. The fee agreement stated that the respondent was to be paid reasonable 
compensation not to exceed 33 1/3% of the settlement plus expenses.
ANSWER
Admitted.
36. On July 5, 2012, the respondent opened a personal account at TD Bank 
with a $5 deposit. The balance in the TD account was never greater than $5.
ANSWER
Admitted that on July 5, 2012, the respondent opened a personal account at 
TD Bank with a $5 deposit. Respondent is uncertain as to the balance.
37. Between July 11 and August 12, 2012, the respondent wrote ten checks 
from his TD account totaling $13,000 to Bud E. Guy.
ANSWER
Admitted.
38. Bud E. Guy is an acquaintance or business associate of the respondent. 
Guy is not a client to whom the respondent owed any funds held in his IOLTA 
account at any time relevant to this petition.
ANSWER
Admitted.
39. On or about July 15, 2012, the respondent deposited a $65 check from 
Guy into his TD account. This check was dishonored due to insufficient funds.
ANSWER
Admitted.
40. Between July 15 and July 19, 2012, the respondent wrote Guy four 
checks for a total of $5,000 from his Sovereign IOLTA account against a balance 
of only $25.18. The bank honored two checks totaling $1,600, thereby creating 
an overdraft in the Sovereign IOLTA in the amount of ($1,574.82).
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ANSWER
Admitted. Respondent further states that he was confused as to the remaining 
balance and the source of funds in his Sovereign IOLTA account at the time he 
issued the checks.
41. On or about July 16, 2012, the respondent settled the Client case for 
$6,500. On or about July 20, 2012, the respondent deposited the settlement check 
into his Sovereign IOLTA.
ANSWER
Admitted.
42. The respondent used $1,574.82 to cover the checks Guy already cashed 
to bring the Sovereign IOLTA balance back to $0.
ANSWER
Denied that respondent “used $1,574.82 to cover the checks Guy already 
cashed to bring the Sovereign IOLTA balance back to $0,” but respondent admits 
that such was the result of the transaction.
43. Between July 20 and July 31, 2012, the respondent intentionally misused 
the balance of Client settlement by withdrawing funds and writing checks for his 
own business or personal purposes, including checks to Guy.
ANSWER
Denied. Respondent admits that between July 20 and July 31, 2012, he 
withdrew funds and wrote checks from the balance of the Client settlement, but 
denies that he did so intentionally. To the extent the respondent misused the 
Client settlement funds, such misuse was the result of confusion as to the source 
and amount of funds in the account.
44. On or about July 27, 2012, the respondent wrote a check from his TD 
account payable to himself for $3,000 and deposited it into his Sovereign IOLTA 
account.
ANSWER
Admitted.
45. The respondent knew when he wrote this check that he did not have 
sufficient funds in his TD account to cover this deposit.
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ANSWER
Denied. Respondent states that he was not aware that he did not have 
sufficient funds in his TD account to cover this deposit, as he was confused as to 
the source and amount of funds in the account.
46. On or about July 30, 2012, the respondent withdrew a total of $3,700 in 
cash from his Sovereign IOLTA. The respondent knew when he made these 
withdrawals that he did not have $3,700 in his Sovereign IOLTA.
ANSWER
Admitted that on or about July 30, 2012, the respondent withdrew a total of 
$3,700 in cash from his Sovereign IOLTA. Respondent denies that he knew when 
he made those withdrawals that he did not have $3,700 in his account.
47. On or about August 1, 2012, the $3,000 TD account check was 
dishonored due to insufficient funds.
ANSWER
Admitted.
48. On July 30, 2012, the balance in the respondent’s Sovereign IOLTA was 
negative ($2,893.64), without any payment to or for the benefit of Client.
ANSWER
Admitted.
49. Between July 30 and September 7, 2012, the respondent wrote nine 
more checks to Guy from his Sovereign IOLTA account, totaling $6,689.50.
ANSWER
Admitted.
50. On September 7, 2012, Sovereign Bank closed the respondent’s IOLTA 
account with a negative balance.
ANSWER
Respondent is without knowledge and information necessary to answer the 
allegation contained in this paragraph, as he has not received notification from 
Sovereign Bank regarding the alleged closure of his IOLTA account.
51. The respondent has never reimbursed Sovereign bank for the overdrawn 
amount.
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ANSWER
Admitted.
52. On or about October 30, 2012, Klaus Client filed a complaint with the 
Office of Bar Counsel. On December 14, 2012, the respondent remitted a 
cashier’s check for $5,000 to an attorney representing Client.
ANSWER
Admitted.
53. By intentionally misusing Client’s funds, the respondent violated Mass. 
R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) and (h) and 1.15(b) and (c).
ANSWER
Respondent denies that he intentionally misused Client’s funds and states 
that any such misuse of funds was the result of confusion as to the source and 
amount of funds in his IOLTA account.
54. By authorizing transactions from his IOLTA account that caused a 
negative balance for a client, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15(f)(1)(C).
ANSWER
Respondent denies that he “authorized” transactions from his IOLTA 
account that caused a negative balance for a client, to the extent the use of the 
word “authorized” suggests that the conduct was intentional. Respondent further 
states that any misuse of funds was the result of confusion as to the source and 
amount of funds in the account.
55. By writing checks from his IOLTA account when he knew he did not 
have sufficient funds in his IOLTA account to cover the checks, the respondent 
violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(b), (c), and (h).
ANSWER
The respondent denies that he knew he did not have sufficient funds in his 
IOLTA account when he wrote the checks.
56. By participating in a scheme to defraud banks, the respondent violated 
Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(b), (c), and (h).
ANSWER
Denied. The respondent did not engage in a “scheme” to “defraud” banks.
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57. By failing to promptly pay clients the funds due to them, the respondent 
violated Mass. R. Prof. C. l .15(c).
ANSWER
Respondent admits that he was untimely in paying settlement funds due to 
Client, but states that Client has since been paid in full.
58. The Rules of Professional Conduct violated by the respondent provide 
as follows: [text of rules omitted].
ANSWER
Respondent admits that the rules bar counsel alleges him to have violated 
are excerpted accurately.
MITIGATION
Mr. Doe intends to introduce evidence as to the following mitigating 
factors: (I) his general reputation in the community for honesty and competency 
during his years at the bar; (2) his lack of any disciplinary history prior to the 
time period in question; and (3) his health problems during the time period in 
question.
JOHN DOE
By his attorneys
________________________________
Mary Moe (BBO #666082)
Law Firm
One Post Office Square
Boston, Massachusetts 02109
Telephone:(617) 867-5309
mmoe@lawfirm.com
Date: October 22, 2017
543
appendix d
Form Stipulation for Discipline
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
BOARD OF BAR OVERSEERS
OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
BAR COUNSEL,
Petitioner
vs. B.B.O. File No. C8-67-5309
JOHN DOE, ESQ.,
Respondent
RESPONDENT’S [AMENDED]2 ANSWER TO PETITION
FOR DISCIPLINE AND STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES
Bar counsel and the respondent, John Doe, Esq., hereby stipulate and agree 
that this matter may be resolved without hearing, and they jointly recommend 
that a sanction of a public reprimand be imposed for the misconduct set forth in 
the petition for discipline, of which a copy is attached hereto. The parties further 
stipulate as follows. 
1. The respondent represents that he is admitted to practice in the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, [OTHER JURISDICTION] and in no other 
state or federal jurisdictions. 
2. Subject to paragraph 10 below, the respondent admits the truth of the 
allegations of the petition for discipline, and the parties stipulate to findings that 
2 If the stipulation is reached after an answer is ﬁled, the stipulation will also serve as an amended 
answer.
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those allegations are established as facts. [ALTERNATIVE FOR BINDING 
STIPULATIONS: The respondent admits the truth of the allegations of the petition 
for discipline, and the parties stipulate to findings that those allegations are 
established as facts.] [ALTERNATIVE FOR STIPULATIONS WHERE THE 
RESPONDENT ADMITS SOME BUT NOT ALL OF THE CHARGES: The 
respondent admits the truth of the allegations of paragraphs ____ through ____ 
of the petition for discipline, and the parties stipulate to findings that those 
allegations are established as facts.]
3. Subject to paragraph 10 below, the respondent admits the disciplinary 
rule violations set forth in the petition for discipline, and the parties stipulate to 
conclusions of law that the respondent violated the rules cited in the petition. 
[ALTERNATIVE FOR BINDING STIPULATIONS: The respondent admits the 
truth of the allegations of the petition for discipline, and the parties stipulate to 
findings that those allegations are established as facts.] [ALTERNATIVE FOR 
STIPULATIONS WHERE THE RESPONDENT ADMITS SOME BUT NOT 
ALL OF THE CHARGES: The respondent admits the disciplinary rule violations 
set forth in paragraphs ____ through ____ of the petition for discipline, and the 
parties stipulate to conclusions of law that the respondent violated the rules cited 
in those paragraphs.]
4. Subject to paragraph 10 below, the parties waive their rights to an 
evidentiary hearing on the facts and disciplinary violations alleged in the petition 
for discipline and on matters in aggravation or mitigation. [ALTERNATIVE FOR 
BINDING STIPULATIONS: The parties waive their rights to an evidentiary 
hearing on the facts and disciplinary violations alleged in the petition for discipline 
and on matters in aggravation or mitigation.] They stipulate that this matter may 
be considered by the full Board of Bar Overseers on the petition for discipline 
and this answer and stipulation.
5. [FOR MATTERS RESOLVED BY STIPULATION BEFORE THE 
PETITION HAS BEEN FILED:] The respondent acknowledges that, upon the 
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filing of the petition for discipline and this answer and stipulation with the Board 
of Bar Overseers, the petition, the answer, and stipulation, and all further 
disciplinary proceedings thereon will become public.
6. The parties stipulate to the following circumstances in aggravation and 
mitigation: 
A. In aggravation, [set forth agreed matters in aggravation]. . . .
B. In mitigation, [set forth agreed matters in mitigation]. . . .
7. The parties acknowledge, based on that misconduct and the factors in 
aggravation and mitigation, that a __________ is appropriate discipline in 
accordance with ____________. [FOR CASES WITH NO CLOSELY SIMILAR 
PRECEDENT, CITE AND BRIEFLY DISCUSS ANALOGOUS PRECEDENT.]
8. The parties stipulate that they have reached this agreement after due 
evaluation of all available evidence both on the merits and on the issue of 
appropriate discipline; that they have taken into account all aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances that are or otherwise might have been presented; and 
that, in consideration of this agreement, each party has foregone other allegations 
or defenses and submission of evidence on the merits and disposition that might 
have been advanced had the case been litigated.
9. [FOR PRO SE RESPONDENTS:] The respondent acknowledges that 
he has declined to be represented by counsel in this matter. [FOR REPRESENTED 
CLIENTS:] The respondent acknowledges that he has been represented by counsel 
in this matter, and he is satisfied with that representation and the advice received.
10. [FOR COLLAPSING STIPULATIONS:] The parties acknowledge 
that the Board of Bar Overseers is not bound by the parties’ recommendation for 
discipline. The parties stipulate and agree that either party may appeal from a 
preliminary determination to recommend discipline that differs from the parties’ 
joint recommendation and, if the Board upholds such a preliminary determination, 
that the parties reserve their right to a hearing and this stipulation will be void. In 
that event, pursuant to Section 3.19(e) of the Rules of the Board of Bar Overseers, 
546
Appendices
the parties may amend their pleadings without prejudice, and the matter will be 
assigned for hearing to an appropriate hearing committee or special hearing 
officer, a hearing panel of the Board, or the full Board. [FOR BINDING 
STIPULATIONS:] The parties acknowledge that the Board of Bar Overseers is 
not bound by the parties’ recommendation for discipline. The parties stipulate and 
agree that either party may appeal from a recommendation for discipline that 
differs from the agreed-to disposition. However, the parties further agree that 
each party shall be bound by their stipulation of facts and disciplinary violations 
and by their joint recommendation for discipline regardless of the discipline 
recommended or imposed by the Board of Bar Overseers (including any committee 
or panel) or imposed by the Supreme Judicial Court.
________________________________ ________________________________
John Doe, Esq. Constance V. Vecchione
Respondent Bar Counsel
By:
________________________________ ________________________________
John Doe, Esq. Assistant Bar Counsel
BBO #987654 BBO # 987653
Date: _________________ Date: _________________
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Form Affidavit of Resignation
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
BOARD OF BAR OVERSEERS
OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
AFFIDAVIT OF RESIGNATION BY JOHN DOE, ESQ.,3
PURSUANT TO SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT RULE 4:01 § 15
I, John Doe, hereby state that I desire to resign from the practice of law in the 
Commonwealth pursuant to SJC Rule 4:01 § 15, and I aver and attest as follows:
1. I was admitted to the bar of the Commonwealth on December 23, 1999. 
I have no prior discipline. [ALTERNATIVE: recite prior discipline.]
2. My resignation is freely and voluntarily rendered, I am not being subjected 
to coercion or duress, and I am fully aware of the implications of submitting my 
resignation. I hereby waive my rights to a hearing and to evidentiary proceedings 
before a hearing committee, the Board of Bar Overseers, and the Supreme 
Judicial Court.
3. I understand that if my resignation is accepted, my name will be stricken 
from the roll of attorneys; I may be disbarred upon my resignation; my resignation or 
disbarment will be made public and will be reported to courts and disciplinary 
authorities in this and other jurisdictions; a summary of the proceedings, including 
my identity and the factual and legal basis for the sanction, will be published by the 
Board of Bar Overseers, sent to media outlets, and posted on the board’s website; I 
will not be eligible to apply for reinstatement before at least eight years have passed 
from the effective date of the judgment of resignation or disbarment; and I may never 
be reinstated to the practice of law in the Commonwealth.
3 “Esq.” is not used if the attorney is not in good standing.
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4. I am aware that there is currently pending an investigation into 
allegations that I have been guilty of misconduct. The nature of this misconduct is 
set forth in a statement of disciplinary charges attached hereto and incorporated 
by reference. [ALTERNATIVE WHERE PETITION IS FILED BEFORE 
AFFIDAVIT WAS PREPARED: The nature of this misconduct is set forth in a 
petition for discipline filed by bar counsel on or about December 17, 2017, a 
copy of which is attached and incorporated by reference.]
5. I do not wish to contest any bar discipline allegations or proceedings 
now pending, and I understand that a judgment for my [disbarment/suspension] 
would likely result if the matters were litigated.
6. I acknowledge freely and voluntarily that the material facts upon which 
the attached statement of disciplinary charges [ALTERNATIVE: the attached 
petition for discipline] is predicated can be proved by a preponderance of the 
evidence and that a hearing committee, the board, and the Court would conclude 
that I have committed the disciplinary violations described in that statement. 
[ALTERNATIVE: If the resigning attorney is acknowledging only some material 
part of the charges, identify those as to which this admission is made.] I agree 
not to contest any of the facts and rule violations set forth in the attached statement 
of disciplinary charges in this or any other bar discipline or reinstatement 
proceeding in the Commonwealth or any other jurisdiction or in any proceedings 
for my admission to the bar of any jurisdiction. [ALTERNATIVE: If the resigning 
attorney is acknowledging only some material part of the charges, identify those 
to which this admission is made.]
7. I understand and acknowledge that bar counsel will recommend that my 
affidavit of resignation be accepted, that I be disbarred upon my resignation 
[ALTERNATIVE: that my affidavit of resignation be accepted as a disciplinary 
sanction], and that the effective date of my resignation and/or disbarment be the 
date of entry of the Court’s order or judgment thereon. [If retroactivity is sought, 
give date and reason, e.g., temporary suspension for the conduct now admitted, 
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and compliance as of a date certain.] I understand that I may also make 
recommendations regarding these matters but that neither the board nor the Court 
is bound to adopt such recommendations or accept my resignation, that the board 
will likely recommend my disbarment [ALTERNATIVE FOR CONDUCT NOT 
LIKELY TO RESULT IN DISBARMENT: that the board will likely recommend 
that my affidavit be accepted as a disciplinary sanction], and that the Court may 
disbar me without further proceedings. 
8. I understand and acknowledge that I have the right to be represented by 
counsel in these proceedings, and I am represented by counsel with whom I am 
satisfied. [ALTERNATIVE FOR PRO SE RESPONDENTS: Although I am aware 
of the assistance in locating counsel provided by the Board of Bar Overseers, I 
have voluntarily chosen to proceed without counsel in executing this affidavit 
and submitting my resignation.]
9. I understand and acknowledge that bar counsel has made no 
representations or promises to me whatsoever regarding the effects of executing 
this affidavit other than what is stated in the affidavit. I understand and 
acknowledge that there have been no representations or promises made to me 
regarding any present or future criminal or civil proceedings against me or as to 
the effect of this affidavit on my privilege against self-incrimination.
10. I am not now suffering from any disability or condition that would 
impair my understanding of the allegations and proceeding against me, the 
voluntariness of this action, or my full understanding of the consequences of the 
execution of this affidavit.
11. I am currently admitted to practice in the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts, [ANY OTHER JURISDICTION], and no other jurisdictions. 
12. I hereby request that I be permitted to resign from the practice of law 
in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. I understand that this affidavit of 
resignation and its attachment will not be impounded.
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Signed and sworn to under the penalties of perjury this ___ day of 
December, 2017.
__________________________________
John Doe, Esq.
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Sample Prehearing Conference Order
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
BOARD OF BAR OVERSEERS
OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
BAR COUNSEL,
Petitioner
vs.  B.B.O. File No. C8-67-5309
JOHN DOE, ESQ.,
PREHEARING CONFERENCE
Respondent
ORDER
A prehearing conference in this matter was held on January 2, 2018, at 
10:00 AM. Present were Assistant Bar Counsel Sally Roe; the respondent, John 
Doe; his counsel, Mary Moe; the Chair of the Hearing Committee, William Smith; 
and Assistant General Counsel Amelia Withers. As a result of the conference, the 
following orders are entered:
A. Exchanges of Exhibits and Witness Lists
1. Preliminary Exchange. By the close of business on Tuesday, January 9, 
2018, the parties shall exchange preliminary written lists of all their expected 
witnesses (with names and addresses) and exhibits, together with copies of all 
proposed exhibits that the parties intend to introduce on the merits (including bar 
counsel’s case in chief and the respondent’s defense), as well as on issues of 
aggravation and mitigation. If a party proposes to introduce testimony from any 
expert witness, that party shall also include, for each such expert, a written 
disclosure of the qualifications of the expert and the subject matter on which the 
expert is expected to testify, the substance of facts and opinions to which the 
expert is expected to testify, and a summary of the grounds for each opinion. 
Each party shall also file a copy of the proposed witness list with the board 
and send copies to the hearing committee members.
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2. Objections. By the close of business on Tuesday, January 16, 2018,
the parties shall exchange, in writing, lists of any objections to the other’s 
proposed witnesses and exhibits, specifying for each contested exhibit the 
grounds for each objection.
3. Supplemental Exchange. By the close of business on Tuesday, 
January 23, 2018, the parties shall furnish each other with written lists of any 
additional witnesses (with expert disclosure as described in ¶ 1 above for any 
additional expert witnesses) or proposed exhibits in supplementation of their prior 
disclosures, together with copies of all exhibits not previously provided. Each
party shall also file a copy of the supplemental witness list with the board 
and send copies to the hearing committee members.
4. Supplemental Objections. By the close of business on Tuesday, 
January 30, 2018, the parties shall exchange, in writing, any objections to the 
other’s proposed additional witnesses and exhibits, specifying for each contested 
exhibit the grounds for each objection.
B. Motions in Limine or Other Prehearing Motions Concerning Conduct 
of the Hearing
5. Motions. By the close of business on Tuesday, February 6, 2018, the 
parties shall file with the board and serve on the opposing party, with copies sent 
to each hearing committee member, any motions in limine or other prehearing 
motions concerning the conduct of the hearing, specifying the relief sought and 
the basis and authority therefor.
6. Oppositions to Motions. The parties shall file with the board and serve 
on the opposing party, with copies sent to each hearing committee member, any 
opposition to a prehearing motion within seven days of service of the motion, but 
in no event later than Tuesday, February 13, 2018.
C. Hearing Subpoena Requests
7. By the close of business on Tuesday, February 6, 2018, the parties 
shall file with the board any requests for hearing subpoenas for those on their 
witness lists. While subpoenas for witnesses not listed (such as witnesses called 
in rebuttal) may be requested beyond this date, please be advised that it takes the 
board several days to issue subpoenas. In addition, it is not the board’s but the 
party’s obligation to serve subpoenas. A copy of each subpoena request shall be 
served on the opposing party.
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D. Filing of Stipulations, Final Witness Lists, Agreed-Upon Exhibits, Lists 
of Disputed Exhibits, and Objections
8. The parties are encouraged to stipulate as to the authenticity of documents 
and/or the purposes for which it is agreed they are admissible in order to expedite 
the hearing of the matter. The standard form of stipulation regarding documents is 
attached to this order.
9. By the close of business on Tuesday, February 13, 2018, the parties 
shall file with the board and serve on the opposing party, with copies sent to each 
hearing committee member, any stipulations, final witness lists, a list of agreed-
upon exhibits as described in ¶ 8, lists of disputed exhibits, and objections to 
exhibits with the grounds therefor.
(a) One set of agreed-upon exhibits shall be:
(1) pre-marked by number, sequentially, with each exhibit 
having a colored numeric label (integers only) affixed to it and 
separated with a numeric tab;
(2) filed with the board and shall not be bound in any manner, 
shall not be three-hole punched, and shall be placed in a redwell 
(with flaps and elastics) that is labeled with the case name; and
(b) An additional copy of the agreed-upon exhibits shall be filed with 
the board, and copies shall be sent to each hearing committee member 
and served on the opposing party. The copies for the board and hearing 
committee members shall be three-hole punched and placed in binders.
(c) All exhibits shall be Bates-numbered so that each page of each 
exhibit has a unique identifying number that can be used to locate that 
specific page without delay during the hearing. The originals and all 
copies of exhibits filed with the board, circulated to committee members, 
or used at the hearing shall be Bates-numbered in this fashion. Exhibits
that are not Bates-numbered may be rejected and returned to the 
submitting party or parties.
(d) Disputed exhibits shall not be filed, forwarded, premarked, or 
bound. The parties shall bring to the hearing six copies of any disputed 
exhibit that they intend to offer at the hearing.
10. All witness and exhibit lists and other evidentiary disclosures between 
the parties shall include evidence on the merits (including bar counsel’s case in 
chief and the respondent’s defense) as well as on issues of aggravation and 
mitigation. The witness and exhibit lists filed with the board and sent to the 
hearing committee pursuant to ¶ 9 shall be limited to evidence on the merits. The 
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parties shall not disclose to the hearing committee any evidence of prior discipline 
until after the completion of bar counsel’s case in chief. The parties are not required 
to exchange or list exhibits to be used in cross-examination or rebuttal, nor shall 
they be required to list rebuttal witnesses.
11. The parties shall be precluded from contesting the authenticity or 
admissibility of any listed exhibit absent timely objection thereto in accordance 
with this order. In addition, if exhibits are not listed and exchanged or witnesses 
not listed or disclosed in accordance with this order, they may be excluded from 
the party’s case in chief, unless good cause is shown.
12. The original of any pleading or other submission must be filed with 
the board.
13. All documents submitted to the committee or filed with the board 
must be redacted so that the document includes at most: (1) the last four digits of 
any Social Security number, taxpayer identification number, credit card or other 
financial account number, driver’s license number, state-issued ID card number, 
or passport number (a dash or X characters or the phrase “ending in” can be used 
in place of the omitted digits); (2) the first initial of a person’s mother’s maiden 
name, if the document identifies it as such; (3) if an individual’s date of birth 
must be included, then only the year should be used; and (4) if a minor child 
must be mentioned, then only the initials of the child should be used. A 
pseudonym, identified as such, may also be used. Where there is a reason to 
submit an unredacted document to the board, then prior to filing the document, 
the party shall file a motion to impound with the board and, if and when such 
motion is allowed, file the document with the board.
E. Hearing
14. The hearing on this matter will take place on Tuesday, February 20, 
2018, Wednesday, February 21, 2018, Thursday, February 22, 2018, and 
Friday, February 23, 2018, commencing at 10:00 AM and concluding at 
approximately 4:00 PM daily, at the offices of the Board of Bar Overseers,
and shall not be rescheduled except for good cause shown.
15. Please be advised that BBO Rule § 3.7(c) provides that the absence of 
one member of a hearing committee shall not be a basis for continuing the 
hearing.
16. Please note that, based on the regulations concerning notaries 
public, the hearing stenographers require all witnesses to have state or 
federal photo identification.
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F. Miscellaneous Matters
17. The respondent’s motion to amend the answer in accordance with the 
proposed answer attached to the motion is allowed.
18. If the respondent has placed his medical or psychological condition at 
issue, then by the close of business on Tuesday, January 9, 2018, the respondent 
shall identify and disclose to bar counsel all medical and psychological conditions 
that the respondent claims may have affected his or her professional conduct or is 
otherwise in issue and for which he or she has received consultation, evaluation, 
or treatment; and for each such condition, provide to bar counsel (1) all related 
hospital, medical, psychiatric, psychological, counseling, and other records and 
reports in the respondent’s possession or control; and (2) the name(s) and 
address(es) of all medical and mental health providers; and (3) executed releases 
authorizing bar counsel or his representatives to communicate with and receive 
information from each provider. Failure to do so may result in exclusion of such 
evidence if offered by the respondent.
Dated: __________________________ ________________________________
William Smith
Hearing Committee Chair
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Standard Form for Document Stipulation
The parties stipulate as follows concerning the documents listed below, which 
have been marked with exhibit numbers corresponding to the numbers listed:
1.  All the documents listed are authentic, that is, they are what they purport 
to be, including, in the case of communications, whether electronic or 
paper, that they were sent by the one party and received by the other.
2.  The following numbered documents are admissible for all purposes, 
including as evidence of the truth of any hearsay contained within them: 
[followed by a list of numbered exhibits]
3.  The following numbered documents are admissible for limited purposes 
[specify numbers and the purpose or purposes for which the parties agree 
they are admissible]. In addition, either party may offer the documents 
at the hearing for different or more general purposes, subject to the 
panel’s ruling whether or not they should be admitted for that purpose 
or those purposes.
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Sample Information
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
SUFFOLK, ss. SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
FOR SUFFOLK COUNTY
NO. BD-2018-107 
IN RE: JOHN DOE, ESQ.
INFORMATION
To the Honorable Chief Justice and the Justices of the Supreme Judicial 
Court:
1. The Board of Bar Overseers brings to the attention of this Court, 
pursuant to Rule 4:01, Section 8(6), of the Rules of this Court, matters regarding 
the character and conduct of John Doe, Esquire, who was duly admitted to 
practice before the Courts of the Commonwealth on December 23, 1999. He was 
administratively suspended from the practice of law for failure to cooperate with 
bar counsel on November 7, 2017, and has not been reinstated.
I. Statement of Facts
2. The docket entries maintained by the Board of Bar Overseers are found 
at Tab 1.
3. The facts of this case are stated in the hearing committee report filed 
with the board on March 23, 2018 (Tab 24).
II. Proceedings
4. Bar counsel commenced disciplinary proceedings before the Board of 
Bar Overseers by filing and serving a petition for discipline on October 2, 2017 
(Tab 2). On October 22, 2017, the respondent filed an answer to bar counsel’s 
petition for discipline (Tab 3).
5. On November 10, 2017, bar counsel moved to deem certain allegations 
of the petition as admitted (Tab 4).
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6. On November 17, 2017, the respondent filed his opposition to bar 
counsel’s motion (Tab 5).
7. On November 21, 2017, the chair of the hearing committee granted bar 
counsel’s motion in part and denied it in part (Tab 6).
8. …
9. Four days of hearing were held on February 20, 21, 22, and 23, 2018 
(Tabs 22–24).
10. On March 23, 2018, the hearing committee filed its findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and recommendation for discipline (Tab 25).
11. On April 12, 2018, the respondent filed a brief on appeal from the 
hearing committee’s findings and recommendation for discipline (Tab 26).
12. On May 2, 2018, bar counsel filed an opposition to the respondent’s 
appeal from the hearing committee’s findings and recommendation for discipline 
(Tab 27).
13. On September 10, 2018, the Board of Bar Overseers voted:
for the reasons stated in the memorandum attached to this vote, to recom-
mend to the Supreme Judicial Court that Mr. Doe be disbarred (Tab 28).
14. On September 11, 2018, the board served a copy of the board’s vote 
and memorandum of decision (Tab 29).
III. Costs
15. The following amounts were expended by the board in furtherance of 
the disciplinary proceedings in this matter:
Stenographer $2,998.89
Photocopying $35.89
Mailing Costs $6.75
Total $3,041.53
IV. Conclusion
The Board of Bar Overseers respectfully brings the foregoing to the attention 
of this Honorable Court for such action as the Court deems necessary. The record 
of these proceedings is annexed hereto and made a part hereof.
__________________________________
Joseph S. Berman
General Counsel
September 15, 2018
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Sample Clerk’s Cover Sheet
CLERK’S COVER SHEET: BAR DISCIPLINE
CLERK ________________________________
NAME OF BAR DISCIPLINE CASE: ____________________________________________
DATE RECEIVED: _______________________________________________________ 
NAME OF BAR COUNSEL FILING MATTER: __________________ TEL NO. _____________
RESPONDENT/LAWYER INFORMATION
NAME: ____________________________________________________________
(ADMIT NAME, IF DIFFERENT) ____________________________________________
BBO NO.: ____________________________________________________________
DATE ADMITTED TO MASS. BAR: ___________________________________________
OTHER JURISDICTIONS ADMITTED TO PRACTICE: ________________________________
CURRENT MAILING ADDRESS: _____________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
TEL. NO./EMAIL: ______________________________________________________
CURRENT ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT/LAWYER: _______________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
NATURE OF BAR DISCIPLINE CASE
____ CONTEMPT PROCEEDING ____ CONVICTION OF CRIME
____ DISABILITY INACTIVE ____ FRAUDULENT CONDUCT
____ MISUSE & LOSS OF TRUST $ ____ MISUSE OF CLIENT’S $
____ MISREPRESENTATION TO COURT ____ NEGLECT CLIENT’S INTEREST
____ SANCTION IN OTHER JURISDICTION ____ ADMINISTRATIVE SUSPENSION
____ NONPAYMENT OF REGISTRATION FEES ____ OTHER (IOLTA VIOLATION)
RECOMMENDATION: ____________________________________________________ 
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DISCIPLINE INFORMATION
INITIAL DISCIPLINE SOUGHT: ______________________________________________
IMMEDIATE HEARING REQUESTED: __________________________________________
DATE OF VOTE OF BOARD: _______________________________________________
FINAL DISCIPLINE SOUGHT: _______________________________________________
OTHER INFORMATION: ___________________________________________________
PUBLIC ___ IMPOUNDED ___ PARTIALLY IMPOUNDED ___
CLERK’S COMMENTS:
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
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Sample Affidavit of Compliance
with Order of Suspension or Disbarment
with Attached Form Notices
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
FOR SUFFOLK COUNTY
Suffolk, ss. No. BD-2018-001 U
In the Matter of
JOHN DOE
AFFIDAVIT OF COMPLIANCE
Pursuant to SJC Rule 4:01 § 17(5), and Section 4.20 of the Rules of the 
Board of Bar Overseers, I hereby certify in connection with my disbarment by 
Order of the Supreme Judicial Court dated January 23, 2018 (“the Order”), as 
follows:
1. That I have fully complied with the provisions of the Order of the 
Supreme Judicial Court relative to disbarment, with SJC Rule 4:01, and with the 
Rules of the Board of Bar Overseers; and
2. Cross out inapplicable paragraph (A or B):
A. That I have sent notice of my disbarment to each person who 
was my client, ward, heir, or beneficiary as of the entry date of the 
Order and to each attorney, court, and agency concerned with a case 
pending as of the entry date of the Order. I have attached hereto a copy 
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of each form of notice, the names and addresses of the clients, wards, 
heirs, beneficiaries, attorneys, courts, and agencies to which notices 
were sent, and all return receipts or returned mail received up to the 
date of this affidavit (supplemental affidavits will be filed covering 
subsequent return receipts and returned mail);
B. That I had no clients and held no fiduciary positions on the 
entry date of the Order.
3. That I have attached hereto:
(a) a copy of each form of notice, the names and addresses of the 
clients, wards, heirs, beneficiaries, attorneys, courts, and agencies to 
which notices were sent, and all return receipts or returned mail 
received up to the date of this affidavit (supplemental affidavits will be 
filed covering subsequent return receipts and returned mail);
(b) a schedule showing the location, title, and account number of 
every bank account designated as an IOLTA, client, trust, or other 
fiduciary account and of every account in which I hold or held any 
client, trust, or fiduciary funds on or after the entry date of the Order;
(c) a schedule describing the disposition of all client and 
fiduciary funds in my possession, custody, or control as of the entry 
date of the Order or thereafter;
(d) such proof of the proper distribution of such funds and the 
closing of such accounts as has been requested by the bar counsel, 
including copies of checks and other instruments; and
(e) a list of all other state, federal, and administrative 
jurisdictions to which I am admitted to practice, whether active or 
inactive.
The residence or other street address where communications may hereafter 
be directed to me is as follows. I understand that this information is public.
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Name: _______________________________
Address: _______________________________
_______________________________
Telephone: _______________________________
Signed and sworn to under the penalties of perjury this ______ day of 
______________________________, 2018.
__________________________________
John Doe
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COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
BOARD OF BAR OVERSEERS
OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
NOTIFICATION OF DISBARMENT
TO COURT, AGENCY, OR TRIBUNAL
TO: __________________________________________________________________
Court, Agency, or Tribunal
__________________________________________________________________
Address
NAME OF CLIENT:
________________________________ ________________________________
(case caption)
ADDRESS OF CLIENT:
________________________________ ________________________________
(docket number)
________________________________
Pursuant to SJC Rule 4:01 § 17, and Section 4.17 of the Rules of the Board 
of Bar Overseers for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, you are hereby 
advised that I have been disbarred from further practice of the law in the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts and consequently am unable to act as an 
attorney after January 23, 2018, the effective date of disbarment. Enclosed are 
copies of the notices of disbarment that I have sent to my client(s), counsel of 
record, and those parties unrepresented by counsel.
DATE: _____________ SIGNATURE: ________________________________
John Doe
ADDRESS: ________________________________
  ________________________________
TELEPHONE: ________________________________
Revised September 1997
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COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
BOARD OF BAR OVERSEERS
OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
RESIGNATION AS FIDUCIARY
TO:* ________________________________
________________________________
________________________________
CASE CAPTION: ________________________________
DOCKET NUMBER: ________________________________
Effective January 23, 2018, I have been disbarred from further practice of 
the law in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Therefore, pursuant to SJC Rule 
4:01 § 17(1)(b), I must hereby resign, as of January 23, 2018, my appointment as 
guardian, executor, administrator, trustee, attorney-in-fact, or other fiduciary in 
this matter. Enclosed are: (a) copies of the notices of disbarment that I have sent 
to the wards, heirs, or beneficiaries, and to other counsel, and (b) a complete list 
of the wards, heirs, or beneficiaries and their places of residence.
DATE: _____________ SIGNATURE: ________________________________
John Doe
ADDRESS: ________________________________
  ________________________________
TELEPHONE: ________________________________
* Resignations are to be sent to all appropriate parties, depending on the attorney’s particular ﬁduciary 
relationship. For example, if the attorney is guardian of a ward who resides in an institution or nursing 
home, this Resignation must be sent to the institution or nursing home. If the attorney is a court-
appointed guardian or executor of an estate, this Resignation must be sent to the court. Counsel may 
also be required to send notice of resignation to the Department of Veterans Aﬀairs, the Social 
Security Administration, other government agencies, banks, boards of directors, and/or co-trustees. 
This is not to be taken as an exhaustive list.
Revised September 1997
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LIST OF WARDS, BENEFICIARIES, OR HEIRS
NAME: _________________________ NAME: _________________________
Place of  Place of
Residence: _________________________ Residence: _________________________
_________________________ _________________________
NAME: _________________________ NAME: _________________________
Place of  Place of
Residence: _________________________ Residence: _________________________
_________________________ _________________________
NAME: _________________________ NAME: _________________________
Place of  Place of
Residence: _________________________ Residence: _________________________
_________________________ _________________________
NAME: _________________________ NAME: _________________________
Place of  Place of
Residence: _________________________ Residence: _________________________
_________________________ _________________________
NAME: _________________________ NAME: _________________________
Place of  Place of
Residence: _________________________ Residence: _________________________
_________________________ _________________________
NAME: _________________________ NAME: _________________________
Place of  Place of
Residence: _________________________ Residence: _________________________
_________________________ _________________________
NAME: _________________________ NAME: _________________________
Place of  Place of
Residence: _________________________ Residence: _________________________
_________________________ _________________________
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COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
BOARD OF BAR OVERSEERS
OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
NOTICE TO COUNSEL OF RESIGNATION AS FIDUCIARY
TO: ________________________________
Counsel
________________________________
Address
COURT: ________________________________
CASE CAPTION: ________________________________
DOCKET NUMBER: ________________________________
Effective January 23, 2018, I have been disbarred from further practice of the 
law in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and am disqualified from continuing 
to practice law or to act in any fiduciary capacity after that date. Therefore, 
pursuant to SJC Rule 4:01 § 17(1)(b), I am resigning, as of January 23, 2018, my 
appointment as guardian, executor, administrator, trustee, attorney-in-fact, or other 
fiduciary in this matter.
DATE: _____________ SIGNATURE: ________________________________
John Doe
ADDRESS: ________________________________
  ________________________________
TELEPHONE: ________________________________
Revised September 1997
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COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
BOARD OF BAR OVERSEERS
OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
NOTICE TO WARD, HEIR, OR BENEFICIARY
OF RESIGNATION AS FIDUCIARY
TO: ________________________________
Ward, Heir, or Beneficiary
________________________________
Address
COURT: ________________________________
CASE CAPTION: ________________________________
DOCKET NUMBER: ________________________________
Effective January 23, 2018, I have been disbarred from further practice of the law 
in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and am disqualified from continuing to 
practice law or to act in any fiduciary capacity after that date. Therefore, pursuant to 
SJC Rule 4:01 § 17(1)(b), I am resigning immediately my appointment as guardian, 
executor, administrator, trustee, attorney-in-fact, or other fiduciary in the above matter.
Under these circumstances, you should act promptly to substitute another 
fiduciary or to seek legal advice elsewhere.
DATE: _____________ SIGNATURE: ________________________________
John Doe
ADDRESS: ________________________________
  ________________________________
TELEPHONE: ________________________________
Revised September 1997
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COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
BOARD OF BAR OVERSEERS
OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
NOTICE OF DISBARMENT TO CLIENT
TO: _____________________________ ________________________________
CLIENT COURT
_____________________________ ________________________________
ADDRESS CASE CAPTION
_____________________________ ________________________________
DOCKET NUMBER
Pursuant to SJC Rule 4:01 § 17, and Section 4.17 of the Rules of the Board 
of Bar Overseers for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, you are hereby 
advised that I have been disbarred from further practice of the law in the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts and consequently am disqualified from acting 
as an attorney after January 23, 2018, the effective date of disbarment.
If you are not represented by co-counsel, you should act promptly to obtain 
other counsel to represent you further in the above matter. In addition, the 
following circumstances of this case will require immediate attention:
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
You have the right to have all papers, documents, and other materials that 
you supplied to me in this case returned to you, as well as the right to certain 
other documents in your file. These documents may be retrieved from:
NAME: _______________________________
ADDRESS: _______________________________
_______________________________
TELEPHONE: _______________________________
Revised September 1997
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You also have the right to a refund of any part of any fees and costs you paid 
in advance that have not been earned or expended.
You are further notified that I am required to close every IOLTA, client, 
trust, or other fiduciary account and properly disburse or otherwise transfer all 
client and fiduciary funds in my possession, custody, or control.
DATE: _____________ SIGNATURE: ________________________________
John Doe
ADDRESS: ________________________________
  ________________________________
TELEPHONE: ________________________________
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COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
BOARD OF BAR OVERSEERS
OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
NOTICE OF DISBARMENT
TO COUNSEL AND UNREPRESENTED PARTIES
TO: ________________________________
Counsel for (or party, if unrepresented by counsel)
________________________________
Address
________________________________
COURT: ________________________________
CASE CAPTION: ________________________________
DOCKET NUMBER: ________________________________
CLIENT NAME: ________________________________
Pursuant to SJC Rule 4:01 § 17, and Section 4.17 of the Rules of the Board 
of Bar Overseers, you are hereby advised that I have been disbarred from the 
further practice of law in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and consequently 
am disqualified from acting as an attorney after January 23, 2018, the effective 
date of disbarment.
DATE: _____________ SIGNATURE: ________________________________
John Doe
ADDRESS: ________________________________
  ________________________________
TELEPHONE: ________________________________
Revised September 1997
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LIST OF NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF THE CLIENTS, WARDS, HEIRS, 
BENEFICIARIES, ATTORNEYS, UNREPRESENTED PARTIES, 
COURTS, AND AGENCIES TO WHICH NOTICES WERE SENT
III. CLIENTS, WARDS, HEIRS, AND BENEFICIARIES
NAME: _________________________ NAME: _________________________
Address: _________________________ Address: _________________________
_________________________ _________________________
NAME: _________________________ NAME: _________________________
Address: _________________________ Address: _________________________
_________________________ _________________________
NAME: _________________________ NAME: _________________________
Address: _________________________ Address: _________________________
_________________________ _________________________
NAME: _________________________ NAME: _________________________
Address: _________________________ Address: _________________________
_________________________ _________________________
NAME: _________________________ NAME: _________________________
Address: _________________________ Address: _________________________
_________________________ _________________________
NAME: _________________________ NAME: _________________________
Address: _________________________ Address: _________________________
_________________________ _________________________
NAME: _________________________ NAME: _________________________
Address: _________________________ Address: _________________________
_________________________ _________________________
(Attach additional sheets as needed.)
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(Attach additional sheets as needed.)
III. ATTORNEYS AND UNREPRESENTED PARTIES
NAME: _________________________ NAME: _________________________
Address: _________________________ Address: _________________________
_________________________ _________________________
NAME: _________________________ NAME: _________________________
Address: _________________________ Address: _________________________
_________________________ _________________________
NAME: _________________________ NAME: _________________________
Address: _________________________ Address: _________________________
_________________________ _________________________
NAME: _________________________ NAME: _________________________
Address: _________________________ Address: _________________________
_________________________ _________________________
NAME: _________________________ NAME: _________________________
Address: _________________________ Address: _________________________
_________________________ _________________________
NAME: _________________________ NAME: _________________________
Address: _________________________ Address: _________________________
_________________________ _________________________
NAME: _________________________ NAME: _________________________
Address: _________________________ Address: _________________________
_________________________ _________________________
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III. COURTS AND AGENCIES
NAME: _________________________ NAME: _________________________
Address: _________________________ Address: _________________________
_________________________ _________________________
NAME: _________________________ NAME: _________________________
Address: _________________________ Address: _________________________
_________________________ _________________________
NAME: _________________________ NAME: _________________________
Address: _________________________ Address: _________________________
_________________________ _________________________
NAME: _________________________ NAME: _________________________
Address: _________________________ Address: _________________________
_________________________ _________________________
NAME: _________________________ NAME: _________________________
Address: _________________________ Address: _________________________
_________________________ _________________________
NAME: _________________________ NAME: _________________________
Address: _________________________ Address: _________________________
_________________________ _________________________
NAME: _________________________ NAME: _________________________
Address: _________________________ Address: _________________________
_________________________ _________________________
(Attach additional sheets as needed.)
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SCHEDULE OF BANK ACCOUNTS
LOCATION TITLE ACCOUNT NUMBER
(Attach additional sheets as needed.)
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SCHEDULE OF DISPOSITION OF CLIENT AND FIDUCIARY FUNDS
(Attach additional sheets as needed.)
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Appendix I
LIST OF ALL OTHER STATE, FEDERAL, AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
JURISDICTIONS TO WHICH THE LAWYER IS ADMITTED TO PRACTICE
________________________________ ________________________________
________________________________ ________________________________
________________________________ ________________________________
________________________________ ________________________________
________________________________ ________________________________
________________________________ ________________________________
________________________________ ________________________________
________________________________ ________________________________
________________________________ ________________________________
________________________________ ________________________________
(Attach additional sheets as needed.)
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appendix j
SJC Standing Order on Nondisciplinary
Voluntary Resignations
STANDING ORDER CONCERNING NONDISCIPLINARY
VOLUNTARY RESIGNATIONS FROM THE BAR
OF MASSACHUSETTS ATTORNEYS
1.  It is ORDERED that upon filing with the Clerk’s Office of the Supreme 
Judicial Court for the County of Suffolk, and a vote of the Board of 
Bar Overseers approving the voluntary request of an attorney in good 
standing at the bar of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, that said 
attorney be allowed to resign from said bar, that said resignation be 
accepted forthwith as an administrative action and judgment shall be 
entered by the Clerk of the Supreme Judicial Court for the County 
of Suffolk immediately removing said attorney from the office of 
attorney at law in the courts of this Commonwealth, without prejudice 
to any request of the said attorney for readmission at a future date. 
Notice of the acceptance of said voluntary resignation shall be sent 
to the resigning attorney, the Board of Bar Overseers, the American 
Bar Association, the Clerk of the United States District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts, and any other interested parties.
2.  A copy of this order shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme 
Judicial Court for the County of Suffolk.
. . . .
Entered: February 3, 2018
(Attach additional sheets as needed.)
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limits on use of; Rule 8.4(c)
public reprimand, 281–282
suspension, 279–281
text of rule, 277
undercover agents or testers, treatment of, 
284–285
public reprimand
engaging in dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation, for; Rule 8.4(c), 
281–282
third persons, truthfulness in statements to; 
Rule 4.1(a), 275–276
tribunal, candor before; Rule 3.3, 268–269
suspension
engaging in dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation, for; Rule 8.4(c), 
279–281
third persons, truthfulness in statements to; 
Rule 4.1(a), 273–275
tribunal, candor before; Rule 3.3, 263–268
third persons, truthfulness in statements to; 
Rule 4.1(a), 261
generally, 256, 270
admonition, 276
disbarment, 272–273
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exceptions, 270–271
public reprimand, 275–276
suspension, 273–275
text of rule, 270
true but intentionally misleading statements, 
prohibition of, 271
undercover investigations, 271
tribunal, candor before; Rule 3.3
generally, 256
admonition, 269–270
adverse authority, duty to disclose, 259–260
disbarment, 262
discipline for violations
generally, 260–261
admonition, 269–270
disbarment, 262
factors inﬂuencing severity of sanction, 261
public reprimand, 268–269
suspension, 263–268
false evidence, attorney may not use, 
258–259, 260
perjury, requirement of attorney to reveal, 260
prohibited conduct, 258–259
public reprimand, 268–269
suspension, 263–268
text of rule, 256–258
true but intentionally misleading statements, 
prohibition of, 259
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF 
MASSACHUSETTS (CLUM)
generally, 4
CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS; RULE 1.4
generally, 109, 127–128, 155
admonition, 129–131, 166–167
bad news to clients, communicating, 128
disbarment, 163–164
discipline for violations, 129–131, 163–167
public reprimand, 129, 165–166
reasonably prudent and competent lawyer 
standard, 127–128
standard for failure to communicate, 127–128, 
131–132
suspension, 164–165
text of rule, 126–127, 153–154
CLIENT FILES, MAINTENANCE OF
generally, 230
CLIENT FUNDS, MANAGEMENT OF. See
SAFEKEEPING PROPERTY; RULE 1.15
CLIENTS’ SECURITY BOARD (CSB)
generally, 4, 10, 15
application for reimbursable loss, ﬁling of, 514
Clients’ Security Fund, 513–514
defalcation during client representation, 
requirement that losses occurred due to, 514
factors CSB considers in making awards, 515
reimbursement to CSB for awards granted as 
consideration in petitions for 
reinstatement, 515
CLOSING ARGUMENT
disciplinary hearings, 102
CLOSING OF COMPLAINT
generally, 19, 72–73
complainant’s right to review, 75–76
CLUM. See CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF 
MASSACHUSETTS (CLUM)
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
generally, 101
COMMITTEE REPORT. See HEARING 
REPORTS
COMMUNICATIONS BY ATTORNEYS
advertising and solicitation. See
ADVERTISING AND 
SOLICITATION
balancing of litigant’s right to fair trial with 
attorney’s right to communicate publicly. 
See ADVOCACY, subhead: balancing of 
litigant’s right to fair trial with attorney’s 
right to communicate publicly; Rule 3.6
client communications. See CLIENT 
COMMUNICATIONS; RULE 1.4
contacts with others. See CONTACT WITH 
OTHERS, LIMITS ON
prosecutor’s communications with represented 
persons. See PROSECUTOR’S DUTIES, 
subhead: contact with represented party, 
limits on; Rule 4.2
COMPETENCE OF ATTORNEY; RULES 
1.1 AND 1.2(a) and (c)
generally, 109–110, 156
diligence requirement. See DILIGENCE IN 
CLIENT REPRESENTATION; RULE 1.3
discipline for violations, 115–116
factors considered in determining competence, 
112
ineﬀective assistance of counsel in criminal cases 
distinguished, 113
limited representation, client’s informed consent 
to, 113, 156
OBC investigations, 115
reasonably prudent and competent lawyer 
standard, 111
referral to more experienced counsel, 114
standard for competence, 111–113, 131–132
text of rule 
Rule 1.1, 110
Rule 1.2(a) and (c), 110–11
COMPLAINTS
generally, 63–67
ACAP initial review and investigation
generally, 18, 64
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dispositions, 67
procedures, 35–36, 66–68
referral to OBC for disciplinary proceedings, 
36, 67
resolutions brokered by, 36, 68
conﬁdentiality of, 64–65
exceptions to conﬁdentiality of, 65
formal complaints (request for investigation), 
18, 36–37, 64
immunity from civil liability of complainant for 
contents of, 64
investigation of. See INVESTIGATION
OBC annual report, 66
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
generally, 28, 104–105
CONFIDENTIALITY
generally, 133
admonition
duty of conﬁdentiality; Rule 1.6, 142–144
former clients, conﬁdentiality duty owed to; 
Rule 1.9(c), 146–147
complaints, of, 64–65
disbarment for violations of Rule 1.6, 138–139
duty of conﬁdentiality; Rule 1.6
generally, 133
admonition, 142–144
assisted persons, conﬁdentiality of 
conﬁdences of, 136–137
attorney-client privilege distinguished, 137–138
conﬁdential information deﬁned, 135–136
disbarment, 138–139
exceptions. See subhead: exceptions
precautions to avoid inadvertent disclosures, 
requirement that attorney take, 136
public reprimand, 141–142
scope of rule, 135–137
social media, dangers of public disputes with 
clients through, 144
suspension, 139–141
text of rule, 133–135
exceptions, 147–151
client consent, 147
conﬂict checks, conducting, 150
death, bodily harm, or substantial ﬁnancial 
injury, prevention of, 148
disputes with client, establishing claim or 
defense in, 148–150
fraud, avoid assisting in, 151
fraud on tribunal, prevent or rectify, 151
law, compliance with other, 150
obstruction of justice, avoiding, 151
former clients, conﬁdentiality duty owed to; 
Rule 1.9(c)
generally, 133
admonition, 146–147
exceptions. See subhead: exceptions
opposing former client in later matter, 
permissibility of, 145
public reprimand, 146
text of rule, 145
public reprimand
duty of conﬁdentiality; Rule 1.6, 141–142
former clients, conﬁdentiality duty owed to; 
Rule 1.9(c), 146
suspension for violations of Rule 1.6, 139–141
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
generally, 179
admonition
generally, 40
concurrent conﬂicts of interest
Rule 1.7, 187–189
Rule 1.8, 196–197
successive conﬂicts of interest under Rule 1.9, 
209–210
concurrent conﬂicts of interest
deﬁned, 179–180
lawyers in same ﬁrm or sharing oﬃce space; 
Rule 1.10, 200–201
Rule 1.7
admonition, 187–189
disbarment, 184
informed consent of client, obtaining, 
182–183
public reprimand, 186–187
standards for imposing discipline, 183
suspension, 184–186
text of rule, 180–181
types of conﬂicts of interest, 181–182
Rule 1.8
“Adam’s Rib” conﬂict of interest, 192
admonition, 196–197
disbarment, 193
guidance oﬀered by, 192
informed consent of client cannot be 
obtained for most conﬂicts under, 192
public reprimand, 194–196
suspension, 193–194
text of rule, 189–191
types of conﬂicts of interest, 192
Rule 1.10; lawyers in same ﬁrm or sharing 
oﬃce space
law ﬁrm, determining whether attorneys 
constitute, 200–201
text of rule, 198–200
disbarment
concurrent conﬂicts of interest
Rule 1.7, 184
Rule 1.8, 193
successive conﬂicts of interest under Rule 1.9, 
207
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public reprimand
generally, 42
concurrent conﬂicts of interest
Rule 1.7, 186–187
Rule 1.8, 194–196
successive conﬂicts of interest under Rule 1.9, 
208–209
successive conﬂicts of interest
deﬁned, 180
Rule 1.9
admonition, 209–210
conﬁdential information, protection of, 203
disbarment, 207
discipline under, 206–210
hot potato doctrine, 210–211
imputation of one lawyer’s conﬂict to rest 
of ﬁrm, 205–206
public reprimand, 208–209
suspension, 207–208
text of rule, 202–203
types of conﬂicts of interest, 203–204
Rule 1.10, 211
suspension
concurrent conﬂicts of interest
Rule 1.7, 184–186
Rule 1.8, 193–194
successive conﬂicts of interest under Rule 1.9, 
207–208
CONSECUTIVE CONFLICTS OF 
INTEREST. See CONFLICTS OF 
INTEREST, subhead: successive conﬂicts 
of interest 
CONTACT WITH OTHERS, LIMITS ON
admonition
communication with persons represented by 
counsel; Rule 4.2, 317–319
fairness to opposing party and counsel; Rule 
3.4(f ) and (g), 317–319
unrepresented person, dealing with; Rule 4.3, 
317–319
communication with persons represented by 
counsel; Rule 4.2
generally, 312–313
admonition, 317–319
disbarment, 315
public reprimand, 316–317
suspension, 315–316
text of rule, 311
disbarment
communication with persons represented by 
counsel; Rule 4.2, 315
fairness to opposing party and counsel;
Rule 3.4(f ) and (g), 315
unrepresented person, dealing with; Rule 4.3, 
315
fairness to opposing party and counsel; Rule 3.4(f ) 
and (g)
generally, 311–312
admonition, 317–319
disbarment, 315
public reprimand, 316–317
suspension, 315–316
text of rule, 310–311
public reprimand
communication with persons represented by 
counsel; Rule 4.2, 316–317
fairness to opposing party and counsel;
Rule 3.4(f ) and (g), 316–317
unrepresented person, dealing with; Rule 4.3, 
316–317
suspension
communication with persons represented by 
counsel; Rule 4.2, 315–316
fairness to opposing party and counsel;
Rule 3.4(f ) and (g), 315–316
unrepresented person, dealing with; Rule 4.3, 
315–316
unrepresented person, dealing with; Rule 4.3
generally, 313–314
admonition, 317–319
disbarment, 315
prosecutors, provisions applicable to. See
PROSECUTOR’S DUTIES, subhead: 
contact with represented party, limits on; 
Rule 4.2
public reprimand, 316–317
suspension, 315–316
text of rule, 311
CONTINGENT FEES
generally, 226–227
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
generally, 114
COOPERATION WITH BAR COUNSEL
aggravating factor, failure to cooperate as, 
406–407
mitigating factor, generally not considered as, 
391–392
COVER SHEET
generally, 419
sample cover sheet, 559–560
CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS
disciplinary hearings following, 106–107
discipline for criminal conduct, 58, 59
CRIME OR FRAUD BY CLIENT, 
PROHIBITION ON ASSISTING; 
RULE 1.2(d)
generally, 155–156, 288–289
admonition, 295
disbarment, 289–291
public reprimand, 294–295
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suspension, 291–294
text of rule, 288
CSB. See CLIENTS’ SECURITY BOARD 
(CSB)
DECEPTION, PROHIBITION OF. See
CANDOR, DUTY OF
DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY, 
ALLOCATION OF. See
ALLOCATION OF ROLES AND 
AUTHORITY IN ATTORNEY-
CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
DEFAULT, MOTION FOR RELIEF 
FROM
generally, 83
DEFERMENT OR TEMPORARY 
CLOSING OF FILE
generally, 19–20
DEPOSITIONS
generally, 24, 86–90
notice and application requirements, 87–88
objections during, 89
subpoenas, 88, 89
substantial need, 86
transcripts, 89–90
unavailable witness, of, 86, 87
DILIGENCE IN CLIENT 
REPRESENTATION; RULE 1.3
generally, 109, 117–119
admonition, 125–126
deﬁning neglect, 118
disbarment, 121–122
discipline for violations, 120–126
diversion, 126
Kane guidelines, 120
public reprimand, 124–125
standard for diligence, 131–132
suspension, 122–124
text of rule, 117
withdrawal of attorney from case, determining 
when attorney’s duty to client ends after, 
119
DISABILITY INACTIVE STATUS
generally, 33, 62, 439, 445
adjudication of incompetence, 445–446
commissioner to manage inactive attorney’s 
aﬀairs, appointment of, 449
Dusky standard of incompetence to stand trial, 
447
duties and restrictions after. See DUTIES AND 
RESTRICTIONS AFTER ORDER TO 
CEASE PRACTICE
eﬀect of, 449
hearings, 448
inability to assist in defense, 446–447
notice of attorney’s transfer to, 448–449
order of court, 448, 449
petition to determine incapacity, 447–449
procedures, 446–447
reinstatement from, 450–451
DISBARMENT
generally, 57–59
advertising and solicitation violations, 360
attorneys’ fees violations, 218–221
BBO recommendation for, 417
candor, violations of duty of. See CANDOR, 
DUTY OF
client communications, misconduct related to, 
163–164
conﬁdentiality duty, violations of, 138–139
conﬂicts of interest. See CONFLICTS OF 
INTEREST
contact with others, limits. See CONTACT 
WITH OTHERS, LIMITS ON
conviction for serious crime, for, 58, 59
crime or fraud by client, prohibition on 
assisting; Rule 1.2(d), 289–291
diligence in client representation, lack of, 121–122
disciplinary resignation and, 61
duration of, 57–58
duties and restrictions after. See DUTIES AND 
RESTRICTIONS AFTER ORDER TO 
CEASE PRACTICE
eﬀective date of, 58
Information, ﬁling of. See INFORMATION
litigation tactics, for. See LITIGATION 
TACTICS, LIMITS ON
mishandling client or third-party funds
generally, 58, 59
Rule 1.15, 245–247
neglecting client matter, for, 58, 59
nonlawyers, supervision of; Rule 5.3, 327
out-of-state discipline, reciprocal treatment of. 
See RECIPROCAL DISCIPLINE, 
subhead: suspension or disbarment, 
treatment of
permissible claims, limits on; Rule 3.1, 289–291
procedures where respondent agrees to, 73–74
reinstatement, application for, 58
sale of law practice by suspended or disbarred 
attorney, 323
SJC, must be imposed by, 14, 30, 74, 418
subordinate lawyer, responsibilities of; Rule 5.2, 
327
supervisory responsibilities; Rule 5.1, 327
unauthorized practice of law; Rule 5.5, 339–340
DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS
ACAP initial review and investigation. See
COMPLAINTS
complaints. See COMPLAINTS
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dispositions. See DISPOSITIONS
formal proceedings. See FORMAL 
DISCIPLINE PROCEEDINGS
grounds for. See GROUNDS FOR 
DISCIPLINE
historical background, 1–8
investigations. See INVESTIGATION
preponderance of evidence standard, 2, 27
removal of attorney from bar, 1–2
DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS
generally, 93–94
attendance by respondent required, 27
BBO General Counsel, role of, 103
burden of proof, 27
closing arguments, 102–103
Committee report. See HEARING REPORTS
conduct of, 26–27
evidence. See EVIDENCE
expert witnesses, 97–98
hearing committee/SHO
generally, 9, 12
assignment of case to, 24
quorum required, 94
reliance on own experience, permissibility of, 
98
selection of, 83–84
hearing oﬃcers. See subhead: hearing 
committee/SHO
issue preclusion, 101
location of, 24, 93
notice of, 93–94
OBC’s case in chief, 96
objections to evidence
generally, 98–99
hearsay, objections to, 99
leading questions, objections to, 100–101
privilege law, applicability of, 100
unauthenticated documents, objections to, 
101
OGC assistant general counsel, role of, 103
opening statements, 94
preponderance of evidence standard, 2, 27, 95, 
96
public may attend, 93
respondent’s presentation, 96
SHO. See subhead: hearing committee/SHO
single justice proceedings, 30–31
subpoenas for witnesses or production of 
evidence, 26, 95
temporary suspension, on, 54
transcripts, 27–28, 103–104
witnesses
examination of, 96
expert witnesses, 97–98
subpoenas to, 26, 95
DISCIPLINARY RESIGNATION. See
RESIGNATION WHILE UNDER 
DISCIPLINARY INVESTIGATION
DISHONESTY, FRAUD, DECEIT, or 
MISREPRESENTATION. See 
CANDOR, DUTY OF
DISCOVERY
generally, 24
depositions. See DEPOSITIONS
document and information production, 84–85
medical records, 85–86
social media as discoverable, 366
DISMISS, MOTION TO
generally, 23–24
prehearing motion, 82–83, 90–91
DISMISSALS
generally, 36–38
appeal of, 30, 417–418
jurisdiction, lack of, 37
meritless claims, dismissal of, 37
review by BBO, request for, 37
DISPOSITIONS
generally, 19–21
admonition. See ADMONITION
aggravating factors. See AGGRAVATING 
FACTORS
closing of complaint
generally, 19, 72–73
complainant’s right to review, 75–76
commencement of formal proceedings, 21
deferment or temporary closing of ﬁle, 19–20
disability inactive status. See DISABILITY 
INACTIVE STATUS
disbarment. See DISBARMENT
dismissal. See DISMISSALS
diversion, 20, 38, 73, 126
mitigating factors. See MITIGATING FACTORS
probation, 39
public reprimand. See PUBLIC REPRIMAND
stipulation for public discipline. See
STIPULATION FOR PUBLIC 
DISCIPLINE
suspension. See SUSPENSIONS
DIVERSION
generally, 20, 38, 73
diligence in client representation, lack of, 126
DRUG ADDICTION
mitigating factor, as, 397–398
DUTIES AND RESTRICTIONS AFTER 
ORDER TO CEASE PRACTICE
generally, 452, 468
activities not permitted when barred from practice
generally, 462–464
assistant or paralegal, attorney may not act as, 
462
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consequences of engaging in banned 
activities, 464
contempt for engaging in banned activities, 
464
law ﬁrm or other attorney, attorney may not 
work in any capacity for, 462
motion for permission to engage in paralegal 
work, 462–464
nature of restrictions on practice, 465–468
administrative suspension, required steps in, 460
assistant or paralegal, attorney may not act as, 
462
commissioner to manage attorney’s aﬀairs, 
appointment of, 458
compliance aﬃdavits and reports
generally, 457
sample aﬃdavits, 561–578
contempt for engaging in banned activities, 464
extension of time to complete steps, request for, 
461
failure to comply with required steps, 
consequences of, 460–461
IOLTA and other trust accounts, closing of, 44, 
455
law ﬁrm or other attorney, attorney may not 
work in any capacity at, 462
motion for permission to engage in paralegal 
work, 462–464
new matters may not be accepted, 456
notice requirements
client notice, 454
other counsel notice, 454–455
sample notice, 561–578
resignation notice, 455
withdrawal, notice of
generally, 455
sample notice, 561–578
paralegal, attorney may not act as, 462
refunding of unearned fees, 455
resignation from appointments, 455, 456
steps required to terminate practice, 452–461
temporary suspension, required steps in, 
458–459
thirty-day period before order becomes 
eﬀective, 453–454
timeline
extension of time to complete steps, request 
for, 461
fourteen days, actions required within, 
453–456
twenty-one days, actions required within, 457
EVIDENCE
admissibility of, 27
aggravating factors, 409–410
mitigating factors. See MITIGATING 
FACTORS
posthearing submission of, 28
presentation of, 27
prior court proceedings, admissibility of 
evidence taken in, 2
witnesses, 27–28
EXCESSIVE ATTORNEYS’ FEES. See
ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND RELATED 
PAYMENTS; RULE 1.5
EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE
prosecutor’s duty to disclose, 371
EXHIBITS
agreed exhibits, 26
EXPEDITED DISCIPLINARY 
HEARINGS
generally, 107–108, 422–424
EXPERT WITNESSES
disciplinary hearings, 97–98
disclosure of, 98
Rules of Professional Conduct, expert testimony 
not permitted as to meaning of, 132
standard of care, on, 132
EXTENSION OF TIME TO ANSWER, 
MOTION FOR
generally, 82, 83
FAMILY STRESS OR ILLNESS
mitigating factor, as, 395–396
FIDUCIARIES
attorney, ﬁduciary status of, 154, 179
FINDINGS OF FACT
generally, 28, 104–105
FOREIGN LEGAL CONSULTANTS
generally, 503–504
FORMAL DISCIPLINE PROCEEDINGS
answer to petition for discipline. See ANSWERS
commencement of, 21, 22–23
conclusions of law, requests for, 28, 104–105
discovery. See DISCOVERY
dismiss, motion to, 23–24
evidence. See EVIDENCE
exhibits, agreement on and exchange of, 26
ﬁndings of fact, ﬁling of, 28, 104–105
hearing, conduct of. See DISCIPLINARY 
HEARINGS
hearing committee/SHO, assignment of case to, 
24
petition for discipline. See PETITION FOR 
DISCIPLINE
posthearing briefs, 28, 104–105
prehearing conference. See PREHEARING 
CONFERENCE
prehearing motions, 25–26
pro se respondents, 25
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stipulation of facts, 26
subpoenas, request for, 26
FORMER CLIENT CONFLICTS OF 
INTEREST. See CONFLICTS OF 
INTEREST, subhead: successive conﬂicts 
of interest
FRIVOLOUS CLAIMS. See ADVOCACY, 
subhead: permissible claims, limits on;
Rule 3.1
GHOSTWRITING
generally, 285–286
GRADUATE LAW SCHOOL 
PROGRAMS
limited admission to Massachusetts bar for 
attorneys working in, 498
GROUNDS FOR DISCIPLINE
generally, 35
advertising and solicitation violations. See
ADVERTISING AND 
SOLICITATION
advocacy, violations related to. See
ADVOCACY
allocation of roles and decision-making by 
attorney, misconduct related to. See
ALLOCATION OF ROLES AND 
AUTHORITY IN ATTORNEY-
CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
candor, violations of duty of. See CANDOR, 
DUTY OF
communications violations. See
COMMUNICATIONS BY 
ATTORNEYS
conﬂicts of interest. See CONFLICTS OF 
INTEREST
law practice management issues. See LAW 
PRACTICE MANAGEMENT
other people’s money, mishandling of
attorneys’ fees and related payments. See
ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND 
RELATED PAYMENTS; RULE 1.5
safekeeping property. See SAFEKEEPING 
PROPERTY; RULE 1.15
prosecutor’s duties. See PROSECUTOR’S 
DUTIES
HARM
aggravating factor, harm caused by attorney’s 
actions as, 404
HEARING COMMITTEE. See
DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS, subhead: 
hearing committee/SHO
HEARING OFFICERS. See
DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS, subhead: 
hearing committee/SHO
HEARING REPORTS
generally, 28–29
appeals, 29–30
BBO review. See POSTHEARING REVIEW
contents of, 105–106
HEARINGS
disability inactive status proceedings, 448
disciplinary hearings. See DISCIPLINARY 
HEARINGS
mitigation hearings, 407–408
reinstatement hearings, 34, 107, 479
HEARSAY
objections to, 99
ILLEGAL ATTORNEYS’ FEES. See
ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND RELATED 
PAYMENTS; RULE 1.5
INEXPERIENCE
mitigating factor, as, 394
INFORMATION
BBO ﬁling of, 30, 74, 417
contents of, 418
record of proceedings accompanying, 418–419
sample Information, 557–558
INTENT
aggravating factor, intent in committing 
misconduct as, 402–403
INTEREST ON LAWYERS TRUST 
ACCOUNTS (IOLTA)
generally, 242–243, 510
attorney’s requirements for, 511–513
commencement of investigation for 
improprieties involving, 65
IOLTA Committee manual, 510–511
record-keeping requirements, 512
safety and security of, 243
suspension, closing of and returning advances in 
account upon, 44, 455
INVESTIGATION
ACAP initial review and investigation. See
COMPLAINTS
OBC investigation. See INVESTIGATION 
BY OBC
INVESTIGATION BY OBC
generally, 68–72
answer by respondent, 18–19, 69–70
counsel for respondent, 70–71
disposition recommended by OBC. See
DISPOSITIONS
ﬁling of charges distinguished, 68–69
formal investigation, 18–19
notice to attorney of complaint, 18, 69
resolution by agreement after completion of, 72–75
subpoenas, 71
witnesses, meetings with, 71–72
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IOLTA. See INTEREST ON LAWYERS 
TRUST ACCOUNTS (IOLTA)
ISSUE PRECLUSION
generally, 101
JURISDICTION
dismissal for lack of, 37
Supreme Judicial Court, of, 1
LAW PRACTICE MANAGEMENT
law-related services, responsibilities regarding. 
See LAW-RELATED SERVICES, 
RESPONSIBILITIES REGARDING; 
RULE 5.7
professional independence. See
PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE; 
RULE 5.4
restrictions on right to practice. See
RESTRICTIONS ON RIGHT TO 
PRACTICE; RULE 5.6
sale of law practice. See SALE OF LAW 
PRACTICE; RULE 1.17
supervisory responsibilities. See
SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITIES
unauthorized practice of law. See
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF 
LAW; RULE 5.5
LAW-RELATED SERVICES, 
RESPONSIBILITIES REGARDING; 
RULE 5.7
generally, 346, 347
ancillary services, providing, 347
discipline for violations, 347–348
text of rule, 346
LAW STUDENTS
limited admission to Massachusetts bar, 
498–500
LAWYERS CONCERNED FOR 
LAWYERS (LCL) PROGRAMS
generally, 10, 16, 38, 73
LCL. See LAWYERS CONCERNED FOR 
LAWYERS (LCL)
LEADING QUESTIONS
objections to, 100–101
LEGAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
limited admission to Massachusetts bar for 
attorneys working in, 498
LIENS
attorneys’ liens, 229
LITIGATION TACTICS, LIMITS ON
generally, 295
admonition
expediting litigation; Rule 3.2, 309–310
fairness to opposing party and counsel; Rule 
3.4, 309–310
impartiality and decorum of tribunal; Rule 
3.5, 309–310
third parties’ rights, respect for; Rule 4.4, 
309–310
disbarment
expediting litigation; Rule 3.2, 301
fairness to opposing party and counsel; Rule 
3.4, 301–302
impartiality and decorum of tribunal; Rule 
3.5, 301
third parties’ rights, respect for; Rule 4.4, 
301–302
expediting litigation; Rule 3.2
generally, 298
admonition, 309–310
disbarment, 301
public reprimand, 307–309
suspension, 302–307
text of rule, 296
fairness to opposing party and counsel; Rule 3.4
generally, 299–300
admonition, 309–310
contact with others, limitations on. See
CONTACT WITH OTHERS, 
LIMITS ON
disbarment, 301–302
public reprimand, 307–309
suspension, 302–307
text of rule, 296–297
impartiality and decorum of tribunal; Rule 3.5
generally, 300
admonition, 309–310
disbarment, 301
public reprimand, 307–309
suspension, 302–307
text of rule, 297
public reprimand
expediting litigation; Rule 3.2, 307–309
fairness to opposing party and counsel; Rule 
3.4, 307–309
impartiality and decorum of tribunal; Rule 
3.5, 307–309
third parties’ rights, respect for; Rule 4.4, 
307–309
suspension
expediting litigation; Rule 3.2, 302–307
fairness to opposing party and counsel; Rule 
3.4, 302–307
impartiality and decorum of tribunal; Rule 3.5, 
302–307
third parties’ rights, respect for; Rule 4.4, 
302–307
third parties’ rights, respect for; Rule 4.4
generally, 300–301
admonition, 309–310
624
Subject Index
disbarment, 301–302
public reprimand, 307–309
suspension, 302–307
text of rule, 297–298
LOBBYING
nonadjudicative proceedings, advocacy in;
Rule 3.9
generally, 379, 386
text of rule, 386
LOMAP. See MASSACHUSETTS LAW 
OFFICE MANAGEMENT 
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (LOMAP)
MARKETING. See ADVERTISING AND 
SOLICITATION
MASSACHUSETTS BAR ADMISSION 
AND MEMBERSHIP
admission to Massachusetts bar
generally, 494–495
certiﬁed law students, limited admission for, 
498–500
character and ﬁtness requirements, 504–506
examination, admission through, 495–496
foreign legal consultants, advising as, 503–504
graduate law school programs, limited 
admission for attorneys working in, 498
in-house counsel, practicing as, 501–502
legal assistance programs, limited admission 
for attorneys working in, 498
MBE, 495–496
motion, admission on, 496–498
MPRE, 495, 496
pro bono representation in limited practice, 502
pro hac vice admission, 503
Uniform Bar Examination of another 
jurisdiction, requesting recognition of, 496
certiﬁed law students, limited admission for, 
498–500
character and ﬁtness requirements, 504–506
examination, admission through, 495–496
foreign lawyers practicing as in-house counsel, 
501–502
foreign legal consultants, advising as, 503–504
graduate law school programs, limited 
admission for attorneys working in, 498
in-house counsel, practicing as, 501–502
legal assistance programs, limited admission for 
attorneys working in, 498
maintaining membership in Massachusetts bar
generally, 506
annual registration statement, ﬁling of, 506–507
nonpermanent members, maintaining good 
standing for, 508–509
permanent members, maintaining good 
standing for, 506–508
registration fees and statement. See
REGISTRATION FEES AND 
STATEMENTS
Massachusetts Bar Association, diﬀerent from 
membership in Massachusetts bar, 3–5
MBE, 495–496
motion, admission on, 496–498
MPRE, 495, 496
nonpermanent members, maintaining good 
standing for, 508–509
permanent members, maintaining good 
standing for, 506–508
pro bono representation in limited practice, 502
pro hac vice admission, 503
registration fees and statement. See
REGISTRATION FEES AND 
STATEMENTS
retirement, 509–510
uniﬁcation proposal of, 3–5
Uniform Bar Examination of another 
jurisdiction, requesting recognition of, 496
voluntary resignation, 60, 509
MASSACHUSETTS BAR EXAMINATION 
(MBE)
generally, 495–496
MASSACHUSETTS IOLTA COMMITTEE
generally, 10, 17
MASSACHUSETTS LAW OFFICE 
MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE 
PROGRAM (LOMAP)
generally, 10, 17, 38, 73
MASSACHUSETTS RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT. See
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT
MBE. See MASSACHUSETTS BAR 
EXAMINATION (MBE)
MEDICAL RECORDS
discovery of, 85–86
prehearing conference, disclosure issues 
addressed at, 92–93
MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS
disability inactive status. See DISABILITY 
INACTIVE STATUS
mitigating factor, as, 396–397, 398
MISHANDLING OF CLIENT FUNDS.
See SAFEKEEPING PROPERTY; 
RULE 1.15
MITIGATING FACTORS
generally, 62, 387, 388
addiction, 397–398
answer to petition for discipline, pleading 
mitigating factors in, 81, 407, 408
burden of proof, 408
delay in disciplinary proceedings, 400–401
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evidence
generally, 408–409
answers, alleging mitigating factors in, 407
burden of proof, 408
hearings, 407
procedural requirement, 407–408
family stress and illness, 395–396
inexperience, 394
mental health problems, 396–397, 398
restitution, 399–400
self-reporting, 395
special claims that may serve as mitigating 
factors
generally, 393–394
addiction, 397–398
delay in disciplinary proceedings, 400–401
family stress and illness, 395–396
inexperience, 394
mental health problems, 396–397, 398
restitution, 399–400
self-reporting, 395
successful assertion of mitigating factor, eﬀect 
on sanction of, 388
typical claims that generally do not serve as 
mitigating factors
generally, 388–390
aggravating factors, absence of, 393
Alter factors, 389
attorney’s career, eﬀect on, 392
cooperation with bar counsel, 391–392
criminal punishment for same oﬀense, 392
excessive workload, 392
prior discipline, lack of, 392
pro bono and volunteer service, 390
underserved populations, work with, 391
MOTIONS
dismiss, motion to. See DISMISS, MOTION 
TO
issue preclusion, motion for, 11
prehearing motions. See PREHEARING 
MOTIONS
MPRE. See MULTI-STATE 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
EXAMINATION (MPRE)
MULTI-STATE PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY EXAMINATION 
(MPRE)
generally, 495, 496
reinstatement, as requirement for, 34, 46, 47
MULTIPLE VIOLATIONS
aggravating factor, as, 402
NEGLECT IN REPRESENTATION OF 
CLIENT. See DILIGENCE IN CLIENT 
REPRESENTATION; RULE 1.3
NO PERJURY RULE. See CANDOR, DUTY 
OF, subhead: tribunal, candor before; Rule 3.3
NOTICE
complaint, notice to attorney of, 18
default for failure to respond to petition for 
discipline, notice of, 23
disability inactive status, notice of transfer to, 
448–449
hearing, notice of, 93–94
Notice to Respondent Accompanying Petition 
for Discipline, service of
generally, 79
sample notice, 529–542
order to cease practice, notices required after. See
DUTIES AND RESTRICTIONS 
AFTER ORDER TO CEASE 
PRACTICE
sale of law practice, notice to clients of, 322
OBC. See OFFICE OF THE BAR 
COUNSEL (OBC)
OBJECTIONS
depositions, during, 89
OFFICE OF THE BAR COUNSEL (OBC)
generally, 9, 13
ACAP. See ATTORNEY AND CONSUMER 
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (ACAP)
chief bar counsel, appointment of, 13
dispositions. See DISPOSITIONS
educational role of, 13
investigation of formal complaints by. See
INVESTIGATION BY OBC
means by which matters may come to attention 
of, 63–64
responsibilities of, 13, 18
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL 
(OGC)
generally, 9, 12
responsibilities of, 12
OFFICE SPACE SHARING 
ARRANGEMENTS
Rule 1.10; lawyers in same ﬁrm or sharing oﬃce 
space
law ﬁrm, determining whether attorneys 
constitute, 200–201
text of rule, 198–200
trade name limitations; Rule 7.5, 358–359
OGC. See OFFICE OF THE GENERAL 
COUNSEL (OGC)
OPENING STATEMENTS
disciplinary hearings, 94
ORDER TO CEASE PRACTICE, DUTIES 
AND RESTRICTIONS AFTER. See
DUTIES AND RESTRICTIONS AFTER 
ORDER TO CEASE PRACTICE
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OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, HANDLING 
OF
attorneys’ fees and related payments. See
ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND RELATED 
PAYMENTS; RULE 1.5
safekeeping property. See SAFEKEEPING 
PROPERTY; RULE 1.15
PAYMENTS IN KIND
generally, 228–229
PETITIONS
discipline, for. See PETITION FOR 
DISCIPLINE
reinstatement, for. See REINSTATEMENT
PETITION FOR DISCIPLINE
answers to. See ANSWERS
commencement of investigation, distinguished, 22
contents of, 22, 77–78
draft petition, 21
ﬁling of, 77–79
Notice to Respondent Accompanying Petition 
for Discipline, service of
generally, 79
sample notice, 529–542
public availability of, 78
sample petition for discipline, 519–528
service of, 22–23, 78–79
PHYSICAL DISABILITY
disability inactive status. See DISABILITY 
INACTIVE STATUS
POLICY-MAKING
nonadjudicative proceedings, advocacy in;
Rule 3.9
generally, 379, 386
text of rule, 386
POSTHEARING BRIEFS
generally, 28, 104–105
POSTHEARING REVIEW
expedited disciplinary hearings, 107–108, 
422–424
hearing report ﬁndings and recommendations, 
review of
generally, 411
appeals. See APPEALS
Information, ﬁling of. See INFORMATION
review process where neither party appeals, 
29, 413–414
scope of review, 411–413
standard of review for factual ﬁndings, 412
SJC review
appeal from single justice decision, 420–422
Information, ﬁling of. See INFORMATION
single justice hearing, 419–420
PREHEARING CONFERENCE
generally, 24–25
documentary evidence, resolution of disputes 
regarding, 92
medical records, disclosure of, 92–93
parties who must attend, 25, 91
purpose of, 91, 92
stipulations/settlement, potential for, 92
PREHEARING CONFERENCE ORDERS
generally, 25, 92, 93
sample prehearing conference order, 551–556
PREHEARING MOTIONS
generally, 25–26, 82–83
appeals, 91
default, motion for relief from, 83
dismiss, motion to, 82–83, 90–91
extension of time to answer, motion for, 82, 83
issue preclusion, motion for, 11
post-answer motions, 90–91
pre-answer motions, 82–83
service of, 90
time for ﬁling or responding to, 90
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE 
STANDARD
disciplinary proceedings, 2, 27, 94, 96
reinstatement petitions, 34
PRIOR DISCIPLINE
aggravating factor, as, 402
mitigating factor, absence of generally not 
considered as, 392
PRIVILEGES
disciplinary hearings, applicability of privilege 
law at, 100
PRO BONO SERVICE
mitigating factor, generally not considered as, 
390
PRO HAC VICE STATUS
generally, 503
PROBABLE CAUSE
needed for prosecutor to bring criminal charges, 
371
PROBATION
generally, 39
PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE; 
RULE 5.4
generally, 346–347
discipline for violations, 347–348
organization where nonlawyers own interest, 
practice of law in, 346–347
sharing legal fees with nonlawyers, 347
text of rule, 345–346
PROSECUTOR’S DUTIES
generally, 367
contact with represented party, limits on;
Rule 4.2
generally, 373, 374–375
“authorized by law” exception, 375
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discipline for violations, 376
text of rule, 373
deception in undercover operations, limits on 
use of; Rule 8.4(c)
generally, 377–378
discipline for violations, 378
text of rule, 376
special responsibilities of prosecutor; Rule 3.8
generally, 367
discipline for violations, 372–373
exculpatory evidence, duty to disclose, 371
probable cause requirement for charging, 370
subpoenas to attorneys, limits on, 371–372
text of rule, 368–370
waiver of pretrial rights from unrepresented 
party, restrictions on seeking, 371
wrongly convicted, ethical duties to, 372
PUBLIC REPRIMAND
generally, 41–43
admonition’s eﬀects on attorney’s practice, 
compared to, 41–43
advertising and solicitation violations, 362–363
appeal of, 30, 417–418
attorneys’ fees violations, 222–223
BBO imposition of, 30, 417
candor, violations of duty of. See CANDOR, 
DUTY OF
client communications, misconduct related to, 
129, 165–166
clients, failure to communicate with, 129
conﬁdentiality duty, violations of
generally, 141–142
former clients, conﬁdentiality duty owed to, 
146
conﬂicts of interest. See CONFLICTS OF 
INTEREST
contact with others, limits. See CONTACT 
WITH OTHERS, LIMITS ON
crime or fraud by client, prohibition on 
assisting; Rule 1.2(d), 294–295
diligence in client representation, lack of, 
124–125
insurance carrier, disclosure to, 43
litigation tactics, for. See LITIGATION 
TACTICS, LIMITS ON
methods of bringing sanction to public 
attention, 41
mishandling client or third-party funds
generally, 42
Rule 1.15, 252–253
neglecting client matters, for, 42
nonlawyers, supervision of; Rule 5.3, 329–330
out-of-state discipline, reciprocal treatment of, 
428
permanently on attorney’s record, 43
permissible claims, limits on; Rule 3.1, 294–295
procedures where respondent agrees to, 73–74
subordinate lawyer, responsibilities of; Rule 5.2, 
329–330
supervisory responsibilities; Rule 5.1, 329–330
unauthorized practice of law; Rule 5.5, 343–344
RECIPROCAL DISCIPLINE
generally, 425
disbarment, treatment of. See subhead: 
suspension or disbarment, treatment of
disciplinary resignations, treatment of, 434–436
nunc pro tunc treatment, 426–427
out-of-state discipline, 427–436
generally, 427
disbarment, treatment of. See subhead: 
suspension or disbarment, treatment of
disciplinary resignations, treatment of, 
434–436
private discipline, treatment of, 428
public reprimand, treatment of, 428
suspension, treatment of. See subhead: 
suspension or disbarment, treatment of
private discipline, treatment of, 428
public reprimand, treatment of, 428
reinstatement after, 438
reporting sanctions from another disciplinary 
authority to BBO and OBC, 425–427, 436
suspension or disbarment, treatment of
generally, 428
greater or lesser sanctions, imposition of, 432
identical discipline, imposition of, 430–431
procedures, 429
standards for, 429–434
stay of sanction imposed in another 
jurisdiction, eﬀect of, 433
weight given to other jurisdiction’s sanction,
430
tribunal discipline, 436–438
REFERRAL FEES
generally, 217–218
REGISTRATION FEES AND 
STATEMENTS
generally, 506–508
administrative suspension for failure to register 
or pay registration fees, 55, 56, 65
contents of registration submission, 507–508
failure to register or pay, administrative 
suspension for, 55, 56, 65
fees, 506–507, 508
nonpermanent members of the bar, 
requirements for, 508–509
renewals, 507
REINSTATEMENT
generally, 469
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administrative suspensions, 57, 491–493
aﬃdavit requirement
petition to submit aﬃdavit late, 472
suspensions of six months or less, 
reinstatement after
generally, 33, 45, 470–471
sample aﬃdavit of compliance, 578
suspensions of six months to one year, 
reinstatement after
generally, 34, 46
sample aﬃdavit of compliance, 578
burden of proof
disability inactive status, reinstatement from, 
450
suspensions of more than one year, 
reinstatement from, 34, 473, 481–483
competence, proving, 487–488
conditions imposed at time of suspension or 
disbarment, compliance with, 480
counsel, advantages of representation by, 484
CSB, reimbursement for awards granted 
considered in petitions for restatement, 515
disability inactive status, from, 450–451
disbarment, 58
evidence and strategies for reinstatement 
hearing
factors hearing panel must address in 
reinstatement decision, addressing all, 
485–491
questionnaire, careful preparation of, 484
factors hearing panel considers in determining 
whether to reinstate, 480
generally, 480
competence, proving, 487–488
evidence and arguments on all factors panel 
must address, presenting, 481–485
learning in the law, proving, 488–490
medical condition related to misconduct 
under control, persuading panel that, 487
moral character, proving suﬃcient, 485–487
public interest, proving reinstatement serves, 
490–491
hearings, 34, 107, 479
learning in the law, proving, 488–490
medical condition related to misconduct under 
control, persuading panel that, 487
moral character, proving suﬃcient, 485–487
petition for reinstatement
generally, 33, 34, 47, 48–49, 474
advance opinion of bar counsel, requesting, 
475
contents of, 474
deposit for board costs, 478
disability inactive status, reinstatement from, 
450
ﬁling requirements, 478
questionnaire ﬁled with, 475–478, 484
public perception of legal profession, 
consideration of
generally, 480
proving reinstatement serves public interest, 
490–491
questionnaire, completion of
careful preparation of, 484
Part I, 475, 476
Part II, 475–478
reciprocal discipline, after, 438
standard for reinstatement, 479–480
suspensions of more than one year
generally, 34, 47–48
burden of proof, 34, 473
disbarment order, reinstatement from, 473
hearings, 34, 107, 479
indeﬁnite suspensions, reinstatement from, 
473
petition for reinstatement. See subhead: 
petition for reinstatement
questionnaire, completion of, 475–478, 484
suspensions of six months or less
generally, 33, 45, 48, 470–471
aﬃdavit of compliance, ﬁling of
generally, 33, 45, 470–471
sample aﬃdavit of compliance, 578
suspensions of six months to one year
generally, 34, 46, 48, 471–472
aﬃdavit of compliance, ﬁling of
generally, 34, 46
sample aﬃdavit of compliance, 578
automatic reinstatements, requirements for, 
34, 46
bar counsel’s objection to routine 
reinstatement, 472–473
MPRE, passing, 34, 46, 47, 471
petition process required in certain cases, 
48–49
REMOVAL OF ATTORNEY FROM BAR
generally, 1–2
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
sanctions received from another disciplinary 
authority, reporting to BBO and OBC, 
425–427, 436
RESIGNATION
disciplinary resignations. See RESIGNATION 
WHILE UNDER DISCIPLINARY 
INVESTIGATION
voluntary resignations, 60, 509
RESIGNATION WHILE UNDER 
DISCIPLINARY INVESTIGATION
generally, 32, 59–62, 75, 439
acceptance of resignation, 442
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advantages of, 61
aﬃdavit requirement
generally, 60–61, 440–441
sample aﬃdavit of resignation, 547–550
bar counsel’s recommendation or assent, 441
board submission of aﬃdavit and 
recommendation to SJC, 442–443
default strategy, 440
disbarment in addition to, 61
duties and restrictions after. See DUTIES AND 
RESTRICTIONS AFTER ORDER TO 
CEASE PRACTICE
eﬀect of, 443–445
out-of-state discipline, reciprocal treatment of, 
434–436
procedures, 439–443
purpose of, 61
voluntary resignations, distinguished, 60
voting by board to approve resignation, 441
RESTITUTION
absence of injury, distinguished from, 400
aggravating factor, failure to make restitution as, 
405
mitigating factor, as, 399–400
RESTRICTIONS ON RIGHT TO 
PRACTICE; RULE 5.6
generally, 348, 349
purpose, 349
restrictive covenants, prohibition of, 348
text of rule, 349
RETAINERS
advance for future attorneys’ fees, 240
classic retainers (compensation for forgoing 
other work), 240–241
client funds, retainer as, 240–241
RETIREMENT
generally, 509–510
RULEMAKING
nonadjudicative proceedings, advocacy in;
Rule 3.9
generally, 379, 386
text of rule, 386
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.1. See COMPETENCE OF 
ATTORNEY
Rule 1.2
generally. See ALLOCATION OF 
ROLES AND AUTHORITY IN 
ATTORNEY-CLIENT 
RELATIONSHIP
Rule 1.2(a) and (c). See COMPETENCE 
OF ATTORNEY
Rule 1.2(d). See CRIME OR FRAUD BY 
CLIENT, PROHIBITION ON 
ASSISTING; RULE 1.2(d)
Rule 1.3. See DILIGENCE IN CLIENT 
REPRESENTATION; RULE 1.3
Rule 1.4. See CLIENT 
COMMUNICATIONS; RULE 1.4
Rule 1.5. See ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND 
RELATED PAYMENTS; RULE 1.5
Rule 1.6. See CONFIDENTIALITY
Rule 1.7. See CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
Rule 1.8. See CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
Rule 1.9
generally. See CONFLICTS OF 
INTEREST
Rule 1.9(c). See CONFIDENTIALITY
Rule 1.10. See CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
Rule 1.13. See ALLOCATION OF ROLES 
AND AUTHORITY IN ATTORNEY-
CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
Rule 1.14. See ALLOCATION OF ROLES 
AND AUTHORITY IN ATTORNEY-
CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
Rule 1.15. See SAFEKEEPING PROPERTY; 
RULE 1.15
Rule 1.17. See SALE OF LAW PRACTICE; 
RULE 1.17
Rule 3.1. See ADVOCACY, subhead: 
permissible claims, limits on; Rule 3.1
Rule 3.2. See LITIGATION TACTICS, 
LIMITS ON
Rule 3.3. See CANDOR, DUTY OF
Rule 3.4
generally. See LITIGATION TACTICS, 
LIMITS ON
Rule 3.4(f ) and (g). See CONTACT WITH 
OTHERS, LIMITS ON
Rule 3.5. See LITIGATION TACTICS, 
LIMITS ON
Rule 3.6. See ADVOCACY
Rule 3.7. See ADVOCACY
Rule 3.8. See PROSECUTOR’S DUTIES
Rule 3.9. See ADVOCACY
Rule 4.1(a). See CANDOR, DUTY OF
Rule 4.2
generally. See CONTACT WITH 
OTHERS, LIMITS ON, subhead: 
unrepresented person, dealing with;
Rule 4.2
prosecutors, provisions applicable to. See
PROSECUTOR’S DUTIES, subhead: 
contact with represented party, limits on; 
Rule 4.2
Rule 4.3. See CONTACT WITH OTHERS, 
LIMITS ON, subhead: unrepresented 
person, dealing with; Rule 4.3
Rule 4.4. See LITIGATION TACTICS, 
LIMITS ON
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Rules 5.1–5.3. See SUPERVISORY 
RESPONSIBILITIES
Rule 5.4. See PROFESSIONAL 
INDEPENDENCE; RULE 5.4
Rule 5.5. See UNAUTHORIZED 
PRACTICE OF LAW; RULE 5.5
Rule 5.6. See RESTRICTIONS ON RIGHT 
TO PRACTICE; RULE 5.6
Rule 5.7. See LAW-RELATED SERVICES, 
RESPONSIBILITIES REGARDING; 
RULE 5.7
Rules 7.1–7.5. See ADVERTISING AND 
SOLICITATION
Rule 8.4(c)
generally. See CANDOR, DUTY OF
prosecutors, applicability to. See
PROSECUTOR’S DUTIES
SAFEKEEPING PROPERTY; RULE 1.15
generally, 212, 230, 239–240
accounting requirements, 243
admonition, 253–255
deprivation, deﬁned, 245
disbarment, 245–247
discipline for violations
generally, 244–245
admonition, 253–255
disbarment, 245–247
public reprimand, 252–253
standard for, 244–245
suspension, 247–252
dishonored check notiﬁcation policy, 243
ﬂat fees, 243–244
IOLTA accounts, 242–243
no-commingling rule, 241
public reprimand, 252–253
retainers, 240–241
Schoepfer standard, 244–245
standard for discipline for violations, 244–245
suspension, 247–252
text of rule, 230–239
Three Attorneys standard, 244–245
trust accounts
accounting and notice requirements for 
withdrawn funds, 242
accounting requirements, 243
dishonored check notiﬁcation policy, 243
ﬂat fees, exception for, 243–244
IOLTA accounts, 242–243
withdrawal of earned fees from, 241–242
withdrawal of earned fees from trust account, 
241–242
SALE OF LAW PRACTICE; RULE 1.17
generally, 320, 322–323
ABA Model Rule, distinguished from, 322–323
discipline for violations, lack of, 323
notice requirements, 322
suspended or disbarred attorney, sale by, 323
text of rule, 321
SELF-INCRIMINATION, PRIVILEGE 
AGAINST
disciplinary hearings, applicability to, 100
SELF-REPORTING
mitigating factor, as, 395
SERVICE OF PAPERS
petition for discipline, service of, 22–23, 78–79
prehearing motions, service of, 90
SINGLE JUSTICE PROCEEDINGS FOR 
SUSPENSION OR DISBARMENT
generally, 30–31, 418
appeal of, 31–32, 420–422
hearings, 30–31, 419–420
Information, ﬁling of, 30, 418-419
SJC. See SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT (SJC)
SOCIAL MEDIA
advertising and solicitation considerations, 355, 
365–366
discovery of, 366
unauthorized practice of law, 366
SOLICITATION. See ADVERTISING 
AND SOLICITATION
SPECIAL HEARING OFFICER (SHO)
disciplinary hearings before. See
DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS, subhead: 
hearing committee/SHO
STIPULATION FOR PUBLIC DISCIPLINE
generally, 20–21
binding stipulations, 20
collapsible stipulations, 20
procedures, 73–74
rejected stipulations, 21
sample stipulation for discipline, 543–546
SUBPOENAS
depositions, for, 88, 89
hearings subpoenas, request for, 26, 95
OBC investigatory subpoenas, 71–72
prosecutor’s subpoena of defense attorney, limits 
on, 372–373
SUCCESSIVE CONFLICTS OF INTEREST.
See CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITIES
nonlawyers, supervision of; Rule 5.3
generally, 327
admonition, 330–331
disbarment, 327
public reprimand, 329–330
suspension, 328–329
text of rule, 325
subordinate lawyer, responsibilities of; Rule 5.2
generally, 326–327
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admonition, 330–331
disbarment, 327
public reprimand, 329–330
suspension, 328–329
text of rule, 324
supervisory responsibilities; Rule 5.1
generally, 325–326
admonition, 330–331
disbarment, 327
public reprimand, 329–330
suspension, 328–329
text of rule, 324
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT (SJC)
generally, 9, 14
authority of, 14
disciplinary rules promulgated by, 4–8
duties of, 14
Information ﬁled with. See INFORMATION
jurisdiction over bar discipline, 1
MBA uniﬁcation proposal rejected by, 3–5
posthearing review. See POSTHEARING 
REVIEW
suspension or disbarment must be imposed by, 
14, 30, 74, 418
SUSPENSIONS
generally, 43–45
administrative suspension. See
ADMINISTRATIVE SUSPENSION
advertising and solicitation violations, 361
attorneys’ fees violations, 221–222
BBO recommendation for, 417
candor, violations of duty of. See CANDOR, 
DUTY OF
cease practice, attorney must, 44
client communications, misconduct related to, 
164–165
conﬁdentiality duty, violations of, 139–141
conﬂicts of interest. See CONFLICTS OF 
INTEREST
contact with others, limits. See CONTACT 
WITH OTHERS, LIMITS ON
crime or fraud by client, prohibition on 
assisting; Rule 1.2(d), 291–294
diligence in client representation, lack of, 122–124
duration of, 43–44
duties and restrictions after. See DUTIES AND 
RESTRICTIONS AFTER ORDER TO 
CEASE PRACTICE
indeﬁnite suspensions, 52–53
criminal conviction involving fraud or 
bribery, for, 53
duration of, 52
mishandling of client funds, for, 52, 53
neglect with harm suﬀered by clients, for, 52
Schoepfer standard, 52
Information, ﬁling of. See INFORMATION
litigation tactics, for. See LITIGATION 
TACTICS, LIMITS ON
mishandling client or third-party funds;
Rule 1.15, 247–252
nonlawyers, supervision of; Rule 5.3, 328–329
out-of-state discipline, reciprocal treatment of. 
See RECIPROCAL DISCIPLINE
permissible claims, limits on; Rule 3.1, 291–294
procedures where respondent agrees to, 73–74
reinstatement procedures. See
REINSTATEMENT
sale of law practice by suspended or disbarred 
attorney, 323
SJC, must be imposed by, 14, 30, 74, 418
stayed suspensions, 50–51
subordinate lawyer, responsibilities of; Rule 5.2, 
328–329
supervisory responsibilities; Rule 5.1, 328–329
temporary suspension. See TEMPORARY 
SUSPENSION
term suspensions, 45–50
mishandling client funds, for, 50
more than one year, 47–49
neglecting client matter, for, 50
presenting false testimony, for, 50
reinstatement requirements.
See REINSTATEMENT
six months or less, 45–46
six months to one year, 46
trust accounts, closing of and returning advances 
in, 44
unauthorized practice of law; Rule 5.5, 
340–343
TEMPORARY SUSPENSION
generally, 32, 54–55, 75
hearing, 54
immediate eﬀect of, 54
order to cease practice, duties and restrictions 
after, 458–459
threat of substantial harm standard, 54, 55
TIME
duties and restrictions after order to cease 
practice, timeline for. See DUTIES AND 
RESTRICTIONS AFTER ORDER TO 
CEASE PRACTICE
petition for discipline, for ﬁling answers to, 23, 
79–81
prehearing motions, 90
TRANSCRIPTS
depositions, of, 89–90
disciplinary hearings, of, 27–28, 103–104
TRUST ACCOUNTS
generally, 243
632
Subject Index
IOLTA accounts. See INTEREST ON 
LAWYERS TRUST ACCOUNTS 
(IOLTA)
safety and security of, 243
suspension, closing and returning advances in 
account upon, 44, 455
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW; 
RULE 5.5
administrative suspension for failure to register 
or pay bar fees, continuing to practice law 
after, 340
admonition, 344
assisting in unauthorized practice of law, 333–334
disbarment, 339–340
multijurisdictional practice, 336–338
practice of law deﬁned, 337–339
public reprimand, 343–344
social media considerations, 366
suspended or disbarred attorney, paralegal or 
legal services oﬀered by, 335
suspension, 340–343
text of rule, 331–333
UNDERSERVED POPULATIONS
mitigating factor, working with underserved 
populations generally not considered as, 
391
VOLUNTARY RESIGNATION
generally, 60, 509
VOLUNTEER SERVICE
mitigating factor, generally not considered as, 
390
VULNERABLE CLIENT OR THIRD 
PARTY
aggravating factor, as, 404–405
WITNESSES
attorney as witness. See ADVOCACY
hearings, at. See DISCIPLINARY 
HEARINGS
OBC investigations, in, 71–72
WRONGLY CONVICTED PERSONS
prosecutor’s ethical duties to, 372
ZEALOUS ADVOCACY. See ADVOCACY
